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	Abstract	
		 This	study	examines	Mapuche	political	organization	in	Chile	from	1920-1960	through	the	lens	of	transnational	indigenismo.	In	that	period,	politicians,	academics	and	social	reformers	across	the	Americas	were	questioning	how	to	incorporate	indigenous	populations	into	modern	national	states.	While	many	historical	accounts	of	similar	phenomena	in	other	countries	have	drawn	categorical	distinctions	between	indigenismo	(as	a	movement	led	by	white	elites)	and	indigenous	activism	(led	by	Indians	themselves),	this	work	places	the	two	phenomena	side-by-side	to	explore	connections	between	them.	That	approach	shows	that	collaboration,	periodic	conflict	and	strategic	alliance	making	were	important	components	of	indigenous	politics	in	Chile.	It	also	brings	indigenous	agency	to	the	fore,	and	in	doing	so	challenges	historical	interpretations	of	indigenismo	that	have	characterized	it	as	a	paternalistic	mechanism	of	the	neocolonial	state.	It	joins	a	growing	body	of	scholarship	that	recognizes	indigenismo	as	an	important	influence	on	and	precursor	to	identity-based	indigenous	social	movements	that	emerged	in	the	late-twentieth	century.	 	
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Introduction		 In	December	1924,	the	Chilean	presidency	was	up	for	grabs.	For	the	moment,	control	fell	to	a	military	junta	brought	to	power	by	a	group	of	young	officers	intent	upon	breaking	the	stalemate	between	a	reform-minded	president	and	a	parliament	committed	to	the	status	quo.	Meanwhile,	in	the	southern	region	known	as	La	
Araucanía,	15,000	Mapuche	Indians	assembled	to	pray	for	the	military	government.	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef,	a	Mapuche	chief	with	“sword	in	hand,”	called	upon	his	shaman	to	lead	the	people	in	prayer	and	ritual	sacrifice	so	that	the	Almighty	might	bless	the	junta	and	bring	great	benefit	to	the	country.3		Three	years	later	in	1927,	Lieutenant	Colonel	Carlos	Ibañez	del	Campo,	one	of	the	brash	young	military	officers	who	had	brought	the	junta	to	power	by	“rattling	their	sabers”	on	the	floor	of	the	Chilean	Congress,	seized	the	presidency	and	ruled	as	a	dictator	until	1931.	In	the	1920s	and	early	1930s,	Aburto	and	the	political	organization	he	founded	radicalized,	aligned	their	interests	with	the	far	left,	and	went	so	far	as	to	propose	the	creation	of	an	autonomous	indigenous	republic	in	southern	Chile.	During	that	time,	Ibañez	had	his	agents	surveil	Aburto’s	activities	and	confiscate	the	archives	of	his	organization.	Aburto	Panguilef	was	arrested,	detained	and	sent	into	internal	exile	in	the	capital	of	Santiago.	Yet	by	the	late	1930s,	Aburto	joined	forces	with	more	moderate	and	conservative	Mapuche	leaders	to	form	a	single	umbrella	organization	to	better	represent	the	political	interests	of																																																									3	El	Diario	Austral,	Dec.	16,	1924.	Cited	in	Rolf	Foerster	and	Sonia	Montecino,	
Organizaciones,	Lideres	y	Contiendas	Mapuches	(1900-1970),	Santiago	de	Chile:	Ediciones	CEM,	1988,	p.	39.		
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their	people.	Despite	the	earlier	repression,	Aburto	Panquilef	and	other	Mapuche	leaders	again	supported	Ibañez	in	his	1938	and	1952	presidential	campaigns.	Throughout	Latin	America	in	this	era,	politicians,	indigenous	leaders	and	non-indigenous	intellectuals	were	wrestling	with	broad	questions	about	how	to	incorporate	indigenous	populations	into	modern	national	states.	Those	questions	had	their	roots	in	the	colonial	and	early	national	periods,	when	only	small	segments	of	large,	diverse	American	societies	were	afforded	political	rights.	In	the	twentieth	century,	efforts	to	spur	economic	and	social	development	while	supporting	native	political	participation	gave	rise	to	a	transnational	intellectual	movement	called	
indigenismo.	Participants	in	that	movement	were	known	as	indigenistas,	and	although	they	did	not	typically	claim	an	indigenous	identity	themselves,	they	respected	and	promoted	indigenous	art,	culture	and	history.	Indigenistas	were	mostly	men	–	although	some	women	made	important	contributions	–	who	were	based	in	urban	areas,	well	educated	and	of	European	descent,	and	many	were	trained	in	anthropology.	Through	their	work	in	literature,	the	arts,	politics	and	social	science,	indigenistas	sought	to	improve	the	lives	of	Indians	and	incorporate	them	into	the	national	fabric.4			Traditional	interpretations	of	indigenismo	have	characterized	indigenistas	as	paternalistic	do-gooders	and	set	their	perspectives	apart	from	those	of	the	Indians	they	sought	to	help,	as	seen	in	the	following	editorial	excerpt	from	an	indigenista	publication	entitled	“Dialogue	on	Indian	Questions.”																																																									4	Note	on	terminology:	Throughout	the	text,	the	English	word	“Indian”	and	the	Spanish	“indígena”	are	used	interchangeably.	In	Spanish,	“indígena”	is	used	to	connote	respect	for	indigenous	peoples.	By	contrast	“indio”	is	a	derogatory	term.	“Mapuche,”	which	translates	literally	as	“people	of	the	land,”	is	used	as	both	singular	and	plural	forms.	
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Indigenista:		“In	order	to	achieve	the	acculturation	of	the	Indian,	it	must	be	done	gradually	in	accordance	with	the	stages	of	evolution	to	which	he	is	incorporated.	First,	it	is	necessary	to	understand	the	nature	of	the	many	psycho-cultural	pre-Columbian	surviving	characteristics	related	to	these	stages,	using	the	methods	of	social	science.	In	this	way	practical	means	of	acculturation	can	be	formulated	authoritatively.”		Indian:		“I	want	more	money	to	satisfy	my	needs,	but	I	do	not	want	to	change	my	way	of	living	which	comes	from	my	ancestors.	During	the	colonial	period,	I	lived	as	a	slave	and	since	then,	I	have	been	exploited	and	deceived	frequently.	Even	those	who	try	to	help	me	do	not	understand	that	they	live	in	one	world	and	I	live	in	another.”	5	
	In	some	countries,	for	example	Mexico	and	the	United	States,	indigenistas	held	important	positions	within	the	structures	of	their	respective	states,	and	steered	the	course	of	national	Indian	policy.	In	Chile,	indigenismo	was	less	formalized	and	therefore	less	influential	in	the	period	studied	here.	Both	Chilean	indigenismo	and	indigenous	activism	resist	neat	classification	and	challenge	traditional	interpretations	that	arose	from	other	national	contexts.		In	the	first	decades	of	the	twentieth	century,	some	Mapuche	organizations	were	founded	with	the	assistance	of	indigenistas,	but	others	were	founded	and	led	by	Mapuche	themselves.	Non-indigenous	Chilean	intellectuals	contributed	to	the	transnational	indigenista	discourse	and	influenced	national	indigenous	policy,	but	so	too	did	Mapuche	leaders,	several	of	whom	became	important	elected	officials.	Mapuche	organizations	and	their	leaders	embraced	a	wide	range	of	political	philosophies	and	forged	alliances	with	one	another,	Chilean	leaders,	and	other	national	and	international	actors.	The	era	of	indigenismo	was	one	phase	of	a	longer	and	more	complex	history	between	the	Mapuche	people	and	the	state,	in	which																																																									5	Manuel	Gamio,	“Dialogue	on	Indian	Questions,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	Vol.	14,	no.	4,	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano:	Mexico	City,	1954,	pp.	232-239.	
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patterns	of	hostility,	negotiation	and	mutual	dependence	–	tactics	rooted	in	the	colonial	era	–	persisted.	Those	patterns	also	created	substantial	division	within	the	Mapuche	movement.	Nevertheless,	the	large	and	sustained	mobilization	of	Mapuche	made	it	possible	to	insert	indigenous	leaders	and	their	ideas	into	the	apparatuses	of	the	state.		By	showing	that	in	Chile	distinctions	between	Indians	and	indigenistas	were	blurred,	this	dissertation	contributes	to	our	understanding	of	the	way	in	which	indigenistas	and	Indians	worked	together	and	at	odds	in	twentieth	century	projects	of	state	formation.	Indigenismo	was	not	simply	an	outsider’s	attempt	to	improve	indigenous	life	in	Chile;	indigenous	agency	was	crucial.	Although	they	often	partnered	with	non-indigenous	Chileans,	I	argue	that	Mapuche	were	themselves	leading	contributors	to	Chilean	indigenismo	in	ways	that	challenge	us	to	re-interpret	the	movement	itself.	Such	a	view	modifies	our	understanding	of	indigenous	collective	action	in	Chile,	and	shows	that	partnership	with	(and	leadership	of)	the	indigenista	movement	represent	important	foundations	of	more	recent	identity-based	indigenous	activism.	In	other	words,	indigenous	social	movements	that	emerged	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	drew	from	longer	and	broader	traditions	of	conflict,	collaboration	and	compromise	rooted	in	the	indigenista	discourse	half	a	century	earlier.		To	illustrate	those	foundational	connections,	four	of	the	five	chapters	that	follow	examine	some	of	the	most	important	participants	in	Chile’s	indigenous	debate	from	the	1920s	through	the	1950s.	Chapter	one	explores	the	roots	and	emergence	of	Mapuche	political	organization,	establishing	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef	
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as	an	archetypal	Mapuche	activist.	Chapter	two	examines	the	indigenismo	of	Monsignor	Guido	Beck	de	Ramberga,	a	Bavarian	Catholic	missionary	who	became	the	leader	of	the	Church’s	efforts	to	educate	and	assimilate	Mapuche	into	Euro-Chilean	society	through	a	conservative	political	and	cultural	philosophy.	Although	Aburto	and	Beck	occupied	opposite	ends	of	the	spectrum	on	most	indigenous	issues,	placing	them	side-by-side	shows	that	they	served	as	foils	for	one	another	in	the	formative	period	from	1926-1938.	Comparing	their	contributions	to	the	indigenista	discourse	also	informs	our	understanding	of	the	movement’s	later	evolution	in	important	ways.		Chapters	three	and	four	shift	the	focus	first	toward	the	transnational	indigenista	discourse	that	officially	began	with	the	founding	of	an	international	institute	in	1940,	then	to	a	detailed	examination	of	the	life	and	career	of	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Chile’s	most	prolific	indigenista.	While	Lipschütz	began	his	indigenista	career	with	a	theoretical	treatise	on	race	in	the	Americas	and	an	ethnographic	study	of	indigenous	Fuegians,	by	the	1960s	he	became	an	advocate	for	indigenous	autonomy	and	self-deterimination	within	national	states.	Finally,	chapter	five	studies	an	important	episode	in	the	career	of	the	most	successful	Mapuche	leader	of	the	era,	as	he	founded	and	led	the	national	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs	from	its	inception	in	1953	until	1958.	Over	the	course	of	his	career,	Venancio	Coñuepán	brought	the	major	Mapuche	organizations	together	to	form	a	unified	political	front,	used	that	to	win	election	to	the	Chilean	National	Congress	three	times,	and	then	convinced	President	Ibañez	to	establish	an	official	government	agency	to	protect	the	rights	of	Indians	in	Chile.	In	doing	all	that,	he	himself	contributed	to	the	
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transnational	indigenista	discourse	and	identified	his	indigenous-led	organization	as	part	of	the	indigenista	movement.6	Together,	Aburto,	Beck,	Lipschütz	and	Coñuepán	demonstrate	the	tremendous	variety	of	voices	and	positions	within	Chilean	indigenismo,	and	show	that	the	categories	of	Indian	and	indigenista	were	dynamic,	fluid	and	permeable.		
Historiography	By	situating	the	Mapuche	movement	within	the	political	context	of	Chile	and	the	broader	Pan-American	indigenista	movement,	this	dissertation	bridges	a	historiographical	divide	between	studies	of	indigenous	activism	and	studies	of	the	intellectual	questions	surrounding	indigenismo.	It	also	contributes	to	an	expanding	body	of	literature	on	Pan-American	indigenismo	and	recent	studies	of	indigenista	projects	that	show	a	great	diversity	of	goals,	participants	and	outcomes	in	distinct	national	contexts.	Chilean	indigenismo	is	not	the	only	example	in	which	indigenous	leaders	played	an	active	role	in	developing	indigenista	ideas	and	projects,	but	until	recently	indigenous	contributions	have	largely	been	overlooked.7	Historian	Laura	Gotkowitz	has	shown	how	local	and	regional	indigenous	leaders	engaged	indigenista	debates	in	Bolivia	in	the	1930s	and	1940s.	In	A	Revolution	for	our	Rights,	
																																																								6	In	1945	the	Mapuche	organization	Corporación	Araucana	added	the	subtitle	“Movimiento	Indigenista	de	Chile”	to	their	name,	emphasizing	the	deep	connections	between	indigenismo	and	indigenous	activism	in	Chile.	7	For	an	introduction	to	the	idea	that	Indians	were	themselves	important	actors	in	the	indigenista	movement,	see	Laura	Giraudo	and	Juan	Martín-Sánchez,	“’Soy	Indígena	e	indigenista’:	Repensando	el	indigenismo	desde	la	participación	de	algunos,	no	tan	pocos,	indígenas,”	in	Protaganismo	Ameríndio	de	Ontem	e	Hoje,	Maria	Cristina	dos	Santos	and	Guilherme	Galhegos	Filippe,	eds.	Brazil:	Paco	Editorial,	2016,	pp.	257-294.		
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she	argues	that	indigenous	leaders	and	activists	challenged	the	authority	of	large	landowners	and	power	brokers	in	rural	Cochabamba,	thus	influencing	military	leaders	to	adopt	more	populist	political	strategies	at	the	national	level	and	contributing	an	overlooked	causal	strand	of	the	1952	Bolivian	Revolution.8	In	contrast	to	traditional	assumptions	that	indigenismo	was	rooted	in	the	contributions	of	white	urban	intellectuals,	Gotkowitz	demonstrates	that	in	Bolivia	rural	indigenous	peasant	leaders	meaningfully	impacted	the	course	of	national	politics.	Although	indigenista	projects	did	produce	some	short-term	improvements	in	the	lives	of	Indians	in	certain	contexts	in	the	1940s	and	1950s,	indigenismo	as	a	whole	did	not	lead	to	lasting	change	on	a	large	scale	across	Latin	America.	By	the	1960s,	indigenous	questions	were	subsumed	by	a	broader	class-based	discourse	and	rural	Marxist	uprisings	that	were	sometimes	carried	out	in	indigenous	territories.	Therefore,	in	the	1970s	many	critics	looked	back	on	the	previous	efforts	of	indigenistas	as	broad	failures.	But	in	the	1980s,	indigenous	activists	began	to	form	identity-based	social	movements	in	many	countries,	especially	in	response	to	political	repression	in	the	previous	decade.9	Indigenous	collective	action	expanded	and	accelerated	in	the	leadup	to	the	1992	quincentennial	of	Columbus’s	“discovery”	
																																																								8	Laura	Gotkowitz,	A	Revolution	for	our	Rights:	Indigenous	Struggles	for	Land	and	Justice	in	
Bolivia,	1880-1952,	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2007.	9	Chile	and	Guatemala	offer	two	examples	of	this	phenomenon.	In	Guatemala,	government	forces	targeted	Indians	for	providing	aid	and	shelter	to	Marxist	rebels	during	a	protracted	civil	war.	In	Chile,	because	of	their	previous	support	for	socialist	reforms	during	the	Allende	presidency	and	their	participation	in	unlawful	land	occupations,	Mapuche	became	targets	for	repression	during	the	Pinochet	dictatorship.	Similar	patterns	can	be	found	in	Peru	in	the	1980s	during	the	Sendero	Luminoso	uprisings,	and	in	Colombia	where	the	FARC	sustained	a	long-running	guerrilla	revolt	against	government	forces	for	more	than	two	decades.	
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of	the	Americas.	As	neoliberal	social	and	economic	reforms	became	common	across	Latin	America	in	the	1990s,	the	view	of	indigenismo	as	an	isolated	period	of	state-directed	reforms	carried	out	on	passive	indigenous	subjects	went	largely	unchallenged.	More	recently	scholars	have	begun	to	re-examine	the	role	that	indigenismo	played	in	laying	foundations	for	the	rise	of	indigenous	social	and	political	activism.	That	historiographical	turn	critiques	previous	interpretations	that	characterized	the	movement	as	scientific	and	apolitical,	or	as	a	form	of	internal	colonialism	that	sought	to	assimilate	and	exploit	Indians.	In	2012,	this	emerging	body	of	scholarship	was	recognized	in	a	special	edition	of	the	journal	Latin	American	
Perspectives,	entitled	“Rethinking	Indigenismo	on	the	American	Continent.”	10		In	their	introduction	to	that	volume,	lead	authors	Laura	Giraudo	and	Stephen	E.	Lewis	showed	that	from	the	beginning,	many	indigenista	efforts	were	complicated	by	events	on	the	world	stage,	including	large-scale	military	conflicts,	global	trade	and	economic	cycles,	and	foreign	policies	that	interfered	with	national	agendas.11	The	founding	of	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano	(III	–	Inter-American	Indianist	Institute)	in	194012	epitomized	those	complications,	coming	just	months	before	the	German	army	occupied	France	and	began	the	aerial	bombardment	of	
																																																								10	“Rethinking	Indigenismo	on	the	American	Continent,”	Latin	American	Perspectives,	Issue	186,	Vol.	39,	No.	5,	Sep.	2012.	11	Laura	Giraudo	and	Stephen	E.	Lewis,	“Pan-American	Indigenismo	(1940-1970):	New	Approaches	to	an	Ongoing	Debate,”	Latin	American	Perspectives,	Issue	186,	Vol.	39,	No.	5,	Sep.	2012,	pp.	3-11.	12	Althought	the	founding	of	the	III	represents	a	watershed	moment	for	the	movement,	indigenista	activities	had	begun	much	earlier	in	several	countries.	In	addition	to	the	early	Chilean	forms	of	indigenismo	presented	in	chapter	1,	which	date	to	the	decade	of	the	1910s,	the	creation	of	an	“Indian	Protection	Service”	in	Brazil	in	1910	and	the	work	of	Luis	Valcárcel	and	José	Carlos	Mariátegui	in	1920s	Peru	all	predate	the	formalization	of	Pan-American	indigenismo.	See	Giraudo	and	Lewis,	p.	3.	
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Britain	during	World	War	II.	The	III	was	dependent	upon	member	states	for	its	funding,	much	of	which	came	from	the	United	States	government.	But	by	1940,	Native	American	issues	in	the	U.S.	had	waned	in	importance	in	the	six	years	since	the	passage	of	the	Indian	Reorganization	Act,	and	the	country	would	soon	be	embroiled	in	the	War	and	its	aftermath.	Following	World	War	II,	U.S.	interest	in	Latin	American	affairs	shifted	from	the	relatively	non-interventionist	aid	programs	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	to	Cold	War	efforts	to	“contain”	the	spread	of	communism	by	supporting	regimes	friendly	to	American-led	capitalism.	The	case	of	Guatemala	illustrates	this	tendency,	where	“an	indigenista	movement	took	root	during	the	‘Guatemalan	Spring’	of	1944-1954,	but	it	fell	victim	to	the	U.S.-backed	coup	that	ousted	Jacobo	Árbenz	and	ushered	in	a	series	of	repressive,	sometimes	genocidal	dictatorships.”13	While	broad	transnational	trends	can	explain	some	of	indigenismo’s	challenges,	they	do	not	account	for	the	tremendous	variation	in	specific	national	contexts.	In	her	individual	contribution	to	the	same	2012	volume,	Laura	Giraudo	focused	on	the	transnational	connections	that	were	forged	through	the	III.	She	finds	that	the	effectiveness	of	the	movement’s	broader	agenda	was	limited	by	the	willingness	of	member	states	to	meaningfully	contribute	to	its	projects.	Varying	levels	and	forms	of	support	for	national	indigenista	efforts	in	the	United	States,	Guatemala	and	Peru	illustrate	that	indigenismo	was	neither	fully	“‘scientific’	nor	
																																																								13	Giraudo	and	Lewis,	p.	5.	See	also,	Abigail	E.	Adams,	“Antonio	Goubaud	Carrera:	Between	the	Contradictions	of	the	Generación	de	1920	and	US	Anthropology,”	in	After	the	Coup:	An	
Ethnographic	Reframing	of	Guatemala	1954,	Tim	Smith	and	Abigail	Adams,	eds.,	Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2011,	pp.	17-48.	
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‘colonialist’”	in	those	cases.14	In	this	study	I	show	that	while	the	class	of	indigenistas	in	Chile	was	relatively	small,	some	of	them	were	well	connected	to	the	III	and	the	broader	Pan-American	discourse.	But	Chilean	indigenistas	received	little	direct	funding	from	the	state,	and	so	their	effectiveness	in	achieving	policy	objectives	supported	by	scientific	inquiry	was	limited.	While	the	state	and	well-intentioned	indigenistas	remained	largely	ineffective,	Mapuche	leaders	themselves	advocated	directly	for	their	own	interests,	but	in	doing	so	they	themselves	participated	in	the	indigenista	discourse	and	applied	ideas	to	their	own	unique	circumstances.		Following	the	failure	of	relatively	conservative	forms	of	institutional	indigenismo	across	the	Americas	in	the	1940s	and	1950s,	indigenous	activists	and	Marxist	revolutionaries	sought	new	ways	to	advance	their	projects.	It	was	in	the	radical	politics	of	the	1960s	that	the	seeds	of	the	1970s	critique	of	indigenismo	were	sown.	In	the	case	of	Peru,	that	transition	can	be	seen	in	later	historiographical	attempts	to	understand	native	participation	in	leftist	political	projects	like	the	Sendero	Luminoso	(Shining	Path)	movement.15	In	Chile,	leftist	organizers	themselves	have	shed	light	on	that	transition	in	the	lead-up	to	Salvador	Allende’s	socialist	experiment	of	1970-1973.16	However,	a	full	understanding	of	Latin																																																									14	Laura	Giraudo,	“Neither	‘Scientific’	nor	‘Colonialist,’”	Latin	American	Perspectives,	Issue	186,	Vol.	39,	No.	5,	Sep.	2012,	pp.	12-32.	15	The	anthology	Shining	and	Other	Paths	(Steve	Stern,	ed.	1998)	provides	a	variety	of	explanations	as	to	why	the	violent	movement	took	root	in	the	highland	region	of	Ayacucho,	among	a	largely	indigenous	population.	Particularly	insightful	for	this	project	is	Marisol	de	la	Cadena’s	essay	in	that	volume	“From	Race	to	Class:	Insurgent	Intellectuals	de	provincia	in	Peru,	1910-1970,”	and	her	book	(Indigenous	Mestizos,	2000)	which	together	show	that	Peruvian	indigenismo	was	linked	to	very	fluid	notions	of	race	and	ethnicity	that	were	bound	up	with	class	identities	and	a	profound	rural-urban	divide.	See	also,	Jaymie	Heilman,	Before	
the	Shining	Path	(2010).	16	Rafael	Railaf,	et	al,	A	Desalambrar:	Historias	de	Mapuches	y	Chilenos	en	la	lucha	por	la	
tierra,	Santiago	de	Chile:	Editorial	Ayun,	2006.	
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American	state	formation	projects	should	also	take	into	account	the	historical	voices	of	indigenous	activists	themselves.	This	work	shows	that	Indians	navigated	their	own	path	across	the	broad	political	landscape,	seeking	openings	and	opportunities	to	protect	their	interests	from	within	the	political	system	when	possible,	or	seeking	to	modify	the	existing	political	order	when	necessary.	The	Chilean	example	illustrates	that	independence,	and	also	that	Mapuche	political	organization	arose	parallel	to	and	intertwined	with	the	emergence	of	an	indigenista	movement.	This	study	of	Chilean	indigenismo	and	Mapuche	political	action	also	adds	conceptually	to	studies	of	indigenismo	in	other	national	contexts	by	showing	how	the	discourse	was	formed,	how	it	spread	through	public	consciousness	and	how	indigenous	activists	altered	the	discourse	and	transformed	ideas	into	strategies.	It	challenges	the	view	that	indigenismo	amounted	to	little	more	than	a	paternalistic	attempt	by	whites	to	“improve”	native	peoples	or	preserve	their	culture	in	a	national	state	that	served	as	a	kind	of	living	museum.	At	the	same	time,	this	work	also	adds	an	ethnic	and	racial	dimension	to	the	literature	on	twentieth	century	Chilean	politics	and	shows	how	the	politics	of	race	and	class	intersected,	which	was	significant	but	has	been	largely	overlooked	to	date.	This	work	also	contributes	a	study	of	the	Mapuche	political	project	to	the	North	American	literature	on	indigenous	politics	in	Latin	America,	and	it	critically	examines	indigenismo	as	a	contested	corpus	of	ideas	projected	onto	a	landscape	of	unequal	power	relations.	For	the	past	three	decades,	historians	of	Latin	America	have	increasingly	tried	to	shed	light	on	the	participation	of	marginalized	groups	in	episodes	of	historical	change.	The	roots	of	that	transition	can	be	seen	in	the	late	1970s	as	labor	
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historians	shifted	away	from	structural	analyses	of	political	economy	and	union	leadership,	and	toward	studies	of	the	lived	experiences	of	workers.17	In	the	1990s	the	trend	in	labor	history	was	complemented	by	studies	that	documented	the	roles	of	subaltern	groups	in	processes	of	state	formation	and	nation	building.18	One	can	also	observe	a	similar	emphasis	in	the	literature	on	the	impact	of	the	Cold	War	in	Latin	America,	which	began	with	state-level	analyses	of	U.S.	foreign	policy	and	journalistic	accounts	that	documented	the	involvement	of	state	actors	in	military	interventions.19	Those	were	followed	by	historical	works	that	expanded	upon	themes	of	ideological	warfare,	terror	and	repression,	and	illuminated	the	much	more	varied	roles	of	Indians,	peasants	and	activists	in	Cold	War	campaigns	and	the	impact	of	those	experiences	on	historical	memory.20	This	study	builds	upon	those	trends	by	combining	“top-down”	analysis	of	supranational	and	state-level	politics	and	guiding	ideologies,	with	“bottom-up”	analysis	of	the	way	political	principles	and	realities	were	understood	by	people	on	the	ground.		
																																																								17	This	movement	began	following	the	lead	of	labor	historians	of	the	US	and	Europe	inspired	by	E.P.	Thompson’s	influential	study	of	the	English	working	class.	By	the	late	1980s	this	shift	was	well-documented	and	the	best	scholarship	combined	structural	and	experiential	analyses.	See	Emilia	Viottti	da	Costa,	“Structure	vs.	Experience”	(1989)	in	which	she	points	to	works	by	Peter	Winn,	Weavers	of	Revolution	(1986)	and	Daniel	James,	Resistance	and	
Integration	(1988)	that	combined	analyses	of	political	and	economic	structures	with	the	ways	institutional	change	was	experienced	by	workers.	18	See	Joseph	and	Nugent,	eds.	Everyday	Forms	of	State	Formation	(1994),	Florencia	Mallon	Peasant	and	Nation	(1995),	Peter	Guardino,	Peasants,	Politics,	and	the	Formation	of	Mexico’s	National	State	(1996).		19	Three	of	the	most	significant	examples	include	the	covert	military	and/or	CIA	interventions	in	Guatemala	in	1954,	Chile	in	1973	and	El	Salvador	in	1981.	See	Schlesinger	and	Kinzer,	Bitter	Fruit	(1982),	Constable	and	Valenzuela,	A	Nation	of	Enemies	(1991)	and	Mark	Danner,	The	Massacre	at	El	Mozote	(1993).	20	For	select	examples	see	Greg	Grandin,	The	Last	Colonial	Massacre	(2004),	Joseph	and	Spenser,	eds.	In	From	the	Cold	(2008)	and	Steve	Stern’s	fine	trilogy	on	the	role	of	violence	on	historical	memory,	The	Memory	Box	of	Pinochet’s	Chile	(2004,	2006	and	2010).	
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This	project	also	draws	from	(and	contributes	to)	the	recent	proliferation	of	studies	devoted	to	understanding	the	social,	cultural	and	political	experiences	of	indigenous	peoples	in	Latin	America,	a	body	of	work	that	benefits	from	disciplinary	intersections	between	anthropology	and	history.	Most	existing	studies	of	indigenismo	fall	into	this	category,	and	have	explored	national	contexts	where	indigenous	persons	constitute	a	large	percentage	of	the	overall	population.	Numerous	studies	of	indigenismo	exist	in	the	Mexican	historiography,	in	part	because	indigenista	projects	were	sponsored	by	the	government	and	viewed	as	integral	to	the	consolidation	of	the	post-revolutionary	state,	especially	under	President	Lázaro	Cárdenas	in	the	1920s	and	1930s.21	In	Chile	during	the	same	period,	national	politics	tended	to	favor	reform	movements	focused	in	urban	areas	and	supported	by	broad	coalitions	of	political	parties,	as	evidenced	by	the	Popular	Front	coalition	of	Radical,	Socialist	and	Communist	political	parties	from	1938	to	1946.	Although	their	base	of	power	rested	more	in	the	rural	south,	individuals	and	groups	of	Mapuche	began	migrating	to	Chile’s	cities	in	this	era.	Mapuche	politicians	learned	to	maneuver	across	the	shifting	sands	of	political	alliances	and	demographic	changes,	and	were	courted	for	the	relatively	small	but	symbolically	important	constituencies	of	voters	they	could	deliver.	
																																																								21	The	orientation	of	indigenismo	to	anthropology	can	be	seen	in	David	Brading’s	“Manuel	Gamio	and	Official	Indigenismo	in	Mexico,”	(1988).	A	more	thorough	treatment	of	the	panoply	of	indigenista	programs	of	this	era	can	be	found	in	Alexander	Dawson,	Indian	and	
Nation	in	Revolutionary	Mexico	(2004).	Dawson	also	takes	pains	to	show	how	Indians	participated	in	those	programs.	The	relationship	of	indigenista	philosophy	to	post-colonial	theories	of	economic	development	is	elaborated	in	Karin	Rosemblatt,	““Modernization,	Dependency	and	the	Global	in	Mexican	Critiques	of	Anthropology”	(2014).	
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Much	of	the	historiography	of	twentieth	century	Chile	adopts	class	as	a	central	motif	for	explaining	political	conflict	and	change.	Peter	Winn’s	Weavers	of	
Revolution	complemented	trends	in	Chilean	historiography	that	had	previously	done	so,	and	was	among	the	vanguard	of	new	labor	histories	from	the	North	American	academy	that	combined	structural	and	experiential	analyses	of	workers’	movements.	Since	its	publication	in	1986	that	book	has	influenced	a	generation	of	Chileanists	to	incorporate	lived	experience	into	their	analyses,	leading	to	several	important	books	explaining	the	ways	that	class	and	gender	identities	overlapped	in	political	projects	across	the	twentieth	century.22	What	is	largely	missing	from	those	works	is	the	role	of	race	and	ethnicity	in	the	imagining	of	the	modern	Chilean	nation.23	This	dissertation	helps	to	fill	that	void	by	showing	that	debates	about	the	“Mapuche	question”	were	also	a	central	concern	in	many	twentieth	century	political	projects,	including	those	devoted	to	economic	development	and	agrarian	reform.24	While	an	extensive	literature	on	the	Mapuche	now	exists	in	the	Chilean	historiography,	only	a	handful	of	books	have	been	published	in	English.	Several	
																																																								22	On	the	rise	of	urban	manufacturing	in	the	first	decades	of	the	century,	see	Elizabeth	Quay	Hutchison,	Labors	Appropriate	to	Their	Sex	(2001).	On	male	gender	roles	in	the	mining	sector,	see	Thomas	Miller	Klubock,	Contested	Communities	(1998).	On	feminism	and	political	reform	during	era	of	populist	coalition	governments,	see	Karin	Alejandra	Rosemblatt,	Gendered	Compromises	(2000).	On	the	role	of	women	in	agrarian	reform,	see	Heidi	Tinsman,	Partners	in	Conflict	(2002).	Although	not	explicitly	about	gender,	Patrick	Barr-Melej’s	Reforming	Chile	(2001)	similarly	focuses	on	class	in	discussing	education	reforms	and	nationalism.	23	Klubock	complements	the	gender	and	class	foci	of	his	book	on	copper	mines	with	an	explicit	discussion	of	the	role	of	race	and	racism	in	mines	of	the	same	period	in	“Nationalism,	Race,	and	the	Politics	of	Imperialism”	in	Gilbert	Joseph,	ed.	Reclaiming	the	
Political	in	Latin	American	History	(2001).	24	One	of	the	few	scholars	of	Chilean	history	that	emphasizes	the	role	of	race	in	Chilean	politics	is	Karin	Rosemblatt.	While	her	co-edited	volume	Race	and	Nation	in	Modern	Latin	
America	(2003)	does	not	include	an	essay	on	Chilean	history,	her	essay	“Sexuality	and	Bio-Power	in	Chile	and	Latin	America”	(2002)	does.		
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ethnographic	studies	emerged	in	recent	years	that	are	largely	focused	outside	the	scope	of	politics	and	activism.25	The	most	important	scholar	to	publish	sophisticated	historical	work	in	English	on	the	Mapuche	and	indigenous	politics	in	Chile	is	Florencia	Mallon.	Two	recent	books	include	a	testimonial	collaboration	with	Mapuche	activist	Rosa	Isolde	Reuque	Paillalef	and	a	fine-grained	monographic	study	of	one	Mapuche	community	and	their	struggle	to	maintain	control	of	their	land	over	the	course	of	the	twentieth	century.26	Both	studies	provide	points	of	guidance	for	this	dissertation	project.	The	former	makes	the	strong	point	that	Mapuche	activists	have	always	been	distributed	across	the	political	spectrum,	as	Reuque	Paillalef	herself	is	a	member	of	the	Christian	Democratic	Party	and	reports	often	feeling	ostracized	from	the	male-dominated	and	predominantly	leftist	nature	of	the	movement	since	the	1960s.	In	Courage	Tastes	of	Blood,	Mallon	shows	that	the	issue	of	land	has	been	central	to	Mapuche	political	struggles	across	the	twentieth	century.	By	illuminating	the	indigenista	discourse,	questioning	how	it	shaped	activism	and	showing	how	Mapuche	themselves	participated	in	that	discourse,	strategies	of	political	alignment	and	the	theme	of	dispossession	from	rightful	territory	are	both	better	understood.		While	Mallon’s	work	has	shown	that	Mapuche	political	strategies	varied	dramatically	over	time,	she	argues	that	the	position	of	the	state	remained	fairly	
																																																								25	Two	examples	are	Ana	Maria	Bacigalupo’s	work	on	gender	and	shamanism	among	the	Mapuche,	especially	Shamans	of	the	Foye	Tree	(2007),	and	a	recent	book	by	Magnus	Course	on	Mapuche	notions	of	selfhood,	Becoming	Mapuche	(2011).	26	Rosa	Isolde	Reuque	Paillalef,	When	a	Flower	is	Reborn:	The	Life	and	Times	of	a	Mapuche	Feminist	(2002)	and	Florencia	E.	Mallon,	Courage	Tastes	of	Blood:	The	Mapuche	Community	
of	Nicolás	Ailío	and	the	Chilean	State,	1906-2001	(2005).	
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static.27	I	set	out	to	show	that	while	state	policies	did	consistently	work	to	reduce	Mapuche	land	tenure,	a	variety	of	voices	attempted	to	influence	the	state’s	position	in	favor	of	Mapuche	rights	over	the	course	of	the	mid-twentieth	century.	In	doing	so,	this	dissertation	builds	upon	the	survey	of	Mapuche	cultural	politics	in	the	twentieth	century	by	historian	Joanna	Crow.28	By	examining	social,	cultural	and	political	trends	across	the	century,	Crow	demonstrates	that	the	contributions	of	Mapuche	and	Chilean	artists,	intellectuals	and	politicians	all	contributed	to	place	indigenous	themes	at	the	heart	of	many	of	the	century’s	most	important	events.	Chile’s	two	most	important	poets,	Gabriela	Mistral	and	Pablo	Neruda,	both	incorporated	indigenous	themes	into	some	of	their	most	significant	works,	and	so	did	the	musicians	of	the	Chilean	New	Song	movement.	Likewise,	Mapuche	activism	was	deeply	connected	to	some	of	the	most	significant	political	developments,	including	agrarian	reform	efforts	in	the	1960s	and	Salvador	Allende’s	democratic	path	to	socialist	revolution	that	commenced	with	his	election	to	the	presidency	in	1970.	 In	addition,	three	important	works	of	Chilean	scholarship	on	Mapuche	politics	in	the	twentieth	century	guide	this	study	in	significant	ways.	The	first	is	a	book	by	two	Chilean	anthropologists	that	surveys	the	creation	and	rise	of	the	major	Mapuche	political	organizations	from	the	turn	of	the	century	until	the	Allende	era.29	Their	work	is	primarily	based	on	newspaper	reports	of	the	organizations’	activities	and	some	private	archives.	It	provides	a	framework	for	understanding	the	main																																																									27	Mallon	2005,	234-236.	28	Joanna	Crow,	The	Mapuche	in	Modern	Chile:	A	Cultural	History,	Gainesville:	University	of	Florida	Press,	2013.	29	Foerster	and	Montecino	(1988).	
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thrust	of	each	group’s	ideological	orientation	and	catalogues	their	leaders	and	activities.	The	second	is	a	recent	biography	of	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	the	most	important	Chilean	indigenista	of	the	twentieth	century,	written	by	one	of	his	former	students,	an	anthropologist	himself	with	connections	to	the	North	American	academy.30	That	book	serves	as	an	overview	of	Lipschütz’s	life	and	career	and	provides	this	study	with	a	guide	to	using	Lipschütz’s	published	work	as	primary	source	material.	The	third	is	a	collection	of	four	essays	that	serve	as	a	historical	manifesto	of	the	Mapuche	movement,	written	by	Mapuche	historians.31	That	work	provides	this	study	with	an	understanding	of	the	role	of	history	in	the	current	politics	of	the	movement,	as	Mapuche	activists	have	used	historical	methods	to	document	the	loss	of	territory	and	the	opposition	and	betrayal	of	state	actors	and	projects.			
Sources	This	work	draws	from	four	main	categories	of	primary	source	material.	The	first	category	is	composed	of	the	historical	records	of	the	largest	and	longest-lasting	Mapuche	organizations	of	the	period.	Until	1938,	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán,	
Federación	Araucana	and	Unión	Araucana	operated	independently	of	one	another,	but	in	that	year	they	partially	merged	operations	under	the	umbrella	of	the	
Corporación	Araucana.	The	Sociedad	and	Corporación	archives	have	not	survived,																																																									30	Bernardo	Berdichewsky,	Alejandro	Lipschütz:	Su	visión	indigenista	y	antropológica,	Santiago:	Ediciones	UCSH,	2004.	Berdichewsky	taught	at	several	universities	in	United	States	and	Canada	while	living	in	exile	from	the	military	dictatorship	of	Aug.o	Pinochet.	31	Pablo	Marimán,	et	al,	¡…Escucha,	Winka…!	(2006).	Although	the	authors	identify	themselves	as	“historians	of	the	Mapuche	movement,”	Mallon	notes	that	only	Marimán	has	had	access	to	PhD	studies	(“Decolonizing	the	History	of	Allende’s	Chile”	lecture).	
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but	their	activities	were	well	documented	in	the	regional	press.	As	the	group	that	most	regularly	organized	large	gatherings,	accounts	of	the	Federación’s	activities	also	appeared	frequently	in	the	press.	Although	the	state	confiscated	their	official	archives	in	1929,	fragments	of	the	Federación’s	founder	and	leader	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef’s	prolific	writing	survive	in	several	smaller	caches.	Aburto	Panguilef’s	descendants	retained	some	of	his	personal	journals,	which	now	are	housed	at	the	Liwen	Center	at	the	Universidad	de	la	Frontera	in	Temuco.	Chilean	scholars	André	Menard	and	Jorge	Pavez	have	published	some	of	those	documents,	as	well	as	other	fragments	that	Pavez	discovered	in	the	official	archives	of	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior.32	Because	the	Unión	Araucana	was	founded,	supported	and	directed	through	much	of	its	existence	by	Monsignor	Guido	Beck	de	Ramberga,	its	records	are	well	preserved	and	organized	at	the	headquarters	of	the	regional	Diocese	in	the	southern	town	of	Villarrica.	Combined	with	newspaper	accounts	and	scholarship	based	upon	oral	history,	these	sources	provide	good	insight	into	the	activities	of	the	major	Mapuche	organizations	during	the	decades	of	the	1920s	and	1930s.	In	the	1940s	and	1950s,	the	transnational	indigenista	movement	gained	momentum	and	benefited	from	the	organization	and	coordination	provided	by	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano.	The	III	archives	are	housed	in	Mexico	City,	and	the	two	major	journals	that	they	produced	during	the	period	(Boletín	Indigenista	and	América	Indígena)	have	been	digitized.	The	work	in	chapter	three	draws	primarily	from	the	Boletín,	which	served	as	a	newsletter	providing	accounts	and	updates	on	indigenista	activities	across	the	Americas.	Larger	countries	and	nations																																																									32	Archivo	Nacional	de	la	Adminstración	(ARNAD),	Ministerio	del	Interior,	Libro	7321.	
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with	large	indigenous	populations,	like	the	United	States,	Mexico	and	Peru,	logically	had	more	activity	and	therefore	received	more	coverage,	but	Chilean	indigenismo	is	represented	there	less	extensively.		The	personal	papers	of	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Chile’s	most	famous	and	prolific	indigenista,	are	housed	at	the	University	of	Chile’s	special	collections	library	at	the	Ñuñoa	campus	in	Santiago.	Lipschütz	maintained	regular	correspondence	with	many	of	the	leading	indigenistas	of	the	day,	including	the	U.S.	Commissioner	of	Indian	Affairs	John	Collier,	and	Mexican	anthropologist	and	III	Director	Manuel	Gamio.	He	also	exchanged	letters	with	many	leading	academics	interested	in	indigenous	affairs	from	around	the	world.	Taken	together	with	the	seven	book-length	texts	Lipschütz	published	on	indigenous	themes,	his	papers	and	published	work	provide	key	links	that	enable	me	to	trace	the	exchange	of	ideas	between	Chile	and	other	national	contexts	through	the	transnational	intellectual	network	of	indigenismo	in	chapter	four.	Finally,	the	Chilean	state	produced	official	documents	through	several	bureaucratic	channels	that	inform	this	study.	Chapter	five	is	largely	based	on	records	generated	by	the	Dirección	de	Asuntos	Indígenas	(DASIN)	found	in	the	
Archivo	Nacional	de	la	Administración	(ARNAD)	in	the	capital	of	Santiago.	President	Carlos	Ibañez	del	Campo	created	DASIN	in	1953	as	part	of	a	sweeping	reorganization	of	the	national	government,	and	Venancio	Coñuepán	led	that	agency	from	its	inception	until	shortly	after	the	election	of	Jorge	Alessandri	in	1958.	Not	only	was	Coñuepán	the	most	successful	Mapuche	leader	in	terms	of	advancing	indigenous	issues	before	the	national	government,	but	DASIN	represents	a	high-
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water	mark	of	more	than	thirty	years	of	Mapuche	organizing	and	political	mobilization.	It	also	can	be	viewed	as	a	formal	counterpart	to	indigenista	institutions	in	other	countries,	like	the	Bureau	of	Indian	Affairs	in	the	United	States	and	the	Instituto	Nacional	Indigenista	(National	Indigenous	Institute)	in	Mexico.		While	the	historical	record	of	Mapuche	political	activity	in	this	period	is	extensive,	it	is	not	complete	or	without	limitations.	The	Sociedad	Caupolicán	was	perhaps	the	most	influential	and	mainstream	of	the	three	major	Mapuche	organizations	between	1910-1938.33	The	Mapuche	leaders	elected	to	Congress	in	this	period	all	rose	through	the	ranks	of	the	Sociedad.	However,	it	is	unfortunate	that	the	organization	left	no	archives.	It	is	likely	that	they	were	merged	with	the	papers	of	the	Corporación	Araucana	after	1938,	and	that	organization’s	official	archives	have	not	survived	either.	That	archival	void	complicates	this	study	by	limiting	insight	into	the	organizational	history	of	the	1940s,	during	which	time	Venancio	Coñuepán	used	the	Corporación	to	consolidate	his	leaderhip	of	the	Mapuche	movement.	Nevertheless,	that	history	can	be	surveyed	through	newspaper	accounts	of	his	activity	and	correspondence	with	leaders	in	other	organizations.	The	Federación	and	Unión	archival	caches	are	helpful	in	that	regard,	but	it	is	worth	noting	that	this	analysis	of	the	Mapuche	movement	proceeds	from	a	detailed	look	at	the	two	organizations	that	tended	toward	the	extremes	of	the	political	spectrum	rather	than	the	more	centrist	Sociedad	and	Corporación.	That	perspective	supports	
																																																								33	Although	this	claim	is	broadly	true,	it	is	important	to	note	that	in	the	late	1920s	the	Sociedad	drifted	dramatically	to	the	left	under	the	leadership	of	Arturo	Huenchullán,	as	the	broader	Mapuche	movement	mobilized	to	oppose	the	1927	indigenous	law.	After	Venancio	Coñuepán	was	elected	president	of	the	Sociedad	in	1931,	he	realigned	the	group	under	a	more	centrist,	pro-economic	development	agenda.	
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the	argument	that	the	movement	was	ideologically	diverse,	and	that	the	full	breadth	of	views	impacted	the	course	charted	by	the	more	mainstream	leaders	and	organizations.	Chile’s	position	on	the	periphery	of	the	indigenista	movement	also	limits	how	much	the	III	archives	illuminate	the	discourse	there.	To	begin	with,	Chilean	submissions	to	the	Boletín	Indigenista	were	less	frequent	and	less	abundant	than	those	from	other	countries,	and	the	Chilean	indigenista	movement	was	smaller	and	less	formally	established.	Alejendro	Lipschütz,	as	the	Chilean	indigenista	most	well-connected	to	the	transnational	movement,	was	also	limited	in	his	ability	to	make	inroads	with	state	bureaucracies	because	of	his	communist	political	views	that	distanced	him	from	the	more	centrist,	rural	and	conservative	orientation	of	the	main	body	of	the	Mapuche	movement	and	their	allies	in	government.34	Although	these	factors	present	challenges	to	the	analysis	of	both	indigenismo	and	Mapuche	politics	within	Chile,	they	support	a	central	contribution	of	the	study,	which	is	that	both	movements	were	diverse	and	contested	throughout	the	period.		
Historical	Context			This	Mapuche	story	of	political	organization,	resistance	and	ethnic	resurgence	opens	near	the	end	of	a	fifty-year	process	of	conquest,	colonization	and	subjugation.	Through	much	of	the	nineteenth	century,	the	Mapuche	controlled	the	Araucanía	as	a	large	autonomous	territory	between	the	Bío	Bío	and	Toltén	Rivers.	In	that	time	they	prospered	as	herdsmen	and	traders.	But	between	1861	and	1883	the																																																									34	André	Menard,	personal	conversation,	July	2013.	
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Chilean	state	executed	a	military	campaign	in	which	they	conquered	the	Mapuche	and	occupied	their	territory.	That	campaign	is	euphemistically	known	as	the	Pacification	of	Araucanía.35	Resettlement	followed	the	war,	and	between	1883	and	1929	the	state	created	a	system	of	reducciones	(reservations)	by	granting	land	titles	called	títulos	de	merced	to	about	3,000	Mapuche	heads	of	household.	The	process	of	
radicación	(settlement)	diminished	Mapuche	territory	from	approximately	five	million	hectares	to	526,285,36	and	the	newly	formed	communities	continued	to	lose	land	through	widespread	legal	fraud	accompanied	by	violence	and	intimidation.	By	the	end	of	the	1920s,	Mapuche	lands	totaled	less	than	ten	percent	of	the	territory	they	had	controlled	before	the	Pacification.37	Parallel	to	the	radicación,	beginning	in	the	1890s	and	carrying	into	the	first	decades	of	the	twentieth	century,	the	state	redistributed	former	Mapuche	lands	to	European	and	Chilean	colonists	through	a	mechanism	of	land	grants.	Chile’s	policy																																																									35	At	about	the	same	time,	the	Argentine	army	executed	a	series	of	military	campaigns	known	as	the	“Conquest	of	the	Desert”	to	subdue	Mapuche	and	other	“Araucanized”	peoples	on	the	eastern	side	of	the	Andes.	Both	campaigns	were	related	to	disputed	border	territory	along	the	cordillera	and	both	countries’	mutual	ambition	to	lay	claim	to	Patagonia.	36	The	Pacification,	reducción	and	founding	of	Mapuche	organizations	in	this	early	period	is	narrated	in	English	in	Xavier	Albó,	“Andean	People	in	the	Twentieth	Century,”	in	The	
Cambridge	History	of	the	Native	Peoples	of	the	Americas,	Frank	Salomon	and	Stuart	B.	Schwartz,	eds.,	Cambridge,	England:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999.	Albó	relies	primarily	upon	Foerster	and	Montecino	Organizaciones,	Lideres	y	Contiendas	Mapuche,	which	remains	the	most	comprehensive	source	on	this	formative	period	of	Mapuche	politics.	On	the	scope	of	land	loss,	see	Albó	p.	776.	37	Ibid,	p.	787.	Albó	cites	José	Bengoa,	Historia	del	Pueblo	Mapuche:	Siglo	XIX	y	XX,	Santiago,	Chile:	Ediciones	Sur,	1985,	to	estimate	that	by	1929	almost	one-third	of	Mapuche	communities	established	by	radicación	had	filed	suit	to	recover	lands	subsequently	usurped,	which	likely	amounted	to	the	loss	of	another	105,000	hectares.	Meanwhile	the	total	size	of	the	Mapuche	population	was	counted	in	the	1920	census	at	105,162,	which	amounted	to	2.8	percent	of	the	total	population	of	Chile,	which	in	1920	was	counted	at	3,753,799.	Dirección	General	de	Estadística.	Censo	de	Poblacion	de	la	República	de	Chile,	
1920.	Santiago	de	Chile:	Sociedad	Impresa	y	Litografía	Universo,	1925.	Available	at:	http://www.ine.cl/estadisticas/censos/censos-de-poblacion-y-vivienda,	accessed	6/29/17..	
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of	“concessionary	colonialism”	was	rife	with	fraud	and	contributed	to	the	further	loss	of	reserve	land	by	Mapuche	communities.38	The	state	granted	huge	tracts	of	land	to	political	insiders	and	colonization	companies,	the	latter	being	charged	with	recruiting	colonists	from	Europe	and	other	parts	of	Chile	to	settle	across	the	region.	It	was	an	effort	to	make	land	productive,	and	thereby	increase	the	nation’s	economic	might	in	an	era	when	the	Chilean	economy	was	primarily	devoted	to	the	production	and	export	of	agricultural	and	mineral	resources.	From	the	beginning,	the	Pacification	was	part	of	the	Chilean	state’s	attempt	to	increase,	consolidate	and	dominate	its	territory,	inhabitants	and	their	resources.	As	these	processes	unfolded,	some	Mapuche	families	were	never	granted	land	in	the	first	place,	while	others	saw	their	smallholdings	decreased	further	through	fraudulent	land	dealings	of	the	colonizers	and	their	entrenched	Euro-Chilean	allies.		During	this	period,	Mapuche	leaders	began	to	form	“mutual	protection”	societies	for	the	purpose	of	defending	their	lands	from	usurpation	and	their	culture	from	the	pressures	of	assimilation.39	From	the	very	beginning	the	Mapuche	organizations	were	joint	projects	between	Indians	educated	in	Chilean	society	who	returned	to	the	south	as	teachers	and	merchants,	and	white	Chileans	who	collaborated	with	them.	The	Mapuche	leaders	tended	to	be	descendants	of	traditional	longkos	(political	leaders)	who	had	been	educated	in	Chilean	schools	and	attained	measures	of	success	in	business	or	education.	In	the	Araucanía,	where	a	large	portion	of	society	identified	as	Mapuche,	many	speaking	only	the	native																																																									38	Jesse	Zarley,	Settling	the	Mapuche	Question:	Concessionary	Colonization	in	Chile,	1900-
1912,	unpublished	manuscript.	In	this	text,	Zarley	provides	detailed	accounts	of	land	usurpation	and	coins	the	phrase	“concessionary	colonialism.”	39	The	first	of	these	was	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán,	founded	in	1910.		
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Mapudungun	language,	the	leaders	of	those	organizations	were	quickly	able	to	utilize	their	organizational	capacity	to	produce	votes,	and	two	Mapuche	diputados	(deputies)	were	elected	to	the	Chilean	National	Congress	in	the	1920s.	It	is	significant	to	note	that	those	two	leaders	represented	political	parties	at	almost	opposite	ends	of	the	political	spectrum.	40		While	broad	debates	between	conservative	and	liberal	political	ideologies	had	embroiled	Chilean	national	politics	since	independence	in	1818,	by	the	1920s	both	ideologies	were	being	challenged.41	During	and	after	World	War	I,	the	nation’s	economy	struggled	under	lower	prices	and	decreased	international	demand	for	nitrates,	its	principal	export	commodity.	Riding	a	popular	wave	of	political	and																																																									40	The	first	Mapuche	representative	elected	to	Chile’s	lower	house	(Chamber	of	Deputies)	was	Francisco	Melivilu,	representing	the	Partido	Demócrata,	one	of	the	most	progressive	parties	in	Chile	at	the	time,	and	not-coincidentally	part	of	President	Arturo	Alessandri’s	ruling	coalition	during	his	first	term	as	president	(1920-1924).	Manuel	Manquilef	was	the	second	Mapuche	elected	the	Cámara	de	Diputados	in	1925,	representing	the	Partido	Liberal.	His	firm	commitment	to	the	tenets	of	private	property	and	classical	liberalism	is	important	to	understand	the	legislative	reforms	he	proposed.	In	1927,	Manquilef	proposed	a	new	indigenous	law	that	encouraged	the	further	fragmentation	of	Mapuche	communal	lands	through	subdivision	and	the	establishment	of	individual	property	titles.	Chapters	one	and	two	illustrate	how	this	law	created	a	significant	rift	in	the	Mapuche	movement,	with	major	organizations	aligning	to	either	support	or	oppose	subdivision.	41	The	Chilean	example	follows	similar	dynamics	in	other	Latin	American	countries	in	the	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries.	For	an	introduction	to	the	place	of	Native	Americans	in	nineteenth	century	state	formation	projects,	see	Brooke	Larsen,	Trials	of	
Nation	Making	(2004)	and	Rebecca	Earle,	The	Return	of	the	Native	(2007).	Larsen	shows	how	the	existence	of	large	indigenous	populations	in	Colombia,	Ecuador,	Peru	and	Bolivia	posed	fundamental	challenges	to	Liberal	state	formation	and	economic	development	projects,	and	how	dominant	racial	ideologies	conditioned	the	way	elites	in	those	countries	grappled	with	various	“Indian	problems”	there.	Earle	focuses	on	national	mythologies	of	pre-Colombian	indigenous	peoples,	and	how	memories	of	their	valiant	past	influenced	culture	and	politics	throughout	the	century.	For	select	examples	on	the	role	of	race	and	racial	mixing	in	processes	of	state	formation	in	the	twentieth	century,	see	Jeffrey	Gould,	To	
Die	in	this	Way	(1998),	Marisol	de	la	Cadena,	Indigenous	Meztizos	(2000),	Greg	Grandin,	The	
Blood	of	Guatemala	(2000)	and	Applebaum,	Macpherson	and	Rosemblatt,	Race	and	Nation	
in	Modern	Latin	America	(2003).	For	an	example	of	Latin	America’s	export	economies	and	their	dependence	upon	the	industrialized	capitalist	countries	of	the	Global	North,	see	Paul	Gootenberg,	Imagining	Development	(1993).	
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economic	dissatisfaction,	Arturo	Alessandri	was	elected	to	the	presidency	in	1920,	supported	by	an	alliance	of	the	Liberal,	Democrat	and	Radical	Parties,	in	an	unprecedented	election	that	threatened	to	end	the	thirty-year	period	of	parliamentary	oligarchic	rule.	His	fiery	campaign	rhetoric	earned	him	the	nickname	“the	Lion	of	Tarapacá”	as	he	promised	reforms	to	the	popular	sectors	of	society.	But	following	his	election,	the	parliamentary	regime	in	Congress	stymied	his	proposals	and	kept	Alessandri	from	delivering	on	his	campaign	promises.	The	public	(and	eventually	the	military)	became	increasingly	frustrated	with	the	government’s	inability	to	function	effectively.	Some	blamed	the	legislative	branch	for	blocking	Alessandri’s	reform	proposals,	while	others	blamed	the	president	for	pushing	them	in	the	first	place.42		The	persistence	of	this	stalemate	prompted	the	military	to	intervene	in	Chilean	politics	in	September	1924,	and	eventually	enabled	Carlos	Ibañez	del	Campo	to	ascend	to	the	presidency	in	1927.43	Ibañez	pushed	forward	a	host	of	social	reforms	that	had	been	frustrated	in	the	first	half	of	the	decade,	but	two	of	the	most	significant	to	the	Mapuche	people	were	the	Southern	Property	Law	and	the	Ley	Indígena	1.469	of	1927.	The	former	sought	to	stem	the	tide	of	fraudulent	land	dealings	in	the	south,	where	settlers,	colonization	agents	and	political	insiders	had	stolen	tens	of	thousands	of	acres	from	the	Chilean	government.44	The	latter	created	a	process	whereby	communally	held	Mapuche	lands,	only	recently	established	as	
																																																								42	Frederick	M.	Nunn,	Chilean	Politics,	1920-1931:	The	Honorable	Mission	of	the	Armed	
Forces,	Albuquerque:	University	of	New	Mexico	Press,	1970,	pp.	1-17.	43	Nunn,	pp.	3-4.	44	See	Thomas	Miller	Klubock,	La	Frontera:	Forests	and	Ecological	Conflict	in	Chile’s	Frontier	
Territory,	Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	2014,	p.	97.	
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reducciones	through	the	granting	of	titulos	de	merced	to	heads	of	household	and	their	extended	families,	could	be	subdivided	and	titled	individually	at	the	request	of	a	single	member	of	the	community.45	By	the	1920s,	Mapuche	communities	increasingly	found	themselves	defending	their	lands	against	settler	incursions	legitimized	by	state	policies.	Using	their	organizations,	Mapuche	appealed	to	the	state	for	redress	through	courts	and	elected	representatives.	The	reducciones	had	been	established	as	a	form	of	communal	land	ownership,	with	tracts	granted	to	longkos	who	would	hold	land	in	trust	and	distribute	parcels	to	members	of	the	community	for	agricultural	purposes.	The	1927	indigenous	law	was	premised	on	classical	liberal	notions	of	private	property,	and	some	Mapuche	supported	the	subdivision	of	communal	lands	to	establish	individual	title	so	they	could	sell	or	borrow	against	their	property.	But	the	major	Mapuche	organizations	fought	to	maintain	communal	ownership	as	they	defended	and	promoted	indigenous	cultural	practices,	and	they	increasingly	allied	with	more	left-leaning	parties	to	protect	their	people	from	further	loss	of	land.	Broad	Mapuche	opposition	to	the	law	ultimately	forced	its	modification	in	1931.	The	1930s	brought	continued	political	instability,	a	second	period	of	military	intervention	in	civilian	politics,	and	vacillation	between	conservative	and	progressive	political	impulses.	Mapuche	organizations	adeptly	navigated	the	full	breadth	of	the	political	spectrum	to	advance	their	interests.	For	example,	when	the	largest	Mapuche	groups	came	together	to	form	the	conglomerate	Corporación	Araucana	as	a	politically	moderate	entity	in	1938,	a	second	group	of	leaders	formed																																																									45	Ley	1.469,	Biblioteca	del	Congreso	Nacional	de	Chile,	https://www.leychile.cl/N?i=24531&f=1930-02-11&p,	accessed	Nov.	19,	2017.	
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a	more	left-leaning	umbrella	organization.46	As	Chilean	presidential	politics	stabilized	in	the	late-1940s	and	1950s,	the	Corporación	developed	into	a	de	facto	“Mapuche	political	party,”	defined	by	the	indigenous	ethnic	identity	of	its	leaders	and	supporters.47	The	Corporación	and	its	long-time	leader	Venancio	Coñuepán	developed	a	kind	of	hegemony	over	the	Mapuche	movement,	and	channeled	that	power	to	form	an	alliance	with	the	populist	but	fairly	conservative	Ibañez,	who	returned	to	the	presidency	in	1952	as	a	stable	alternative	to	the	partisan	chaos	of	national	politics	in	the	1940s.	Ibañez	created	an	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs	within	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization,	which	he	tapped	Coñuepán	to	run.	In	this	way,	Mapuche	leaders	were	able	to	carve	out	space	for	their	people	within	the	Chilean	state	as	it	developed	over	this	fifty-year	period.			
Chapter	Outline	The	first	two	chapters	open	this	dissertation	by	summarizing	the	emergence	of	Mapuche	organizations	in	the	early	twentieth	century.	As	popular	movements	brought	changes	to	the	Chilean	political	landscape	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	the	major	Mapuche	organizations	were	founded	with	the	help	of	non-Mapuche	allies,	but	most	rapidly	became	independent	of	non-native	leaders.	As	they	did	so,	some	made	use	of	new	political	openings	made	available	by	left-leaning	political	parties.	Chapter	one	focuses	on	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef	and	his	Federación	Araucana,	which	represent	the	more	radical	elements	within	the	Mapuche																																																									46	Here	I	refer	to	the	Frente	Único	de	Araucanía,	which	quickly	curried	the	favor	of	the	Frente	
Popular	coalition	led	by	President	Pedro	Aguirre	Cerda	(1938-1941).	47	Albó,	818.	
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movement.	Aburto’s	political	thought	and	strategy	were	premised	upon	older	traditions	of	alliance	making	between	Mapuche	leaders	and	Spanish/Chilean	state	actors	that	extended	back	to	the	colonial	era.	When	Aburto	developed	ties	with	the	Socialist	and	Communist	Parties,	he	used	them	to	oppose	Liberal	Party	projects	that	had	the	potential	to	further	diminish	Mapuche	lands.	In	the	same	era,	he	also	fought	to	preserve	Mapuche	cultural	traditions	by	organizing	large	religious	ceremonies	and	by	supporting	and	practicing	polygamy.	At	one	point	Aburto	even	went	so	far	as	to	propose	the	creation	of	an	autonomous	indigenous	republic	for	the	Mapuche	in	southern	Chile,	which	he	believed	would	be	supported	by	his	socialist	and	communist	allies.		But	Aburto’s	radical	proposals	did	not	go	unchallenged;	he	was	watched	and	arrested	by	federal	police,	and	other	elements	in	Chilean	society	organized	a	response	to	the	prospect	of	greater	independence	for	Indians.	In	chapter	two	I	show	that	the	Catholic	missionary	and	bishop	Guido	Beck	helped	found	and	lead	the	Unión	Araucana	as	a	response	to	Aburto	and	the	Federación.	Beck	and	his	Mapuche	collaborators	advanced	a	more	conservative	form	of	indigenismo,	one	that	staunchly	opposed	the	spread	of	communism	and	sought	to	assimilate	Indians	to	western	social	norms	through	Catholicism.	But	their	efforts	to	carry	out	the	subdivision	of	communally-held	indigenous	lands	using	a	new	indigenous	law	in	1927	caused	the	other	Mapuche	organizations	to	unite	in	opposition,	pushing	the	main	body	of	the	movement	further	to	the	left	of	the	political	spectrum.	Shortly	after	that	frustration,	Beck	had	a	falling	out	with	Antonio	Chihuailaf,	the	president	and	indigenous	face	of	the	Unión,	which	was	publicized	in	the	regional	press	and	
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threatened	to	undercut	Beck’s	influence	with	state	actors.	His	response	was	to	continue	attacking	Aburto	and	the	Federación,	and	as	a	result	he	maintained	a	level	of	importance	within	the	movement	by	providing	a	connection	to	indigenous	populations	that	did	not	fundamentally	challenge	state	control	of	southern	property	or	indigenous	populations.	The	more	conservative	orientation	and	deep	connections	to	state	actors	proved	valuable	to	the	movement,	and	the	right-wing	Unión	joined	the	left-leaning	Federación	and	the	more	centrist	Sociedad	Caupolicán	to	form	the	Corporación	Araucana	when	they	came	together	in	1938.	The	next	two	chapters	shift	the	focus	from	Mapuche	and	indigenista	organizing	within	Chile	to	consider	the	impact	of	the	emergent	transnational	indigenista	movement	after	1940.	Chapter	three	first	provides	an	overview	of	the	indigenista	discourse	by	framing	it	within	global	and	hemispheric	geopolitical	trends	before	shifting	the	focus	to	Chilean	indigenismo	more	specifically.	I	show	how	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano	was	formed	at	a	critical	but	imperiled	moment.	During	and	after	World	War	II,	geopolitical	events	shifted	the	foreign	and	domestic	policies	of	the	most	powerful	governments	in	the	hemisphere	from	populist	and	progressive	efforts	supported	by	international	cooperation	in	the	1930s	toward	new	priorities,	principally	the	consolidation	of	the	post-revolutionary	state	in	Mexico	and	the	containment	of	communism	led	by	the	United	States.	The	III	did	initiate	and	guide	significant	development	projects	toward	the	improvement	of	Indian	populations	in	Mexico	and	other	countries.	However,	those	efforts	unfolded	as	development	schemes	shifted	their	focus	from	integrated	models	that	combined	social	enhancements	with	economic	growth,	toward	more	targeted	development	
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projects	that	prioritized	growth	in	economic	production	over	other	forms	of	improvement.	In	Chile,	indigenistas	contributed	their	insight	to	a	variety	of	indigenous	projects	both	within	the	country	and	through	the	III.	Chapter	four	brings	the	analysis	of	indigenismo	even	more	directly	to	Chile	by	examining	the	life	and	career	of	that	country’s	most	accomplished	indigenista.	Alejandro	Lipschütz	was	born	in	Latvia	and	trained	as	a	biologist	before	emigrating	to	Chile	in	1920.	Once	there,	Lipschütz	became	interested	in	biological,	social	and	political	questions	pertaining	to	indigenous	populations	in	the	Americas,	and	gradually	developed	a	productive	avocation	as	an	indigenista.	Between	the	1930s	and	his	death	in	1980,	he	published	seven	books	on	indigenous	topics,	and	developed	deep	personal	connections	to	indigenistas	around	the	world.	Lipschütz	corresponded	regularly	with	leading	indigenistas	linked	to	the	III.	In	addition	to	participating	in	several	international	indigenista	conferences,	he	helped	found	a	national	indigenista	institute	(Instituto	Indigenista	Chileno	–	IIC)	in	Chile	and	tried	to	convince	the	government	to	ratify	the	Patzcuaro	Convention	and	support	the	institute’s	work,	but	was	largely	unsuccessful.	As	an	avowed	communist	living	and	working	in	Santiago,	I	argue	that	Lipschütz	and	his	counterparts	at	the	IIC	struggled	to	influence	the	Mapuche	movement	or	the	Chilean	government	directly.	As	the	transnational	indigenista	movement	gained	steam,	Mapuche	leaders	based	in	the	rural	south	and	Chilean	state	actors	were	moving	toward	a	more	conservative	brand	of	indigenismo.	They	utilized	long-standing	traditions	of	political	clientelism	and	alliance-making,	which	effectively	marginalized	both	Euro-Chilean	indigenistas	and	more	radical	voices	within	the	Mapuche	movement	at	the	same	time.	
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The	fifth	and	final	chapter	closely	examines	the	work	of	Venancio	Coñuepán	during	his	time	as	Director	of	the	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs	(DASIN),	and	interprets	that	episode	as	an	example	of	formal,	institutionalized	state	indigenismo.	The	critical	period	from	1952-1958	represents	the	height	of	Mapuche	influence	in	Chilean	national	politics	during	the	second	presidency	of	Carlos	Ibañez	del	Campo.	While	in	many	ways	DASIN	can	be	viewed	as	analogous	to	the	Bureau	of	Indian	Affairs	in	the	United	States	or	the	National	Indian	Institute	in	Mexico,	its	work	was	underfunded	and	consumed	with	functional	tasks	related	to	its	supervision	of	the	Indian	courts	in	southern	Chile.	Those	courts	attempted	to	sort	through	decades	of	land	claims	that	were	complicated	by	persistent	fraud	perpetrated	by	Euro-Chilean	landowners,	colonists	and	their	allies	in	the	legal	system,	and	sustained	by	collusion	between	those	sectors.	In	some	cases,	Coñuepán	was	able	to	use	the	mandate	given	to	DASIN	by	Ibañez	as	leverage	to	improve	systems	for	researching	legal	claims,	administering	contracts	and	lending	money	to	Mapuche	smallholders.	But	by	the	end	of	the	decade,	during	the	administration	of	President	Jorge	Alessandri	(1958-1964),	the	political	winds	shifted	and	Coñuepán	was	forced	from	his	post	as	Director	at	about	the	same	time	that	many	Mapuche	politicians	were	swept	from	office.	Thereafter	the	agency	ceased	to	be	an	effective	bulwark	of	protection	for	the	Mapuche	people.	When	the	Mapuche	movement	did	reorganize	in	the	1960s,	the	previous	order	that	sought	alliances	with	politicians	and	parties	in	power	gave	way	to	more	radical	forms	of	political	organizing	and	agitation	affiliated	with	the	left.		This	dissertation	brings	together	these	disparate	forces	to	understand	the	complex	set	of	relationships	between	Mapuche	leaders,	state	actors,	indigenistas	
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and	their	ideas.	In	combining	those	perspectives,	I	map	the	terrain	upon	which	the	Mapuche	people	were	incorporated	into	the	Chilean	state	in	the	forty-year	period	from	1920-1960.	I	show	that	indigenous	leaders	adeptly	borrowed	from	the	transnational	flow	of	ideas	that	circulated	throughout	the	period.	Although	the	story	ends	as	the	tide	of	Mapuche	influence	ebbed,	the	movement	would	quickly	rebound	to	form	a	main	source	of	support	for	Salvador	Allende’s	electoral	socialist	revolution	in	the	early	1970s.	It	would	later	emerge	as	a	vibrant	and	multi-faceted	identity-based	movement	that	helped	to	bring	democracy	back	to	Chile	after	the	seventeen-year	dictatorship	of	Augusto	Pinochet	ended	in	1990.	This	dissertation	joins	a	growing	list	of	studies	that	critically	re-examine	the	role	of	indigenismo	and	the	origins	of	indigenous	activism	in	the	mid-twentieth	century.	While	relatively	small	groups	of	Chilean	indigenistas	and	Mapuche	activists	were	on	the	periphery	of	the	Pan-American	movement,	their	connections	to	it	provided	a	framework	that	enabled	Mapuche	leaders	to	formulate	demands,	and	which	state	actors	could	access	to	understand	and	respond	to	those	demands.		
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Chapter	1:	The	Roots	of	Mapuche	Activism	
	Across	the	twentieth	century,	Mapuche	activists,	organizers	and	politicians	expressed	many	different	viewpoints	on	the	central	challenges	facing	their	people.	Traditional	interpretations	of	the	Mapuche	movement	have	focused	on	the	central,	compromising	character	of	leaders,	specifically	Venancio	Coñuepán	and	his	alliance	of	organizations	under	the	auspices	of	the	Corporación	Araucana	after	1938.	This	chapter	and	the	next	one	explore	the	diversity	of	thought,	strategies	and	alliances	within	the	Mapuche	movement	by	focusing	on	two	organizations	at	the	extremes	–	the	Federación	Araucana	and	the	Unión	Araucana	–	in	the	period	from	1920-1938,	before	they	came	together	to	form	the	Corporación.		Chapter	one	shows	that	Mapuche	activism	emerged	in	partnership	with	white	Euro-Chileans	who	exemplified	the	traditional	characteristics	of	indigenistas.48	Thirty	years	before	the	institutional	framework	of	indigenismo	was	formalized	with	the	creation	of	the	III,	the	first	Mapuche	organizations	were	founded	in	the	1910s.	Even	in	that	early	period,	Mapuche	leaders	chose	a	range	of	strategies	and	political	alliances	to	advance	their	goals.	Those	choices	show	that	the	movement	was	broad,	diverse	and	influenced	by	many	factors.	Then	focusing	more	directly	on	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef’s	thought,	philosophy,	early	influences	and	his	
																																																								48	Foerster	and	Montecino	use	the	phrase	“huincas	‘indigenistas.’”	Huinca	(also	spelled	“winka”	or	“wingka”)	is	a	phrase	that	means	white	and	non-Mapuche,	but	also	carries	connotations	of	the	unbalanced	power	relationship	in	the	process	of	Chilean	colonial	expansion.	Foerster	and	Montecino,	16-18.	Mallon	points	out	that	“wigka”	originally	meant	“thief	who	operates	quickly	and	violently.”	See	Florencia	Mallon,	2005,	p.	255.	
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leadership	of	the	Mapuche	movement	through	the	Federación	Araucana,	I	show	that	Aburto	drew	from	a	long	tradition	of	engagement	with	colonial	and	Chilean	authorities,	and	that	his	projects	and	positions	were	conceived	in	a	reflexive	way.	Aburto	not	only	drew	ideas	from	both	opponents	and	allies,	he	understood	that	both	contributed	to	his	own	prestige	and	authority.	The	Federación	Araucana	and	the	projects	it	carried	out	were	clearly	influenced	by	(and	reactive	to)	the	broader	social,	cultural,	economic	and	political	circumstances	of	Chile	in	the	1920s	and	1930s.	But	in	the	process	of	advocating	for	a	particular	set	of	solutions	to	Mapuche	problems,	Aburto	effectively	constituted	specific	terrain	and	social	roles	for	his	people.	In	effect,	his	work	was	part	of	the	ongoing	creation	of	the	Mapuche	indigenous	identity.			
The	First	Mapuche	Organizations	As	Chilean	settlers	advanced	into	the	Araucanía	in	the	late	nineteenth	century	they	established	schools.	The	first	Mapuche	organizations	were	founded	with	the	help	of	non-Mapuche	educators	associated	with	those	schools.	Their	projects	were	initially	collaborative,	and	illuminate	a	Chilean	form	of	indigenismo	in	which	white,	educated	intellectuals	helped	indigenous	Mapuche	leaders	establish	themselves	and	promote	the	interests	of	their	people.	Mapuche	leaders	derived	from	a	relatively	high	social	stratum	within	Mapuche	society,	the	foundations	of	which	predated	the	Pacification.	This	understanding	provides	an	intellectual	jumping-off	point	to	guide	analysis	of	their	evolving	political	philosophy	and	later	strategic	alliance	making.	
	 35	
	
Perhaps	due	to	the	influence	of	the	indigenistas,	but	also	deriving	from	their	own	familial	and	cultural	backgrounds,	early	Mapuche	leaders	brought	distinct	perspectives	to	the	Mapuche	movement	and	the	organizations	they	founded	and	led.	Historian	Joanna	Crow	has	analyzed	the	intellectual	underpinnings	of	three	of	those	Mapuche	leaders’	views	on	land	and	culture	in	the	1920s	and	1930s:	Manuel	Manquilef,	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef	and	Venancio	Coñuepán.	Manquilef	was	a	strong	proponent	of	individual	land	rights	and	the	subdivision	of	communally	held	land.	He	spearheaded	the	passage	of	the	Ley	Indígena	1.469	in	1927,	which	created	a	process	for	subdividing	Mapuche	communal	land	so	that	individuals	could	sell,	borrow	against	and	improve	their	lands.	Manuel	Aburto,	on	the	other	hand,	saw	the	preservation	of	community	land	(and	recovery	of	lost	land)	as	central	to	his	people’s	ability	to	maintain	their	cultural	practices	and	therefore	their	identity	as	Indians.	He	also	held	out	hope	for	the	re-creation	of	an	independent	Mapuche	republic,	which	put	him	at	odds	with	the	Chilean	state	and	made	him	a	target	for	incarceration	and	repression.49	Although	they	both	strove	for	the	betterment	of	their	people,	Manuel	Manquilef	and	Manuel	Aburto	held	competing	visions	of	the	indigenous	past	of	the	Mapuche.	On	one	hand,	Manquilef	expressed	ambivalence	between	the	glorious,	prosperous	and	warlike	past	and	the	Mapuche’s	destitute	and	repressed	present.	Accounting	for	that	difference,	he	blamed	a	lack	of	education	and	Mapuche	ignorance	of	Chilean	legal	and	economic	practices,	hence	his	perseverance	in	demanding	educational	opportunities	and	ultimately	a	greater	measure	of																																																									49	Joanna	Crow,	“Negotiating	Inclusion	in	the	Nation:	Mapuche	Intellectuals	and	the	Chilean	State,”	Latin	American	and	Caribbean	Ethnic	Studies,	Vol.	5,	No.	2,	Jul.	2010,	pp.	131-152.	
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assimilation	for	Mapuche	in	the	1920s.	Aburto,	on	the	other	hand,	felt	no	ambivalence	toward	the	past	or	contradiction	in	the	value	of	Mapuche	culture	in	the	present.	It	was	not	necessary	for	individuals	to	give	up	aspects	of	indigenous	culture	in	order	to	prosper	in	the	1920s,	it	was	only	necessary	for	the	Chilean	state	and	people	to	gain	a	measure	of	respect	for	that	culture	and	value	it	as	equal	(or	at	least	equivalent)	to	their	own.50		Foerster	and	Montecino	trace	this	distinction	to	the	hereditary	roots	of	the	two	leaders.	Manquilef	was	the	son	of	a	cacique	aliado	(a	chief	who	cooperated	with	the	Chilean	army	during	the	Pacification)	and	a	captive	Chilean	mother.	Aburto	descended	from	the	Mapuche	“huilliche”	culture	group	in	territory	further	south	and	less	directly	affected	during	the	Pacification.	A	distant	ancestor	had	served	as	a	“go-between”	and	had	participated	in	the	peace	treaty	signed	in	1793	between	the	Spanish	Crown	and	Mapuche	caciques	in	the	southern	region	of	Osorno.	That	accord,	the	authors	argue,	resulted	from	a	significantly	less	traumatic	“pacification”	than	the	one	that	occurred	a	hundred	years	later	and	further	north.51	It	also	occurred	before	the	period	of	Mapuche	prosperity	in	the	mid-nineteenth	century,	and	therefore	reinforced	Aburto’s	conception	that	traditional	Mapuche	culture	did																																																									50	In	chapter	three,	I	establish	a	continuum	of	cultural	preservation-assimilation	that	is	a	useful	tool	in	understanding	the	indigenista	approach	to	uplifting	Indians.	Without	exploring	that	concept	fully	at	this	point,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	these	three	indigenous	leaders	occupied	different	places	on	that	continuum	as	well,	related	to	the	positions	they	took	on	specific	questions	related	to	social	and	economic	advancement.		51	For	a	different	perspective	on	the	“trauma”	produced	by	the	Spanish	colonial	subjugation	of	the	Huilliche,	see	Jesse	Zarley,	“Towards	a	Transandean	Mapuche	Politics:	Ritual	and	Power	in	Chile	and	Argentina,	1792-1834,”	PhD	diss.,	University	of	Maryland,	College	Park,	2017.	Zarley	shows	that	although	the	Huilliche	peoples	around	Valdivia	maintained	a	tenuous	peace	with	Spanish	colonial	authorities,	they	were	the	victims	and	perpetrators	significant	episodic	violence.	In	particular,	the	1793	Parlamento	of	Negrete	was	precipitated	by	a	brutal	campaign	against	Huilliche	longkos	who	had	pushed	back	against	colonial	incursions	on	their	territory	(chapter	3).	
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not	need	to	be	abandoned.52	Those	differences	aside,	they	both	supported	their	people	against	perceived	injustices	from	the	state	and	Chilean	society.	As	early	as	1915,	Manquilef	was	trying	to	overcome	the	racial	prejudices	that	Chilean	society	had	of	Mapuche.	In	his	book	Las	Tierras	de	Arauco,	Manquilef	listed	and	refuted	several	commonly	held	prejudices,	including	the	notions	that	Indians	were	lazy,	dirty	and	dishonest.	Ten	years	later	in	an	interview	published	in	the	region’s	newspaper	of	record	El	Diario	Austral	he	added,	“It	can	be	said	that	all	of	the	vices	that	are	today	attributed	to	Indians	are	fictitious.	They	are	the	products	of	efforts	made	by	those	who	would	steal	their	last	inch	of	land.”53	Venancio	Coñuepán,	meanwhile,	charted	a	pragmatic	middle	course	in	which	he	maintained	support	for	the	rights	of	Mapuche	to	hold	land	in	common	and	thereby	prevent	the	division	and	sale	of	land	by	individuals.	However,	he	also	viewed	economic	progress	as	critical	for	Mapuche	survival	and	therefore	recognized	the	need	for	some	measure	of	cultural	assimilation.54	Coñuepán’s	pragmatism	enabled	him	to	become	a	kind	of	political	insider.	He	went	on	to	unite	and	then	lead	the	major	Mapuche	organizations	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Corporación	Araucana	in	1938.	Then	he	was	elected	to	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	in	1945	and	1949,	and	appointed	as	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	in	1953.	Finally,	he	oversaw	the	creation	of	an	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs	within	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	and	served	as	the	Director	of	that	office	from	1953	until	1960.	That	period	represents	a	high-water	mark	for	the	incorporation	of	the	Mapuche																																																									52	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	81-88.	53	Manuel	Manquilef,	Las	Tierras	del	Arauco,	Temuco:	Imprenta	Modernista,	1915.	Cited	in	Foerster	and	Montecino,	p.	82.	54	Joanna	Crow,	2010,	p.	132.	
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movement	into	the	Chilean	state.	But	in	order	to	fully	understand	the	process	by	which	the	Corporación	came	together,	and	why	that	component	of	the	movement	was	able	to	penetrate	the	state	while	others	were	excluded,	we	must	step	back	and	explore	more	fully	the	roots	of	these	Mapuche	political	organizations	and	the	spectrum	of	political	issues	and	positions	they	supported.				
La	Sociedad	Caupolicán	The	first	major	Mapuche	political	organization,	La	Sociedad	Caupolicán,	was	founded	in	1910,	with	the	assistance	of	Tomás	Guevara	and	Charles	Sadleir.	Guevara	was	the	Director	of	the	Liceo	Temuco,	a	secondary	school	in	the	regional	capital	that	educated	Mapuche	youth,	and	Sadleir	was	an	Anglican	minister	whose	mission	founded	several	schools	that	functioned	as	gathering	places	for	Mapuche	leaders	and	their	children	in	the	first	decades	of	the	century.	Foerster	and	Montecino	explain	that	their	presence	at	the	founding	banquet	of	the	Sociedad	illustrated	a	connection	between	the	Mapuche-led	organizations	and	“white	‘indigenistas’	who	promoted	education.”	However,	they	add	that	their	partnership	was	not	exactly	one	of	equals.	“We	can	appreciate	that	the	indigenista	ideas	of	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	were	based	on	the	notion	of	equality	between	Mapuche	and	Huinca.	However,	this	equality	was	not	real	because	‘reason’	was	a	source	of	power	in	the	hands	of	whites.	Only	by	being	compassionate	and	handing	over	‘reason’	could	equality	be	realized.”55		
																																																								55	Foerster	and	Montecino,	p.	18.	
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Although	their	partnership	carried	with	it	an	imbalance	of	power	tilted	in	favor	of	the	indigenistas,	the	Mapuche	leaders	of	the	Sociedad	soon	eclipsed	them	in	leading	the	organization.	In	1916,	Manuel	Manquilef	rose	to	become	president	of	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán.	Manquilef	was	the	son	of	a	Mapuche	longko	and	his	Chilean	wife.	He	had	been	educated	briefly	at	one	of	Sadleir’s	mission	schools,	but	later	studied	at	the	Liceo	Temuco,	where	he	met	Tomás	Guevara.56	Manquilef	and	Guevara	co-authored	several	books	on	Mapuche	history,	culture	and	linguistics,	and	Manquilef	would	pioneer	the	publication	of	bilingual	Spanish-Mapudungun	texts	with	his	Comentarios	del	Pueblo	Araucano	in	1911.57		Under	his	leadership,	Manquilef	built	a	platform	for	the	Sociedad	that	included	the	settlement	of	communities	not	yet	granted	land,	tax	exemption	for	Mapuche	lands,	education	and	persistent	denunciation	of	the	abuses	received	by	Mapuche.	For	a	time	the	Sociedad	was	able	to	work	together	with	the	leaders	of	other	Mapuche	organizations	that	were	founded	later	in	the	1910s,	like	the	Federación	Araucana	and	Moderna	Araucanía.58	But	in	1925,	Manquilef	resigned	his	leadership	position	in	the	Sociedad	in	order	to	run	for	a	seat	in	the	Cámara	de	Diputados.	Soon	after	his	election,	he	introduced	a	revised	indigenous	law	to	the	Chilean	National	Congress	that	facilitated	the	division	of	Mapuche	lands.	On	that	
																																																								56	Biblioteca	del	Congreso	Nacional	de	Chile,		https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Manuel_Segundo_Manquilef_Gonz%C3%A1lez,	accessed	Feb.	22,	2018.	57	Manuel	Manquilef,	Comentarios	del	Pueblo	Araucano	(la	faz	social),	Santiago	de	Chile,	Imprenta	Cervantes,	1911.		58	Moderna	Araucanía	was	an	organization	founded	by	Antonio	Chihuailaf.	In	1926,	Chihuailaf	became	the	president	of	the	Unión	Araucana,	a	role	that	is	explored	more	fully	in	chapter	two.	Although	Moderna	continued	to	exist	throughout	the	period,	it	did	not	develop	a	major	role	in	the	movement.	
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issue,	the	Sociedad	and	other	Mapuche	organizations	broke	with	Manquilef	and	began	to	organize	their	opposition	to	the	law.59	In	1925,	the	Mapuche	schoolteacher	Arturo	Huenchullán	Medel	succeeded	Manquilef	as	president	of	the	Sociedad.	Huenchullán	aligned	the	Sociedad	more	strongly	against	Manquilef’s	proposed	Ley	Indígena.	For	two	years	they	fought	against	the	law,	but	in	1927	Ley	Indígena	1.469	was	promulgated	by	the	Senate	and	signed	by	President	Carlos	Ibañez	del	Campo.	Huenchullán	left	Chile	to	study	in	the	United	States,	and	José	Cayupi	took	the	reins	of	the	Sociedad	with	Esteban	Romero	as	his	Secretary.	All	three	men	would	later	win	election	as	diputados	themselves,	but	in	the	meantime	tried	to	use	the	law’s	provisions	to	recover	usurped	lands	and	called	for	the	establishment	of	a	fund	to	loan	money	to	indigenous	farmers	for	agricultural	development.		Resistance	to	the	division	of	community	lands	continued,	and	in	1929	the	tribunal	that	had	been	tasked	with	subdividing	lands	was	disbanded.	Romero	took	over	the	presidency	of	the	Sociedad,	with	Venancio	Coñuepán	as	Secretary,	at	a	time	when	the	Sociedad	had	maintained	a	relatively	antagonistic	position	toward	President	Ibañez’s	reform	of	southern	property	and	indigenous	landholding	through	Manquilef’s	Ley	Indígena	1.469.60	It	is	worth	noting	that	although	many	Mapuche	leaders	rose	to	prominence	through	their	leadership	of	the	Sociedad,	those	leaders	took	a	range	of	political	positions	and	the	organization	itself	moved	across	the	political	spectrum	over	time.	Manuel	Manquilef’s	land	reform	project	was	based	upon	classically	liberal	notions	of	private	property,	Arturo	Huenchullán	moved	the																																																									59	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	22-23.	60	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	23-28.		
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group	to	the	left	to	oppose	Manquilef’s	law	and	Coñuepán	ultimately	charted	a	more	moderate	middle	path	to	bring	the	disparate	movement	together	after	1938.	In	1931,	Coñuepán	would	assume	the	presidency	of	the	Sociedad,	which	marked	a	new	phase	not	only	in	the	political	orientation	of	that	organization,	but	soon	all	Mapuche	organizations.	In	that	year,	Coñuepán	joined	other	Mapuche	leaders	like	Romero,	Cayupí,	Huenchullán	and	Manuel	Aburto	to	support	the	candidacy	of	Arturo	Alessandri	for	President	of	Chile.	For	his	part,	Coñuepán	viewed	economic	advancement	as	central	to	the	aspirations	of	the	Mapuche	people,	and	believed	that	they	could	achieve	a	measure	of	equality	within	Chilean	society	by	collaborating	with	the	ruling	class.	In	Alessandri,	those	Mapuche	leaders	saw	a	candidate	who	would	champion	the	working	classes	and	return	Chile	to	the	rule	of	law	following	years	of	dictatorial	and	junta	rule.	Although	Coñuepán,	Romero	and	Cayupi	tended	to	favor	economic	advancement,	Huenchullán	supported	improvements	in	education	and	Aburto	fought	for	cultural	independence,	they	all	agreed	that	the	defense	of	Mapuche	landholding	was	central	to	their	cause,	and	for	a	time	saw	Alessandri	as	a	champion	for	the	Mapuche	people	in	the	highest	office	in	the	land.61		
La	Federación	Araucana	La	Federación	Araucana	was	the	brainchild	of	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef,	a	descendant	of	a	distinguished	line	of	Mapuche	longkos,	from	the	southern	town	of	Loncoche.	In	1916,	Aburto	formed	the	Sociedad	Mapuche	de	Protección	Mutua	de																																																									61	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	30-32.	
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Loncoche	(Mapuche	Mutual	Protection	Society	of	Loncoche),	which	from	the	beginning	had	as	its	primary	aim	the	preservation	and	continuation	of	Mapuche	cultural	traditions	that	were	being	eroded	and	undermined	by	the	processes	of	radicación,	Euro-Chilean	settlement	in	the	region,	and	agricultural	development.	Those	forces	were	combining	to	divide	Mapuche	communities	and	parcel	off	their	land.	One	of	their	earliest	cultural	efforts	included	a	theater	tour	that	brought	a	Mapuche	troupe	through	Valparaiso	and	Santiago,	introducing	indigenous	songs	and	dances	to	white,	urban	Chilean	society.	In	1921	Aburto	organized	the	first	Congreso	
Araucano	(Araucanian	Congress),	which	brought	together	Mapuche	from	throughout	the	region	in	a	gathering	that	expressed	their	common	cultural	characteristics	and	the	need	to	unite	in	order	to	defend	indigenous	culture,	land	and	community	against	the	onslaught	of	migration	and	development.	In	1922,	in	order	to	broaden	the	organization’s	focus,	Aburto	reconstituted	it	as	the	Federación	Araucana,	which	he	would	go	on	to	lead	until	his	death	in	1952.	At	its	inception	the	organization	was	led	entirely	by	Mapuche.	Although	Sadleir	supported	the	Federación	and	participated	in	the	Congresos	it	organized	as	“Cacique	General,”	that	title	was	more	ceremonial	than	functional,	and	throughout	its	existence	the	Federación	would	remain	the	most	radical,	autonomous	and	for	a	period	of	time	left-leaning	of	the	major	Mapuche	political	organizations.62	The	adoption	of	the	name	“Federación”	mirrored	the	terminology	used	by	two	of	the	most	important	leftist	organizations	of	the	period,	the	Federación	Obrera	de	Chile	(FOCh	–	Workers’	
																																																								62	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	33-36.	
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Federation	of	Chile)	and	the	Federación	de	Estudiantes	de	la	Universidad	de	Chile	(FECh	–	Federation	of	Students	of	the	University	of	Chile).	In	1924,	Aburto	used	the	Federación	to	form	a	committee	to	support	the	candidacy	of	Francisco	Melivilu,	another	young	Mapuche	who	had	been	educated	at	the	Liceo	Temuco	under	Tomás	Guevara’s	tutelage.63	In	the	same	year	Aburto	formed	the	Comité	Ejecutivo	de	la	Araucanía	(Executive	Committee	of	the	Araucanía),	which	served	to	bring	together	the	leaders	of	several	Mapuche	organizations,	most	importantly	the	Federación	and	Sociedad	Caupolicán,	and	coordinate	the	annual	Congresos	that	he	used	to	mobilize	rank	and	file	participants.64	Melivilu	campaigned	to	become	a	Diputado	in	the	Chilean	National	Congress	representing	the	Partido	Demócrata	(PD),	which	emerged	as	the	first	significant	pillar	of	support	for	Mapuche	interests	within	the	Chilean	political	landscape	in	the	1920s.	Not	inconsequentially,	the	PD	was	also	part	of	President	Arturo	Alessandri’s	ruling	coalition.	In	the	same	year,	Aburto	joined	other	Mapuche	leaders	with	different	political	allegiances	in	a	regional	Parlamento	where	those	assembled	agreed	on	proposals	to	suspend	payments	of	property	taxes,	subdivide	indigenous	property	and	found	an	industrial	and	agricultural	boarding	school	for	Mapuche	in	Temuco.65	Although	Aburto	and	the	Federación	worked	with	the	other	
																																																								63	Biblioteca	del	Congreso	Nacional	de	Chile,	https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Francisco_Melivilu_Henr%C3%ADquez,	accessed	February	20,	2018.	64	Menard	and	Pavez	2005a,	p.	51	65	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	36-39.	See	also,	André	Menard	and	Jorge	Pávez,	(2005a),	p.	51.	In	footnote	1,	the	authors	explain	that	in	1923	Aburto	expressed	support	for	the	project	of	land	division	for	the	first	and	only	time	by	signing	a	document	prepared	by	Manquilef.	They	add,	“the	details	of	their	agreement	remain	murky.”	It	is	possible	that	Aburto’s	early	support	for	subdivision	was	due	to	the	belief	that	the	process	would	unearth	past	land	fraud	
	 44	
	
Mapuche	organizations,	they	maintained	a	cultural	and	religious	character	in	their	political	action	that	set	them	apart	from	mainstream	Chilean	society	and	even	the	other	Mapuche	groups.66		As	the	1920s	wore	on,	more	Mapuche	leaders	were	elected	to	national	office	and	they	made	more	concrete	proposals	for	the	subdivision	of	land.	As	mentioned,	Manuel	Manquilef	was	elected	as	a	Diputado	representing	the	Liberal	Democratic	Party,	and	he	pushed	for	a	new	Ley	Indígena	that	subdivided	Mapuche	community	land.	Aburto	and	the	Federación	vehemently	opposed	Manquilef’s	law,	and	that	put	them	at	odds	with	other	Mapuche	leaders.	For	example,	in	the	same	year,	the	outspoken	Martín	Collío	published	a	letter	in	El	Diario	Austral	(paper	of	record	in	Temuco	and	throughout	Cautín	Province)	in	which	he	called	Aburto	the	“caudillo	(strongman)	of	communism”	and	referred	to	the	Federación	as	“the	Soviet	of	the	Mapuche.”67	Those	charges	situate	Aburto	and	the	Federación	within	the	political	
																																																																																																																																																																					and	thereby	advance	Mapuche	interests	in	recovering	usurped	land.	It	is	also	possible	that	Aburto’s	support	for	Manquilef	was	principally	for	the	creation	of	a	new	law,	and	that	need	superseded	his	concern	over	subdivision.	Foerster	and	Montecino	make	the	point	that	early	in	this	period	(1915-1925)	Manquilef,	Melivilu	and	Aburto	were	united	in	their	criticism	of	the	process	of	radicación	and	they	all	argued	for	a	new	law	that	took	as	a	starting	point	the	indigenous	perspective.	As	it	turns	out,	however,	Manquilef	saw	subdivision	as	the	answer,	while	Aburto	was	concerned	that	subdivision	would	further	the	loss	of	culture,	and	that	difference	of	opinion	pitted	them	against	one	another.	(see	also	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	68-73).	66	Aburto	joined	Manuel	Manquilef	and	Antonio	Chihuailaf	in	the	1924	Parlamento.	As	we	have	seen,	Manquilef’s	Ley	1.469	would	later	divide	the	two	over	the	issue	of	land	reform.	Chihuailaf	was	at	this	time	the	leader	of	Moderna	Araucanía,	a	small	Mapuche	organization	based	in	the	southern	town	of	Cunco,	but	he	would	later	be	chosen	by	Guido	Beck	to	lead	the	Unión	Araucana.	His	leadership	of	the	Unión	is	examined	more	fully	in	chapter	three.	67	Martín	Collío	R.,	letter	to	El	Diario	Austral,	Jul.	8,	1926,	cited	in	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	40-41.	See	also,	Martín	Collío	R.,	letter	to	El	Diario	Austral,	Jul.	5,	1926.	Published	in	Menard	and	Pavez	2005a,	p.	99,	where	Collío	uses	the	same	language	to	lambast	Arturo	Huenchullán	and	the	Sociedad.	For	their	part,	members	of	the	Unión	Araucana	also	accused	Collío	of	having	communist	sympathies.	See	complaint	sent	by	Antonio	Trangulao	
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landscape	of	Chile	in	the	1920s,	which	was	an	era	in	which	workers’	parties	were	being	organized	and	left-wing	factions	were	breaking	off	of	mainstream	parties.	As	political	parties	evolved	and	contested	one	another	for	power	in	Chile,	Aburto	attempted	to	navigate	this	shifting	terrain	to	advance	the	interests	of	his	people.	His	allegiance	with	left-leaning	parties	would	have	broad	significance	that	extends	beyond	Chile’s	borders.	Scholars	have	pointed	out	that	in	the	Cold	War	period,	the	hesitance	of	the	United	States	to	participate	more	officially	in	transnational	indigenismo	was	due	in	part	to	procommunist	attitudes	within	indigenous	politics	and	the	indigenista	movement.68	In	1927,	the	same	year	that	Carlos	Ibañez	seized	power	and	promulgated	Manquilef’s	Ley	1.469,	the	rift	between	Mapuche	organizations	grew,	with	Huenchullán’s	Sociedad	and	Aburto’s	Federación	opposing	the	law	and	Manquilef,	Collío	and	Guido	Beck’s	Unión	Araucana	supporting	it.	As	the	divide	grew,	the	rhetoric	escalated.	In	March	of	that	year,	the	Sociedad	and	Federación	hosted	a	joint	rally	attended	by	as	many	as	5,000	Mapuche.	The	Mexican	Protestant	preacher	Roberto	Tellez	spoke	about	Mexico’s	history	of	revolution	where	Indians	rose	up	to	demand	land	and	rights	from	an	oppressive	liberal	regime.	According	to	a	report	in	
El	Diario	Austral,	the	crowd	was	whipped	into	frenzy,	shouting	“war”	and	“cannon,”	at	which	point	“Aburto	increased	the	dread	by	emptying	his	revolver	with	five	shots	
																																																																																																																																																																					Huentecura	to	Intendente	de	Cautín,	Jul.	6,	1928	and	responses,	Archivo	Diócesis	de	Villarrica,	Carpeta	Unión	Araucana	1.	See	also	footnote	217.	68	Jorge	Iván	Vergara	and	Hans	Gundermann,	“Chile	y	El	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano,	1940-1993:	Una	Visión	de	Conjunto,”	Chungara,	Revista	de	Antropología	
Chilena,	2016,	p.	3.	
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into	the	air.”69	Such	actions	drew	not	only	the	criticism	of	the	Bishop	Guido	Beck,	who	called	Aburto	“the	seducer	of	the	Araucanian	people”	who	“openly	spread	anti-Christian,	subversive	and	ill-fated	propaganda	and	knows	how	to	stir	their	baser	instincts,”	but	also	the	future	President	Ibañez	himself.	As	Minister	of	the	Interior,	Ibañez	sent	a	telegram	to	the	Intendencia	of	Temuco,	threatening	Aburto	and	Huenchullán	with	jail	or	exile	if	they	persisted	in	propagandizing	against	the	government	and	the	proposed	law.70		Ibañez	would	make	good	on	his	threat	six	months	after	his	uncontested	election	to	the	presidency.	In	November	of	1927,	Ibañez	called	on	his	newly	created	national	police	force,	the	Carabineros	de	Chile,	to	detain	Aburto	and	send	him	into	internal	exile,	where	he	would	remain	until	March	1928.	The	following	year,	Aburto	organized	the	ninth	Congreso	Araucano,	which	boasted	the	largest	crowds	yet	with	about	10,000	Mapuche	in	attendance.	The	Congreso	subsequently	sent	their	accords	to	President	Ibañez	in	the	form	of	a	telegram,	which	included	calling	for	a	study	of	potential	reforms	to	the	Ley	1.469	and	the	return	of	the	archives	of	the	Federación	and	Comité	Ejecutivo,	which	had	been	seized	in	1929.71	In	this	period,	Aburto	was	increasingly	well	connected	with	actors	on	the	left,	although	the	extent	to	which	that	contact	was	intentional	and	strategic	is	debatable.72	
																																																								69	El	Diario	Austral,	Feb.	16,	1927;	cited	in	Foerster	and	Montecino,	p.	43.	70	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	42-44.	71	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	44-48.		72	Some	have	argued	that	Aburto’s,	and	by	extension	other	Mapuche	actors’,	ties	to	the	left	were	exaggerated	by	their	political	enemies	like	Guido	Beck	and	the	Unión	Araucania,	as	we	shall	see	in	the	next	chapter.	See	also,	Thomas	Miller	Klubock,	“Ránquil:	Violence	and	Peasant	Politics	on	Chile’s	Southern	Frontier,”	in	Greg	Grandin	and	Gil	Joseph,	eds.	A	Century	
of	Revolution:	Insurgent	and	Counter-Insurgent	Violence	During	Latin	America’s	Long	Cold	
War,	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010,	pp.	144-145.	
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As	Chile	plunged	into	a	second	period	of	political	crisis,	in	which	the	country	had	a	total	of	eight	different	presidents	between	Ibañez’s	resignation	in	July	of	1931	and	the	second	presidency	of	Arturo	Alessandri	that	began	in	December	of	1932,	Aburto	worked	to	bring	the	Federación	and	Sociedad	Caupolicán	together.	He	relied	on	his	partnership	with	Arturo	Huenchullán,	who	still	had	great	influence	with	the	Sociedad	and	would	later	be	elected	to	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	himself	in	1933.	But	in	the	meantime	the	Aburto	and	Huenchullán	collaborated	to	support	Alessandri’s	campaign	in	the	fall	of	1931.	Aburto’s	political	positions	and	aspirations	were	becoming	significantly	more	ambitious	and	increasingly	moving	toward	the	left.	In	order	to	understand	how	those	transitions	were	compatible	with	his	support	for	Alessandri,	we	must	remember	that	Chile’s	political	turmoil	began	when	Alessandri’s	populist	legislative	reforms	became	mired	in	parliamentary	gridlock	during	his	first	presidency	in	the	early	1920s.	Aburto	also	saw	Alessandri	as	a	candidate	who	would	be	willing	to	help	him	solve	the	central	problems	facing	his	people.73	Meanwhile,	the	Federación,	Sociedad	Caupolicán	and	other	Mapuche	organizations	came	together	to	celebrate	the	eleventh	Congreso	Araucana	in	December	of	1931.	That	gathering	produced	the	most	radical	elements	of	Aburto’s	vision	for	his	people,	including	his	utopian	dream	of	an	independent	Mapuche	republic.	Moreover,	the	Congreso	coincided	with	a	political	transition	in	which	Aburto	worked	to	create	allegiances	with	the	most	radical	segments	of	Chile’s	political	left,	including	the	Partido	Comunista	(PC	–	Communist	Party)	and	the																																																									73	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	48-49.	
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FOCh.74	In	order	to	more	fully	understand	the	reasons	behind	and	significance	of	Aburto’s	transition	toward	the	left	in	the	late	1920s	and	early	1930s,	we	next	turn	to	examine	Aburto’s	personal	and	family	background.		
Manuel	Aburto:	Portrait	of	a	Mapuche	Leader	Many	of	the	twentieth	century	Mapuche	leaders,	organizers	and	activists	descended	from	powerful	chiefs	and	merchants	of	nineteenth	century	Araucanía.	That	was	certainly	the	case	for	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef,	and	an	examination	of	his	lineage	provides	a	window	into	his	framework	for	thinking	about	political	practice	and	the	issues	that	he	engaged	during	his	career.	Although	he	sometimes	staked	out	positions	that	could	be	considered	radical	or	extreme	from	a	Euro-Chilean	perspective,	he	maintained	a	respect	for	political	authority	that	made	him	seem	somewhat	contradictory	as	a	revolutionary	figure.	In	the	mid-nineteenth	century	Aburto	Panguilef’s	great	grandfather	José	Ayiñamco	adopted	the	surname	“Aburto”	as	a	symbol	of	a	pact	he	made	with	the	Chilean	Francisco	Aburto	y	Ramírez.	Members	of	the	Aburto	family	had	served	in	the	capacity	of	comisario	de	naciones	(literally,	“commissioner	of	nations”)	since	the	late-eighteenth	century,	a	role	that	functioned	as	a	kind	of	ambassador	between	the	Spanish	colony	(and	later	the	Chilean	state)	and	various	Mapuche	chiefs	in	the	frontier	region.	Because	the	comisario	de	naciones	had	the	authority	to	create	treaties,	the	Mapuche	longkos	who	interacted	with	them	derived	some	of	their	own	authority	from	that	relationship.	It	also	put	them	in	a	privileged	position	relative	to	other	Mapuche																																																									74	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	49-52.	
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longkos,	as	they	had	the	authority	to	negotiate	with	the	state	and	represent	other	longkos	in	doing	so.	Chilean	historian	André	Menard	examines	this	lineage	in	detail	in	his	presentation	of	Aburto	Panguilef’s	Libro	Diario.75	Aburto	Panguilef’s	paternal	uncle,	Bernardo	Aburto	Namuncurá,	also	figured	prominently	in	the	development	of	Aburto	Panquilef’s	political	mindset.	Aburto	Namuncurá	served	as	a	secretary	to	the	renowned	longko	Juan	Calfucurá,	which	put	him	in	a	position	to	collaborate	and	negotiate	with	both	Chilean	and	Argentine	authorities	to	draft	treaties	in	the	1870s	as	the	Pacification	and	War	of	the	Desert	unfolded.	Namuncurá	derived	his	authority	and	prestige	from	his	proximity	to	Calfucurá	and	Chilean	authorities,	and	also	from	his	ability	to	speak,	read	and	write	the	Spanish	language.	Speaking	of	his	grandfather	and	Uncle	Bernardo	in	a	1923	interview,	Aburto	Panguilef	said	they	“played	a	great	role	in	the	pacification	of	Araucanía	in	the	province	of	Valdivia,	and	never	allowed	the	Indians	to	lack	the	respect	owed	to	the	government.”76	Considering	that	Aburto	Panguilef	is	often	characterized	as	the	most	radical	of	the	Mapuche	leaders	in	this	period,	and	also	that	he	was	surveilled	and	persecuted	by	Chilean	authorities	in	the	1920s	and	1930s,	this	insight	provides	a	counterbalance	to	the	view	of	Aburto	Panguilef	as	a	radical	when	trying	to	ascertain	his	intentions	and	understand	his	political	strategy.		Aburto	Namuncurá	and	other	leaders	of	his	father’s	generation	figured	importantly	in	the	creation	of	the	Anglican	mission	at	Quepe,	which	was	founded	by																																																									75	André	Menard,	“Estudio	Preliminar:	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef	y	los	archivos	de	la	Federación	Araucana,”	in	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef,	Libro	Diario	del	Presidente	de	la	
Federación	Araucana:	1940,	1942,	1948-1951,	André	Menard,	ed.	CoLibris:	Santiago,	Chile,	2013,	pp.	XX-XXIII.	76	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef,	“Los	fines	que	persigue	la	Federación	Araucana	de	Loncoche,”	
El	Mercurio,	Santiago	de	Chile,	Jan.	20,	1923,	p.	14.	Cited	in	Menard	2013,	p.	XX.	
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the	Canadian	missionary	Charles	Sadleir.77	Namuncurá	and	the	longko	Ambrosio	Payllalef	adopted	the	Christian	faith	and	spent	considerable	time	at	the	mission.	In	the	next	generation,	Aburto	Panguilef	and	Manuel	Manquilef	were	both	educated	there,	and	established	important	indigenista	contacts	through	the	mission.	Charles	Sadleir	corresponded	with	the	famed	Chilean	linguist	and	folklorist	Rodolfo	Lenz	between	1896	and	1912.78	Manuel	Manquilef	began	his	education	at	the	mission’s	school,	then	went	on	to	graduate	from	Liceo	Temuco	where	he	studied	with	Tomás	Guevara,	and	eventually	returned	to	the	Quepe	mission	as	a	teacher.79	Sadleir	would	also	later	attend	many	of	Aburto’s	Congresos,	adopting	the	ceremonial	title	“Cacique	General	de	la	Araucanía.”	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef	originally	set	out	to	become	a	missionary	himself,	and	the	training	he	received	at	the	Quepe	mission	school	established	the	roots	of	his	profound	spirituality,	which	remained	an	important	thread	in	his	writing	throughout	his	prodigious	career.	However,	upon	graduating	from	the	school,	he	took	his	first	job	working	for	the	Protectorado	de	Indígenas	(Indian	Protectorate)	in	Valdivia,	where	he	served	as	a	translator	for	the	court.80	There	he	himself	entered	the	tradition	of	Mapuche	“go-betweens”	as	his	grandfather	and	uncle	before	him.	In	the	introduction	to	Aburto	Panguilef’s	published	diaries	from	the	1940s,	Menard	shows	how	this	family	and	personal	history	shaped	his	life,	work	and	writings	from	his	founding	of	the	Sociedad	Mapuche	de	Protección	Mutua	de	Loncoche	in	1916																																																									77	For	a	photographic	introduction	to	the	work	of	Sadleir	at	the	Quepe	mission,	see	André	Menard	and	Jorge	Pavez,	Mapuche	y	Anglicanos:	Vestigios	fotográficos	de	la	Misión	Araucana	
de	Kepe,	1896-1908,	Ocho	Libros	Editores:	Santiago	de	Chile,	2007.	78	Mapuche	y	Anglicanos,	pp.	174-181.	79	Ibid.	158.	80	Menard	2013,	p.	XXIV.	
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and	throughout	his	career.81	Menard	traces	those	influences	through	three	distinct	phases,	which	correspond	to	the	evolution	of	his	political	activities	and	organizations,	and	also	to	the	existing	archival	sources	that	remain.	To	follow	Menard’s	work,	let	us	take	a	brief	aside	to	explain	and	establish	the	chronology	of	Aburto	Panguilef’s	political	career.		The	corpus	of	archival	material	relating	to	Aburto	Panquilef’s	life	and	career	includes	three	distinct	caches.	In	1929,	Carabineros	(Chilean	military	police)	raided	the	offices	of	the	Federación/Comité	Ejecutivo	and	confiscated	their	archives.82	Some	of	those	documents	ended	up	in	the	National	Archives	collection	of	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior,	and	were	discovered	by	sociologist	Jorge	Pavez	in	2003.83	Those	constitute	a	sample	of	approximately	170	pages,	dating	from	1924-1929.	Although	Aburto	Panguilef	(and	later	his	son	Germán)	repeatedly	and	officially	requested	the	return	of	all	the	confiscated	documents,	it	is	not	clear	what	became	of	the	remainder.	The	second	cache	of	documents	is	found	in	the	Museo	Municipal	de	Loncoche,	where	about	300	pages	of	material	from	1933-1955	represent	internal	documents	related	to	the	function	of	the	Federación,	Comité	Ejecutivo	and	the	annual	Congresos	they	organized.84	Finally,	descendants	of	Aburto	Panguilef	retained	in	their	family	archive	a	series	of	journals	that	he	wrote,	which	totaled	
																																																								81	Menard	recounts	this	family	history	in	several	published	works,	including	“Los	Archivos	del	’29,”	p.	60,	“El	Congreso	Araucano,”	p.	221,	and	“Libro	Diario,”	p.	XIX-XXVII.	82	Menard	and	Pavez	2005,	p.	56.	83	Menard	2013,	p.	XVI.	84	In	2013,	André	Menard	explained	to	me	in	a	personal	conversation	that	the	documents	held	at	the	Loncoche	museum	had	gone	missing.	Prior	to	their	disappearance,	he	had	created	a	photocopied	set	of	the	documents,	which	he	shared	with	me	and	upon	which	much	of	my	analysis	below	is	based.	In	order	to	trace	their	origin,	I	have	cited	them	to	the	Archivo	Museo	Municipal	de	Loncoche,	where	he	found	them.	
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nearly	1,900	pages.85	With	the	exception	of	one	early	notebook	recording	genealogical	and	historical	information	related	to	his	family	from	the	1910s,	the	rest	were	produced	between	1940	and	his	death	in	1952,	although	some	may	have	been	confiscated	in	1929	and	subsequently	disappeared.	The	period	covered	by	these	journals	was	a	time	in	which	Aburto’s	dominance	over	the	Mapuche	movement	had	waned	and	in	which	his	writings	had	become	increasingly	spiritual	in	nature.	Combined,	these	three	caches	represent	only	a	fragment	of	the	written	material	this	important	leader	produced	during	his	career,	but	nevertheless	are	an	extensive	set	of	resources.86	Surveying	this	vast	collection,	we	can	identify	at	least	four	distinct	categories	of	his	work.	First,	working	through	the	Federación	in	particular,	Aburto	sought	to	mediate	disputes,	both	between	individual	members	of	the	Federación,	and	between	those	individuals	and	the	state.	Disputes	over	land	possession	and	titles	were	common,	but	he	also	received	claims	and	requests	for	things	like	education	and	legal	representation.	Second,	the	annual	Congresos	organized	through	the	Federación	and	Comité	Ejecutivo	produced	elaborate	accounts	of	cultural	and	political	ceremony,	and	also	extensive	lists	of	demands	and	proposals	to	the	state.	The	latter	include	suggested	legal	reforms,	requests	for	the	creation	and	funding	of	state	schools,	forms	of	political	representation	and	a	host	of	other	things.	Third,	the	Federación	maintained	a	civil	registry	in	which	Aburto	Panguilef	recorded	births,	deaths	and	marriages,	including	plural	marriages	that	were	not	recognized	by	the																																																									85	These	journals	are	now	held	at	the	Centro	Liwen,	a	Mapuche	archive	and	library	at	the	Universidad	de	la	Frontera	in	Temuco.	86	Menard	2013,	pp.	XI-XIX.	See	also,	Menard	and	Pavez	2005a,	p.	67.	
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church	or	state.87	Finally,	and	especially	in	the	years	following	the	integration	of	the	Federación	into	the	Corporación	Araucana,	Aburto	Panguilef’s	writings	became	increasingly	spiritual	in	nature,	recording	dreams	and	visions	he	had	that	were	often	related	to	the	past,	current	status	and	future	of	the	Mapuche	people	as	part	of,	or	distinct	from,	the	Chilean	state.88	André	Menard	and	Jorge	Pavez	have	argued	that	this	proliferation	of	work	amounts	to	a	kind	of	“written	sovereignty,”	expressed	by	Aburto	Panguilef	as	a	counterpoint	to	the	territorial	sovereignty	they	had	lost	through	the	processes	of	conquest	and	resettlement.89	His	re-appropriation	of	the	written	word	turned	the	tools	of	European	colonialism	against	the	Chilean	state,	and	it	almost	seems	as	if	Aburto	Panguilef	was	“writing	the	Mapuche	state	into	existence.”	Menard	believes	this	“archivistic	tendency”	is	a	cultural	marker	that	predates	the	post-radicación	period	in	which	the	Mapuche	movement	flourished,	the	roots	of	which	can	be	seen	in	the	production	of	Mapuche	scribes	in	the	nineteenth	century,	for	example	the	work	of	Bernardo	Namuncurá.90		All	of	this	background	is	important	to	a	full	understanding	of	Aburto	Panguilef’s	political	project	in	several	distinct	ways.	It	shows	that	his	work	was	not	purely	a	response	to	the	aggression	of	the	state	in	the	immediate	period,	but	rather	was	constructed	upon	a	much	longer	and	deeper	tradition	of	political	engagement	with	Spanish	and	Chilean	states.	That	longevity	is	significant	to	the	debate	about																																																									87	Menard	2013,	pp.	XXVIII-XXX.	88	Ibid.	pp.	XCII-C.	89	André	Menard	and	Jorge	Pavez,	“El	Congreso	Araucano:	Ley,	raza	y	escritura	en	la	política	mapuche,”	Política,	Vol.	44,	Autumn,	2005(b),	p.	217,	230.	90	Menard	2013,	pp.	XXXIX-XL.	Bernardo	Aburto	Namuncurá’s	letters	appear	prolifically	in	the	compilation	of	Jorge	Pavez,	Cartas	Mapuche:	Siglo	XIX,	CoLibris:	Santiago	de	Chile,	2008.	
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why	and	how	Aburto	Panguilef,	and	potentially	other	Mapuche	activists,	allied	themselves	with	particular	political	parties	at	the	times	and	in	the	ways	they	did.	For	example,	José	Bengoa	has	characterized	the	explosion	of	Mapuche	political	activity	after	1910	as	arising	out	of	a	vacuum	of	leadership	created	by	the	process	of	radicación.91	Menard’s	work,	on	the	other	hand,	shows	that	the	Mapuche	political	legacy	and	activity	stretched	back	much	further,	and	that	it	only	seemed	new	in	the	1920s	because	the	broader	Chilean	political	landscape	was	rapidly	transforming	in	that	period.92	Whereas	Bengoa	explained	Aburto	Panguilef’s	political	strategy	as	one	of	alignment	with	the	working	classes,	Menard	shows	that	his	strategy	only	appeared	class-based	in	the	1920s.	Bengoa’s	argument	fails	to	explain	Aburto	Panguilef’s	later	criticism	of	the	left	and	support	for	Ibañez	del	Campo	(a	much	more	conservative	figure)	in	the	late	1930s	and	1940s,	despite	his	surveillance	and	repression	of	Aburto	in	the	1920s	and	early	1930s.93		In	a	2003	interview,	Aburto	Panguilef’s	son	Germán	explained	that	his	father’s	worldview	was	in	part	shaped	by	the	pre-existing	class	order	of	Mapuche	society,	in	which	his	family	figured	prominently	as	a	kind	of	aristocracy.	Menard	suggests	that	in	addition,	the	spiritual	dimension	of	Aburto’s	politics	cut	across	his	
																																																								91	José	Bengoa,	Historia	de	un	Conflicto:	El	estado	y	los	mapuches	en	el	siglo	XX,	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Planeta,	1999.	92	Menard	2013,	pp.	XLVII-XLVIII.	Here	Menard	refers	to	the	end	of	a	century	of	oligarchic	rule	that	came	about	with	the	election	of	Arturo	Alessandri	in	1920,	who	adopted	a	populist	political	strategy	in	an	era	when	new	political	ideas	related	to	anarchism,	socialism	and	communism	were	circulating	through	Chile,	and	when	miners	and	other	workers	began	organizing	to	press	demands	upon	the	Chilean	bourgeoisie.	For	a	detailed	of	state	repression	against	anarchists	in	this	period,	see	Raymond	Craib,	The	Cry	of	the	Renegade:	
Politics	and	Poetry	in	Interwar	Chile,	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2016.	93	Menard	2013,	pp.	XLIX-LI.	
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entire	career	and	tied	back	to	even	older	traditions	from	the	nineteenth	century.94	“In	other	words,	the	material	forces	(military,	political	and	economic)	belonged	to	the	state,	while	the	ancestral	and	the	spiritual	pertained	to	the	Araucanian	race.”95	Ultimately,	Menard	proposes	a	deeper	look	at	the	turbulent	period	of	the	1930s	to	understand	the	immediate	and	pragmatic	causes	of	Aburto’s	shifting	party	allegiance.	From	1932-1936,	Aburto	walked	a	fine	line	between	forging	alliances	with	the	left	without	provoking	Alessandri,	although	the	president	did	eventually	send	him	into	exile	on	the	island	of	Chiloé	in	1936	as	a	response	his	leftist	provocations.96	Menard	acknowledges	that	Aburto	was	willing	to	shift	allegiances	when	it	was	politically	expedient,	but	maintains	that	alliance	with	the	state	and/or	parties	in	power	was	his	preference,	in	keeping	with	Mapuche	tradition	dating	back	through	the	nineteenth	century	and	into	the	colonial	period.97		By	the	time	the	1938	election	was	held,	the	Federación	and	Sociedad	Caupolicán	had	combined	as	the	Corporación	Araucana,	which	officially	supported	Ibañez	in	his	campaign	for	the	presidency.98	But	that	support	aggravated	a	rift	within	the	movement	between	the	young,	urban	Mapuche	who	supported	Pedro	Aguirre	Cerda	and	the	Frente	Popular,	and	the	older	generation	of	leaders	who	backed	Ibañez.	It	also	caused	a	bit	of	a	row	between	the	Federación	and	Sociedad,	due	to	the	public	pronouncements	on	both	sides	during	the	campaign.	Aburto	had	
																																																								94	Ibid.	pp.	LX-LXII.	95	Ibid.	LXIII.	96	Ibid.	LXV.	97	Ibid.	LXVII-LXX.	98	Ibañez	campaigned	for	the	presidency	in	1937-1938,	but	withdrew	his	candidacy	shortly	before	the	election	following	a	large	demonstration	and	massacre	of	his	supporters.	See	Collier	and	Sater,	pp.	233-234.	
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initially	lent	his	support	to	Marmaduke	Grove	as	he	formed	and	led	the	Frente	Popular	from	his	position	in	the	Socialist	Party.	However,	the	outcome	of	the	election	cemented	Aburto’s	break	with	his	previous	allies	on	the	left,	especially	the	Partido	Comunista.	Menard	explains	this	as	the	result	of	two	factors:	the	PC	advanced	another	Mapuche	leader,	José	Andrés	Huichalaf,	as	a	candidate	for	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	in	1936	without	consulting	with	Aburto	first,	and	they	supported	a	group	of	urban	youth	who	formed	a	Congreso	Nacional	Araucano	(Araucanian	National	Congress)	which	Aburto	saw	as	competition	for	his	own	Congreso.99	Perhaps	the	larger	issue	was	the	emergence	of	a	generational	transition,	in	which	Aburto	represented	the	old	guard	that	was	being	challenged	by	a	more	progressive	urban	youth	on	one	side	and	a	more	centrist	rural	faction	led	by	Coñuepán	on	the	other.	Menard	argues	that	1938	was	a	point	of	inflection	for	Aburto	and	the	Mapuche	movement.	Throughout	the	1930s,	the	Federación	had	maintained	strong	ties	with	the	left	and	worked	primarily	for	the	recovery	of	usurped	lands,	which	put	it	at	odds	with	the	entrenched	powers	of	the	region.	Meanwhile,	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	had	worked	for	the	creation	of	the	Caja	Indígena	(Indigenous	Fund	–	established	for	making	agricultural	loans	to	Mapuche	peasants)	and	for	economic	and	commercial	advancement	of	the	race,	which	made	them	politically	more	moderate.	The	two	groups,	and	their	leaders,	had	very	public	rivalries,	which	made	their	union	difficult	in	1938.100	The	merger	not	only	represented	a	break	with	the	parties	of	the	left	and	a	younger	generation	of	urban	Mapuche,	it	also	represented																																																									99	Ibid.	LXXIII-LXXIV.	100	Ibid.	LXXVI-LXXVII.	
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Venancio	Coñuepán’s	eclipse	of	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef	as	the	hegemonic	leader	of	the	Mapuche	movement	with	the	merger	of	their	two	organizations	into	the	Corporación	Araucana	under	Coñuepán’s	leadership.101			
Proposals,	Projects	and	Quotidian	Assistance	for	Indígenas	Aburto’s	efforts	through	the	Federación	Araucana	engaged	a	host	of	questions	that	were	all	related	to	Mapuche	legal,	cultural	and	territorial	sovereignty.	His	civil	registry	project,	in	which	he	began	recording	the	names	of	both	parents	on	Mapuche	birth	certificates,	took	place	in	the	same	era	that	the	Chilean	state	created	its	own	civil	registry,	which	was	technically	established	in	1884	but	only	began	requiring	citizens	to	obtain	passports	and	identification	cards	in	1924.102	By	recording	births	with	the	mother’s	name,	which	the	state	registry	often	neglected	to	do	for	indigenous	children,	Aburto	helped	Mapuche	avoid	later	complications	in	the	inheritance	of	land	stemming	from	the	1874	Ley	Indígena.103	The	functional	aspects	of	the	Federación	and	Aburto’s	other	projects	were	able	to	directly	assist	Mapuche	in	defending	their	material	interests,	especially	related	to	land	disputes.	When	the	indígena	Antonio	Maria	Paillalef	came	to	Aburto	for	help	in	making	a	claim	against	Fermín	Sebastian	Miguel	for	assaulting	him	and	destroying	two	buildings	on	his	property	during	a	land	dispute	in	1924,	Aburto	first	recorded	his	testimony.	He	then	helped	him	hire	an	attorney,	who	ordered	a	visual	inspection	of	the	property.	Aburto	even	helped	Paillalef	prepare	his	case	to	present	to	the																																																									101	Ibid.	LXXV-LXXVI.	102	Menard	2013,	XXXIV.	103	Actas	del	VI	Congreso	Araucano,	published	in	Menard	and	Pavez	2005a,	pp.	81-82.	
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court.104	In	a	similar	complaint	from	1927,	Rufino	Chepo	Montecino	accused	Luciano	Raynante	of	attacking	him	on	his	own	property,	and	subsequently	seizing	a	fallow	field	and	constructing	a	house	on	it.	Drawing	from	his	early	experience	working	as	an	interpreter	for	the	Indian	Protectorate,	Aburto	collected	testimony	from	witnesses,	typed	a	formal	complaint,	and	helped	Chepo	prepare	for	his	court	appearances.105	In	a	similar	fashion,	Aburto	assisted	Fernando	Paillan	Shayhueque	with	a	land	dispute,	in	which	he	claimed	that	an	engineer	had	deceived	and	defrauded	him	while	conducting	a	survey	on	behalf	of	the	Commission	for	the	Settlement	of	Indians.	Paillan	maintained	that	he	had	cleared	the	land,	which	had	been	virgin	forest	when	he	arrived,	and	that	no	one	else	had	ever	worked	it.	Aburto	was	able	to	assist	by	securing	a	letter	of	support	from	the	President	of	the	Settlement	Commission,	which	he	sent	along	with	his	own	letter	of	support	to	the	Minister	of	Agriculture.106	Aburto	first	proposed	the	idea	of	an	autonomous	indigenous	republic	at	the	11th	Congreso	Araucano	in	1931.	Almost	immediately	the	idea	was	met	with	strong	and	loud	opposition	from	many	sectors	of	Chilean	society.	When	Armando	Bergue,	a	landowner	from	the	south,	wrote	a	letter	to	the	editor	of	El	Diario	Austral	in	1932	to	oppose	the	idea,	Mapuche	leader	César	Colima	replied	with	his	own	vehement	defense	of	the	idea.	Colima	passionately	justified	the	right	of	Mapuche	to	assemble	and	advocate	for	solutions	to	their	problems.	He	referenced	a	long	list	of	abuses	in																																																									104	Reclamo	No.	227,	May	14,	1924,	Complaint	of	Antonio	Maria	Paillalef	against	Fermin	Sebastian	Miguel.	Ministerio	del	Interior,	ARNAD,	Libro	7321.		105	Reclamo	No.	379-79,	Mar.	12,	1927,	Complaint	of	Rufino	Chepo	Montecino	against	Luciano.	Ministerio	del	Interior,	ARNAD,	Libro	7321.			106	Reclamo	No.	379-78,	Mar.	8,	1927,	Complaint	of	Fernando	Paillan	Shayhueque	about	fraudulent	survey.	Ministerio	del	Interior,	ARNAD,	Libro	7321.	
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the	south,	and	said	that	Bergue	raised	alarm	at	the	prospect	of	an	indigenous	republic	because	he	and	his	compatriots	stood	to	lose	the	land	and	advantages	they	had	stolen	from	the	Mapuche	people.107		In	more	mundane	affairs,	Aburto	used	the	official	status	of	the	Federación	to	help	members	petition	the	government	with	a	variety	of	requests.	In	August	of	1928,	Alonso	Quilaqueo,	a	Mapuche	Carabinero,	wrote	to	Aburto	to	ask	for	his	help	in	securing	a	transfer	to	a	squad	closer	to	his	family.	Over	a	period	of	several	months,	Aburto	maintained	a	correspondence	with	the	Director	General	of	the	Carabineros	to	communicate	and	lend	his	support	to	Quilaqueo’s	request.108	He	also	helped	Maria	Loncomilla	Santana	clarify	the	relationship	in	which	workers	farmed	her	property.	He	certified	a	rental	agreement,	in	which	she	leased	land	to	other	Mapuche	farmers	for	cultivation.109	In	these	relatively	mundane	ways,	Aburto	both	engaged	the	state	and	assisted	with	or	performed	functions	that	the	state	otherwise	neglected.	Aburto	also	assisted	indígenas	with	their	legal	defenses	when	they	were	accused	of	crimes.	That	was	the	case	of	Rufino	Rainante	Becerra,	whose	son	Juan	was	charged	with	robbery.	Aburto	traveled	by	train	in	order	to	advocate	for	Juan	Rainante	before	the	Tribunal	in	the	rural	town	of	Pitrufquen.110		While	in	many	cases,	Aburto	performed	legal	services	for	Mapuche	that	could	have	otherwise	been	performed	by	non-Mapuche	attorneys	or	advocates,	he	was																																																									107	César	Colima,	letter	to	the	editor,	El	Diario	Austral,	Jan.	6,	1932.	Published	in	Menard	and	Pavez	2005a,	pp.	102-103.	108	Alonso	Quilaqueo	to	Manuel	Aburto,	Aug.	25,	1928.	Ministerio	del	Interior,	ARNAD,	Libro	7321.		109	Reclamo	No.	379-8,	Jan.	13,	1926.	Complaint	of	Maria	Loncomilla	Santana	against	Teófilo	Loncomilla	Santana.	Ministerio	del	Interior,	ARNAD,	Libro	7321.		110	Reclamo	No.	379-37,	Jun.	18,	1926.	Rufino	Rainante	Becerra	motion	in	defense	of	his	son	Juan	befor	the	Tribunal	of	Pitrufquen.	Ministerio	del	Interior,	ARNAD,	Libro	7321.		
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also	in	the	unique	position	to	help	with	more	culturally	sensitive	Mapuche	concerns.	In	October	of	1925,	Celestino	Quileñan	came	to	the	Federación	offices	to	refute	slanderous	charges	made	against	his	wife,	Anjelina	Meliñamco,	who	had	been	accused	of	witchcraft.	Aburto	drafted	a	formal	statement	on	Quileñan’s	behalf,	in	which	he	said,	“As	this	office	represents	the	entity	in	which	the	sovereignty	of	all	Araucanians	in	the	country	is	embodied,	I	wish	to	(renounce)	before	it	these	slanderers	and	their	criminal	accusations.”111	Later	that	month,	Quileñan	returned	to	the	Federación	office	to	request	help	in	finalizing	his	second	marriage,	to	Emilia	Urrutia.	It	seems	that	both	families	had	initially	given	their	support,	but	then	Quileñan	received	word	that	the	parents	of	Urrutia	had	changed	their	minds.	Aburto	drafted	a	statement	on	Quileñan’s	behalf	in	which	he	stated	that	plural	marriage	was	“in	agreement	with	the	laws	of	the	Araucanian	race,	all	in	perfect	accord	with	the	parents	of	my	second	wife.”	Although	that	was	the	case,	this	particular	instance	was	complicated	by	the	fact	that	Urrutia	was	not	indigenous.	Ultimately,	Aburto	was	able	to	gain	written	consent	from	Urrutia’s	parents,	but	her	father	requested	a	payment	of	500	pesos	in	exchange.			
Collaboration	and	Division	within	the	Mapuche	Movement	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef’s	first	efforts	to	support	and	promote	the	well	being	of	his	people	centered	on	the	promotion	and	defense	of	Mapuche	culture.	Those	efforts	were	apparent	in	the	theatrical	shows	he	organized	in	the	late	1910s,	which																																																									111	Reclamo	No.	355,	Oct.	31,	1925.	Celestino	Quileñan	Colipi	defends	his	wife	Anjelina	Meliñamco	Reumai	against	charges	of	witchcraft.	Ministerio	del	Interior,	ARNAD,	Libro	7321.		
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introduced	Mapuche	art,	song	and	dance	to	Chileans	in	major	cities	like	Valparaiso	and	Santiago.	Then	as	the	1920s	advanced,	Aburto	expanded	his	organizational	capacity	and	engaged	more	directly	in	political	matters.	As	we	have	seen,	the	Federación	and	Comité	Ejecutivo	grew	parallel	to	the	expansion	of	popular	politics	in	Chile	during	the	first	Alessandri	presidency.	In	a	1923	interview,	Aburto	explained	that	the	first	Congreso	Araucano	came	about	when	in	1921	a	law	was	being	considered	that	would	have	profoundly	impacted	Araucanian	society,	but	that	no	one	debating	it	had	any	direct	experience	or	understanding	of	the	realities	of	Mapuche	life	and	culture.	That	conversation	provided	the	impetus	to	bring	together	Mapuche	from	across	the	region	to	consult	and	debate	the	needs	of	his	people	to	guide	that	legal	project.	At	the	Congreso,	they	decided	to	create	the	Federación	Araucana,	which	would	be	independent	of	all	outside	influences	and	could	create	its	own	laws	and	governing	structure	to	support	and	defend	Mapuche	customs,	rights	and	territory.112	From	there,	Aburto	used	his	organizational	capacity	to	help	Francisco	Melivilu	become	the	first	Mapuche	elected	to	the	Chilean	Congress	in	1924.	As	noted	above,	when	Manuel	Manquilef,	in	concert	with	Ibañez	and	the	Unión	Araucana,	pushed	through	a	Ley	Indígena	that	threatened	to	dissolve	Mapuche	lands,	and	by	extension	the	fabric	that	held	together	Mapuche	culture,	spirituality	and	identity,	Aburto	expanded	the	political	activity	of	his	organization	by	forging	alliances	with	other	Mapuche	organizations	and	non-Mapuche	political	parties.	He	was	thus	able	to	mobilize	as	many	as	20,000	Mapuche	to	attend	his	Congresos,	and	demonstrate																																																									112	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef,	interview	in	El	Mercurio,	Jan.	20,	1923.	Cited	in	Menard	and	Pavez,	2005b,	pp.	213-214.	
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that	the	vast	majority	of	Mapuche	opposed	Manquilef’s	law.113	Although	they	were	drastically	opposed	on	the	subject	of	communal	versus	private	indigenous	landholding,	Manquilef	and	Aburto	both	criticized	various	other	laws	that	they	blamed	for	the	impoverishment	of	the	Mapuche	people,	while	ignoring	the	class	hierarchies	within	Mapuche	society.	Both	came	from	relatively	privileged	backgrounds,	descended	from	“caciques	‘civilizados’”	and	educated	in	colonial	schools,	in	fact	the	same	primary	school	at	the	Anglican	mission	at	Quepe.	But	whereas	Manquilef	advocated	for	the	dissolution	of	the	Mapuche	body	politic	into	that	of	the	Chilean	state,	Aburto	fought	for	the	(re)creation	of	a	Mapuche	state.114	But	neither	advocated	for	the	dissolution	of	class	hierarchies.115		The	1927	Ley	Indígena	created	a	deep	divide	between	ordinary	Mapuche	and	some	of	their	leaders.	Those	divisions	correlated	to	splits	between	the	political	affiliations	of	those	leaders.	Francisco	Melivilu	was	elected	to	the	Cámara	de	Diputados	as	a	member	of	the	Partido	Demócrata,	but	Manuel	Manquilef	represented	the	Partido	Liberal	Democrática,	a	decidedly	more	conservative	party	that	was	originally	formed	in	1891	as	a	reaction	to	the	creation	of	the	parliamentary	republic	that	the	junta	sought	to	correct.116	As	Manquilef	proposed	what	would	become	the	Ley	Indígena	1.469	and	campaigned	for	support	across	the	Araucanía	in	1926,	Aburto	and	other	Mapuche	leaders	came	together	in	the	Congreso	of	1926	to	oppose	his	project.	In	fact,	Manquilef	was	not	invited	to	participate,	a	meaningful	and	public	rebuke	of	his	leadership.	That	Congreso	revealed	deep	divisions	between																																																									113	Menard	and	Pavez	2005b,	p.	212.	114	Ibid.	p.	225.	115	Ibid.	pp.	225-228.	116	Ibid.	pp.	52-53.	
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factions	within	the	Mapuche	movement,	with	Manquilef	and	the	newly	formed	Unión	Araucana	supporting	the	law,	and	Aburto,	Huenchullán	and	the	membership	of	the	Federación	and	Sociedad	vehemently	opposing	it.117		While	the	Ley	Indígena	1.469	was	ultimately	revised	in	1930	and	1931,	the	opposition	campaign	pushed	Aburto’s	political	allegiances	to	the	left.	Recently	declassified	documents	from	the	Comintern	in	Russia	reveal	that	there	were	close	ties	between	the	Partido	Comunista	and	Mapuche	activists	in	the	early	1930s,	although	Menard	and	Pavez	point	out	that	we	ought	to	read	those	documents	critically.	They	are	skeptical	of	the	communists’	claims	of	broad	support	among	Mapuche,	as	their	project	tried	to	assimilate	the	organization	and	mobilization	of	all	workers	and	peasants	into	the	class-consciousness	raising	efforts	of	international	communism.118		Nevertheless,	as	early	as	the	1926	Congreso,	Aburto	sent	a	copy	of	their	accords	to	the	president	of	the	Communist	Committee	in	the	Chamber	of	Deputies,	and	other	details	from	that	Congreso	bear	out	the	political	alignment	of	Aburto	and	the	Federación	in	that	early	period.119	But	as	the	1930s	progressed,	Aburto	adeptly	navigated	the	shifting	sands	of	Chile’s	political	landscape	by	continuing	to	court	the	support	of	leftist	parties,	but	also	remaining	in	close	collaboration	with	more	moderate	Mapuche	actors	like	Coñuepán	and	the	Sociedad.120	Carlos	Ibañez	was	
																																																								117	Menard	and	Pavez	2005b,	p.	224.	118	Olga	Ulianova,	“Levantimiento	campesino	de	Lonquimay	y	la	Internacional	Comunista,”	
Estudios	Publicos,	Santiago	de	Chile,	No.	89,	Summer	2003,	p.	199.	Cited	in	Menard	2013,	p.	LV.	Also	cited	in	Klubock	2010,	p.	145.	119	Published	in	Menard	and	Pavez	2005a,	pp.	71-95.	See	also	ARNAD,	Ministerio	del	Interior,	Libro	7321.	120	Menard	and	Pavez	2005a,	pp.	52-54.	
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forced	to	resign	the	presidency	in	July	of	1931.	A	series	of	presidents	associated	with	the	Radical	Party	succeeded	him	over	the	course	of	the	next	year,	and	then	a	government	junta	briefly	established	a	Socialist	government	in	late	1932.	In	December	of	that	year,	Arturo	Alessandri	returned	to	the	presidency	and	carried	out	a	full	six-year	term	through	the	end	of	1938.	Aburto	and	the	Federación	moved	to	the	left	in	the	early	1930s	following	these	national	political	trends,	but	by	1938	they	remained	close	enough	to	other	Mapuche	organizations	to	combine	forces	through	the	Corporación.121		When	Manuel	Manquilef	was	not	invited	to	the	1926	Congreso,	Mapuche	leaders	José	Andrés	and	Luciano	Huichalaf	Alcapán	complained,	to	which	Aburto	replied,	“Manuel	Manquilef	was	not	invited	because	he	had	declared,	in	the	capital	of	the	Republic,	in	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	that	he	was	not	a	deputy	of	the	Araucanian	Race,	rather	he	represented	his	party.”122	That	statement	illustrates	the	importance	of	ethnic	identity	in	the	Mapuche	movement,	despite	party	alliances	or	other	political	overtures	to	other	groups.	Subsequently,	Aburto	also	referenced	the	Ley	Indígena	that	Manquilef	had	proposed	before	the	Cámara,	which	did	not	reflect	his	campaign	promises	to	help	settle	landless	Mapuche,	but	instead	created	a	path	for	the	division	of	those	communities	already	settled.	On	the	second	day	of	the	Congreso,	a	large	delegation	traveled	by	horseback	to	the	train	station	in	nearby	Ercilla	to	greet	the	Senators	Artemio	Gutierrez	and	Luis	Enrique	Concha,	both	
																																																								121	Corporación	included	not	only	the	Federación	and	Sociedad,	but	also	the	Unión	Araucana.	The	merger	is	examined	more	closely	in	chapter	two,	making	use	of	that	organizaion’s	perspective	on	the	reconciliation.	122	Actas	del	VI	Congreso	Araucano,	published	in	Menard	and	Pavez	2005a,	pp.	74-75.	
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members	of	the	Partido	Demócrata.123	Their	visit	was	significant,	as	that	party	was	one	of	the	first	to	begin	fighting	for	social	reforms.	In	fact,	Luis	Emilio	Recabarren,	the	founder	of	Chilean	socialism	had	broken	away	from	the	party	in	1912	to	found	the	Partido	Obrero	Socialista,	which	then	became	the	Partido	Comunista	in	1922.	Close	ties	remained	between	the	two	parties	in	1926,	which	necessitated	Aburto’s	explicit	rejection	of	“subversive,	agitating	or	communist”	activities,	addressed	to	the	governor.124	His	clarification	suggests	that	those	ties	were	already	becoming	a	concern,	and	he	felt	the	need	to	distance	himself	from	attempts	at	surveillance	and	oppression	by	the	state,	and	attacks	from	his	enemies	within	the	movement,	from	Beck	and	the	Unión	Araucana	for	example.		In	this	period,	Aburto	and	Huenchullán,	as	well	as	the	organizations	they	led,	courted	the	left	in	order	to	oppose	efforts	to	divide	Mapuche	lands.	In	December	of	1926,	in	the	same	month	that	the	sixth	Congreso	was	held,	Antonio	Chihuailaf	had	publicly	criticized	Huenchullán	in	a	letter	published	in	El	Diario	Austral	on	December	15th,	in	which	he	charged	him	with	holding	communist	sympathies	and	called	him	a	hypocrite	for	criticizing	the	government	when	he	himself	had	benefited	from	the	government’s	support	of	schools	in	which	he	had	been	educated	and	employed	as	a	teacher.125	Huenchullán	replied	with	his	own	letter	two	days	later	in	which	he	denied	being	a	communist.	He	maintained	that	he	loved	his	country	and	respected	its	authorities,	but	felt	that	it	was	his	duty	to	fight	for	his	people	when	he	
																																																								123	Ibid.	p.	77-78.	124	Ibid.	p.	81.	125	Antonio	Chihuailaf,	letter	to	El	Diario	Austral,	Dec.	15,	1926,	“Ecos	de	una	asamblea	araucana.”	Published	in	Menard	and	Pavez	2005a,	pp.	100-101.	
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observed	their	suffering.126	Considering	the	reflexive	notions	of	authority	previously	discussed,	it	must	have	been	difficult	for	Mapuche	leaders	to	navigate	the	rapidly	changing	political	landscape	during	this	period	of	Chile’s	history.	The	impulse	to	align	oneself	with	the	party	or	leader	in	power	was	often	in	tension	with	the	best	interests	of	the	Mapuche	people.	
	
Surveillance,	Repression	and	Connections	with	the	Left	Between	1926	and	1936,	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef	was	the	object	of	political	surveillance	and	persecution.	His	archives	were	confiscated	and	three	times	he	was	sent	into	internal	exile	by	Chilean	authorities.	Antonio	Chihuailaf	attributed	that	attention	from	state	agents	to	“his	great	popular	influence	among	the	Mapuche	of	the	era	and	a	certain	radicalness	in	his	proposals.”127	The	political	attention	Aburto	garnered	from	the	state	stemmed	from	his	close	ties	to	unions,	worker’s	organizations	and	the	Communist	Party.	Beginning	in	1926,	charges	of	communist	sympathizing,	combined	with	Aburto’s	persistent	opposition	to	the	subdivision	of	Mapuche	lands	being	carried	out	under	the	authority	of	the	Ley	Indígena	4.169	of	1927,	led	to	the	first	of	three	periods	in	which	Aburto	was	detained	and	exiled.	From	December	1927	to	March	1928,	Aburto	was	arrested	and	sent	to	Santiago,	where	he	was	detained.	Then,	following	the	1929	confiscation	of	the	Federación	and	Comité	archives,	he	was	exiled	to	the	northern	port	city	of	Caldera	in	1930.128	Ibañez’s	surveillance	of	Aburto	and	censure	of	the	Federación	relates	to	two	distinct	types	of																																																									126	Arturo	Huenchullán,	reply	to	Antonio	Chihuailaf,	El	Diario	Austral,	Dec.	17,	1926,	“Response	to	Antonio	Chihuailaf.”	Published	in	Menard	and	Pavez	2005a,	pp.	100-101	127	Ibid.	p.	51.	128	Menard,	LXVII	(footnote	2).	
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information	that	were	heavily	monitored	by	the	state	in	this	period:	those	related	to	property	in	the	south,	and	political	agitation.129	About	170	pages	of	documents	relating	to	Ibañez’s	surveillance	of	Aburto	are	located	in	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior	collection	of	the	National	Archives.	Some	of	those	papers	seem	to	have	originated	from	the	Federación	archives	that	were	seized	in	1929.	Other	documents	include	correspondence	between	the	Intendente	of	Cautín,	the	Minister	of	the	Interior	and	various	Carabineros	who	carried	out	the	surveillance	and	assessed	the	threat	that	Aburto	posed.	In	February	of	1929,	the	Intendente	of	Cautín	Province,	Arturo	Vidal	Pizarro,	wrote	to	the	Minister	of	the	Interior	to	express	his	concern	that	a	reporter	for	the	Heraldo	del	Sur	had	intercepted	a	telegram	about	the	surveillance	of	Aburto,	which	had	not	been	encoded.	He	suggested	that	future	communications	related	to	ongoing	surveillance	should	be	encrypted,	to	preserve	the	secrecy	of	the	work.130	It	is	not	clear	whether	Aburto	knew	he	was	being	watched,	but	on	February	1,	1929	he	wrote	to	the	Minister	of	the	Interior	to	refute	accusations	that	he	was	a	subversive	and	political	agitator.	Rather,	he	claimed	to	be	a	keeper	of	peace	and	order	in	the	south,	and	said	he	only	defended	the	rights	of	his	people	by	opposing	large	landowners	who	cheated	them	as	far	as	the	law	would	allow.131	In	November,	Captain	Alberto	Sotomayor	Gonzalez	wrote	to	his	commander	at	the	Prefecture	of	Cautín	with	a	summary	of	the	documents	he	sent,	which	are	included	in	this	collection.	His	own	
																																																								129	Menard	and	Pavez,	2005a,	p.	60.	In	a	slightly	earlier	period,	see	Raymond	Craib,	2016.		130	Intendente	of	Cautín,	Arturo	Vidal	Pizarro	to	Minister	of	the	Interior,	Feb.	18,	1929.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	del	Interior,	Libro	7321.		131	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef	to	Minister	of	the	Interior,	Feb.	1,	1929.	Ministerio	del	Interior,	ARNAD,	Libro	7321.		
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assessment	ends	by	saying,	“I	consider	(Aburto)	to	be	a	danger	to	the	peace	of	the	entire	province,	and	above	all	the	sector	in	which	he	lives	–	Loncoche.”132	A	short	while	later,	Coronel	Facundo	Grismali	Barrientos	passed	along	his	own	assessment	to	the	Intendente,	which	indicated	that	while	he	did	consider	Aburto	to	be	a	danger	to	the	region	and	those	who	followed	him,	and	he	did	think	his	statements	seemed	to	suggest	the	violation	of	various	laws,	that	he	did	not	find	Aburto	to	be	in	violation	of	the	particular	law	that	was	the	justification	for	his	surveillance.133	After	Alessandri	returned	to	the	presidency	in	1932,	Aburto,	Huenchullán	and	the	Mapuche	organizations	maintained	a	working	relationship	with	him	for	a	time.	In	May	1933,	Aburto	convened	an	Extraordinary	Session	of	the	Congreso	Araucano	to	debate	several	reforms	proposed	at	previous	Congresos.	In	his	announcement,	Aburto	mentioned	that	he	had	recently	met	with	Alessandri,	who	had	asked	them	to	debate	the	issues	to	more	fully	develop	their	proposals.134	The	following	year	he	traveled	to	Santiago	to	meet	with	Alessandri	again,	this	time	also	with	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	to	discuss	their	requests	for	changes	to	the	Ley	Indígena.	Upon	his	return,	Aburto	called	a	meeting	to	discuss	the	newly	created	Caja	Agrícola	(Agricultural	Fund),	which	was	a	major	initiative	of	Coñuepán	and	the	Sociedad.	In	particular,	Aburto	asked	the	regional	representatives	to	bring	a	list	of	all	Mapuche	farmers	who	would	request	seed	loans	from	that	fund.135	Meanwhile,	Aburto’s	private	correspondence	to	his	son	Cornelio	during	May	and																																																									132	Capitán	y	Comisario	de	Carabineros,	Prefectura	de	Cautín,	Alberto	Sotomayor	Gonzalez	to	Minister	of	the	Interior,	Feb.	18,	1929.	Ministerio	del	Interior,	ARNAD,	Libro	7321.		133	Coronel	de	Carabineros,	Prefectura	de	Cautín	Facundo	Grismal	Barrientos,	report	on	surveillance	of	Manuel	Aburto,	Nov.	21,	1929.	Ministerio	del	Interior,	ARNAD,	Libro	7321.		134	Circular	No.	161,	May	7,	1933.	Archivo	Museo	Municipal	de	Loncoche	(AMML),	Carpeta	1.	135	Circular	No.	687,	May	20,	1934.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	
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July	of	1934	sheds	additional	light	on	his	interactions	in	Santiago,	including	meetings	with	Huenchullán	and	other	state	officials,	a	lunch	at	the	Palacio	Moneda	(Chile’s	presidential	palace),	a	legal	victory	in	the	Supreme	Court	and	a	visit	to	the	Chamber	of	Deputies.	He	also	referenced	reports	of	threats	made	against	Marmaduke	Grove,	who	had	recently	returned	from	exile	to	found	the	Chilean	Socialist	Party	and	won	a	special	election	to	the	Senate	two	days	later.136	In	fact,	Grove	had	carried	out	that	campaign	from	prison,	where	he	had	been	detained	for	conspiring	against	President	Alessandri.	Aburto’s	comments	suggest	that	he	was	well	aware	of	the	fine	line	he	was	walking	in	trying	to	maintain	alliances	with	more	radical	elements	on	the	left	and	at	the	same	time	remain	in	the	good	graces	of	the	President.	Other	simultaneous	events	in	southern	Chile	reinforced	the	need	for	caution.	In	June	1934,	several	hundred	Chilean	and	Mapuche	peasants	carried	out	an	armed	rebellion	against	the	owners	and	managers	of	the	sprawling	Ránquil	and	Guayalí	estates	in	the	province	of	Lonquimay,	near	the	headwaters	of	the	Bío-Bío	River.	After	ten	days	of	violence	on	the	part	of	peasants	armed	mostly	with	farming	tools,	the	Carabineros	brutally	repressed	the	uprising,	sending	hundreds	of	combatants	and	their	families	fleeing	across	the	snow-covered	Andes	while	they	rounded	up	hundreds	more	and	marched	them	toward	Temuco	for	a	hastily	arranged	trial.	In	the	process,	somewhere	between	350	and	1,500	indigenous	and	mestizo	peasants	died	during	the	direct	conflict,	ensuing	flight	and	subsequent	hardship.	Many	of	the	detainees	were	executed	during	the	march	from	Lonquimay																																																									136	Letters	to	Cornelio	Aburto,	May	7,	May	8,	May	9	and	Jul.	14,	1934.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	
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to	Temuco,	and	their	bodies	were	discarded	into	the	river,	not	to	be	seen	again.	This	episode	is	known	as	the	Ránquil	Massacre,	and	has	come	to	occupy	a	significant	place	in	the	historical	memory	of	southern	Chile.137	Historians	Thomas	Klubock	and	Florencia	Mallon	have	each	analyzed	the	Ránquil	Massacre	in	recent	essays	and	shown	that	the	event	contributed	to	important	political	narratives	both	at	the	time	and	later	in	the	century.	Klubock	demonstrates	that	violence	and	disputes	over	land	stemmed	from	the	state’s	inability	to	establish	and	maintain	administrative	control	over	the	frontier	region	from	the	1880s	through	the	middle	of	the	twentieth	century,	in	contradistinction	to	the	relatively	peaceful	landowner-labor	relations	in	the	central	valley.138	The	Ránquil	uprising	began	at	a	meeting	of	a	local	union	that	had	been	organized	with	the	assistance	of	the	FOCh,	the	most	prominent	workers’	organization	in	Chile	during	the	period,	which	was	allied	with	the	Chilean	Communist	Party.	While	both	the	FOCh	and	the	Communist	Party	had	begun	to	organize	peasants	in	the	countryside,	they	had	little	direct	influence	in	the	south	and	their	efforts	were	not	being	guided	directly	by	the	Comintern.139	Mallon,	meanwhile,	emphasizes	important	ways	that	various	actors	have	remembered	the	uprising.	“For	the	Left,	it	has	served	as	a	symbol	of	the	Chilean	people’s	revolutionary	spirit…For	the	right,	it	became	a	symbol	of	state	consolidation	and	the	loss	of	popular	innocence	caused	by	international	communism.	More	recently	for	Mapuche	intellectuals	and	activists,																																																									137	For	two	valuable	but	different	interpretations	of	the	Ránquil	Massacre,	see	Thomas	Miller	Klubock	(2010)	and	Florencia	E.	Mallon,	“Victims	into	Emblems:	Images	of	the	Ránquil	Massacre	in	Chilean	National	Narratives,	1934-2004,”	Labor:	Studies	in	Working	
Class	History	of	the	Americas,	Vol.	8,	No.	1,	Spring	2011,	pp.	29-55.	138	Klubock,	2010,	pp.	150-152.	139	Ibid.	pp.	144-145.	
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Ránquil	has	served	as	a	metaphor	for	the	enduring	usurpation	and	resistance	of	the	(Mapuche)	people.”140	Manuel	Aburto	and	the	Federación	were	connected	to	the	FOCh	and	his	idea	for	an	autonomous	indigenous	republic	was	in	line	with	the	Comintern’s	platform	that	supported	national	liberation	for	ethnic	minorities,	but	he	was	not	directly	involved	in	the	uprising.	However,	because	Aburto	had	been	branded	a	communist	for	close	to	ten	years	by	1934,	and	had	already	drawn	attention	and	repression	from	the	state,	the	Ránquil	Uprising	almost	certainly	made	his	position	with	Alessandri	more	precarious.	For	a	time,	Aburto	continued	to	maintain	connections	with	both	Alessandri	and	the	left.	In	October	1934	he	invited	Alessandri	to	attend	the	fourteenth	Congreso	Araucano	and	on	the	30th	of	that	month	he	had	a	twenty-minute	phone	call	with	the	President.141	Alessndri	did	not	attend	the	fourteenth	Congreso,	but	there	Aburto	established	a	formal	alliance	between	the	Congreso	and	the	FOCh.	Accord	No.	2	included	the	statement	“that	the	problems	that	directly	concern	the	Araucanian	race	are	completely	analogous	to	those	that	affect	the	proletariat	in	general.”142	In	March	and	April	of	1935,	Aburto	held	additional	special	sessions	of	the	Congreso,	to	which	he	invited	representatives	from	the	FOCh,	FECh,	the	Federation	of	Railroad	Workers,	Confederación	Generál	de	Trabajadores,	Associación	de	Profesores,	and	other	workers’	organizations.	There	they	formed	a	“frente	único”	(united	front)	with	the	block	of	leftist	organizations	and	formalized	
																																																								140	Mallon,	2011,	p.	54.	141	Circular	No.	702,	Oct.	15,	1934	and	letter	to	Cornelio	Aburto,	Oct.	31,	1934.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	142	“Acuerdos	del	14°	Congreso	Araucano,”	Mar.	19,	1935.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	
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those	alliances.143	Again	at	the	fifteenth	Congreso,	held	in	December	1935,	Aburto	invited	President	Alessandri,	and	extended	invitations	to	all	the	organizations	of	the	leftist	block.	While	some	members	of	the	left	did	attend,	Alessandri	again	declined	the	invitation.144		In	February	1936,	Aburto	was	again	arrested.	On	behalf	of	her	father	and	the	Federación,	Manuel’s	daughter	Herminia	called	a	special	meeting	to	plan	a	response.	In	a	handwritten	note	to	her	brother	Cornelio	at	the	bottom	of	the	announcement,	Herminia	wrote,	“They	took	papa,	despite	the	fact	that	we	told	them	he	was	not	a	communist.”145	In	the	mid-1930s,	Herminia	served	as	Secretary	of	the	Federación,	and	in	her	father’s	absence	she	took	on	the	work	of	spearheading	its	ongoing	activities,	as	well	as	keeping	her	family	apprised	of	his	situation.	On	the	21st	of	February,	she	wrote	to	Cornelio	to	inform	him	that	in	the	morning	their	father	was	to	be	exiled	to	the	city	of	Quellón,	on	the	island	of	Chiloé.	She	reported	that	Manuel	said	he	was	ready	to	make	whatever	sacrifice	was	demanded	of	him.146	The	following	month,	Aburto	himself	wrote	to	Cornelio,	expressing	hope	but	also	anger	and	frustration	at	the	injustice	of	his	detention.	He	said	he	did	not	want	to	reach	out	to	President	Alessandri	for	help,	perhaps	indicating	that	he	saw	him	as	in	some	way	responsible	for	the	detention	in	the	first	place.147	In	the	meantime,	Cornelio	took	up	a	collection	of	funds	from	the	membership	of	the	Federación	to	help	Aburto	and	
																																																								143	Circular	No.	753	and	762,	“Acuerdos	de	Sesiones,”	Mar.	17-18	and	Apr.	21-22,	respectively.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	144	Circular	No.	814,	Nov.	27	1935	and	“Acuerdos	del	15°	Congreso,”	Jan.	9,	1936.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	145	Circular	No.	853.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	146	Herminia	to	Cornelio,	Feb.	21,	1936.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	147	Manuel	to	Cornelio,	Mar.	13,	1936.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	
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Aurelio	Ñanculeo	(who	was	detained	with	him)	to	assist	with	their	expenses	while	in	exile.148	Herminia	organized	a	special	session	where	members	produced	a	series	of	statements	to	send	to	Aburto,	the	press,	and	President	Alessandri	directly.	They	asked	all	the	longkos	of	the	south	to	pray	for	those	in	exile,	and	requested	the	contribution	of	funds	to	support	the	office	of	the	Federación	and	the	families	of	those	detained.149	On	April	3rd,	Herminia	again	wrote	to	Cornelio	to	say	that	Aburto	had	lost	his	appeal.	She	said	she	was	despondent	and	could	not	stop	crying,	and	that	she	prayed	that	God	would	take	her	life.	She	even	thought	of	killing	herself,	but	said	she	was	too	afraid	to	follow	through.150	Then	on	April	19th,	Aburto	was	released.	Upon	his	return	from	Quellón,	the	Federación	held	a	special	session	on	May	16-17,	in	which	they	passed	several	accords	that	signaled	a	continuation	of	their	left-leaning	alliances	and	a	break	from	President	Alessandri.	The	very	first	accord	asked	God	to	remove	his	support	from	Alessandri	for	not	having	addressed	the	problems	of	the	Mapuche	people.	They	went	on	to	express	gratitude	to	the	leaders	and	residents	of	Quellón	for	treating	Aburto	so	well	during	his	time	there.	Accord	No.	4	established	the	Federación	as	a	member	of	the	Frente	Popular	de	Temuco,	with	Aburto,	Martín	Painemal	and	Avelino	Melivilu	as	delegates	to	that	organization.	Finally,	they	expressed	their	appreciation	to	the	members	of	the	Frente	Popular	de	Temuco	for	their	protests	against	Aburto’s	exile,	and	to	several	workers’	organizations	for	supporting	his	
																																																								148	Lista	No.	10,	Mar.	15,	1936.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	149	Circular	No.	856,	May	19,	1936.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	150	Herminia	to	Cornelio,	Apr.	3,	1936.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	
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family	financially	during	that	time.151	The	following	month,	Aburto	sent	a	telegram	to	the	President	and	the	press	denouncing	the	application	of	the	“corrupt	Ley	Ibañez.”	He	also	requested	that	the	Frente	Popular	de	Temuco	petition	the	government	for	an	investigation	into	irregularities	in	the	administration	of	justice	through	the	Juzgados	de	Indios.152		In	the	elections	of	1937,	the	indígena	José	Andrés	Huichalaf	ran	as	a	Communist	Party	candidate	for	the	Chamber	of	Deputies.	However,	the	Federación	resolved	not	to	put	forward	a	candidate	who	officially	represented	the	organization,	and	made	clear	in	a	resolution	at	the	sixteenth	Congreso	that	Huichalaf	was	running	without	the	knowledge	or	consent	of	the	Federación.153	They	did	at	first	formally	express	their	support	for	Marmaduke	Grove	as	he	formed	and	led	the	Popular	Front	coalition	that	would	bring	Aguirre	Cerda	into	power.154	It	seems	that	the	repressive	actions	of	the	state	in	exiling	Aburto	for	a	third	time	pushed	him	and	the	Federación	further	to	the	left	in	1936	and	1937,	but	that	was	about	to	change.		The	presidential	elections	of	1938	exacerbated	a	growing	divide	between	rural	elders	and	urban	youth,	who	were	beginning	to	form	their	own	organizations	in	the	capital.155	In	February	of	1938,	Aburto	planned	a	trip	to	Santiago	where	he	met	with	a	delegation	of	members	of	the	Confederación	de	Trabajadores	and	the	Sociedad	Galvarino,	both	urban	Mapuche	organizations	with	leftist	ties.156	But	in	the	end,	Aburto	would	abandon	the	left	in	favor	of	a	partnership	with	the	Sociedad	and																																																									151	Circular	No.	866,	“Acuerdos	de	las	Sesiones,”	May	19,	1936.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	152	Circular	No.	873,	Jun.	29,	1936.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	153	Circular	No.	891,	“Acuerdos	del	16°	Congreso	Araucano,”	Jan.	13,	1937.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	154	Circular	No.	906,	May	17,	1937.	AMML,	Carpeta	1.	155	Crow,	2013,	p.	79.	156	Circular	No.	972,	Feb.	1,	1938.	AMML,	Carpeta	2.	
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Unión.	In	1938,	the	three	groups	would	come	together	to	form	the	Corporación	Araucana,	and	Aburto’s	impact	on	the	Mapuche	movement	in	the	rural	south	would	begin	to	wane.	The	alliance	between	the	Federación	and	the	Corporación	Araucana	would	necessitate	a	measure	of	political	moderation,	which	was	somewhat	contradictory	not	only	with	the	positions	of	his	previous	allies,	but	also	with	many	of	the	issues	and	proposals	he	had	previously	championed.		
Explaining	Aburto’s	Political	Philosophy		Dating	back	to	the	late	nineteenth	century,	the	Chilean	state	had	crafted	legislation	that	applied	only	and	specifically	to	the	Araucanians	of	the	south.	In	1866,	the	process	for	settling	Mapuche	kin	groups	on	specific	parcels	of	land	by	granting	them	titulos	de	merced	was	established.	The	1874	law	established	a	process	for	contracting	with	firms	to	colonize	large	tracts	of	land	with	foreign	(European)	settlers,	and	it	specifically	excluded	Indians	from	acquiring	those	lands,	which	were	government-owned	territories	that	were	granted	or	sold	by	the	state	to	the	privately-owned	colonization	companies.157	Because	the	Congreso	Nacional	created	these	laws,	and	all	laws	for	that	matter,	Aburto	realized	that	it	was	in	that	body	that	the	sovereignty	of	the	state	rested.	We	can	understand	almost	all	the	rest	of	his	work	as	a	variety	of	attempts	to	reassert	the	sovereignty	of	the	Mapuche	people.	In	that	vein,	“the	Congreso	Araucano	functioned	as	a	kind	of	reflexive	inverse	of	the	Congreso	Nacional,”158	and	that	is	why	Menard	and	Pavez	consider	Aburto’s	vast	archival	production	to	represent	a	kind	of	“written	sovereignty,”																																																									157	Menard	and	Pavez	2005b,	p.	215	(footnote	1).	158	Ibid.	p.	216.	
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created	on	paper	when	there	was	not	a	territory	in	which	to	establish	it.159	The	sovereignty	claimed	by	Aburto’s	writing	also	correlates	to	earlier	patterns	of	treaty-	and	alliance-making,	in	which	Aburto’s	ancestors,	role	models	and	namesakes	had	established	their	sovereignty	over	territory	and	people	through	the	ritual	parlamentos	in	which	Mapuche	longkos	and	colonial	or	Chilean	officials	reflexively	legitimized	one	another’s	claims	to	rule.160	Notions	of	race	figured	prominently	in	Aburto’s	political	philosophy.	At	the	same	time	he	used	the	word	raza	(race)	to	define	a	biological	category,	Aburto	was	also	speaking	of	cultural	features	of	Mapuche	life,	and	there	exists	a	degree	of	slippage	between	his	use	of	the	two	categories.	Nevertheless,	it	is	clear	that	Aburto	and	just	about	everyone	else	in	the	era	considered	the	Mapuche	people	to	be	a	biologically	and	culturally	distinct	population,	even	if	their	claims	to	political	sovereignty	were	questioned.	In	much	of	his	writing,	he	referred	to	the	“natural	law	of	the	race.”	That	phrase	indicates	a	familiarity	with	European	political	philosophy,	and	also	suggests	that	he	understood	certain	features	of	Mapuche	civilization	to	be	endemic	to	the	group.	The	implication	for	politics	was	that	those	features	should	be	considered	when	governing	or	incorporating	the	Mapuche	people	into	the	Chilean	state.	That	was	the	basis	for	his	original	proposal	to	bring	together	Mapuche	in	the	first	Congreso	in	1921,	and	the	subsequent	evolution	of	the	Federación	Araucana,	which	he	described	in	his	1923	interview	in	El	Mercurio.161	In	thinking	about	race	in	this	way,	Aburto	drew	from	much	of	the	predominant	racial	thinking	of	the	era,																																																									159	Ibid.	p.	221.	160	Zarley,	2017.	161	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef,	interview	in	El	Mercurio,	Jan.	20,	1923.	Cited	in	Menard	and	Pavez,	2005b,	pp.	213-214.	
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which	lent	his	arguments	an	“aura	of	scientific	legitimacy”	by	adopting	the	same	basic	framework	that	others	used	to	argue	for	the	inferiority	of	the	Mapuche	people	and	justify	the	colonization	of	the	south,	for	example.	162	Aburto	was	both	describing	and	constructing	the	Araucanian	race	in	his	writing,	“through	a	process	of	continual	inscription,	an	entity	in	constant	production	between	the	alliances	and	treaties	that	were	recorded,	the	product	of	a	body	or	of	a	judicial	or	political	archive	in	which	they	were	manifesting	their	own	natural	law.”163		There	is	also	an	underlying	political	philosophy	at	play	that	can	help	us	understand	Aburto’s	seemingly	enigmatic	alliance-making	strategy.	By	tracing	Aburto’s	lineage	and	the	ways	in	which	his	paternal	forebears	derived	power	through	their	proximity	to	powerful	figures,	Menard	has	shown	that	the	force	of	one’s	allies	reflects	upon	oneself.	That	makes	a	strong	figure	a	better	ally,	but	also	means	that	a	strong	opponent	implies	one’s	own	strength.	In	the	formative	period	of	the	1920s,	Aburto’s	political	emergence	coincided	with	the	rise	of	the	labor	movement	and	the	populist	politics	during	the	first	Alessandri	administration.	We	see	that	Aburto	even	patterned	the	name	of	his	own	organization	after	those	of	some	important	leftist	organizations	of	the	era,	like	the	FOCh	and	FECh.	However,	as	appealing	as	the	left	may	have	seemed	as	a	collection	of	allies,	Ibañez	was	a	stronger	figure	by	the	end	of	the	decade,	and	according	to	Menard’s	formulation	he	could	have	been	as	valuable	as	an	enemy	as	he	would	have	been	as	an	ally	in	terms	of	constructing	Aburto’s	own	political	strength	in	the	eyes	of	his	constituents.	Furthermore,	although	the	left	made	efforts	to	incorporate	peasants	into	their	class																																																									162	Ibid.	p.	215.	163	Menard	2013,	p.	XXXVIII.	
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struggle	in	the	early	1930s	as	Klubock	and	Mallon	showed	in	their	studies	of	the	Ranquil	Massacre,	the	international	communist	movement	was	attempting	to	erase	racial	barriers	at	the	same	time,	which	Aburto	had	relied	upon	to	justify	the	unique	relationship	of	the	Mapuche	with	the	Chilean	state	and	fight	for	their	claims	to	sovereignty.	That	made	the	left	a	somewhat	incompatible	set	of	political	allegiances.164	This	is	perhaps	why	Aburto	would	have	supported	Ibañez	in	the	late	1930s,	after	he	had	surveilled	and	persecuted	him	in	the	1920s.165	Finally,	we	cannot	overlook	the	spiritual	dimension	of	Aburto’s	political	philosophy.	His	faith	seems	obviously	prominent	at	the	beginning	and	end	of	his	career,	evidenced	by	his	early	religious	training	and	pastoral	work	at	the	Anglican	mission	at	Quepe,	and	the	increasingly	spiritual	tone	of	his	later	writings.	But	traces	of	that	spirituality	are	scattered	across	his	work	in	the	1920s	and	1930s	also,	in	the	form	of	prayers	spoken	at	Congresos,	invocations	of	the	name	Dios	Todopoderoso	(Almighty	God)	and	petitions	for	God’s	strength	to	be	delivered	to,	or	removed	from,	his	political	allies	and	enemies.	In	April	1938,	Aburto	referred	to	information	about	the	upcoming	presidential	election	as	“spiritual	news,”	suggesting	he	used	a	religious	frame	to	understand	that	political	contest.166	Following	the	election,	Aburto	called	on	Federación	members	to	maintain	the	“spiritual	forces”	they	had	brought	into	play	in	the	election	as	they	continued	to	fight	for	Ibañez’s	eventual	political	triumph.	“According	to	my	revelation…I	exhort	each	one	of	you,	as	well	as	
																																																								164	Ibid.	pp.	LI-LII.	165	Ibid.	pp.	LXXXIII-LXXIV,	see	footnote	3.	166	Circular	No.	995,	Apr.	30,	1938.	AMML,	Carpeta	2.	
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all	Evangelicals	of	our	country…that	we	should	keep	praying	until	Sr.	Ibañez	is	carried	to	the	Presidency	of	the	Republic.”167		As	he	withdrew	from	active	political	life	in	the	1940s,	Aburto’s	emphasis	on	the	spiritual	dimension	of	his	personal	life	as	well	as	the	broader	Mapuche	struggle	became	even	more	prominent.	Writing	to	his	sons	Cornelio	and	Manuel	Segundo	during	a	trip	to	Santiago	in	1946,	he	wrote,	“Each	day	I	am	more	content	with	all	that	I	have	done	in	this	city,”	in	reference	to	the	divine	messages	he	had	received.168	And	he	increasingly	referred	to	the	Mapuche	movement	as	a	“movement	of	faith”	in	the	official	accords	produced	by	the	Federación,	acts	which	he	characterized	as	“of	divine	origin	and	material	aspects.”169		While	a	full	exploration	of	the	spiritual	component	of	Aburto’s	later	writings	is	not	possible	here,	it	will	suffice	to	say	that	his	religious	worldview	was	deeply	syncretic.	He	drew	from	both	the	polytheistic	ancestral	traditions	of	his	people,	as	well	as	the	monotheistic	teachings	of	his	Anglican	mentor	Charles	Sadleir.	Aburto	was	a	“bricoleur,”	in	Claude	Levi-Strauss’	famous	formulation.170	Aburto’s	political	millenarianism	reminds	the	observer	of	the	Incaic	tradition	that	foretold	of	the	return	of	an	indigenous	leader	who	would	overthrow	the	colonial	order.	But	he	also	saw	the	creation	of	the	state	of	Israel	as	a	sign	that	the	same	could	happen	for	the	Mapuche	people	in	the	Araucanía,	which	he	noted	in	a	1948	journal	entry.171	Aburto	was	able	to	see	parallels	in	vastly	different	circumstances	and	pull	them	together	in																																																									167	Circular	No.	1019,	Nov.	1,	1938.	AMML,	Carpeta	2.	168	Letter	from	Santiago,	Jun.	1,	1946.	AMML,	Carpeta	3.	169	Circular	No.	10,	May	25,	1947	and	Oficio	Federal	33,	Nov.	15,	1946.	AMML,	Carpeta	2.	170	Claude	Lévi-Strauss,	The	Savage	Mind,	London:	Weidenfeld	and	Nicholson,	1966,	pp.	16-17.	Referenced	in	Menard	2013,	p.	CVIII.	171	Menard	2013,	pp.	CX-CXIII.	
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service	of	his	people’s	political	struggle.	He	acknowledged	the	hegemony	of	the	United	States	in	the	western	hemisphere,	and	he	prefigured	many	of	the	rights	of	indigenous	peoples,	which	fifty-five	years	after	his	death	were	codified	in	the	United	Nations	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples,	especially	the	right	to	self-determination	and	political	participation	established	in	Articles	3-5.172	
	
Summary	Mapuche	organizations	were	founded	in	the	1910s	and	1920s	as	the	process	of	radicación	was	drawing	to	a	close.	Settlement	and	the	right	to	maintain	communally	owned	land	was	a	central	issue	in	that	early	period.	The	Ley	Indígena	4.169,	which	facilitated	the	easy	dissolution	of	Mapuche	community	land,	provided	a	flashpoint	that	enabled	the	organizations	to	mobilize	large	numbers	of	their	members	and	fellow	Mapuche,	ultimately	expanding	the	capacity	of	the	organizations.	The	Federación	and	Sociedad	Caupolicán,	in	particular,	mobilized	thousands	of	Mapuche	in	defense	of	their	lands.	Additionally,	the	unstable	and	rapidly	evolving	political	context	of	the	1920s	created	a	landscape	that	enabled	the	organizations	to	stake	out	a	range	of	positions	on	the	issue	of	settlement	and	division	of	Mapuche	lands,	as	well	as	other	issues	like	cultural	preservation	and	assimilation.	The	leadership	of	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef	is	especially	insightful	into	those	trends,	because	his	lineage	is	well	established,	and	his	own	positions	tended	toward	political	extremes.	Even	though	he	recognized	that	his	own	authority	
																																																								172	Full	text	available	at:	www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf	Accessed	Apr.	22,	2017.	Referenced	in	Menard	2013,	p.	CXX.		
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derived	from	the	proximity	to	power,	he	did	not	hesitate	to	forge	alliances	with	opposition	parties,	even	when	the	establishment	persecuted	him	for	it.	More	importantly,	the	example	of	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef	demonstrates	how	fluid	and	flexible	the	reflexive	strategies	of	alliance	making	could	be.	Aburto	attempted	to	navigate	the	complex	terrain	of	national	politics	in	Chile	during	a	very	unstable	period.	While	he	was	guided	by	the	political	expediency	of	certain	partnerships,	he	also	was	guided	by	his	broader	view	of	the	world	and	political	principles	that	pre-date	the	era	in	question.	His	own	spiritual	beliefs,	while	certainly	influenced	by	his	Anglican	education	and	the	indigenista	partnership	of	Charles	Sadleir,	did	not	preclude	him	from	taking	two	wives	and	defending	Mapuche	cultural	practices	that	were	considered	antithetical	to	most	Christian	teaching.	Aburto,	as	an	indigenous	leader	who	was	influenced	by	non-indigenous	allies,	and	in	turn	influenced	the	indigenista	discourse	in	Chile,	was	most	certainly	a	complex	figure	who	left	an	indelible	mark	on	the	politics	of	his	own	era	and	well	beyond.				 	
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Chapter	2:	A	Conservative	Indigenismo	
	 The	Unión	Araucana	was	also	founded	as	a	partnership	between	religious	educators	and	indigenous	leaders,	in	this	case	between	Bishop	Guido	Beck	de	Ramberga	and	Antonio	Chihuailaf.	However,	from	its	founding	in	1926	until	its	merger	with	other	organizations	in	1938,	Beck	retained	a	much	firmer	control	over	the	direction	and	efforts	of	the	organization	than	either	the	Sociedad	or	Federación,	which	were	fully	directed	by	the	Mapuche	leaders	themselves.	Beck	was	the	leader	of	the	Catholic	Church	in	Araucanía,	and	came	from	the	Capuchin	order	of	monks	who	had	first	come	to	the	region	in	the	mid-nineteenth	century.	Chihauilaf,	meanwhile,	was	the	mayor	of	the	southern	town	of	Cunco,	and	had	founded	the	organization	Moderna	Araucanía	de	Cunco	in	1916.	Although	Moderna	Araucanía	continued	to	operate	throughout	the	1920s,	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	and	Federación	Araucana	had	emerged	as	the	two	most	influential	groups,	and	the	founding	of	the	Unión	was	a	reaction	to	the	leadership	of	those	groups	moving	to	the	left	of	the	political	spectrum	under	the	influence	of	Manuel	Aburto	and	Arturo	Huenchullán	as	they	sought	to	oppose	Manquilef’s	Ley	Indígena	1.469.		The	Unión	Araucana	hosted	its	own	regional	parlamentos	(parliaments,	or	formal	gatherings	for	decision	making)	in	the	late	1920s,	where	they	advanced	a	substantially	different	kind	of	indigenista	influence	over	the	Mapuche	movement.	Their	discourse	prioritized	branding	and	attacking	the	Sociedad	and	Federación	and	their	leaders	as	communists.	They	also	took	pains	to	“prohibit	the	practice	of	
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ancient	pagan	and	superstitious	indigenous	customs,	like	the	machitún,	rehuetún,	
guillatún	and	others	that	are	celebrated	with	great	excess.”173	As	they	worked	to	convert	Mapuche	to	Christianity,	the	Capuchins	did	offer	mass	in	Mapudungun	and	allow	a	measure	of	syncretism	between	Catholic	and	indigenous	spirituality.	Félix	José	de	Augusta,	another	Capuchin	missionary,	was	instrumental	in	those	efforts,	as	he	had	studied	Mapudungun	and	even	published	a	Spanish-Mapudungun	dictionary.174	In	response	to	claims	that	Mapuche	children	lacked	adequate	education,	Beck	and	the	Unión	publicly	reminded	critics	that	the	Capuchins	operated	more	than	thirty	schools	in	the	province,	which	were	subsidized	by	the	national	government.	It	is	not	surprising	then,	that	the	government	was	at	times	more	receptive	to	the	Unión’s	petitions	and	supported	the	organization	more	than	the	other	two.	The	Unión,	after	all,	was	the	only	of	the	major	groups	to	support	Manquilef’s	Ley	1.469,	and	they	used	their	assemblies	to	actively	support	the	law	and	attack	the	other	groups	at	the	same	time.175	The	example	of	Beck	and	the	Unión	Araucana	further	demonstrates	the	breadth	and	diversity	of	thought	within	Chilean	indigenismo	and	Mapuche	activism.	While	most	of	the	Mapuche	organizations	operated	independently	under	indigenous	leadership,	the	Unión	could	only	be	described	as	autonomous	at	most.	And	if	we	are	to	compare	Beck	and	Lipschütz	as	indigenistas,	we	clearly	see	the	two	at	opposite	
																																																								173	Diario	Austral,	Apr.	26,	1926.	Cited	in	Foerster	and	Montecino,	p.	57.	The	Nguillatún	is	a	religious	ceremony	that	involves	a	large	gathering	of	Mapuche	for	the	purpose	of	connecting	to	the	spiritual	world.	The	Machitún	is	a	related	ceremony	led	by	a	shaman	that	helps	connect	living	people	with	their	ancestors.	The	Rehue	is	a	vertical	pole	used	by	the	machi	in	religious	ceremonies.	174	Félix	José	de	Aug.a,	Gramática	Araucana,	Valdivia:	Imprenta	Central	J.	Lampert,	1903.	175	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	56-58.	
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ends	of	an	ideological	spectrum.	Beck	was	committed	to	the	Conservative	Party	and	its	candidates,	and	maintained	few	connections	to	the	indigenista	movement	outside	of	Chile.	His	firm	commitment	remained	to	the	education	and	cultural	assimilation	of	Mapuche	in	the	Araucanía.	Nevertheless,	many	indigenous	students	benefited	from	the	education	Beck’s	schools	provided,	and	he	opened	many	doors	to	Chilean	society,	which	addressed	one	fundamental	tenet	of	the	indigenista	movement.		
Monsignor	Guido	Beck	de	Ramberga	Guido	Beck	de	Ramberga	was	born	in	the	town	of	Ramberg,	Germany,	on	the	western	edge	of	Bavaria,	in	1885.	He	entered	the	Capuchin	Order	of	Franciscan	friars	and	was	ordained	as	a	priest	in	1910.	Two	years	later,	Beck	traveled	to	southern	Chile	to	become	a	missionary	and	teacher.	He	taught	in	Padre	Las	Casas,	just	outside	the	regional	capital	of	Temuco,	served	as	a	parish	priest	in	Cunco	and	as	a	missionary	in	Coñaripe,	all	small	communities	in	Cautín	Province	with	large	indigenous	populations.	In	1925	he	was	appointed	Apostolic	Prefect	of	Araucanía,	and	in	1928	his	status	was	elevated	to	Apostolic	Vicar	and	he	was	granted	the	title	of	bishop	as	the	Church’s	work	in	the	region	advanced	under	his	leadership.176	He	learned	to	speak	Mapudungun	as	a	missionary	and	operated	more	than	thirty	schools	in	the	region,	many	of	which	included	Mapuche	youth	alongside	white	Chilean	students.		
																																																								176	Mario	Céspedes	and	Lelia	Garreaud,	Gran	Diccionario	de	Chile	(Biográfico-Cultural),	CMA:	Santiago	de	Chile,	1988,	2nd	ed.,	p.	77.	Beck	was	technically	the	“Titular	Bishop	of	Mastaura,”	a	region	in	Asia,	as	the	Araucanía	did	not	become	a	full	diocese	until	2001.	However,	throughout	the	period	examined	here,	Beck	was	referred	to	by	the	title	of	bishop	or	monsignor	within	the	region.	
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Beck’s	promotion	as	the	central	leader	of	the	Catholic	Church	in	Araucanía	coincided	with	the	chaotic	period	of	presidential	politics	in	the	nation’s	capital	during	the	1920s.	At	the	same	time,	the	radicación	process	was	coming	to	end,	and	Mapuche	communities	were	increasingly	struggling	to	hold	onto	their	meager	land	holdings	and	organizing	to	carry	out	that	effort.	It	is	not	surprising	then,	that	he	inserted	himself	into	the	Mapuche	political	movement	at	the	time	he	did.	By	creating	the	Unión	Araucana,	Beck	carved	out	space	within	the	movement	for	a	more	conservative	brand	of	indigenous	politics,	and	through	his	schools	he	had	the	organizational	capacity	to	cultivate	leaders	loyal	to	him	and	his	political	priorities.	From	1926	onward,	Beck	and	the	Unión	supported	private	ownership	of	land,	staunchly	opposed	traditional	Mapuche	cultural	practices	like	polygamy	and	faith	healing,	and	allied	the	group	with	the	Conservative	Party	and	its	candidates.		Beck	was	willing	to	blend	elements	of	indigenous	culture	with	the	Catholic	rites	of	mass	in	order	to	attract	Mapuche	into	the	church.	At	the	fourth	Parlamento	of	the	Unión	Araucana	in	1928,	Father	Félix	de	Augusta	celebrated	a	mass	that	included	prayers	and	songs	recited	in	Mapudungun,	and	the	bread	and	wine	for	Holy	Commnion	were	brought	to	the	altar	by	an	Indian.177	However,	the	rest	of	his	efforts	were	quite	culturally	conservative	and	required	Mapuche	to	assimilate	to	the	values	of	western	Christian	culture.	Foerster	and	Montecino	illustrate	how	the	Unión	Araucana’s	vision	of	cultural	development	was	an	inherently	gendered	one.	Recognizing	that	Mapuche	women	were	the	keepers	and	purveyors	of	much	traditional	wisdom	and	power,	for	example	in	the	role	of	machi	(shaman),	the	Unión																																																									177	Foerster	and	Montecino,	p.	63.	
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and	the	Church	sought	to	subject	women	to	more	patriarchal	western	norms.	“The	woman	owes	her	husband	obedience	and	subservience,	and	he	owes	her	compassion	in	return,	he	should	rule	her	with	moderation	and	good	sense	because	she	is	fragile	and	weak.”178		Boarding	schools	most	fully	carried	out	the	goal	of	cultural	integration,	Beck	argued,	because	they	brought	Mapuche	and	Chilean	children	into	sustained	contact	and	interaction	through	their	living	arrangements,	thus	assimilating	their	customs.179	“What	type	of	school	does	the	Araucanian	need?	The	boarding	school.	Why?	Because	only	there,	watched	and	instructed	daily,	in	contact	with	Chilean	children	who	already	have	a	higher	level	of	culture,	does	the	Indian	lose	his	savage	customs	and	acquire	the	true	habits	of	a	civilized	person.”	180	In	the	same	proposal,	Beck	also	asked	for	direct	funding	for	the	Unión	Araucana	and	its	official	newspaper	
El	Araucano,	for	the	purpose	of	carrying	out	an	anti-alcoholism	campaign.	By	aligning	the	group’s	efforts	with	the	priorities	of	state	actors,	Beck	was	able	to	increase	the	influence	he	had	with	the	state,	and	extract	resources	to	support	his	programs.	Statistics	compiled	by	the	Bishop	indicate	that	since	1896	the	Capuchin	missions	had	educated	83,692	students	in	the	Araucanía.181	By	1930,	the	Capuchins	claimed	80	primary	and	secondary	schools	under	their	operation,	in	which	they	were	educating	5,920	students,	2,061	of	whom	they	identified	as	indigenous.	When	
																																																								178	El	Araucano,	No.	14,	1927,	quoted	in	Foerster	and	Montecino,	p.	59.	179	For	a	comparative	treatment	of	indigenous	boarding	schools	as	indigenista	projects	in	other	national	contexts,	see	Dawson,	2012	(referenced	in	introduction	and	discussed	further	in	chapter	three).	180	Guido	Beck	to	Luis	Schmidt,	Minister	of	Development,	May	27,	1929.	Archivo	Diócesis	de	Villarrica	(ADV),	Carpeta	Unión	Araucana	(UA)	1.		181	Notes	on	mission	Schools,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.	
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they	came	under	fire	for	doing	a	poor	job	of	serving	those	indigenous	charges,	Beck	defended	the	work	by	arguing	that	teachers	struggled	with	high	rates	of	absenteeism	and	a	myriad	of	social	and	family	problems	that	interrupted	the	educational	process	for	indigenous	children.182	In	addition	to	Guido	Beck’s	political	strategy,	his	work	with	Mapuche	was	also	inherently	personal.	It	is	not	entirely	clear	how	or	why	Beck	chose	Antonio	Chihuailaf	to	lead	the	Unión	Araucana,	but	before	his	appointment	as	Apostolic	Prefect	he	had	been	a	parish	priest	in	Cunco,	where	Chihuailaf	had	founded	the	organization	Moderna	Araucanía	and	served	as	mayor	of	the	town.	In	comparison	to	the	relationship	that	Beck	maintained	with	Floriano	Antilef	as	the	second	President	of	the	Unión	Araucana,	he	and	Chihuailaf	remained	rather	distant.	Antilef	regularly	wrote	to	Beck	to	ask	for	assistance	with	his	son’s	education	and	to	update	the	Monsignor	on	Floriano	Segundo’s	progress.183	Beck	helped	Antilef	get	his	son	into	a	secondary	school	in	Temuco,	and	both	father	and	son	would	regularly	write	to	express	their	gratitude.184	On	the	other	hand,	the	correspondence	between	Beck	and	Chihuailaf	sometimes	lapsed	for	months	at	a	time,	especially	in	the	late	1920s	as	tensions	rose	between	the	two.		Later	in	the	organization’s	history,	the	Unión	would	draw	leaders	from	the	cohort	of	students	that	Beck’s	missions	had	cultivated.	In	the	late	1930s,	Beck	supported	Victor	and	Zenón	Leñam	as	they	came	up	through	mission	schools	and	
																																																								182	Statistics	on	mission	Schools,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		183	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	Feb.	21	and	26,	1932.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		184	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	Mar.	23,	1933	and	Mar.	3,	1935.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
	 88	
	
went	on	to	study	in	Santiago	at	the	Universidad	Católica.185	Victor	would	go	on	to	contribute	to	the	Unión	Araucana,	first	through	the	group’s	youth	branch	“Juventud	Araucana.”	In	1940	he	gave	a	speech	to	the	Youth	Conference	that	was	later	published	as	an	article	in	the	Juventud’s	official	bulletin	Pelomtúe.	There	he	argued	for	the	importance	of	developing	and	maintaining	a	strong	organizational	structure	for	their	movement.186	In	early	1944,	Beck	helped	Victor	Leñam	secure	a	job	as	an	agronomist,	working	on	the	estate	of	Senator	Carlos	Haverbeck.187	Later	that	year,	in	October,	Victor	Leñam	was	elected	president	of	the	Unión	Araucana.188	He	would	continue	to	put	his	education	and	scientific	training	to	work	in	the	service	of	his	people	and	Guido	Beck’s	broader	educational	objectives.	In	1949,	when	he	toured	a	group	of	Mapuche	communities	and	compiled	statistics,	Leñam	wrote	to	Beck,	commenting	on	their	living	conditions	and	offering	to	share	some	insights	he	developed	into	the	benefits	of	agricultural	training	for	Mapuche	smallholders.189		Other	Union	members	would	also	go	on	to	play	influential	roles	outside	of	that	organization	and	develop	connections	to	the	broader	indigenista	network.	Domingo	Curaqueo	was	a	leader	in	the	UA	in	the	1930s	and	1940s190	and	would	later	become	a	professor	in	Santiago	and	a	member	of	the	Instituto	Indigenista																																																									185	Correspondence	between	Guido	Beck	and	Victor	and	Zenón	Leñam,	Jan.	1937,	Apr.	1941	and	Dec.	1943.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		186	Pelomtúe,	Issue	2,	Feb./Mar.	1940.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.	“Pelomtúe”	is	actually	a	Mapudungun	word	meaning	“genius.”	It	is	curious	that	the	Unión	allowed	its	youth	cohort	to	embrace	this	linguistic	aspect	of	their	native	culture	as	the	title	of	their	official	publication,	and	illustrates	that	although	the	UA	was	the	most	conservative	of	the	major	Mapuche	organizations	and	broadly	supported	assimilation	into	Chilean	society,	they	did	also	make	concessions	to	indigenous	culture.		187	Guido	Beck	to	Carlos	Haverbeck,	Senator,	Mar.	4,	1944.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		188	Report	of	annual	assembly,	Oct.	8,	1944.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		189	Victor	Leñam	to	Guido	Beck,	Aug.	3,	1949.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		190	Domingo	Curaqueo	to	Guido	Beck,	Jun.	12,	1937.	Domingo	Curaqueo	to	Victor	Painemal,	Aug.,	4,	1937.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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Chileno.191	Through	the	IIC,	he	became	acquainted	with	the	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	and	when	the	American	anthropologist	Louis	Faron	reached	out	to	Lipschütz	to	ask	for	help	arranging	a	site	for	his	fieldwork	in	the	early	1950s,	Lipschütz	put	Faron	in	touch	with	Curaqueo,	who	helped	him	make	arrangements	for	his	study	in	the	Comunidad	Alonqueo	near	Temuco	in	1952-1953.192	But	one	of	the	most	consistent	and	salient	features	of	Guido	Beck’s	role	in	the	Mapuche	movement	was	that	he	maintained	connections,	both	personal	and	professional,	with	a	whole	host	of	state	actors.		As	the	Apostolic	Prefect	of	Araucanía,	Beck	was	able	to	communicate	directly	with	high-ranking	officials,	obtain	a	personal	meeting	if	he	requested	one,	and	was	often	consulted	when	elites	in	Santiago	had	a	question	about	how	a	particular	policy	would	affect	the	region.	Some	of	those	interactions	were	relatively	minor	and	mundane,	such	as	when	Floriano	Antilef	asked	him	for	help	getting	livestock	imported	from	Argentina,193	but	others	were	more	significant	to	the	Mapuche	movement,	as	when	he	asked	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	reject	a	Radical	Party	proposal	that	would	have	ended	restitution	payments	to	Indians	
																																																								191	IIC	statement,	undated,	signed	by	Curaqueo.	Collección	Alejandro	Lipschütz	(CAL),	Caja	6357.		192	Correspondence	between	Alejandro	Lipschütz	and	Louis	Faron,	Jan.-Aug.	1953.	CAL,	Caja	6353.		193	It	is	worth	mentioning	that	the	transport	of	livestock	across	the	Andes	was	a	major	component	of	the	Mapuche	economy	in	the	nineteenth	century,	and	including	livestock	stolen	from	Argentinian	herds	in	the	Pampas	through	much	of	that	earlier	period.	Most	of	that	traffic	was	brought	to	an	end	with	the	conclusion	of	the	Pacification	and	War	of	the	Desert	(Argentine	conquest	of	native	peoples	in	the	Pampas)	between	the	1860s	and	1880s.	Thus	while	Antilef’s	request	held	relatively	little	economic	significance	in	1930,	it	also	carried	much	greater	historical	and	cultural	significance.	
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whose	land	had	been	usurped.194	In	May	of	1928,	Beck	requested	and	received	from	the	Ministry	of	Development	a	monthly	salary	from	the	state	of	$200	pesos	for	each	of	the	thirty-five	missionaries	working	in	the	Araucanía.	At	about	the	same	time,	Beck	wrote	to	the	Minister	of	Development	to	request	his	intervention	in	a	land	dispute	where	Mapuche	settlers	were	being	evicted	from	their	land.195	Through	exchanges	like	these,	Beck	was	able	to	advocate	for	the	Mapuches	under	his	care	and	state	actors	offered	him	privileged	access	and	support.		Indígenas	also	utilized	their	relationships	with	the	bishop	to	access	his	connections	within	the	state.	In	May	1932,	Beck	received	a	request	for	help	from	Antonio	Penchulef,	when	his	property	had	been	attacked.	Beck	passed	his	concern	along	to	the	Juez	de	Indios	(Indian	Court	Judge)	in	Pitrufquén,	and	assured	Penchulef	that	he	if	he	was	attacked	again	they	would	elevate	the	concern	to	the	Governor	of	Valdivia	or	the	Minister	of	the	Interior.196	Beck’s	agents	also	advocated	directly	to	government	officials,	although	presumably	those	direct	petitions	carried	less	weight.	In	1933,	Floriano	Antilef	wrote	to	the	Governor	of	La	Unión	to	request	that	he	intervene	to	stop	“various	caudillos	that	have	given	themselves	the	title	of	cacique”	from	making	unreasonable	demands	of	Indians	in	the	province.197	In	the	same	year,	he	also	asked	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	intervene	with	the	courts	as	they	implemented	provisions	of	the	Ley	Indígena,	to	help	Indians	who	had	
																																																								194	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	Aug.	18,	1930.	Letter	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		195	Correspondence	with	Ministry	of	Development,	May	1928.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1		196	Reply	to	Antonio	Penchulef,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		197	Floriano	Antilef	to	Governor	of	La	Unión,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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been	granted	titulos	de	merced	but	not	yet	received	restitution	for	lands	that	had	been	stolen	from	them.198	It	is	also	likely	that	Guido	Beck’s	connections	with	state	actors	played	a	role	in	the	desire	of	Coñuepán	and	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	to	partner	with	them	in	the	creation	of	the	Corporación	Araucana.	In	a	summary	of	the	January	15,	1937	General	Assembly	of	the	Unión,	Antilef	provided	members	with	an	account	of	a	meeting	that	he,	Coñuepán	and	Esteban	Romero	had	with	President	Alessandri,	in	which	they	asked	for	his	assistance	in	dealing	with	land	issues,	promoting	agricultural	development,	forming	a	consumer	cooperative	and	other	issues	like	combating	alcoholism.199	Two	years	later,	after	the	Corporación	had	officially	been	formed	and	Pedro	Aguirre	Cerda’s	Frente	Popular	government	came	to	power,	Antilef	asked	Beck	his	opinion	about	a	proposal	that	he	and	the	Corporación	leaders	had	drafted	for	the	new	President,	especially	because	the	plan	called	for	enhanced	educational	opportunities	for	Mapuche	youth.200	Beck’s	connections	were	also	valuable	in	that	he	could	get	state	actors	to	intervene	quickly	in	the	event	of	an	emergency	or	fast-moving	situation.	In	May	1938,	in	the	wake	of	a	disastrous	harvest	in	the	south,	Beck	reached	out	to	the	Minister	of	Agriculture,	who	provided	400	sacks	of	wheat	to	help	eighty	Mapuche	families	ward	off	starvation	as	they	headed	into	the	winter.201	The	Unión’s	regional	centers	provided	a	mechanism	for	assessing	the	needs	of	the	suffering	peasants,	and	
																																																								198	Floriano	Antilef	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		199	Summary	of	General	Assembly	meeting,	Jan.	15,	1934.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		200	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	Sep.	11,	1939.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		201	Guido	Beck	to	Máximo	Valdes,	Minister	of	Agriculture,	May	13	1938	and	related	petition	for	food	aid.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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tracking	the	amount	of	grain	that	they	needed	and	were	then	awarded.202	And	state	actors	were	sure	to	keep	Beck	in	the	loop	when	various	proposals	were	being	considered.	In	1943,	when	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	formed	a	commission	to	study	the	“indigenous	question,”	he	included	Coñuepán,	Aburto	and	“a	missionary	from	Araucanía”	on	the	panel,	and	the	Minister	forwarded	a	summary	of	the	findings	to	Beck	for	his	reference.203	Manuel	Aburto	and	Guido	Beck	both	served	as	leaders	of	Mapuche	organizations	and	intermediaries	between	individual	Mapuche	and	the	state.	Many	of	their	efforts	were	even	directed	at	solving	similar	problems,	in	particular	those	pertaining	to	land	claims.	However,	Aburto	and	Beck	maintained	very	different	relationships	with	the	state	officials	they	interacted	with,	including	political	appointees	like	ministers,	elected	officials	like	deputies,	governors	and	even	several	presidents.	Because	Aburto’s	proposals	were	often	more	radically	in	support	of	minority	interests	and	therefore	more	difficult	for	politicians	to	support,	he	often	found	himself	in	the	role	of	provoking	entrenched	interests,	as	in	his	alignment	with	the	Socialist	and	Communist	Parties	in	the	late	1920s	and	early	1930s.	In	addition,	because	he	was	much	more	flexible	ideologically,	the	alliances	Aburto	crafted	were	relationships	of	convenience	and	likely	to	change	with	the	political	winds,	as	he	did	after	1938.	Beck,	on	the	other	hand,	consistently	favored	more	conservative	policy	positions	on	social,	economic	and	political	questions.	His	steadfast	support	of	the	
																																																								202	List	of	accounts,	Apr.	29,	1938.	ADV	Carpeta	UA	2.		203	Decree	empaneling	Commission	on	Indian	Affairs,	Jul.	29,	1943	and	list	of	proposals,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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status	quo	and	the	Conservative	Party	must	have	made	him	seem	like	a	more	reliable	partner.		
Ley	Indígena	4.169	and	the	Special	Tribunal	The	Unión	Araucana	was	founded	in	1926,	in	the	same	year	that	Manuel	Manquilef	was	elected	to	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	and	began	proposing	the	Ley	Indígena	that	would	be	passed	the	following	year.	Some	Mapuche	supported	Ley	4.169	because	the	process	included	a	historical	review	of	legal	titles	and	a	survey	of	lands	to	be	divided,	which	Indians	could	use	to	recover	usurped	lands.	However,	others	were	staunchly	opposed	because	the	process	was	relatively	easy	to	set	in	motion,	beginning	with	the	request	of	a	single	community	member.	Many	viewed	that	as	a	very	low	threshold	and	raised	concerns	that	more	Mapuche	communities	would	thus	disintegrate.		The	law	created	a	Tribunal	de	División	de	Comunidades	(Tribunal	for	the	Division	of	Indigenous	Communities),	which	was	charged	with	overseeing	the	process	of	subdivision.	The	Tribunal	consisted	of	three	members,	a	president,	secretary	and	indigenous	representative,	and	from	the	start	Antonio	Chihuailaf	was	appointed	as	the	sole	Mapuche	member	of	the	Tribunal.	In	some	instances,	the	Tribunal	had	to	reject	requests	because	“the	action	of	this	Tribunal	extends	only	to	those	indigenous	communities	with	a	titulo	de	merced,	and	does	not	apply	to	land	rights	of	Indians	derived	from	other	ownership	titles.”204	Títulos	de	merced	were	the	original	legal	titles	to	reducción	lands	that	the	Chilean	state	granted	to	Mapuche																																																									204	Letter	from	Tribunal,	May	24,	1928.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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heads	of	household	in	the	period	of	resettlement	that	began	after	the	Pacification	in	1883.	However,	over	the	years	many	Mapuche	communities	had	lost	portions	of	their	communal	land	through	fraud,	which	in	some	cases	happened	when	neighboring	landowners	simply	moved	fencelines	onto	indigenous	plots	adjacent	to	their	own.	As	early	as	1927,	the	Unión	leaders	were	connected	with	the	Conservative	Party	and	sent	their	suggestions	for	the	Ley	Indígena	4.169	to	their	representatives	in	Congress.205	The	Unión	also	maintained	alliances	with	some	Mapuche	leaders	in	this	era,	but	were	among	the	few	indigenous	supporters	of	Manquilef	in	the	promotion	of	Ley	4.169.	In	July	1927,	Antonio	Chihuailaf	traveled	to	Osorno	to	visit	with	members	of	the	Unión	there,	in	which	he	encouraged	them	to	support	Manquilef’s	proposed	law.206	In	addition,	from	the	start	the	Unión	maintained	a	cultural	and	political	position	distinctly	separate	from	the	more	radical	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef.	In	Chihuailaf’s	invitation	to	the	third	Unión	Parlamento	in	Boroa,	he	mentioned	that	there	would	be	no	machi	dances	or	nguillatún	celebrated	there.	Instead,	Chihuailaf	advocated	for	progress,	cultural	assimilation	and	substituted	Catholic	Masses	for	the	ancient	pagan	traditions	embraced	by	Aburto	and	the	Federacion.207	It	seems	that	for	those	reasons,	as	well	as	his	respect	and	personal	relationship	with	Guido	Beck,	the	new	President	Ibañez	named	Antonio	Chihuailaf	
																																																								205	Letter	from	Conservative	Party	officials,	Jan.	1927.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		206	Antonio	Chihuailaf	to	Guido	Beck,	Jul.	18,	1927.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		207	Public	invitation	to	3rd	Annual	Parlamento,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.	
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as	the	indigenous	representative	to	the	Special	Tribunal	that	Ley	4.169	established	to	carry	out	the	subdivision	of	indigenous	lands.208	Ley	4.169	did	have	some	success	in	recovering	usurped	land	and	returning	it	to	communities.	By	February	of	1929,	the	Tribunal	had	recovered	1653	hectares	of	land.	However,	those	from	whom	Mapuche	lands	had	been	recovered	mounted	a	challenge	to	those	actions	through	the	regional	press,	characterizing	themselves	as	the	legitimate	owners	of	the	lands	and	the	Tribunal	and	the	state	as	those	stealing	it	unjustly.	At	the	same	time,	other	Mapuche	leaders	were	challenging	the	law	because	it	made	subdivision	easier	and	organizations	like	the	Caupolican	Society	and	Araucanian	Federation	swelled	their	ranks	by	organizing	peasants	in	opposition.	Some	challenged	Chihuailaf’s	appointment	to	the	Tribunal,	and	in	February	1929,	Diputado	Hector	Alvarez	proposed	legislation	in	the	Cámara	that	would	modify	Ley	4.169	to	stipulate	that	the	President’s	nominee	for	indigenous	representative	to	the	Tribunal	must	first	be	nominated	by	the	Minister	of	Education	and	be	employed	as	a	teacher.	Because	that	move	would	have	disqualified	Antonio	Chihuailaf,	he	wrote	to	Beck	to	ask	him	to	contact	his	friends	in	Santiago	and	oppose	the	amendment.	“This	would	mean	the	achievement	of	the	goals	of	many	who	have	bothered	us	and	sought	to	stir	things	up,”	he	wrote.209		In	May	1929,	Chihuailaf	wrote	to	Beck	to	explain	that	several	options	were	being	discussed	to	reform	the	subdivision	process.	Diputados	from	the	Democrat	and	Radical	Parties	were	proposing	the	creation	of	supervisory	positions	above	the	Tribunal	that	would	report	to	the	Court	of	Appeals.	Other	rumors	were	circulating																																																									208	Copy	of	Presidential	Decree,	Jan.	13,	1928.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		209	Antonio	Chihuailaf	to	Guido	Beck,	Feb.	15,	1929.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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about	a	change	of	personnel	on	the	Tribunal,	including	the	possibility	that	Manuel	Aburto	would	replace	Chihuailaf	as	the	indigenous	representative.210	The	following	month,	Beck	sent	a	telegram	directly	to	President	Ibañez,	lamenting	the	end	of	the	first	project	of	subdivision.	He	expressed	his	opinion	that	new	proposals	were	problematic	and	might	open	the	door	to	“pernicious	ambitions”	of	“undesirable	elements	that	abound	in	this	region.”211	Beck	regularly	utilized	such	defamatory	language	as	code	when	referring	to	Manuel	Aburto	and	other	left-leaning	Mapuche	leaders	like	Arturo	Huenchullán.	As	proposals	for	the	modification	of	Ley	1.469	were	being	developed	in	the	spring	of	1929,	Beck	submitted	to	the	Minister	of	Development	Luis	Schmidt	a	broader	plan	for	the	incorporation	of	Araucanians	into	Chilean	society.	Beck	suggested	the	government	should	continue	to	expand	and	subsidize	educational	opportunities	for	Mapuche	youth	and	include	them	in	the	military	draft.	Regarding	education,	he	proposed	more	rural	schools,	grants	for	exceptional	students	and	a	system	of	traveling	agronomists	who	could	teach	modern	agricultural	techniques	to	Mapuche	farmers	in	the	countryside.212	The	following	month,	Beck	expanded	upon	his	proposal	with	a	request	that	the	Ministry	support	his	work	by	funding	boarding	schools	for	both	girls	and	boys.		Chihuailaf	wrote	to	Beck	again	to	suggest	they	employ	some	members	of	the	Unión	to	propagandize	on	behalf	of	their	position,	recommending	Floriano	Antilef	
																																																								210	Antonio	Chihuailaf	to	Guido	Beck,	May	30,	1929.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		211	Guido	Beck	to	President	Ibañez,	Jun.	11,	1929.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		212	Draft	proposal,	Guido	Beck	to	Minister	of	Development.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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and	Antonio	Cofian	for	the	role.213	He	also	asked	Beck	to	write	to	President	Ibañez,	which	he	did	a	week	later.214	In	that	communication,	Beck	suggested	that	instead	of	adding	five	judges	to	the	Tribunal,	they	should	hire	twenty-five	surveyors.	More	judges	would	mean	more	legal	wrangling	and	competing	interpretations,	slowing	the	process	even	further.	He	explained	that	a	shortage	of	surveyors	was	the	current	bottleneck	in	the	process.215	Antilef	and	Cofian,	representing	the	interests	of	the	Unión	Araucana	and	La	Moderna	Araucanía,	subsequently	sent	letters	and	telegrams	to	Ibañez,	the	Minister	of	Development	and	several	Diputados	with	a	similar	proposal.216	In	trying	to	carry	out	the	division	of	indigenous	communities,	Chihuailaf	and	the	Tribunal	faced	many	obstacles	and	great	opposition	from	Mapuche	constituents.	In	July	1928,	Antonio	Trangulao	Huentecura	sent	a	complaint	to	Arturo	Vidal,	the	Intendente	of	Cautín	Province.	He	protested	the	actions	taken	by	Chihuailaf	and	the	Tribunal.	He	wrote	that	Chihuailaf	was	a	tool	of	the	other	non-indigenous	members	of	the	Tribunal,	who	had	colluded	with	a	wealthy	landowner	to	evict	him	from	his	land	because	they	disputed	his	heredity.	The	Intendente	forwarded	the	protest	to	the	Tribunal.	Chihuailaf	responded	with	information	about	the	lineage	of	deceased	members	of	the	community,	and	an	official	statement	from	the	Tribunal	said	that	they	believed	alleged	communist	Martín	Collío	was	the	true	author	of	the	complaint.	As	evidence,	they	pointed	out	that	Collío	had	not	been	quiet	about	his	opposition	to	
																																																								213	Antonio	Chihuailaf	to	Guido	Beck,	Jun.	13,	1929.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		214	Antonio	Chihuailaf	to	Guido	Beck,	Jun.	25,	1929.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		215	Guido	Beck	to	President	Ibañez,	Jul.	2,	1929.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		216	Floriano	Antilef	and	Antonio	Cofian	to	Cámara	and	Senado,	Jun.	24,	1929.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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Chihuailaf,	that	the	letter	appeared	to	be	written	on	the	same	typewriter	as	a	previous	message	sent	by	Collío,	and	that	all	the	members	of	the	community	except	Collío	disputed	Trangulao’s	claim.	Chihauilaf	wrote	to	Beck	to	affirm	the	Tribunal’s	response	and	told	him	not	to	worry	about	it.	He	claimed	that	other	communist	agitators	were	behind	Collío,	and	worried	about	connections	between	the	Partido	Comunista	and	the	current	president	of	the	Catholic	center	in	Imperial.217	Fear	of	communist	infiltration	was	an	important	theme	trumpeted	by	Beck	and	the	Unión	leaders	throughout	the	late	1920s	and	early	1930s.	Even	though	he	supported	the	Ley	4.169	and	the	Tribunal	it	established,	Beck	was	not	completely	satisfied	with	its	progress	either.	He	recognized	it	was	an	enormous	task	that	required	more	manpower,	time	and	resources.	In	addition,	there	was	not	enough	land	to	settle	all	the	Indians	who	were	never	settled	in	the	first	place,	and	there	was	not	enough	time	or	manpower	to	divide	the	communities	given	the	level	of	conflict	and	confusion	that	the	process	produced.	He	also	worried	about	violence	if	ocupantes	(squatters)	were	forcibly	removed	from	state	lands.218	Chihuailaf	acknowledged	those	concerns	even	as	he	carried	on	with	the	project.219		The	Tribunal	and	the	process	of	subdivision	also	provided	a	means	by	which	Mapuche	communities	could	recover	land	that	had	been	stolen	from	them.	Manuel	Aburto	tried	to	use	the	process	in	that	way,	as	in	the	case	of	Filipe	Millahuala	
																																																								217	Complaint	by	Antonio	Trangulao	Huentecura,	Jul.	6,	1928.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.	It	is	not	clear	from	the	existing	historical	record	who	Martín	Collío	was	or	what	his	role	he	played	in	this	period	of	Mapuche	history.	Here	an	accusation	is	made	that	Collío	is	himself	a	communist	agitator.	In	other	correspondence	he	levies	similar	charges	against	Aburto	and	Huenchullán.	See	also,	footnote	67.	218	Guido	Beck,	draft	proposal	for	legal	reforms,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		219	Antonio	Chihuailaf	to	Guido	Beck,	Oct.	26,	1928.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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Caniulaf,	who	had	been	granted	42	hectares	within	the	reducción	of	José	Painequeo.	Aburto	explained	that	the	Comité	Ejecutivo	had	studied	his	claim,	confirmed	Millahuala’s	assertion	and	requested	that	the	government	restore	his	property.220	In	some	cases,	the	process	did	work	to	restore	lost	land	to	its	rightful	owners.	In	November	1928,	the	Tribunal	offered	a	lengthy	explanation	and	resolution	of	a	dispute	between	Juan	Millahuaiqui	and	Simón	Puchi.	Millahuaiqui	claimed	that	Puchi	had	colluded	with	others	to	push	him	off	his	land,	and	petitioned	to	have	the	Comunidad	Juan	Manque	divided	in	an	effort	to	recover	that	land,	which	they	granted.221		It	is	difficult	to	establish	conclusively	what	percentage	of	land	disputes	arose	within	Mapuche	communities	and	how	many	were	between	Mapuche	and	non-indigenous	landholders.	However,	all	of	the	major	indigenous	organizations	were	involved	in	defending	Mapuche	lands	from	usurpation	at	one	time	or	another,	suggesting	that	the	latter	was	a	much	more	prevalent	injustice.	As	Manquilef’s	Ley	1.469	was	being	applied,	Beck,	Chihuailaf	and	the	Unión	ardently	supported	the	subdivision	of	land	that	it	prescribed,	arguing	that	private	property	was	in	the	best	interest	of	Indians	seeking	to	advance	in	modern	Chilean	society,	and	at	the	same	time	that	the	process	contained	valuable	tools	to	recover	lost	land.	However,	by	1929	pressure	from	the	other	Mapuche	organizations	led	to	the	modification	of	the	law,	and	the	Tribunal	was	disbanded.222	Eventually,	President	Ibañez	would	modify	Ley	4.169	with	Decree	Law	4.111	in	1931.	The	latter	raised	the	threshold	by	which	a																																																									220	Manuel	Aburto	to	Guido	Beck,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		221	Record	of	land	dispute,	Nov.	26,	1928.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		222	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	62-64.	
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community	could	request	subdivision	from	a	single	person	to	one-third	of	the	group,	which	did	serve	to	dramatically	slow	the	number	of	subdivisions	requested	by	Mapuche	communities	even	though	private	ownership	of	land	remained	a	strategy	for	helping	Indians	develop	economically	and	integrate	socially.223			
The	Fracas	of	1930:	Internal	Politics	Following	the	breakup	of	the	Tribunal,	several	cracks	appeared	in	the	partnership	between	Antonio	Chihuailaf	and	Guido	Beck,	which	nearly	resulted	in	the	Unión’s	demise.	In	early	1929,	Chihuailaf	began	having	personal	problems,	and	at	the	same	time	his	relationship	with	Beck	was	becoming	strained.	In	May	of	that	year,	Unión	member	Floriano	Antilef	wrote	to	Monsignor	Beck	to	inform	him	that	for	some	time	he	had	been	hearing	disturbing	rumors	about	Antonio’s	wife.	At	first	he	did	not	believe	them,	as	he	did	not	know	the	young	men	who	were	spreading	the	stories.	But	it	was	later	confirmed	by	people	he	trusted	that	Antonio’s	wife	had	been	caught	having	relations	with	another	man	in	the	house	of	Antonio’s	father.	Antilef	suggested	that	Antonio	ought	to	divorce	his	wife	for	that	reason,	but	thought	the	Bishop	might	be	able	to	offer	counsel	on	what	he	should	do.224	It	seems	that	Beck	already	knew	about	the	incident,	because	the	day	before	two	officers	of	the	court	in	Cunco	had	written	to	Beck,	explaining	the	circumstances	in	even	greater	detail.	On	March	22,	1929,	Antonio	Chihuailaf’s	parents,	Juan	Antonio	Chihuailaf	and	Rudecinda	Huenulaf,	had	come	before	the	court	to	denounce	Antonio’s	wife,	Camela	Morales,	and	request	that	their	son’s	marriage	to	her	be	annulled.	It	seems	that	the																																																									223	Ibid.	pp.	79-81.	224	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	May	11,	1929.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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Carabineros	in	Cunco	had	investigated	a	claim	that	Antonio	had	murdered	Camela,	but	found	her	living	at	her	grandmother’s	house.	Antonio’s	parents	claimed	Camela	suffered	from	a	serious	mental	illness,	and	that	she	was	“a	threat	to	Antonio’s	existence.”	In	fear	of	her,	Antonio	had	moved	back	into	their	house.225	Antonio	had	written	to	Beck	only	days	before	and	asked	for	a	personal	meeting	to	discuss	what	to	do.	He	reassured	Beck	that	even	though	“such	incredible	things”	had	occurred,	his	“enthusiasm	and	discipline	would	not	be	withered.”226	Later	that	year,	in	November,	Beck	wrote	to	Antonio	to	say	that	he	would	be	in	Santiago	soon	(where	Antonio	had	been	staying)	and	offered	to	meet	up	with	him.	He	mentioned	that	he	had	not	received	a	reply	to	his	most	recent	letter,	and	wondered	if	Antonio	had	received	it.227	It	seems	that	as	President	of	the	Unión	Araucana,	Antonio	Chihuailaf	operated	with	quite	a	bit	of	autonomy	from	Beck,	whose	title	was	Director	General.	In	some	cases,	Beck’s	letters	indicate	that	he	had	not	heard	from	Chihuailaf	in	months,	or	that	Antonio	had	not	responded	to	a	previous	communication	Beck	had	sent.	Later	on,	Beck	would	maintain	a	closer	working	relationship	with	Floriano	Antilef	after	he	became	President.	Chihuailaf’s	independence	contributed	to	the	strained	relationship	with	Beck,	and	the	distance	that	grew	between	them	led	eventually	to	outright	antagonism.		In	January	1930,	Beck	wrote	to	Chihuailaf	to	express	his	concern	that	Antonio	had	declared	his	candidacy	for	Diputado	without	consulting	him.	He	was	
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most	disturbed	that	Antonio	had	claimed	to	stand	as	an	official	candidate	of	the	Unión,	but	had	not	received	an	endorsement	from	the	group.		“My	dear	Antonio!	This	is	bad	for	you,	very	bad.	No	one	would	be	happier	for	you	if	you	became	a	Deputy	than	the	one	who	writes	these	lines.	But	you	have	lost	the	confidence	of	the	one	who	has	been	like	a	father	to	you	until	this	day,	and	that	you	would	not	communicate	matters	of	such	importance	like	standing	as	a	candidate	for	Deputy	is	a	bad	sign.	To	announce	your	candidacy	as	a	Deputy	of	the	UA	without	an	official	accord	having	been	made,	is	not	truthful,	it	is	to	deceive	the	public.	You	do	not	know	how	much	it	has	made	me	suffer	and	how	much	it	has	hurt	me	that	you	did	not	answer	my	last	letter	and	that	you	have	shown	me	this	mistrust.”228		It	is	clear	that	Beck	saw	Chihuailaf’s	independence	as	more	than	just	bad	form.	He	was	concerned	that	it	was	dishonest	and	felt	personally	let	down	that	this	man	whom	he	had	educated,	mentored	and	promoted	to	lead	the	organization	would	shut	him	out	of	such	a	major	decision.	The	move	not	only	hurt	their	relationship,	it	also	sowed	discord	and	mistrust	among	the	members	of	the	Unión.		Unión	member	Juan	Pichunlaf	wrote	to	Beck	in	April	1930	to	ask	why	he	had	opposed	Chihuailaf’s	candidacy.	He	characterized	Beck	as	the	one	who	had	betrayed	Antonio,	and	questioned	whether	he	had	done	this	because	Antonio	divorced	his	wife,	a	choice	that	he	thought	was	justified	given	the	nature	of	her	“crimes.”229	Beck	responded	to	Pichunlaf	to	refute	the	claim	that	he	had	opposed	Chihuailaf’s	candidacy.	“To	the	contrary,	I	recommended	him	directly	in	a	letter	to	the	Minister,”	he	wrote,	in	spite	of	his	concern	that	Antonio’s	claim	to	represent	the	Unión	contradicted	their	own	bylaws.	He	added	that	he	preferred	Chihuailaf	to	a	dozen	other	candidates,	especially	Manuel	Aburto,	because	he	knew	Antonio	to	be	a	decent	and	honorable	man.230																																																										228	Guido	Beck	to	Antonio	Chihuailaf,	Jan.	16,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		229	Juan	Pichunlaf	to	Guido	Beck,	Apr.	9,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		230	Guido	Beck	to	Juan	Pichunlaf,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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But	Beck	and	Chihuailaf	continued	to	drift	apart,	and	the	indígenas	they	represented	were	caught	in	the	middle.	In	April	1930,	Chihuailaf	wrote	to	Beck	to	say	that	he	heard	from	Pichunlaf	and	a	friend	of	Antilef’s	that	their	associates	in	Loncoche	had	a	distinctly	bad	impression	of	the	Capuchins.	Chihuailaf	asked	Beck	for	a	monthly	salary	of	800	pesos	so	he	could	begin	again	to	travel	there	and	work	to	undo	the	damage	that	had	been	done	by	criticism	of	the	mission	schools.231	In	Beck’s	reply,	he	answered	that	he	could	not	accept	his	terms.	“It	is	too	much.	Do	not	make,	Antonio,	a	business	with	the	defense	of	your	race.	Another	piece	of	advice	for	you:	Don’t	allow	yourself	to	be	dominated	by	your	friends.	Guard	well	your	independence	and	your	good	sense,	which	will	always	guide	you	well.”232	It	is	not	clear	who	Beck	thought	was	influencing	Chihuailaf,	but	this	reference	suggests	that	Chihuailaf	maintained	ties	with	other	indigenous	leaders	who	had	different	political	views	and/or	allegiances.		Although	Beck	referred	to	Antonio’s	independence	as	a	good	thing,	it	was	that	very	independent	streak	that	seemed	to	have	damaged	their	relationship.		As	the	relationship	between	Beck	and	Chihuailaf	broke	down,	Beck	turned	increasingly	to	Floriano	Antilef,	who	would	eventually	become	the	next	President	of	the	Unión.	However,	Antilef	was	at	first	ambivalent	about	whether	to	follow	Chihuailaf	as	the	President	or	Beck	as	the	Director	General.	In	April	1930,	he	wrote	to	Beck,	expressing	his	concern	that	Beck’s	ties	to	the	Conservative	Party	did	not	seem	to	be	in	the	best	interest	of	the	race.	He	referred	to	comments	Conservative	candidates	had	made,	disparaging	Mapuche	as	culturally	backward.	He	added	that																																																									231	Antonio	Chihuailaf	to	Guido	Beck,	Apr.	6,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.	232	Guido	Beck	to	Antonio	Chihuailaf,	Apr.	12,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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he	never	wanted	to	be	in	contradiction	to	the	Church’s	teachings	or	Beck	personally,	but	he	viewed	the	brand	of	capitalism	advanced	by	the	Conservative	Party	as	exploitative.	He	acknowledged	that	Beck	had	not	openly	opposed	Chihuailaf’s	candidacy,	but	also	recognized	that	by	not	actively	supporting	him	he	dealt	a	fatal	blow	to	his	chances	for	election.233	Ultimately,	Antilef’s	trust	in	Beck	and	his	faith	in	the	Church	overshadowed	the	misgivings	he	had	about	the	politics	of	the	Conservative	Party	being	best	for	the	Mapuche	people.	The	following	month,	in	a	reply	to	Antilef,	Beck	suggested	that	the	heart	of	the	matter	lay	in	Chihuailaf’s	criticism	of	mission	schools,	which	centered	around	the	types	of	careers	for	which	the	mission	schools	prepared	its	indigenous	students.	“To	work	against	our	schools,	that	produce	such	immense	benefit	for	the	race,	is	true	insanity,	a	thing	that	cannot	be	understood.	I	spoke	extensively	about	this	with	the	President	of	the	Republic.	He	was	very	indignant	and	willing	to	proceed	against	these	agitators.	He	said	that	an	honorable	and	hardworking	Indian	who	cultivates	the	land	is	a	greater	tribute	to	his	people	than	a	lawyer,	and	contributes	more	to	the	wealth	of	the	nation	than	a	lawyer.”234		It	seems	that	Chihuailaf’s	unforgiveable	sin	was	to	side	with	other	Mapuche	activists	in	their	criticism	of	Beck’s	schools.	By	not	separating	himself	from	the	other	Mapuche	organizations	on	that	point,	Chihuailaf	fatally	distanced	himself	from	the	Unión	Araucana	and	had	to	embark	on	a	new	direction.		In	the	spring	of	1930,	Antonio	Chihuailaf	abandoned	his	role	as	leader	of	the	Unión	Araucana,	and	attempted	to	dissolve	the	organization.	In	a	battle	waged	on	the	pages	of	the	region’s	newspapers,	Chihuailaf	challenged	Beck’s	self-proclaimed	status	as	a	representative	of	the	Mapuche	people	as	he	criticized	the	educational	
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work	carried	out	in	the	mission	schools.	On	the	first	point,	he	questioned	why	the	Mapuche	needed	a	German	Catholic	mission	to	represent	them	when	they	already	had	multiple	members	of	their	own	race	elected	to	the	Chilean	Congress	and	several	other	organizations	fighting	for	their	rights	and	well	being.	Regarding	the	Capuchin	schools,	he	claimed	that	Mapuche	youth	accounted	for	only	a	small	percentage	of	the	students	there,	and	that	they	had	been	unsuccessful	in	training	them	for	careers	as	teachers,	lawyers	and	business	leaders.		Guido	Beck	fired	back,	claiming	he	had	dedicated	his	life’s	work	to	helping	Mapuche	peasants	in	Southern	Chile,	and	that	he	had	personally	visited	the	homes	and	communities	of	many	of	the	students	he	had	guided	into	and	through	the	mission	schools.	He	characterized	Chihuailaf’s	statements	as	politically	motivated	betrayals	as	the	dispute	played	out	publicly	in	the	region’s	newspapers.	On	April	25th,	1930,	several	members	of	the	Unión	Araucana	published	an	article	in	the	
Heraldo	del	Sur	that	defended	the	Capuchin	mission	and	listed	the	good	works	the	fathers	had	done	on	behalf	of	Mapuche	communities.	On	May	9th,	the	paper	printed	a	rebuttal,	which	characterized	the	Capuchins	as	businessmen,	trying	to	make	a	buck	on	the	education	of	poor	indigenous	peasants.	The	authors	echoed	Chihuailaf’s	statement	about	the	strength	of	the	Mapuche	movement,	contending	that	they	had	their	own	elected	representatives	and	did	not	need	the	missionaries	to	fight	their	battles	for	them.235	Charges	of	profiting	from	the	business	of	representing	poor	Mapuche	peasants	became	ammunition	for	both	sides.	
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In	the	wake	of	such	public	discord,	between	organizations	and	even	within	the	Unión,	statements	were	prepared	and	distributed	through	the	organization’s	regional	centros	(centers).	In	those	messages,	Unión	leaders	apologized	for	the	attitude	and	actions	of	former	president	Antonio	Chihuailaf,	and	rejected	the	criticism	levied	against	mission	schools	as	unjust	and	unfounded.	They	clarified	that	the	Unión	Araucana	had	not	been	disbanded,	and	that	they	were	calling	for	members	to	regroup	and	confirm	their	commitment	to	the	Unión	by	flying	their	tri-colored	flag,	on	which	were	written	the	words	“religion,”	“family,”	“education”	and	“work.”236	Beck	and	several	priests	were	instrumental	in	helping	Floriano	Antilef	coordinate	this	response,	sketching	out	five	points	with	which	to	respond.237	Antilef	and	another	Mapuche	member	of	the	Unión,	Marcelino	Ñanculeo,	remained	in	close	correspondence	with	the	Capuchin	priest	Father	Sebastián,	expressing	their	support	and	ongoing	loyalty.238	However,	they	did	indicate	that	“the	protest	of	Chihuailaf	has	infected	some	members”	of	the	Unión.239	In	May	1930	they	published	an	explanation	of	Chihuailaf’s	attempt	to	dissolve	the	Unión,	indicating	that	it	was	invalid	because	the	meeting	in	which	it	was	approved	did	not	have	a	quorum.240	Then	they	called	the	Unión	leadership	together	in	a	special	meeting	on	June	4th,	1930,	to	chart	a	path	forward.241		The	priest	Father	Vicente	wrote	to	the	editor	of	the	Heraldo	del	Sur	to	refute	several	charges	levied	by	Mapuche	individuals	identified	as	“R.	Chuquelef”	and	“Fr.																																																									236	Notes	related	to	Antonio	Chihuailaf,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		237	Notes	related	to	Antonio	Chihuailaf,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		238	Marcelino	Ñanculeo	to	Fr.	Sebastián,	Oct.	12,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		239	Floriano	Antilef	to	Fr.	Sebastián,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		240	Statement	published	in	Heraldo	del	Sur,	Apr.	18,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		241	Marcelino	Ñanculeo	to	Guido	Beck,	May	23,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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Caniulaf”	in	a	previous	article.	He	clarified	that	the	numbers	of	Mapuche	students	in	their	schools	were	much	higher	than	they	had	claimed,	and	that	the	cost	of	tuition	and	fees	were	much	lower.	In	fact,	the	schools’	fees	were	so	low	that	the	mission	could	not	possibly	make	a	profit	from	their	work,	Vicente	added.	He	also	explained	that	the	school	provided	a	range	of	instruction,	including	practical	lessons	in	agricultural	techniques.	242	In	May	1930,	Antilef	wrote	to	Father	Remigio	about	the	dispute	between	Chihuailaf,	Aburto	and	the	Unión.	He	said	he	was	sorry	to	see	the	fight	playing	out	publically,	in	the	papers.	“You	said	it	well,	that	one	(bad)	potato	can	spoil	a	sack	of	potatoes.	We	see	the	insertion	of	Pichunlaf	among	the	Indians	(like	that)	and	(wonder)	why	Chihuailaf	allowed	it.	We	are	like	crazy	idiots	fighting	amongst	ourselves.”243	Antilef	went	on	to	mention	that	he	was	traveling	to	Temuco	in	the	morning	to	speak	with	Chihuailaf,	and	he	planned	to	tell	him	that	if	he	decided	to	leave	the	Unión	he	would	not	try	to	convince	him	to	stay.	From	that	point	on,	Beck	and	the	Capuchin	fathers	embarked	on	a	project	of	damage	control.	Since	much	of	the	criticism	against	them	had	played	out	in	the	region’s	newspapers,	they	began	a	letter	and	article	writing	campaign	to	defend	their	work.	At	the	fifth	Unión	Parlamento,	those	who	assembled	passed	an	accord	and	sent	it	to	the	editor	of	the	Heraldo	del	Sur.	The	Unión’s	membership	established	an	official	stance	that	walked	back	the	toughest	talk	of	their	former	president.	In	response	to	the	criticism,	the	Unión	proposed	asking	the	government	to	fund	more	Mapuche	schools	and	students,	and	reiterated	that	they	deeply	valued	the	education																																																									242	Fr.	Vicente	to	Heraldo	del	Sur,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		243	Floriano	Antilef	to	Fr.	Remigio,	May	4,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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that	the	Capuchins	provided.	They	also	argued	that	criticism	of	mission	schools	had	been	overstated	in	the	press.244		Beck	was	able	to	secure	the	endorsement	of	President	Ibañez,	who	defended	the	technical	aspects	of	mission	education,	explained	that	cultures	are	uplifted	little	by	little,	and	that	the	Capuchins’	mission	should	not	be	to	train	a	cadre	of	indigenous	lawyers.	At	the	same	time,	Ibañez	retreated	from	his	previous	advocacy	for	the	carte	blanche	subdivision	of	indigenous	lands	and	credited	Beck	for	changing	his	mind	rather	than	leaders	who	had	been	more	vehemently	and	vocally	opposed,	in	the	process	agreeing	with	statements	Beck	had	recently	made	on	the	subject.245	Following	a	meeting	with	the	president	on	May	5,	1930,	Beck’s	secretary	Tomás	de	Augusta	sent	minutes	from	their	meeting	to	newspapers,	in	which	Ibañez	confirmed	that	he	thought	the	mission	schools	were	“very	adequate”	and	that	their	practical	approach	to	indigenous	education	was	very	sensible.246	In	a	subsequent	piece	of	pro-Capuchin	propaganda,	they	reported	asking	the	President	what	he	wanted	them	to	teach	the	Indians,	to	which	he	replied,	“to	read	and	write	and	cultivate	their	lands	effectively.”247	Finally,	in	a	lengthy	“call	to	the	President,”	Beck	contrasted	the	Catholic	Church’s	historical	approach	to	indigenous	affairs,	and	by	extension	that	of	Chile	and	all	of	Latin	America,	with	United	States	General	William	Sherman’s	infamous	motto	“the	only	good	Indian	is	a	dead	Indian.”248	He	coupled	the	Church’s	
																																																								244	Letter	to	editor,	Heraldo	del	Sur,	Apr.	23,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		245	Draft	statement,	President	Ibañez,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		246	Minutes	from	meeting	with	President	Ibañez,	May	5,	1930;	Tomás	de	Augusta	to	newpapers,	May	10,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		247	Draft	statement	to	newspapers,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		248	This	reference	to	U.S.	Indian	policy	is	interesting	in	this	moment,	as	federal	policy	was	being	heavily	criticized	in	the	United	States	in	the	early	1930s.	At	that	time,	the	critique	was	
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enlightened	historical	defense	of	American	aborigines	with	a	defense	of	himself	against	the	“unreasonable”	attacks	against	him	and	his	schools	that	had	been	circulating	in	the	papers.249	Beck	also	advocated	directly	to	other	Mapuche	leaders.	Writing	to	Antonio	Cofian,	president	of	Moderna	Araucanía’s	regional	center	in	Cunco,	Beck	refuted	Chihuailaf’s	claim	that	the	mission	had	demanded	land	from	Indians	in	order	to	build	a	school	in	Quechurehue.250	Meanwhile,	Antilef	and	other	Unión	members	continued	to	distance	themselves	from	Chihuailaf.	Writing	to	Beck	in	early	May,	Floriano	claimed	that	his	name	had	been	added	to	a	letter	published	in	the	Heraldo	del	Sur	without	his	permission.	He	was	indignant	that	a	private	conversation	with	Chihuailaf	had	been	made	public	in	that	way.251	Two	weeks	later,	Emilio	Baeza	of	Nueva	Imperial	wrote	to	Beck	to	say	that	a	recent	article	published	in	the	Heraldo	del	Sur	was	falsely	attributed	to	him	–	he	had	not	even	been	present	at	the	meeting	where	it	was	supposedly	generated.252	At	the	same	time,	opponents	of	the	Unión	Valentin	Morales	and	Juan	Pichunlaf	attacked	Beck,	publishing	a	statement	in	the	Heraldo	del	Sur	on	May	27th	in	which	they	refuted	his	recent	statements	and	suggested	he	was	no	friend	of	the	Mapuche	–	that	he	should	stay	out	of	their	affairs.253	Beck	denounced	the	attacks	against	him	to	René	Reyes,	the	Intendente	of	Cautín	Province,	and	sent																																																																																																																																																																						being	led	by	John	Collier,	among	others,	who	would	soon	be	appointed	as	Commissioner	of	Indian	Affairs	in	1933	and	reform	U.S.	policy	through	the	Indian	Reorganization	Act	in	1934.	It	is	not	clear	exactly	how	much	Beck	knew	about	this	debate	in	1930,	but	the	dark	history	of	European/indigenous	relations	in	the	U.S.	did	provide	a	cultural	point	of	reference	and	in	his	mind	a	favorable	comparison	with	the	Catholic	Church’s	efforts	in	Latin	America.	249	Draft	statement,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		250	Tomás	de	Augusta	to	Antonio	Cofian,	May	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		251	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	May	4,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		252	Emilio	Baeza	to	Guido	Beck,	May	21,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		253	News	clipping.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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him	a	list	of	names	of	those	who	were	attacking	him.	He	also	clarified	that	Chihuailaf’s	attempt	to	disband	the	Unión	was	not	legal,	as	he	had	met	without	the	full	leadership	of	the	organization	present.254	At	the	end	of	the	month,	Beck	sent	a	circular	to	the	regional	presidents	to	call	a	special	meeting	to	be	held	on	June	4th	to	discuss	Chihuailaf’s	“frankly	hostile	attitude	toward	the	Unión	Araucana”	and	“clarify	the	situation	produced	by	his	disloyal	conduct.”255	Finally,	on	June	17th	he	sent	a	circular	to	the	Capuchin	fathers	throughout	the	region,	which	explained	the	current	state	of	affairs.		Following	that	defense	of	the	mission	schools,	Beck	gave	notice	that	Antonio	Chihuailaf	and	all	the	members	of	his	reducción	had	been	expelled	from	the	Unión	Araucana,	and	that	Floriano	Antilef	had	been	named	Interim	President.	Furthermore,	he	explained	that	the	teacher	and	Deputy	Arturo	Huenchullán	had	offered	an	explanation	of	his	position	on	the	mission	schools,	in	which	he	clarified	that	he	had	never	sought	to	undermine	the	educational	work	of	the	Fathers	in	particular,	and	that	his	criticism	before	the	government	was	only	addressed	toward	the	general	state	of	indigenous	education	broadly.	However,	Beck	had	recently	received	an	anonymous	letter	full	of	insults	from	an	Indian	who	claimed	to	be	a	friend	of	Huenchullán’s.	For	that	reason,	he	advised	all	the	mission	schools	that	Huenchullán	should	not	be	provided	any	documents	if	he	were	to	show	up	and	request	them,	and	that	the	mission’s	Provincial	Director	of	Education	was	calling	all	teachers	together	at	a	meeting	in	Valdivia	to	discuss	the	state	of	affairs.256																																																										254	Guido	Beck	to	René	Reyes,	Intendente	de	Cautín,	Jun.	7,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		255	Circular	to	centro	presidents,	May	22,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		256	Circular,	Jun.	17,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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In	November	of	1930	Beck	organized	a	General	Assembly	of	the	Unión	to	elect	new	leadership.	But	even	as	the	1930s	progressed	with	the	Unión	Araucana	under	new	indigenous	leadership,	the	organization	struggled	to	stay	relevant	as	the	political	climate	of	the	country	rapidly	evolved.	Ibañez	would	be	forced	to	resign	the	presidency	in	1931,	and	a	short-lived	Socialist	Republic	was	established.	The	other	Mapuche	organizations	tried	to	come	together	to	strengthen	the	Mapuche	position	amid	the	political	turmoil.	In	the	early	1930s,	Beck	and	his	team	rejected	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán’s	call	for	a	unification	of	Mapuche	organizations,	writing	“this	idea	is	totally	unfeasible	because	the	true	ties	of	union	do	not	stem	from	sharing	the	same	race	and	blood,	but	rather	the	same	ideas.”257	Beck’s	view	stood	in	contrast	to	the	view	of	most	Mapuche	leaders,	who	prioritized	ethnic	identity	over	allegiances	to	ideas	or	political	parties.	He	would	eventually	change	that	view,	but	not	for	several	more	years,	and	not	before	the	Unión	continued	to	limp	along	with	realatively	weak	indigenous	leadership	and	management.		In	January	1935,	Marcelino	Ñanculeo,	president	of	the	UA	center	in	Nueva	Imperial,	wrote	to	Monsignor	Beck	to	complain	that	he	had	not	received	communication	from	Antilef	as	president	and	that	the	Unión	seemed	to	be	devolving	from	its	previous	vibrancy	and	efficient	function.	He	went	so	far	as	proposing	to	renounce	his	position	as	Secretary	General	in	protest.258	The	following	week	he	wrote	to	Antilef	directly	to	say	that	he	finally	received	the	announcement	of	their	upcoming	meeting,	but	that	it	was	too	late	for	him	to	attend	as	he	received	word																																																									257	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	64-67.	Quotation	from	Diario	Austral,	Nov.	14,	1930,	quoted	in	Foerster	and	Montecino,	p.	66.	258	Marcelino	Ñanculeo	to	Guido	Beck,	Jan.	8,	1935.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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only	the	day	before	the	event	was	scheduled.259	In	the	week	following	the	Assembly,	Antilef	sent	a	circular	to	the	regional	centers	sanctioning	members	for	not	attending	the	General	Assembly,	and	followed	that	with	a	personal	note	to	Ñanculeo	asking	him	to	step	down	since	he	missed	the	meeting.260	In	subsequent	years,	the	Unión	Araucana	would	go	on	to	improve	its	organizational	efficiency	and	expand	its	capacity	to	help	indigenous	peasants	by	offering	more	services	to	its	members.	Regarding	a	meeting	scheduled	in	July	1937,	Antilef	wrote	to	Beck	suggesting	they	postpone,	because	he	had	consulted	with	other	regional	presidents	and	they	agreed	that	the	agricultural	work	to	prepare	for	the	planting	season	would	make	it	difficult	for	many	members	to	attend.261	In	1936	Beck	had	hired	an	attorney	on	retainer	to	provide	legal	services	to	Unión	members	in	Osorno,	and	by	1938	proposed	hiring	a	second	to	offer	the	same	services	to	members	in	Valdivia.262	All	Unión	members	received	an	identification	card	when	they	paid	regular	dues,	and	Beck	required	the	attorneys	to	ask	for	the	card	before	helping	them.	He	also	required	a	monthly	summary	of	services	be	provided	so	he	could	track	the	work	of	the	attorneys.263		All	of	this	led	Victor	Painemal,	in	his	role	as	Secretary	General,	to	opine	optimistically	in	June	1938,	“I’m	certain	that	with	a	little	more	work	we	will	create	
																																																								259	Marcelino	Ñanculeo	to	Guido	Beck,	Jan.	14,	1935.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		260	Circular;	Floriano	Antilef	to	Ñanculeo,	Jan.	18,	1935.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		261	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	Jul.	27,	1937.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		262	Guido	Beck	to	José	Schwerter,	Nov.	1,	1936;	Guido	Beck	to	Aurelio	Herrera,	Apr.	12,	1938.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		263	Fr.	Gundecar	to	Guido	Beck,	Apr.	27,	1938;	Letter	to	Aurelio	Herrera,	May	27,	1938.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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an	excellent	organization.”264	Painemal	continued	to	carry	out	that	work	in	the	late	1930s,	arranging	contracts	for	printing	materials	like	ID	cards,	flyers	for	their	General	Assemblies	and	coordinating	the	publication	of	the	Unión	newspaper,	El	
Araucano.265	But	there	were	bumps	in	the	road	also,	as	when	Painemal	declined	the	position	of	Director	General	in	1939	because	of	Antilef’s	leadership,	which	he	characterized	as	oppositional	in	Unión	meetings	as	he	rejected	proposals	based	on	his	personal	opinions	while	refusing	to	carry	out	the	will	of	the	regional	centers.266	Beck	asked	him	to	continue	working	as	before	and	try	to	reconcile	with	Antilef.267	In	1940,	Painemal	proposed	to	Beck	that	they	create	a	new	“Provincial	President”	position	to	help	administer	the	work	of	the	Unión,	and	expressed	his	concern	that	the	partnership	with	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	through	the	Corporación	was	creating	confusion,	as	some	Unión	members	were	also	organizing	Sociedad	centros,	which	he	thought	created	the	danger	that	messages	and	priorities	become	mixed.268	
	
Opposing	Aburto:	Communism	&	Indigenous	Culture	It	is	important	to	acknowledge	that	from	the	very	beginning,	“the	Sociedad	Unión	Araucana	was	founded	by	the	Capuchin	missions	for	the	purpose	of	counteracting	the	subversive	communist	propaganda	among	the	Araucanians	to	whose	civilization	(the	Capuchins)	are	sent.”269	When	the	Ley	Indígena	1.469	was	
																																																								264	Victor	Painemal	to	Guido	Beck,	Jun.	10,	1938.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		265	Victor	Painemal	to	Guido	Beck,	Sep.	24,	1939.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		266	Victor	Painemal	to	Guido	Beck,	Sep.	16,	1939.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		267	Guido	Beck	to	Victor	Painemal,	Sep.	29,	1939.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		268	Victor	Painemal	to	Guido	Beck,	Feb.	6,	1940.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		269	Telegram	from	Guido	Beck	de	Ramberga	to	the	Governor	of	Cautín	Province,	published	in	
El	Araucano,	May	1,	1927,	quoted	in	Foerster	and	Montecino,	p.	54;	a	copy	of	this	
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debated	in	the	Cámara	de	Diputados	in	1927,	the	delegation	of	the	Communist	Party	were	the	only	representatives	who	opposed	it.	“The	Communist	representatives	are	opposed	to	this	project,	and	vote	against	it.	We	consider	this	project	to	be	one	that	not	only	will	not	protect	the	Araucanians,	but	on	the	contrary,	one	that	covers	a	system	of	theft	and	plunder	that	has	made	them	victims	for	a	long	time	with	a	cloak	of	legality.”	When	Aburto’s	Comité	Ejecutivo	immediately	objected	and	sent	a	series	of	demands	to	the	President,	the	regional	press	in	Cautín	Province	characterized	their	objections	as	“communist	agitation.”270		As	a	parallel	goal,	the	leaders	of	the	Unión	made	efforts	to	stamp	out	traditional	cultural	practices	that	they	perceived	to	be	antithetical	to	the	development	of	Mapuche	as	practicing	Catholic	Christians.	In	his	invitation	to	the	Unión’s	third	Parlamento,	to	be	held	in	Boroa	in	January	1928,	Unión	president	Antonio	Chihuailaf	explained	to	the	membership	why	this	was	important.		“But	if	we	celebrate	our	Parlamentos	with	the	dances	of	machis	as	was	done	recently	(by	the	Federación),	if	we	recommend	to	our	brothers	the	celebration	of	nguillatún	in	its	ancient	forms,	if	we	tell	them	to	return	to	polygamy	and	to	sell	their	daughters,	we	shamefully	degrade	our	sisters.	Then,	my	compatriots,	we	do	not	civilize	our	race,	we	degrade	it,	we	throw	it	three	centuries	into	the	past,	we	are	criminals	that	do	not	deserve	the	name	of	educated	and	civilized	men.”271		Although	Chihuailaf	did	not	mention	Aburto	by	name	in	his	exhortation,	the	implication	would	have	been	clear	to	his	audience,	and	he	positioned	the	Unión	as	relatively	supportive	of	cultural	assimilation,	particularly	as	compared	to	the	Federación,	which	fought	for	cultural	preservation.	Both	of	those	priorities	put	the																																																																																																																																																																						communication,	dated	Apr.	16,	1927,	is	found	in	the	Diocesan	archives,	and	is	signed	by	Beck,	Chihuailaf	and	Marcelino	Ñanculeo,	as	Director	General,	President	and	Secretary	General	of	the	UA,	respectively:	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		270	Foerster	and	Montecino,	p.	78.	271	Invitation	to	3rd	Annual	Parlamento,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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UA	in	direct	opposition	to	Manuel	Aburto	and	the	Federación	Araucana,	who	embraced	political	alliances	on	the	left	and	fought	to	maintain	polygamy	and	celebrated	the	nguillatún	at	every	Congreso	Araucano	that	they	organized.		Beck’s	preoccupation	with	Manuel	Aburto	was	sustained	throughout	the	period.	In	January	1930,	Manuel	Raiman	wrote	him	to	describe	what	he	had	observed	at	the	recent	Congreso	Araucano	that	Aburto	had	organized	in	Boroa.	“My	beloved	pastor,	I	was	very	sad	to	see	the	little	civilized	Mapuche	dancing	with	the	machis	and	in	that	way	the	Araucanian	race	was	insulted	by	a	con	man	who	is	deceiving	the	ignorant	with	his	old	ideas.”	Enclosed	with	his	letter,	Raiman	included	notes	on	the	events	he	witnessed,	in	which	he	described	an	assembly	of	about	1,000	Mapuche	dancing	with	machis	and	celebrating	the	nguillatún.	In	his	address,	Aburto	criticized	Beck	and	belittled	the	size	and	activities	of	the	Unión	Araucana.	He	mentioned	that	Arturo	Huenchullán	was	also	present,	having	recently	completed	his	studies	in	the	United	States.272		Beck	took	his	objections	to	Mapuche	cultural	gatherings	all	the	way	to	the	President	of	the	Republic.	In	October	1929	he	wrote	to	President	Ibañez	to	express	his	concerns	about	the	celebration	of	nguillatún,	which	included	assertions	that	they	were	characterized	by	excessive	drinking,	thievery	and	vandalism.	He	also	opposed	on	religious	grounds	the	“demonic	possession”	of	the	machi	and	the	sacrifice	of	cows	and	horses	by	removing	their	still-beating	hearts	during	the	ceremony.273	In	addition	to	Aburto’s	efforts	to	corrupt	the	Indians	by	promoting	communism	and	ancient	pagan	practices,	Beck	complained	that	he	was	encouraging	Mapuche	to																																																									272	Manuel	Raiman	to	Guido	Beck,	Jan.	7,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		273	Guido	Beck	to	President	Ibañez,	Oct.	18,	1929.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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break	the	law	and	not	pay	their	taxes.	In	doing	so,	Beck	positioned	the	Unión	on	the	side	of	the	direct	interests	of	the	state,	while	Aburto	threatened	those	interests.274		The	fight	against	Aburto	was	waged	in	the	papers,	as	well	as	the	personal	correspondence	of	Beck	and	other	indígenas	who	wrote	directly	to	state	actors.	In	response	to	Aburto’s	open	opposition	to	Ley	1.469	and	his	public	protests	through	the	Federación’s	assemblies,	Beck	prepared	a	press	release	in	May	1930	in	which	he	characterized	Aburto’s	position	as	illegal,	and	in	open	opposition	of	the	rule	of	law.	In	contrast,	the	Unión	was	conservatively	aligned	with	state	policies	and	willing	to	adhere	to	whatever	laws	it	passed.	“We	believe	that	the	only	viable	path	is	to	obey	the	Law;	to	not	put	any	obstacles	before	it;	to	cooperate	so	that	the	judges,	who	are	all	very	honorable	and	competent	people,	may	carry	out	their	work.”275	On	June	7th,	1930,	Floriano	Antilef	mentioned	to	Beck	that	he	heard	from	the	Carabineros	in	Loncoche	that	Aburto	had	been	detained	on	the	fifth,	and	driven	to	San	Felipe	de	los	Andes,	a	town	in	the	Valparaíso	region	north	of	Santiago.276	That	would	prove	to	be	the	second	of	three	times	that	Aburto	was	“relegated”	by	the	state,	or	sent	into	internal	exile,	for	political	stances	that	threatened	the	order	and	stability	of	the	state.	 In	response	to	Aburto’s	criticism	and	that	of	other	radical	elements	within	the	Mapuche	movement,	Beck	was	on	the	defensive	throughout	the	early	1930s.	In	December	1930	Diputado	Enrique	Montero	Cabrera277	wrote	to	Monsignor	Beck	to	
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explain	the	status	of	subsidies	delivered	by	the	state.	The	Vicariate	received	twenty-five	pesos	per	student,	with	an	additional	amount	for	indigenous	students.	Some	Diputados	from	the	Democrat	and	Radical	parties	were	trying	to	strip	the	subsidies,	perhaps	to	wrest	control	of	indigenous	education	away	from	religious	institutions,	but	Montero	was	fighting	to	keep	them	in	place.	He	indicated	that	he	was	hopeful	for	success,	and	that	the	support	of	the	President	of	the	Cámara,	and	President	Ibañez	would	help	him	win.278	The	dustup	over	Chihuailaf’s	betrayal	and	subsequent	charges	of	mismanagement	of	the	schools	had	threatened	Beck’s	access	to	those	state	subsidies.	Monsignor	Beck	fought	back	by	attacking	Aburto,	whom	he	believed	to	be	behind	the	antagonism	facing	the	Unión,	and	in	February	1931	wrote	to	Pedro	Opazo	Letelier,	the	President	of	the	Senate,	to	request	his	support	in	opposing	Aburto’s	organization	of	nguillatúnes	through	the	annual	Congresos.279	Members	of	the	Unión	directly	opposed	and	denounced	Aburto	and	other	more	radical	elements	of	the	movement	to	state	actors.	In	September	of	1930,	Marcelino	Ñanculeo	and	Floriano	Antilef	wrote	a	series	of	short	notes	to	the	Intendente	of	Araucanía,	the	Minister	of	Development	and	President	Ibañez	himself,	to	“protest	corrupters	of	the	race	who	would	return	us	to	ancient,	barbaric	customs.”280	Antilef	also	opposed	Aburto	publicly	in	an	attempt	to	win	over	Mapuche	who	might	favor	his	ideas.	Writing	to	Father	Sebastián	in	January	of	1932,	Antilef	said	that	he	was	inclined	to	write	a	statement	for	El	Diario	Austral	opposing	Aburto’s	idea	for	an	autonomous	indigenous	republic,	saying	he	was	willing	to	face																																																									278	Enrique	Montero	to	Guido	Beck,	Dec.	4-5,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		279	Guido	Beck	to	Pedro	Opazo	Letelier,	Feb.	23,	1931.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		280	Draft	letters,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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whatever	consequences	came	from	opposing	him	and	his	supporters.281	Antilef’s	statement	sketched	his	opposition	in	very	broad	terms.	He	argued	that	Aburto	was	attempting	to	enrich	himself	and	his	associates	at	the	expense	of	poor	Mapuche	peasants.	In	addition	to	the	familiar	defense	of	Capuchin	mission	schools	and	assaults	on	the	backwardness	of	indigenous	ceremonies	that	Aburto	promoted,	he	also	criticized	the	leftist	political	position	of	the	Federación.	He	called	the	idea	for	an	indigenous	republic	“communism	in	its	most	revolutionary	form,”	and	branded	Aburto’s	proposals	as	class	warfare.	“Russia	has	shown	us	clearly.	There,	millions	of	peasants	were	killed,	only	because	they	were	not	in	agreement	with	the	tyrants	of	the	Soviet	government.”282	That	position	of	the	Unión	was	communicated	internally	through	circulars	sent	to	the	regional	centers.	In	May	of	1932	Antilef	promised	to	begin	sending	monthly	updates	on	the	challenges	faced	by	Araucanians	in	the	region.	In	particular,	he	implied	connections	between	Aburto’s	utopian	pipedreams	and	the	worst	aspects	of	communism	in	Europe,	in	the	process	appealing	to	a	sense	of	loyalty	to	their	homeland.	“My	fellow	Araucanians:	let	us	not	lose	the	momentum	we	have	gained.	The	fatherland	does	not	want	the	death	of	your	children,	the	fatherland	does	not	kill	your	children,	the	fatherland	does	not	see	its	own	children	as	slaves,	as	the	Russian	communists	do,	and	as	will	happen	in	Chile	if	we	embrace	communism.”283	Throughout	this	period,	not	only	Mapuche	leaders,	but	also	ordinary	peasants	in	the	countryside	were	navigating	a	shifting	set	of	political	alliances.	It	is																																																									281	Floriano	Antilef	to	Fr.	Sebastián.	Jan.	14,	1932.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		282	Floriano	Antilef	to	newpapers.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		283	Francisco	Catrileo	to	Guido	Beck,	June	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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important	to	remember	that	on	one	level	the	leaders	of	organizations	tried	to	navigate	political	alliances	strategically,	in	the	interests	of	their	members	and	their	view	of	what	was	best	for	all	Mapuche.	In	the	spring	of	1931,	Antilef	wrote	to	Beck	asking	if	he	should	support	Juan	Esteban	Montero,	representing	the	Radical	Party,	in	the	upcoming	presidential	election.	He	wanted	to	make	sure	Montero	was	a	good	supporter	of	Catholicism,	and	proposed	to	send	a	circular	to	the	regional	presidents	advising	them	to	counsel	their	members	to	vote	for	Montero	also.284	He	wrote	again	following	the	election	to	say	that	all	the	Unión	members	in	Loncoche	voted	for	Montero,	and	asked	Beck	to	pass	along	their	best	wishes	to	the	President-elect.285	But	Montero’s	time	in	office	was	to	prove	short-lived,	and	he	was	deposed	in	June	1932.	In	September,	Antilef	sent	another	circular	in	which	he	reinforced	the	importance	of	voting,	not	only	for	the	candidate	who	represents	the	material	best	interests	of	Mapuche,	but	also	who	shares	their	values.	In	this	case,	Antilef	wrote	that	the	Conservative	Party	best	represents	Catholic	ideals,	and	he	listed	their	candidates	for	office.286	On	a	more	grassroots	level,	individual	Mapuche	were	targeted	for	political	support.	In	October	of	1932,	the	president	of	the	UA	centro	in	La	Unión	wrote	to	Monsignor	Beck	to	complain	about	the	attacks	of	Aburto	and	his	associates	on	the	Unión.	He	also	mentioned	that	two	men	in	La	Unión	who	demanded	to	know	for	whom	he	had	voted	in	the	recent	election	had	confronted	him.	One	was	an	official	with	the	Socialist	Party	and	the	other	a	member	of	the	Democrat	Party.																																																										284	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	Sep.	15,	1931.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		285	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	Oct.	15,	1931.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		286	Circular	No.	3,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
	120	
	
“He	got	a	curious	look	on	his	face	when	he	asked	me	which	party	I	supported	and	I	told	him	I	did	not	trust	or	belong	to	any	political	party.	Well,	said	the	Socialist,	I	am	a	furniture	maker	and	I	can	give	you	work,	but	if	you	accept	the	post	of	secretary	of	the	Party	I	can	give	you	a	government	job	in	Valdivia;	they	made	me	many	promises,	but	ultimately	the	Democrat	spoke	badly	of	the	clergy.	‘Enough,’	I	said,	these	people	are	bad	influences.”287			For	some	Mapuche	peasants,	their	Catholic	faith	alone	was	enough	to	draw	a	line	in	the	political	sands.	Aburto,	meanwhile,	engaged	the	Monsignor	on	his	own	terms.	In	January	of	1930	he	wrote	to	Beck	to	share	with	him	a	resolution	from	the	Federación’s	most	recent	(9th)	Congreso,	celebrated	the	previous	month	in	Boroa.	The	resolution	expressed	that	fifty	years	before,	the	Mapuche	leaders	had	donated	land	to	the	founders	of	the	Capuchin	mission	in	Boroa,	and	that	in	exchange	they	had	been	promised	that	the	fathers	would	look	after	the	education	and	well	being	of	their	children.	They	now,	therefore,	respectfully	asked	that	the	mission	school	provide	free	education	for	Mapuche	youth.	“If	it	is	not	possible	for	you	to	provide	these	services	free	of	charge,	we	ask	that	you	provide	a	reasonable	discounted	rate	for	children	of	both	sexes,	without	denying	entry	to	the	children	of	the	chiefs	or	other	Indians	that	belong	to	the	Federación	Araucana,	as	it	follows	that	this	Federación	coordinates	the	activities	in	Araucanía	in	defense	of	their	moral	and	material	interests.”288	In	making	the	claim	in	this	way,	Aburto	claimed	legitimacy	and	hegemony	for	the	Federación	in	indigenous	affairs.	He	made	no	mention	or	reference	to	the	Unión	Araucana	or	Sociedad	Caupolicán.	
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Beck	stayed	informed	about	Aburto’s	claims	to	authority	over	the	Mapuche	movement.	The	Unión	Araucana	papers	housed	at	the	Diocesan	archives	in	Villarrica	contain	news	clippings	of	material	published	by	a	number	of	organizations,	especially	those	that	referenced	Aburto	and	the	Federación.	In	March	of	1935,	El	
Correo	de	Valdivia	published	a	story	about	a	letter	Aburto	sent	to	the	Intendente	of	Araucanía,	in	which	he	claimed	that	the	Mapuche	were	not	consulted	in	the	reform	of	the	Ley	Indígena.289	The	following	year,	Beck	clipped	an	article	about	“Communist	Agitation	in	Araucanía,”	which	claimed	that	the	resolutions	of	the	Congreso	Araucano	“clearly	show	the	communist	infiltration	(of	the	Federación)	and	the	terrible	results	that	uncontrolled	infiltration	is	producing	in	the	indigenous	communities	and	their	populations.”290	Responding	to	the	Congreso’s	accords	published	in	the	newspaper	La	Frontera,	Antilef	wrote	an	editorial	in	which	he	referred	to	the	Congreso	as	a	“Soviet.”	In	an	increasingly	direct	confrontation	between	the	two	groups,	Antilef	drew	particular	opposition	to	the	Federación’s	claim	to	represent	all	Mapuche	and	their	call	to	eliminate	the	Bishop	of	Araucanía.291	Writing	to	Beck	to	say	that	El	Diario	Austral	had	agreed	to	publish	his	protest,	he	added	that	“the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	has	not	protested	the	accords	of	Panguilef;	I’ve	been	deceived!”292	While	the	groups	sometimes	saw	one	another	as	necessary	allies,	the	Sociedad	seemed	more	willing	to	walk	a	centrist	position	between	the	Unión	and	Federación,	especially	after	1931	under	Coñuepán’s	leadership.	
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Although	Beck,	Antilef	and	the	Unión	Araucano	remained	staunch	adversaries	of	Aburto,	with	one	of	their	most	strident	objections	being	his	association	with	communist	ideas,	party	activists	and	projects,	some	of	their	own	initiatives	approached	communalism.	In	their	June	1936	General	Assembly,	the	UA	discussed	creating	a	consumer	cooperative,	a	project	they	later	undertook	and	which	was	well	received.293	In	January	of	1936,	Aburto	wrote	to	Monsignor	Beck	and	Father	Gúndecar,	requesting	that	they	return	the	house	they	were	occupying	within	the	reducción	of	Juan	Chihuailaf	in	Cunco.294	It	seems	that	the	Capuchins	had	plans	to	convert	the	property	into	a	school	that	would	be	located	within	the	reducción,	but	as	the	Capuchins	and	Aburto	squared	off	over	the	project,	the	Chihuailafs	were	caught	in	the	middle.	In	December	of	that	year,	Venancio	Manquel,	a	Unión	member	who	was	involved	in	the	project,	wrote	to	Monsignor	Beck	to	suggest	that	Father	Sebastián	speak	directly	to	Chihuailaf	to	try	to	resolve	the	dispute.	Otherwise,	he	feared,	the	disagreement	would	escalate	if	the	two	sides	dug	in	their	heels.295		Projects	like	these	show	how	the	diversity	of	political	thought	among	the	organizations	at	times	led	to	infighting	and	fragmented	the	movement.	It	also	shows	just	how	tenuous	it	would	become	for	the	Corporación	to	hold	together	an	alliance	between	the	three	main	groups.	However,	in	contrast	to	Manuel	Aburto,	Guido	Beck	saw	Venancio	Coñuepán	and	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	as	better	allies	against	the	more	radical	Socialist	and	Democrat	political	influences	in	the	region.	In	a	1933																																																									293	Program	of	General	Assembly	meeting,	Jun.	18,	1935.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		294	Manuel	Aburto	to	Guido	Beck,	Jan.	22,	1935.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		295	V.	Manquel	to	Guido	Beck,	Dec.	20,	1936.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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letter	to	Alfredo	Rodríguez	Mac	Iver,	Governor	of	Cautín	Province,	Beck	indicated	that	Coñuepán	and	the	Sociedad	provided	an	important	counterweight	to	Aburto	and	Huenchullán.	He	expressed	his	support	for	the	Sociedad’s	efforts	to	stimulate	the	development	of	agriculture	in	the	region,	and	also	included	a	statement	about	the	need	to	curb	the	abuse	of	alcohol	among	the	Mapuche.296		As	the	1937	elections	approached,	several	Mapuche	leaders	and	their	organizations	stepped	forward	to	support	candidates	for	Diputado.	In	December	1936,	Coñuepán	wrote	to	Guido	Beck	to	say	that	the	Sociedad	wanted	to	put	forward	a	candidate,	but	they	were	unsure	about	which	party	to	approach.	Acknowledging	that	the	Mapuche	were	themselves	“still	divided,”	and	that	no	political	party	had	uniformly	supported	indigenous	issues,	nor	did	any	one	“inspire	much	confidence,”	he	asked	Beck	for	his	support	and	a	recommendation.297	Beck	replied	that	in	his	estimation	it	was	impossible	for	them	to	unite	when	Aburto	and	his	supporters	had	“publicly	declared	war	on	the	Capuchin	fathers,”	and	when	their	positions	were	so	diametrically	opposed.	He	referred	to	the	Federación’s	propaganda	as	a	“frenzy	of	Chilean	Nazism.”	For	his	part,	Beck	favored	an	alliance	with	the	Conservative	Party.298		In	1937,	as	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	was	working	to	bring	the	major	Mapuche	organizations	together	under	the	auspices	of	the	Corporación	Araucana,	Venancio	Coñuepán	and	several	other	Mapuche	leaders	considered	running	for	election	as	Diputados	representing	various	districts	in	the	Araucanía.	As	they	made																																																									296	Guido	Beck	to	Alfredo	Rodríguez	Mac	Iver,	Jul.	22,	1933.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		297	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Guido	Beck,	Dec.	21,	1936.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		298	Guido	Beck	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Dec.	24,	1936.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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plans,	Coñuepán	reached	out	to	Beck	to	ask	for	his	advice	and	counsel.299	Beck	replied	that	he	did	not	“desire	to	get	mixed	up	in	political	issues,”	but	agreed	to	the	meeting	because	he	did	“not	want	to	neglect	to	give	my	opinion.”300	Antilef	later	wrote	to	Beck	saying	that	he	was	sorry	to	hear	that	Coñuepán	was	not	accepted	as	a	candidate	by	the	Conservative	Party,	and	that	he	feared	he	would	be	unsuccessful	if	he	did	decide	to	go	ahead	with	his	candidacy.301	He	then	wrote	to	Fernando	Varas,	of	the	Conservative	Party,	to	say	that	the	Unión	Araucana’s	values	aligned	with	Conservative	Party	principles,	and	asked	if	they	might	consider	one	of	the	Unión	members	as	a	candidate	instead.302	In	the	end,	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Floriano	Antilef	and	José	Cayupi	all	ran	as	independents,	but	were	unsuccessful	in	their	bids	for	office.303	The	Federación,	meanwhile,	decided	not	to	put	forward	their	own	candidate	for	Diputado,	but	rather	endorsed	José	Huichalaf	Alcapan	who	was	running	on	the	Communist	Party	ticket.304	The	following	summer,	at	the	Unión’s	meeting	of	the	executive	committee,	they	held	several	sessions	about	the	dangers	that	communism	posed	to	the	Araucanian	race.305	Even	within	the	conservatively	aligned	Unión	Araucana,	the	threat	of	communism	had	penetrated.	In	October	1938,	José	Neculmán	wrote	to	Beck	as	the	president	of	the	Boroa	centro	to	inform	him	that	Bartolo	Neculmán	(relation	unknown)	had	been	spreading	propaganda	in	support	of	
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leftist	candidates	within	the	centro.306	All	of	this	shows	how	remarkable	it	was	that	within	two	years	Coñuepán	was	able	to	bring	both	the	Federación	and	Unión	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Corporación,	and	the	savvy	of	his	political	alliance-making	both	within	the	Mapuche	movement	and	also	with	the	entrenched	powers	of	Chilean	politics.		Indeed,	throughout	the	period,	the	fight	against	communism	was	perhaps	the	most	consistent	thread	running	through	the	Unión’s	goals	and	strategies.	As	early	as	1929,	before	succeeding	Chihuailaf	as	president	of	the	Unión,	Floriano	Antilef	had	written	Father	Sebastián	to	affirm	the	idea	that	education	was	one	of	the	most	effective	ways	to	counter	the	communist	threat.307	In	a	letter	dated	May	21,	1936,	Antilef	wrote	that	he	had	read	in	the	papers	that	Aburto	had	been	deported	to	the	Juan	Fernandez	Islands,	and	he	asked	Beck	if	it	was	true.308	In	fact,	Aburto	had	been	exiled	to	the	island	of	Chiloé,	for	what	would	turn	out	to	be	the	third	and	final	detention	by	the	state	of	his	political	career.	The	repeated	harassment	by	the	authorities	illustrates	that	Aburto	was	a	potential	liability	as	a	partner	to	the	other	organizations,	and	also	that	ties	to	leftist	political	parties	were	dangerous.		
Forming	the	Corporación	Araucana	In	the	late	1920s	and	early	1930s,	the	Unión	Araucana	operated	without	much	collaboration	from	other	Mapuche	organizations.	In	fact,	from	their	founding,	the	Unión	took	as	its	priority	to	combat	other	Mapuche	organizations,	especially																																																									306	José	Neculmán	to	Guido	Beck,	Oct.	18,	1938.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		307	Floriano	Antilef	to	Fr.	Sebastián,	Apr.	1,	1929.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		308	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	May	21,	1936.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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Manuel	Aburto	and	the	Federación	Araucana,	but	also	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	during	the	late	1920s	when	it	was	led	by	Arturo	Huenchullán	and	oriented	toward	the	left	in	opposition	to	the	Ley	Indígena	1.469.	Most	of	the	correspondence	in	their	archives	from	this	period	is	internal,	with	the	exception	of	Beck’s	deep	connections	with	the	state.	However,	as	the	1930s	wore	on,	more	ties	to	other	organizations	developed.	By	1938,	the	Unión	joined	with	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	and	even	Aburto’s	Federación	to	form	the	Corporación	Araucana.	The	Unión	archives	reveal	that	Venancio	Coñuepán	worked	to	cultivate	a	relationship	with	Beck	for	several	years	leading	up	to	that	critical	juncture.	But	it	was	a	long	road	from	the	fracas	of	1930	to	the	founding	of	the	Corporación.	Although	the	Unión	was	probably	the	most	distinct	and	least	collaborative	of	the	Mapuche	organizations,	they	were	not	entirely	without	allies	within	the	movement.	In	the	midst	of	the	turmoil	of	1930,	Francisco	Catrileo,	president	of	a	newly	founded	Mapuche	organization	(the	Sociedad	Araucana),	reached	out	to	Beck	to	express	that	group’s	official	regret	for	the	“unjust	attacks	that	have	been	launched	by	some	young	brothers	of	the	race	who	are	misguided.”	Catrileo	went	on	to	say	thank	you	for	all	the	efforts	the	Capuchins	had	made	to	benefit	and	improve	the	lives	of	Mapuche	in	southern	Chile.309		In	December	1931,	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	invited	Floriano	Antilef	to	a	meeting	where	they	planned	to	discuss	the	creation	of	indigenous	schools	and	a	credit	fund	for	Mapuche	farmers.	Antilef	wrote	to	Beck,	saying	he	thought	their	plans	for	schools	were	not	serious	because	they	did	not	have	access	to	resources	or	teachers.	About	the	credit	fund,	though,	he	said	he	thought	it																																																									309	Francisco	Catrileo	to	Guido	Beck,	Jun.	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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was	a	good	idea,	but	was	careful	to	ask	Beck	for	his	opinion	and	his	blessing	to	attend	the	meeting	to	learn	more.310	Soon	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	would	begin	to	court	the	Unión	also,	but	Beck	was	initially	resistant	to	their	proposals.	He	sent	a	circular	to	the	Unión’s	membership	in	October	that	acknowledged	he	had	heard	that	the	Sociedad	had	begun	to	invite	young	Mapuche	to	meetings	with	the	purpose	of	uniting	the	various	organizations.	In	principle,	he	wrote,	“this	idea	of	a	merger	is	not	bad,	it	is	good.”	But	he	recognized	the	vast	differences	between	the	Unión	and	other	Mapuche	organizations,	and	ultimately	said	that	a	partnership	between	groups	with	such	vastly	different	goals	would	not	work.	The	Unión	Araucana	was	first	and	foremost	a	Catholic	organization,	in	Beck’s	mind.	“The	society	they	hope	to	found,	composed	of	people	so	different,	cannot	survive.	It	carries	within	it	the	germ	of	dissolution.	We	are	Catholics,	and	before	all	else	Catholics.”311	This	early	pronouncement	illustrates	two	important	things.	First,	the	effort	to	bring	the	organizations	together	under	one	umbrella	was	a	long	process,	taking	place	over	a	span	of	almost	ten	years.	Second,	the	process	of	unification	was	a	component	of	a	larger	process,	under	which	Mapuche	organizations	transitioned	from	partnerships	founded	with	Euro-Chilean	allies	to	self-sufficient	groups	led	by	Mapuche	politicians	and	activists.	In	addition,	the	transition	from	reliance	on	white	allies	to	a	more	unified	and	self-sufficient	Mapuche	movement	represents	an	eclipse	of	racial	and	ethnic	identity	politics	over	simple	political	alliances	and	short-term	expedience.	But	that	transition	took	place	
																																																								310	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		311	Guido	Beck	to	centro	presidents,	Oct.	28,	1930.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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at	different	times	and	in	reaction	to	vastly	different	circumstances	in	the	three	major	organizations.		Venancio	Coñuepán	continued	to	court	Beck	directly	as	a	collaborator	in	his	efforts	to	create	a	unified	Mapuche	organization.	In	the	fall	of	1932,	he	wrote	to	Beck	several	times.	The	main	subject	of	those	letters	was	his	effort	to	gain	Beck’s	support	for	Mapuche	candidates	for	the	Congress,	and	include	him	and	the	Unión	leaders	in	the	process	by	which	they	were	selected.	But	more	broadly,	Coñuepán’s	outreach	signified	his	desire	to	unify	the	organizations	around	the	racial	and	ethnic	identity	of	his	people	and	across	religious,	cultural	and	political	divides.312	In	June	1933,	Coñuepán	wrote	again	to	share	with	the	Bishop	information	about	an	Assembly	of	Indigenous	Farmers	that	the	Sociedad	was	organizing,	at	which	they	planned	to	discuss	solutions	to	their	problems	and	petition	the	government	for	help	in	solving	them.	In	the	text	of	the	circular,	Beck	underlined	the	phrase,	“we	are	powerful	when	organized	collectively	and	in	that	way	we	have	the	best	defense.”	It	is	likely	that	such	a	statement	of	ethnic	collectivism	made	Beck	uncomfortable	as	it	had	the	potential	to	eclipse	his	promotion	of	Catholicism,	but	nevertheless	he	wrote	back	to	express	his	support.	He	did	ask,	however,	that	they	work	to	suppress	alcoholism	and	pagan	rituals	–	that	they	could	count	on	his	support	as	long	as	they	did	not	directly	or	indirectly	oppose	his	religious	convictions.313	Throughout	that	winter	and	into	the	spring,	Coñuepán	stayed	in	contact	with	Beck	about	their	projects.	He	forwarded	letters	that	the	Sociedad	had	solicited	or	drafted	in	support	of	their	agricultural	efforts.	They	had	secured	the	support	of	the																																																									312	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Guido	Beck,	Sep.-Oct.	1932.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		313	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Guido	Beck	correspondence,	Jun.	1933.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		
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Junta	Provincial	de	Agricultura	de	Cautín	(Provincial	Agricultural	Council	of	Cautín)	for	their	proposals,	and	the	leaders	of	that	group	advocated	on	their	behalf	to	the	Minister	of	Agriculture.314	But	in	September	the	Sociedad	wrote	to	the	Minister	directly	to	express	their	disappointment	that	he	did	not	see	the	necessity	of	their	proposals,	including	the	idea	of	a	traveling	agronomist	to	offer	technical	advice	to	Mapuche	farmers.	That	suggested	he	did	not	understand	the	needs	of	their	constituents,	they	wrote,	and	asked	him	to	reconsider.315	In	July	1933,	Coñuepán	again	brought	up	the	idea	of	combining	the	organizations	to	put	forward	a	“united	front”	and	asked	about	Antilef’s	opinion	of	the	proposal.316	By	September	the	two	organizations	agreed	to	publicly	announce	their	accord.	In	that	communication,	they	highlighted	the	fact	that	the	two	groups	that	had	done	the	most	to	advance	the	cause	of	Indian	education	in	the	region	were	the	Anglican	and	Capuchin	missions,	which	were	the	same	two	groups	that	helped	to	found	the	Sociedad	and	Unión,	respectively.	Mapuche	leaders	like	Coñuepán	and	Antilef	had	been	trained	in	the	very	schools	that	the	two	missions	operated.317	This	religious	and	educational	connection	was	therefore	a	lasting	and	important	feature	of	Chilean	indigenismo.		In	November	1933,	Antilef’s	circular	to	the	regional	presidents	announced	that	at	their	upcoming	General	Assembly	they	would	elect	three	delegates	to	participate	in	the	United	Front	with	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán,	because	the	time	had	
																																																								314	Alfredo	Rodríguez	Mac	Iver	and	Manuel	Cruz	to	Minister	of	Agriculture,	Aug.	10,	1933.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		315	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Agriculture,	Sep.	25,	1933.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		316	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Guido	Beck,	Jul.	29,	1933.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		317	Correspondence	between	Unión	and	Sociedad	leaders,	Sep.	1933.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.	
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come	for	all	Mapuche	to	confront	their	common	problems	together.318	But	Antilef	remained	ambivalent	about	the	project.	The	following	July	he	wrote	to	Beck	to	say	that	he	had	not	heard	much	from	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	with	respect	to	their	partnership,	and	that	he	was	having	doubts	about	the	utility,	effectiveness	and	durability	of	an	alliance	with	a	group	that	had	such	different	values.319	At	about	the	same	time,	in	the	mid-1930s,	Unión	Araucana	leaders	were	attempting	to	develop	greater	self-sufficiency	from	Beck’s	patronage,	and	also	more	substantive	and	effective	organizational	structure.	In	his	May	1934	circular	to	the	presidents	of	the	regional	Unión	centers,	Antilef	announced	that	they	would	be	instituting	annual	dues	of	one	peso	per	member,	in	order	to	cover	the	cost	of	correspondence	and	publicity,	an	expense	that	Beck	had	covered	up	until	that	point.320	It	is	important	to	recognize	that	in	the	institutional	history	of	the	Unión	Araucana,	efforts	to	develop	greater	organizational	efficiency	and	independence	from	the	Capuchin	fathers	came	at	the	same	time	their	alliances	with	other	Mapuche	organizations	grew	stronger	and	more	formal.	Antilef’s	loyalty	to	Beck	and	uneasy	feelings	about	the	partnership	with	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán	persisted	for	some	time.	By	July	1936,	the	Sociedad	had	achieved	their	goal	of	creating	a	centralized	Mapuche	agricultural	fund	called	the	
Caja	Central321	to	lend	money	to	Mapuche	peasants.	Writing	to	Beck	about	the	
																																																								318	Circular,	Nov.	12-13,	1933.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		319	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	Jun.	29,	1934.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.		320	Circular	No.	15,	May	25,	1934.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	1.	321	The	Caja	Central	is	also	sometimes	referred	to	as	the	Caja	Agrícola	(Agricultural	Fund)	or	
Caja	Indígena	(Indigenous	Fund)	in	the	historical	record.	Accordingly,	the	three	terms	are	used	interchangeably	at	various	points	in	this	text,	in	keeping	with	the	way	they	are	used	in	the	sources	referenced.	
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celebration	of	this	event,	Antilef	lamented	the	fact	that	Beck	had	not	been	invited	to	the	ceremony,	and	seemed	offended	by	the	snub.	Nevertheless,	Beck	suggested	to	Antilef	that	if	he	had	occasion	to	deliver	remarks,	he	might	emphasize	the	importance	of	saving	money	for	the	Mapuche	small	farmer,	the	lack	of	which	he	blamed	for	the	poverty	of	many	Indians.322	But	the	groups	did	stay	together,	and	on	the	12th	of	November,	1938,	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán,	Federación	Araucana	and	Unión	Araucana	formally	came	together	as	the	Corporación	Araucana.	One	of	their	first	official	acts	was	to	send	a	telegram	to	the	President	of	the	Republic	announcing	their	union,	and	claim	to	be	the	official	political	voice	of	the	Mapuche	people.323	For	Antilef	and	Guido	Beck	a	sense	of	ambivalence	surely	remained,	as	the	following	month	the	Caja	Central	(under	Coñuepán’s	leadership)	celebrated	its	anniversary	by	bringing	together	2,000	Mapuche	to	host	a	nguillatún.324	However,	in	1938	Pedro	Aguirre	Cerda	won	the	presidency	representing	the	Popular	Front	coalition	of	left-leaning	political	parties,	which	dealt	a	blow	to	Beck	in	his	steadfast	support	for	the	Conservative	Party.	But	the	combined	efforts	to	represent	the	Mapuche	people	continued	and	advanced	to	the	highest	levels	of	government.	In	October	1939,	Antilef	wrote	to	Beck	to	inform	him	about	a	proposal	that	the	Corporación	was	about	to	make	to	President	Pedro	Aguirre	Cerda,	taking	care	to	point	out	there	was	no	danger	of	undermining	the	Capuchin	schools.325	In	a	six-page	document,	the	Corporación	proposed	the	creation	of	a	sub-cabinet-level	position	within	the	government	to																																																									322	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	Jul.	1936.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		323	News	clipping,	El	Diario	Austral,	Nov.	1938.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		324	News	clipping,	El	Diario	Austral,	Dec.	21,	1938,	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		325	Floriano	Antilef	to	Guido	Beck,	Oct.	2,	1939.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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oversee	indigenous	affairs.	This	“Subsecretariat	Indígena”	would	supervise	three	initiatives	toward	improving	land	tenure,	economic	development	and	education	for	Mapuche	communities.326	While	it	took	some	time	for	this	proposal	to	gain	traction,	this	seems	to	be	the	first	incarnation	of	the	idea	for	what	would	later	come	to	be	the	Dirección	de	Asuntos	Indígenas	that	Ibañez	created	in	1953,	and	which	Coñuepán	would	lead	for	much	of	the	1950s.	It	is	also	worth	recognizing	that	this	initial	proposal	predates	Coñuepán’s	visit	to	the	Patzcuaro	Conference	in	1940	where	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano	was	founded,	and	shows	that	the	organization	and	formalization	of	the	Mapuche	political	movement	was	well	underway	in	the	1930s.	At	that	time,	proposals	made	by	Mapuche	leaders	were	on	pace	with	similar	developments	that	had	already	begun	in	Mexico,	Peru	and	Bolivia.	As	the	1930s	gave	way	to	the	1940s,	Coñuepán	stayed	in	contact	with	Guido	Beck,	and	the	two	remained	cordial,	although	they	were	not	always	in	agreement	on	the	material	aspects	of	the	Mapuche	movement.	In	December	1943,	Beck	wrote	to	Eulogio	Robles	as	Minister	of	the	Courts,	to	share	his	thoughts	on	“the	indigenous	question,”	but	at	the	same	time	to	reject	Coñuepán’s	proposal	for	the	sub-secretariat,	which	he	thought	“would	create	a	state	within	a	state.”327	He	did	write	to	congratulate	Coñuepán	when	he	was	elected	as	a	Deputy	in	August	1945	representing	the	right	wing	party,	Alianza	Popular	Libertadora	(Popular	Freedom	Alliance).	Coñuepán	wrote	back	to	thank	him	and	to	affirm	their	alliance,	but	he	also	acknowledged	that	some	of	the	younger	Mapuche	who	worked	for	Beck	in	Padre	Las	Casas	supported	another	candidate	“whose	party	was	not	on	the	right	and	who	are																																																									326	Notes	from	meeting	with	Corporación	leaders,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		327	Guido	Beck	to	Eulogio	Robles,	Dec.	16,	1943.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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actually	enemies	of	those	who	support	the	subsidies”	that	supported	the	Capuchin	mission	schools.328	Throughout	the	1940s,	their	relationship	remained	strained	by	various	political	issues,	as	when	Beck	wrote	to	Coñuepán	in	1948	to	complain	that	he	had	criticized	the	mission	schools.329	Coñuepán	replied	that	he	had	not	said	those	things,	that	his	enemies	within	the	movement,	and	other	politicians,	had	attributed	the	comments	to	him.330			
Summary	While	the	Unión	Araucana	was	not	able	to	mobilize	large	numbers	of	indigenous	peasants	in	public	gatherings	like	the	great	congresos	organized	by	Manuel	Aburto,	they	did	exert	significant	influence	over	the	Mapuche	movement.	Monsignor	Guido	Beck	de	Ramberga	was	well	connected	with	high-level	state	actors,	which	made	him	an	important	ally	and	a	difficult	adversary	for	other	leaders	within	the	movement.	Although	Manuel	Aburto	courted	and	was	supported	by	left-leaning	political	parties,	including	the	Communist	and	Socialist	Parties,	at	the	same	moment	the	left	triumphed	with	the	election	Popular	Front	presidential	candidate	Pedro	Aguirre	Cerda,	he	and	other	major	Mapuche	organizations	joined	forces	under	the	auspices	of	the	Corporación	Araucana	with	a	decidedly	more	moderate	political	orientation.	That	enabled	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	become	the	de	facto	leader	of	the	Mapuche	movement,	and	later	win	a	second	election	to	the	to	Chamber	of	Deputies	as	a	candidate	of	the	Conservative	Party	in	1949.																																																										328	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Guido	Beck,	Aug.	13,	1944.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		329	Guido	Beck	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	undated.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		330	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Guido	Beck,	Mar.	3,	1949.	ADV,	Carpeta	UA	2.		
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While	it	would	be	a	stretch	to	credit	Guido	Beck’s	influence	as	the	sole	cause	of	the	Mapuche	movement	trending	toward	the	center	of	the	political	spectrum	in	this	period,	his	connections	to	state	actors	enabled	him	to	influence	ways	that	the	state	received	and	reacted	to	Mapuche	political	demands	and	advance	a	more	conservative	indigenista	agenda.	Again,	we	see	that	Mapuche	and	other	indigenista	leaders	were	guided	by	factors	outside	the	locus	of	their	control.	The	case	of	Guido	Beck	and	the	Unión	Araucana	represents	both	a	response	to	the	leftist	provocations	of	Manuel	Aburto	and	others,	and	a	distinct	effort	to	proactively	influence	the	movement	toward	preferred	outcomes.	Beck	and	the	Mapuche	leaders	of	the	Unión	Araucana	built	their	following	from	among	the	many	indigenous	youth	that	Catholic	schools	educated,	and	expanded	the	tradition	of	organizing	in	the	rural	south.	They	too	were	operating	within	a	sphere	of	influences	created	by	national	and	international	political	events,	as	well	as	the	goals	of	their	allies	and	opponents.	What	is	more,	although	Beck	retained	more	direct	control	of	the	organization	he	founded	than	Guevara	and	Sadleir	did	with	the	Sociedad,	even	in	the	Unión	the	indigenous	leaders	had	room	to	maneuver,	advocate	and	express	their	individual	and	collective	agency	as	Indians.		 	
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Chapter	3:	Indigenismo	in	Chile	and	the	Americas	
	At	this	juncture,	we	shift	our	lens	of	inquiry	from	the	organizational	work	of	Mapuche	activists	and	their	Chilean	allies,	to	consider	the	broader	influence	of	transnational	indigenismo	on	the	Mapuche	movement.	One	central	argument	of	this	dissertation	is	that	the	categories	of	Indian	and	indigenista	were	much	more	flexible	and	dynamic	than	most	scholarship	on	indigenismo	and	indigenous	activism	has	traditionally	accounted	for.	However,	I	maintain	the	use	of	such	categories	in	the	effort	to	illustrate	the	fluidity	between	them,	and	to	show	how	ideas	were	shared	between	actors.		In	order	to	demonstrate	that	intellectual	flow	in	the	case	of	the	Mapuche	in	Chile,	chapter	three	first	examines	the	origins	of	formal	transnational	indigenismo	and	the	creation	of	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano.	I	lay	out	some	key	aspects	of	the	global	context	in	which	the	indigenista	discourse	developed,	explaining	the	significance	of	World	War	II	and	the	Cold	War	on	indigenista	initiatives.	I	then	show	how	the	transnational	network	of	indigenistas	formed	and	developed	through	travel,	joint	projects	and	the	exchange	of	scholars	across	national	contexts	during	the	1940s.	The	second	part	of	chapter	four	turns	to	look	at	the	contributions	of	Chilean	indigenistas	to	the	pan-American	discourse	in	the	1950s,	with	particular	attention	paid	to	news	items	reported	through	III	publications.	That	work	shows	that	although	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Chileno	operated	as	a	private	organization	from	1949-1961	and	the	Chilean	state	did	not	
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formally	support	its	initiatives,	members	did	actively	participate	in	the	indigenista	discourse.	They	sent	delegations	to	several	international	conferences	and	contributed	scholarly	and	journalistic	articles	to	its	publications.		
Indigenismo	across	the	Americas	Gathering	force	in	the	1920s,	the	broad	goal	of	indigenismo	as	a	movement	was	to	incorporate	indígenas	into	national	states	as	citizens,	retaining	only	the	“least	offensive”	features	of	their	native	cultures	as	their	life	ways	and	living	conditions	were	modernized.331	The	vanguard	of	this	movement	broke	out	in	Mexico	during	the	presidency	of	Lázaro	Cárdenas	during	the	1930s,	where	the	incorporation	of	indígenas	into	the	national	political	system	was	a	major	goal	of	the	populist	revolutionary	government.332	In	Mexico,	the	official	status	of	indigenismo	led	to	broad	funding	and	support	from	the	government,	which	in	turn	created	an	indigenous	school	system,	public	health	projects	and	economic	development	schemes.333	In	other	countries,	the	goals	of	indigenistas	varied	widely	based	on	the	degree	of	support	they	received	from	political	institutions	and	the	various	ideological	orientations	of	proponents.		In	the	United	States,	indigenista	projects	found	support	during	the	presidency	of	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	as	the	Indian	Reorganization	Act	(also	known	as	the	“Indian	New	Deal”)	aligned	with	other	policies	geared	toward	social	reform,	economic	stimulus	and	modernization	in	the	1930s	and	early	1940s.	John	Collier,	as																																																									331	Berdichewsky,	p.	16.	332	Giraudo	and	Lewis,	p.	3.	333	See	Alexander	Dawson,	Indian	and	Nation	in	Revolutionary	Mexico,	Tucson:	University	of	Arizona	Press,	2004.	
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Commissioner	of	the	Bureau	of	Indian	Affairs	from	1933-1945,	was	responsible	for	many	of	the	advances	in	U.S.	Indian	policy	in	those	years,	and	is	generally	viewed	as	the	architect	of	the	Indian	Reorganization	Act.	Collier	is	also	credited	with	closing	the	federal	Indian	boarding	schools	that	had	served	a	critical	role	in	the	assimilation	of	Indian	youth	into	the	national	culture	since	the	late	nineteenth	century.	But	following	World	War	II,	the	emergence	of	the	Cold	War	dramatically	shifted	the	priorities	of	the	U.S.	federal	government	and	indigenismo	lost	its	official	prioritization	and	support.	In	the	post-War	era,	a	new	cadre	of	reformers	sought	to	“terminate”	the	special	relationship	that	Indian	nations	had	with	the	United	States,	which	unraveled	many	of	the	gains	indigenistas	had	made	in	that	country.		In	Peru,	the	impact	of	indigenismo	also	fluctuated	as	the	nation’s	political	winds	shifted.	Peruvian	sociologist	Osmar	Gonzales	describes	that	country’s	indigenista	movement	as	composed	of	two	distinct	branches.	One	school	of	thought,	epitomized	by	the	work	of	radicals	inspired	by	Marxism	in	the	1920s	like	José	Carlos	Mariátegui,	Víctor	Raúl	Haya	de	la	Torre	and	a	young	Luis	Valcárcel,	held	that	the	indigenous	question	stemmed	from	fundamental	flaws	in	the	Peruvian	state.	As	a	result,	they	favored	the	overthrow	of	the	state	and	its	reconstruction	along	very	different	lines,	i.e.	socialism.	The	other	line	of	analysis	saw	indigenous	problems	as	flaws	within	a	project	of	state	formation	that	was	incorrect	or	incomplete,	but	which	could	be	fixed	through	reforms.	After	repressive	political	regimes	effectively	crushed	leftist	politics	in	the	1930s,	a	more	reform-minded	indigenismo	emerged	in	Peru	at	the	same	time	the	III	was	forming	in	the	1940s.	Luis	Valcárcel,	who	had	previously	advocated	for	a	more	strident,	revolutionary	brand	of	indigenismo,	
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became	one	of	the	most	prominent	Peruvian	indigenistas,	eventually	leading	the	Peruvian	Indigenista	Institute	from	1946-1949.	By	that	time,	through	his	association	with	the	III	and	captivation	with	the	more	scientific	approach	of	North	American	anthropology,	Valcárcel	had	tempered	his	views.	His	career	trajectory	mirrors	the	incorporation	of	indigenismo	into	official	state	policies	and	projects	in	Peru,	and	elsewhere	in	the	Americas.334		Historical	memory	reflects	the	fluctuations	and	ambivalence	of	national	Indian	policy.	Historian	Alexander	Dawson	has	compared	indigenista	education	projects	in	Canada,	the	United	States	and	Mexico.	In	all	three	national	contexts,	indigenistas	operated	boarding	schools	that	removed	indigenous	children	from	their	home	communities	in	efforts	to	improve	the	lives	of	the	students	and	their	communities.	But	while	the	Mexican	schools	were	part	of	a	broad	strategy	to	honor	and	recognize	indigenous	contributions	to	the	Mexican	nation,	other	North	American	schools	were	part	of	a	strategy	to	assimilate	Indians	into	white	culture	by	stripping	them	of	their	native	language	and	customs.	In	the	U.S.,	federal	Indian	boarding	schools	are	remembered	as	violent	places	where	indigenous	children	were	deprived	of	food	and	subjected	to	harsh	punishment	when	they	ran	away	or	refused	to	speak	English.	In	Canada,	owing	to	a	handful	of	high-profile	lawsuits	seeking	damages	stemming	from	sexual	abuse	in	church-run	schools,	the	legacy	of	First	Nations	schools	has	been	tainted	and	is	remembered	as	one	more	chapter	in	a	sad	history	of	ethnocide.	Dawson’s	work	shows	that	broad	similarities	in	the	projects																																																									334	Osmar	Gonzales,	“The	Instituto	Indigenista	Peruano:	A	New	Place	in	the	State	for	the	Indigenous	Debate,”	Latin	American	Perspectives,	Issue	186,	Vol.	39,	No.	5,	Sep.	2012,	pp.	33-44.	
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themselves	contrast	with	the	very	different	ways	in	which	the	projects	were	remembered,	owing	to	the	unique	national	contexts	in	which	they	were	produced.335			
Origins	of	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano		“After	the	first	World	War,	persons	working	on	behalf	of	Indians…gradually	became	aware	of	each	other	and,	realizing	they	had	a	great	deal	to	learn	from	each	other,	began	working	together.”336	Some	years	later	in	1933,	at	their	Seventh	International	Conference	in	Montevideo,	Uruguay,	the	Organization	of	American	States	(OAS)	identified	the	need	to	bring	together	various	individuals	and	agencies	working	to	improve	the	living	conditions	of	indigenous	peoples	across	the	Americas	in	a	more	formal	way.	Then	in	1938	at	the	Eighth	International	Conference	in	Lima,	Peru,	the	OAS	announced	that	the	first	Congreso	Indigenista	Interamericano	(Inter-American	Indianist	Conference)	would	be	held	in	1940	in	Patzcuaro,	Mexico.	Among	the	resolutions	adopted	in	Patzcuaro	was	the	formal	establishment	of	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano.337	John	Collier,	Commissioner	of	the	U.S.	Bureau	of	Indian	Affairs	(BIA),	was	appointed	president	of	the	conference	and	eventually	the	president	of	the	III	Board	of	Directors,	and	Mexican	President	Lázaro	Cárdenas	attended	the	opening	ceremonies	and	delivered	an	impassioned	speech	extolling	the	
																																																								335	Alexander	Dawson,	“Histories	and	Memories	of	the	Indian	Boarding	Schools	in	Mexico,	Canada,	and	the	United	States,”	Latin	American	Perspectives,	Issue	186,	Vol.	39,	No.	5,	Sep.	2012,	pp.	80-99.	336	Robert	C.	Jones,	“Indians	Look	to	the	Future,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1945	Vol.	5,	No.	2,	p.	141.	337	Carlos	Giron	Cerna,	“The	Beginning	of	an	Inter-American	Program	on	Behalf	of	the	Indians,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1941	Vol.	1,	No.	1,	pp.	1-4.	
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legacy	of	Mexico’s	indigenous	cultures.	Mexican	educator,	politician	and	diplomat	Moisés	Sáenz	was	selected	as	the	first	Director	of	the	III,	although	his	sudden	and	untimely	death	in	1941	got	the	new	institute	off	to	an	unstable	start.338	Soon	afterward,	Manuel	Gamio,	an	anthropologist	trained	by	Franz	Boas	at	Columbia	University,	was	appointed	as	the	Institute’s	next	director.	Two	years	into	his	leadership,	Gamio	wrote	of	the	Institute’s	mission:	“…we	are	not	attempting	to	reconstruct	for	the	Indian	an	existence	like	the	one	his	ancestors	led	before	the	Conquest…	Nor	are	we	trying	forcibly	to	impose	upon	him	a	ridiculous	process	of	complete	Europeanization,	uprooting	him	from	his	traditional	and	natural	environment.	We	simply	wish	to	elaborate	and	offer	him	an	harmonious	combination	of	the	best	of	his	pre-Hispanic	and	colonial	legacy,	the	best	autochthonous	material	he	possesses	today,	and	the	best	elements	in	western	culture	which	may	be	adaptable	to	the	nature	of	his	particular	needs	and	aspirations.”339		That	mission	would	later	be	scrutinized	and	criticized	by	historians	of	indigenismo,	but	does	represent	a	valuable	lens	through	which	I	analyze	its	many	projects.	Delegates	attending	the	first	Congreso	Indigenista	Interamericano	in	the	Mexican	city	of	Patzcuaro	created	the	III	in	1940	and	required	each	member	state	also	create	its	own	national	indigenista	institute.340	The	purpose	of	that	broader	structure	was	to	support	collaboration	and	coordination	between	the	III,	its	affiliated	national	institutes,	social	scientists	and	indigenous	organizations	in	each	country.	Results	produced	by	social	science	research	would	be	coordinated	and	disseminated	by	the	III.	That	research	would	then	inform	policy	decisions	made	by	
																																																								338	Editorial,	“Sadness	in	the	Home	of	Indianists,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1941	Vol.	1,	No.	2,	pp.	1-3.	339	Manuel	Gamio,	“Static	and	Dynamic	Values	of	the	Indigenous	Past	of	America,”	The	
Spanish	American	Historical	Review,	Vol.	23,	No.	3	(Aug.	1943),	pp.	392-392.	Cited	in	Boletín	
Indigenista,	1943	Vol.	3,	No.	4,	p.	267.	340	“El	Primer	Congreso	Indigenista	Interamericano,”	Boletín	Bibliográfico	de	Antropología	
Americana	(1937-1948),	Vol.	4,	No.	1	(Enero-Abril	1940),	pp.	1-36.	
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the	state,	which	could	also	consult	indigenous	organizations	through	the	national	institutes	as	policies	were	adopted	and	implemented.341	Although	member	states	were	expected	to	contribute	funds	to	the	III	and	to	support	national	institutes	within	their	countries,	in	many	countries	indigenistas	had	difficulty	building	political	support	for	their	projects	at	the	national	level,	which	slowed	the	III’s	progress	toward	its	goals.	The	Institute	had	no	means	to	enforce	its	requirements,	so	many	member	states	simply	refused	to	create	national	institutes	or	pay	their	annual	dues.	That	was	precisely	what	happened	in	Chile.	The	country	did	send	an	official	delegation	to	the	Patzcuaro	conference	that	included	the	Mapuche	leaders	Venancio	Coñuepán	and	César	Colima.	But	while	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Chileno	(IIC)	was	created	in	1949,	it	was	not	recognized	by,	and	did	not	receive	funding	from,	the	Chilean	government	until	1961,	and	was	only	inconsistently	consulted	on	indigenous	questions.	However,	Alejandro	Lipschütz	was	a	major	contributor	to	the	IIC	and	attempted	to	prompt	state	actors	to	comply	with	III	policies	and	requests	for	information	throughout	the	period.342	Writing	in	a	1942	editorial	in	the	Boletín	Indigenista,	Manuel	Gamio	further	elaborated	the	scientific	mission	of	the	III.	In	order	to	identify	populations	with	which	to	work,	Gamio	categorized	Indians	in	four	groups:	those	whose	characteristics	and	needs	are	unknown	because	they	had	never	been	studied,	those	whose	characteristics	and	needs	were	known	generally	but	had	yet	to	be	prioritized,	those	who	had	been	studied	scientifically	but	not	yet	targeted	for	social	improvement,	and	those	who	had	been	studied	and	subsequently	benefitted	from																																																									341	Editorial,	“Indian	Day,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1941	Vol.	2,	No.	1,	pp.	1-5.	342	Colección	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Caja	6353.		
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social	or	political	intervention.	By	placing	indigenous	populations	in	categories	along	a	continuum	in	this	way,	Gamio	made	clear	that	the	goal	of	the	III	was	to	facilitate	the	transition	from	the	first	to	the	fourth	categories.	Although	the	consequences	of	that	approach	were	inherently	political,	often	requiring	the	direct	intervention	of	the	state,	Gamio	strove	to	maintain	an	apolitical	stance	for	the	III.	But	as	we	shall	see,	such	independence	proved	impossible	to	maintain.343	While	the	III	would	make	progress	on	those	initiatives	and	others	in	the	coming	years,	their	advancement	was	sometimes	slow	and	plodding,	and	at	other	times	inconsistent.	The	III	was	founded	at	the	beginning	of	American	involvement	in	World	War	II,	which	instantly	became	the	priority	of	the	United	States,	the	largest	and	most	internationally	powerful	of	the	member	states.	As	a	result,	interest	in	Native	American	issues	waned	at	the	level	of	national	political	debate	in	the	United	States.	Native	Americans	did	play	key	roles	in	the	U.S.	war	effort,	most	famously	the	Navajo	“code	talkers.”	For	his	part,	Collier	also	contributed	to	the	war	effort,	using	the	BIA	to	create	and	manage	a	Japanese	internment	camp	at	the	Colorado	River	Indian	Reservation,	where	interned	Japanese-Americans	were	put	to	work	on	an	irrigation	project	intended	to	ultimately	benefit	Native	Americans	in	the	southwest	by	bringing	irrigation	waters	to	90,000	acres	of	previously	unproductive	soil.344	In	reality,	Collier’s	experiment	was	more	complicated	as	he	sought	not	only	to	benefit	Native	Americans	under	his	charge,	but	also	minimize	the	trauma	of	what	he	believed	to	be	the	injustice	of	internment	in	the	first	place,	while	simultaneously																																																									343	Editorial,	Boletín	Indigenista,	1942	Vol.	2,	No.	2,	pp.	1-2.	344	Noticias:	United	States,	“Indian	Service	Relocates	Japanese,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1942	Vol.	2,	No.	3,	p.	18.	
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conducting	social	experiments	to	understand	how	the	interned	Japanese-Americans	themselves	managed	life	in	the	camp.345	Collier	and	his	wife,	anthropologist	Laura	Thompson,	saw	in	their	experiment	a	model	for	self-sufficient	indigenous	communities	in	the	U.S.	and	Latin	America,	and	also	for	the	administration	of	U.S.	dependencies	in	the	Pacific	in	the	post-war	era.	John	Collier,	as	a	major	architect	of	both	the	III	and	United	States	Indian	policy	reform,	would	resign	as	commissioner	of	the	Bureau	of	Indian	Affairs	in	1945	as	the	war	was	drawing	to	a	close,	in	large	part	because	the	priorities	of	federal	Indian	policy	shifted	significantly	in	the	post-War	administration	of	President	Harry	S.	Truman	to	favor	efforts	to	“terminate”	the	special	relationship	sovereign	native	nations	had	with	the	United	States	government.346		During	the	war,	the	III	attempted	to	link	Latin	American	indigenous	peoples	to	the	war	effort.		“While	it	is	physically	impossible	for	the	countries	extending	from	Mexico’s	northern	frontier	to	Patagonia	to	carry	out	a	job	of	such	magnitude,	they	will	in	general	gladly	cooperate	to	the	limit	of	their	respective	capacities…If	the	totalitarian	aggressors	later	attempt	to	invade	the	continent,	or	it	becomes	really	urgent	to	fill	the	decimated	ranks	of	the	Allies,	in	which	Indians	of	the	United	States	and	Canada	already	fight,	the	companies,	battalions	and	armies	will	come	from	those	southern	countries.”347		Of	course,	no	such	invasion	would	come	to	pass,	and	ultimately	no	major	contribution	of	troops	to	Allied	armies	was	made.	Then	after	the	war,	as	U.S.	foreign	policy	became	increasingly	preoccupied	with	containing	the	spread	of	communism,																																																									345	For	a	more	thorough	analysis	of	Collier’s	project,	see	Karin	Rosemblatt,	The	Science	and	
Politics	of	Race	in	Mexico	and	the	United	States,	1910-1950,	Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2018,	chapter	3.	346	John	Collier	and	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt,	“Resignation	of	the	Head	of	the	Office	of	Indian	Affairs	and	President	Roosevelt’s	Reply,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1945	Vol.	5,	No.	2,	pp.	126-137.	347	Editorial,	“The	Indian	and	the	War,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1942	Vol.	2,	No.	3,	p.	1.	
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indigenous	populations	in	Latin	America	gradually	presented	a	different	sort	of	concern	as	they	were	alternately	targeted	by	or	recruited	into	Marxist	uprisings	across	the	region.	Although	Indians	in	Latin	America	did	not	participate	in	direct	combat	during	World	War	II,	several	indirect	hardships	fell	upon	them,	which	the	III	tried	to	mitigate.	In	1943,	the	editors	of	the	Boletín	Indigenista	pointed	out	that	the	costs	of	basic	raw	materials	used	by	Indians	across	Latin	America	were	climbing	out	of	their	reach.	Wool,	leather	and	even	rubber	dedicated	to	the	production	of	wartime	supplies	created	shortages	and	therefore	inflationary	costs	for	those	materials	that	were	fundamental	to	the	indigenous	production	of	handcrafts	and	utilitarian	items	like	blankets,	sarapes	and	sandals.	The	situation	was	so	bad,	the	editors	pointed	out,	that	rubber	from	discarded	tires	could	not	even	be	substituted	for	leather	in	the	construction	of	sandals,	as	the	value	of	the	latter	had	become	even	greater	than	leather.	In	proposing	solutions,	the	III	called	upon	the	governments	of	the	hemisphere	to	intervene,	or	at	least	remember,	the	plights	of	their	indigenous	inhabitants.	In	doing	so,	the	editors	fell	into	the	paternalistic	tone	that	later	led	to	the	sustained	criticism	of	the	movement,	writing	that	“The	Indian	can	do	nothing	himself,	and	if	the	governments	do	not	assist	in	this	extremely	difficult	situation,	he	must	remain	silent,	continuing	to	suffer	perhaps	more	acutely	than	before.”348		
Transnational	Connections	
																																																								348	Editorial,	“Raw	Materials	Needed	by	the	Indian,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1943	Vol.	3,	No.	3,	pp.	138-141.	
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The	III	offered	opportunities	for	indigenistas	to	collaborate	and	learn	from	one	another.	In	1941,	Ernest	Maes,	at	the	time	working	as	a	Field	Representative	for	the	U.S.	BIA,	traveled	throughout	South	America,	“seeking	to	glean	from	the	administrative	experiences	of	these	countries	in	dealing	with	their	Indian	populations,	information	which	might	be	of	use	to	the	U.S.	Indian	Service.”	News	of	his	travels	was	reported	in	the	Boletín	Indigenista,	which	indicated	he	spent	one	month	in	Venezuela	before	moving	on	to	Ecuador,	Argentina	and	Brazil.349	Maes	later	spent	time	in	Chile,	where	in	1942	his	visit	resulted	in	the	creation	of	a	“provisional	commission”	in	Temuco.	The	commission	had	three	primary	objectives:	1)	to	convince	the	Chilean	government	to	sign	the	Patzcuaro	Convention,	2)	to	bring	information	from	the	III	to	Chilean	indigenistas	broadly,	and	Chilean	government	officials	in	particular,	and	3)	for	the	provisional	commission	to	be	officially	recognized	by	the	III	and	Chilean	government,	laying	the	groundwork	for	the	establishment	of	a	National	Indigenista	Institute	in	Chile.350	However,	in	order	to	establish	the	provisional	commission	quickly,	Maes	drew	upon	members	of	the	Corporación,	which	shifted	the	orientation	of	the	group.	Whereas	in	other	countries	indigenista	efforts	were	led	by	white	indigenistas	trained	in	the	social	sciences,	these	first	III	efforts	in	Chile	were	reliant	upon	indigenous	leaders	whose	primary	objectives	lay	with	their	own	political	activities	and	direct	engagement	with	the	state.351		
																																																								349	Noticias:	Venezuela,	Boletín	Indigenista,	1941	Vol.	1,	No.	1,	p.	13.	350	Noticias:	Chile,	“An	Indianist	Committee,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1943	Vol.	3,	No.	1,	p.	27.	351	Vergara	and	Gundermann,	p.	6.	
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In	1942,	there	were	only	four	official	national	indigenista	institutes	among	the	countries	of	the	two	continents:	the	United	States,	El	Salvador,	Ecuador	and	Nicaragua.	Even	Mexico,	the	official	seat	of	the	III,	had	failed	to	obtain	official	approval	for	its	national	institute,	illustrating	the	difficulties	that	indigenistas	encountered	in	obtaining	political	and	financial	support	from	their	governments.	As	Secretary	of	the	National	Indian	Institute	in	Washington,	D.C.,	and	acting	as	a	representative	of	the	III,	Ernest	Maes	again	traveled	to	member	countries	in	1942	to	encourage	the	creation	of	national	institutes.	He	eventually	worked	his	way	through	Central	America,	visiting	Guatemala,	Honduras,	El	Salvador,	Nicaragua,	Costa	Rica	and	Panama.352	Following	his	two-month	trip	to	all	the	countries	of	Central	America,	Maes	summarized	the	insight	he	had	gathered	for	readers	in	other	places	in	a	letter	published	in	the	Boletín.	He	identified	a	method	by	which	national	institutes	could	start	small	and	grow	their	operations,	providing	examples	of	micro-projects	undertaken	by	the	affiliates	in	El	Salvador	and	Honduras.	National	institutes	represented	the	only	way	to	ensure	that	the	III	would	be	effective	at	producing	tangible	results	for	indigenous	groups,	and	not	just	function	as	a	distributor	of	research	findings.353		Maes	offered	the	insight	that	they	should	function	not	only	as	a	“friend	in	court”	for	disenfranchised	indigenous	peoples,	but	also	set	an	example	of	scientific	approaches	to	social	problem	solving,	both	for	native	peoples	and	for	their	
																																																								352	Noticias:	United	States,	“Mr.	Maes’	Visit	to	Central	America,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1943	Vol.	3,	No.	3,	p.	165.	353	Noticias,	“The	Inter-American	Indian	Institute	in	Central	America,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1943	Vol.	3,	No.	4,	pp.	216-227.	
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governments.354	For	their	part,	the	editors	of	the	Boletín	Indigenista	reminded	those	trying	to	get	national	institutes	off	the	ground	that:	“It	is	essential	that	these	National	Institutes	avoid	becoming	what	so	many	Indianist	groups	have	become	in	the	past,	a	debating	society	where	well	intentioned	but	largely	futile	Indianists	gather	together	to	make	discourses	with	revolutionary	implications	on	the	situation	of	the	Indian,	instead	of	pointing	out	specific	Indian	problems	by	demonstrations	of	constructive	suggestions	on	how	to	deal	with	them.	These	suggestions	must	be	practical	within	the	resources	of	the	governments	concerned.	The	organization	of	these	Institutes	need	not	be	at	all	elaborate,	much	less	bureaucratic.”355		An	example	of	just	such	a	simple,	straightforward	solution	was	the	III’s	proposal	to	broadcast	technical,	cultural	and	administrative	information	via	radio,	directly	into	indigenous	regions	and	in	native	languages.356	Maes’	travels	were	productive,	and	by	1943	Ecuador,	El	Salvador	and	Nicaragua	had	created	national	institutes.	More	significantly	he	was	able	to	exchange	ideas	with	indigenistas	working	in	different	contexts	and	populations	with	distinct	needs.	He	reported	that	the	first	projects	undertaken	varied	significantly,	as	El	Salvador’s	national	indigenista	institute	began	a	project	to	encourage	soy	production	among	Indians,	Honduras	undertook	a	pottery	project	and	Panama	and	Guatemala	were	working	on	health	initiatives.	He	suggested	that	although	national	institutes	were	created	within	various	branches	of	government	or	the	educational	system	in	each	country,	it	was	important	for	them	to	be	connected	to	key	decision	
																																																								354	Ibid.	p.	213.	355	Ibid.	pp.	210-215	356	Editorial,	“The	Continental	Celebration	of	Indian	Day,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1944	Vol.	4,	No.	1,	pp.	2-5.	
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makers	and	leverage	their	successes	in	early	projects	toward	gradually	larger	efforts.357	In	his	role	as	Director	of	the	III,	Gamio	was	perhaps	the	single	most	widely	traveled	and	well-connected	indigenista.	In	1944	he	visited	Colombia,	Venezuela	and	Brazil,	meeting	with	Presidents	Isaías	Medina	and	Getulio	Vargas,	as	well	as	ministers	of	foreign	relations,	education	and	economy.	Among	other	issues	addressed,	Gamio	encouraged	Colombia	to	pay	the	dues	they	owed	to	the	III	under	the	Patzcuaro	Convention	and	secured	a	promise	from	Vargas	that	Brazil	would	soon	sign	the	agreement	as	well.	Recognizing	that	Brazil	had	been	working	for	the	advancement	of	indigenous	peoples	for	more	than	thirty	years	through	their	Indian	Protective	Service	and	Council	for	Indian	Protection,	he	proposed	the	creation	of	scholarships	to	support	the	exchange	of	students	between	those	three	South	American	countries	and	Mexico	and	the	United	States,	so	that	“once	they	have	a	scientific	training,	(students)	would	visit	Brazil	in	order	to	study	the	systems	used	there…then…return	to	their	respective	countries	in	order	to	work	among	the	various	jungle	Indian	groups.”	In	the	following	months,	Gamio	planned	to	visit	the	United	States	as	a	complement	to	his	trip	to	South	America.358		The	professional	networks	built	through	the	indigenista	movement	facilitated	advanced	study	at	U.S.	universities	for	scholars	across	Latin	America.	Manuel	Gamio	and	Moisés	Saénz	had	both	studied	at	Columbia	University	in	the	1910s,	under	Franz	Boas	and	John	Dewey	respectively,	and	by	the	early	1940s	news																																																									357	Editorial,	“The	Future	National	Indian	Institutes,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1943	Vol.	3,	No.	4,	pp.	210-227.	358	Noticias,	“The	Director’s	Trip	to	South	America,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1944	Vol.	4,	No.	3,	pp.	172-189.	
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of	scholarships	and	the	progress	of	anthropology	students	regularly	made	the	pages	of	Boletín	Indigenista.	In	1941,	anthropologist	Robert	Redfield	provided	such	an	update	informing	readers	that	Guatemalans	Antonio	Goubaud	Carrera	and	Juan	Rosales	were	pursuing	doctoral	study	in	his	department	at	the	University	of	Chicago.359	Those	networks	also	provided	field	research	opportunities	to	North	American	academics,	such	as	the	work	completed	by	professors	John	Gillin	and	Melvin	Tumin,	who	spent	part	of	1941	conducting	research	in	eastern	Guatemala.360	In	other	instances,	North	American	anthropologists	spent	time	at	Latin	American	universities	offering	courses	as	visiting	professors.	In	1942,	anthropologist	Sol	Tax	offered	a	seminar	on	Maya	ethnography	at	the	National	School	of	Anthropology	in	Mexico	City,	and	later	offered	a	field	methods	class	in	Chiapas.361	In	1943,	Alfred	Métraux	of	the	Smithsonian’s	Bureau	of	American	Ethnology	taught	a	course	on	the	Ethnology	of	South	America	at	the	National	School	of	Anthropology	in	Mexico	City,	and	Alfonso	Caso	of	Mexico’s	National	Institute	of	Anthropology	taught	a	course	on	Mexican	archaeology	at	the	University	of	Chicago.362	The	III	also	directly	supported	Indians	in	efforts	to	travel	and	learn	from	indigenous	communities	in	other	American	contexts.	In	August	of	1940,	five	indigenous	Mexicans	accepted	the	invitation	of	the	U.S.	BIA	to	travel	to	the	north,	
																																																								359	Noticias:	United	States,	“Guatemalen	Students	in	Chicago	Anthropology	Department,”	
Boletín	Indigenista,	1941	Vol.	1,	No.	2,	p.	33	360	Noticias:	United	States,	“Ethnological	Research	of	U.	S.	A.	Institutions,”	Boletín	
Indigenista,	1942	Vol.	2,	No.	2,	p.	17.	361	Noticias:	Mexico,	“National	School	of	Anthropology,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1942	Vol.	2,	No.	3,	p.	22.	362	Noticias:	Mexico,	“National	School	of	Anthropology,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1943	Vol.	3,	No.	2,	p.	107.	
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where	they	visited	several	American	Indian	communities.363	At	times,	III	work	was	supported	by	direct	contributions	of	personnel	from	member	states,	rather	than	consistent	funding.	For	the	first	two	years	following	the	Patzcuaro	Convention,	the	U.S.	BIA	stationed	Emil	Sady	in	Mexico	City	to	support	the	growth	of	the	III	until	he	was	recalled	to	the	United	States	for	service	to	the	war	effort.364	For	other	initiatives,	funding	originated	both	from	the	coffers	of	member	states,	and	later	on	from	supranational	entities	like	the	United	Nations.	For	the	U.S.	Coordinator	of	the	Office	of	Inter-American	Affairs	(COIAA),	Nelson	Rockefeller,	the	III’s	onchocerciasis	project,	which	was	identified	as	a	priority	at	Patzcuaro,	fit	with	the	goals	of	the	COIAA’s	broader	campaign	to	raise	standards	of	living	across	the	Americas.	Beginning	in	1945,	the	Institute	of	Inter-American	Affairs	at	the	U.S.	State	Department	began	experimental	projects	under	the	name	Servicio	Cooperativo	(Cooperative	Service),	which	operated	as	“an	organic,	permanent	part	of	the	government	where	it	works.	Its	Director	is	both	a	functionary	of	the	Insititute	of	Inter-American	Affairs	and	an	officer	of	the	Latin	American	government.”365	In	addition	to	projects	like	the	eradication	of	onchocerciasis,	indigenismo	also	sustained	transnational	engagement	with	theories	and	intellectual	trends.	One	such	body	of	thought	is	the	theme	of	race	and	its	relationship	to	the	place	and	role	of	Indians	within	modern	society.	We	now	turn	our	attention	to	that	
																																																								363	Noticias,	“Past	Activities	of	the	Institute,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1942	Vol.	2,	No.	2,	p.	7.	364	Noticias,	“Mr.	Sady	Leaves	for	the	United	States,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1942	Vol.	2,	No.	4,	p.	10.	365	Noticias:	United	States,	“The	Servicio	Cooperativo,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1949	Vol.	9,	No.	2,	pp.	170-173.	
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important	concept	to	understand	how	scientific	theories	that	impacted	indigenous	issues	circulated	through	and	were	shaped	by	the	indigenista	discourse.			
Indigenismo	and	the	Concept	of	Race	Indigenismo	contained	a	continuous	thread	of	anti-racism,	which	cut	across	and	through	the	periodic	shifts	in	the	policy	goals	of	the	III	and	national	governments.	On	the	occasion	of	the	Indian	Day	celebration	on	April	19,	1945,	Manuel	Gamio	broadcast	a	radio	address	tackling	the	issue	of	racial	prejudices	and	the	perceived	psychological	inferiority	of	indigenous	persons.	Those	issues	linked	together	several	important	themes	in	the	history	and	legacy	of	indigenismo	as	an	ideology.	“In	certain	countries…where	although	race	prejudices	are	practically	unknown,	there	exist	culture	prejudices.	These	prejudices	are	not	common	only	to	the	social	elements	of	European	origin,	but	are	frequently	shared	by	Indians	of	favored	economic	position	who	are	incorporated	into	Western	culture.”	Gamio	built	his	argument	on	the	foundational	understanding	that	race	is	a	social	construct,	not	a	biological	one,	thus	connecting	his	work	to	that	of	racial	thinkers	like	his	mentor	Franz	Boas	and	his	longtime	friend	Alejandro	Lipschütz.366	He	also	linked	that	insight	to	the	emerging	anthropological	interest	in	the	North	American	academy	in	personality	studies.367	Finally,	and	most	significantly	for	the	overall	agenda	of	the	III	and	indigenismo	as	a	movement,	Gamio	made	clear	that	the	goals	of	social	and	economic	advancement	for	Indians	were	threefold:	first,	to	improve	living																																																									366	See	Franz	Boas,	Race,	Language	and	Culture,	New	York:	Macmillan,	1940	and	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Indoamericanismo	y	Raza	India,	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Nascimiento,	1937.	367	See	Rosemblatt,	2014.	
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conditions	broadly;	second,	to	help	indigenous	leaders	emerge	into	the	upper	echelons	of	society;	and	third,	that	the	success	of	individuals	would	serve	to	offer	hope	and	inspiration	to	all	members	of	the	indigenous	classes.368		Indigenistas	realized	that	they	were	working	to	overcome	social	prejudices	of	many	types	in	their	efforts	to	improve	the	lives	of	Indians.	They	viewed	those	prejudices	through	broad	lenses	informed	by	history,	culture	and	comparison	with	other	contexts.	In	1957,	for	example,	in	the	wake	of	efforts	to	desegregate	schools	in	the	United	States,	a	comparison	of	racism	in	North	American	and	Latin	American	contexts	was	framed	on	the	pages	of	the	Boletín.	The	editor,	like	many	later	historians	have	done,	characterized	racism	in	the	United	States	as	grounded	in	biology	and	genetics,	while	the	prejudices	of	Latin	America	were	fundamentally	more	socially	and	culturally	constructed.		“If	in	Mexico,	Bolivia	or	Guatemala	an	individual	with	dark	skin	and	other	Indian	racial	characteristics	appears	in	a	first-class	hotel	or	restaurant,	who,	however,	is	dressed	the	same	as	the	other	customers,	no	one	would	take	notice	of	him.	But	if	this	same	person	appears	in	these	places	wearing	Hauraches	or	sandals,	white	cotton	trousers	and	a	straw	or	reed	hat,	he	would	probably	not	be	admitted,	or	else	he	would	be	an	object	of	contempt.	On	the	other	hand,	if	a	Negro,	no	matter	how	elegantly	he	might	be	dressed,	appears	in	a	first-class	hotel	or	restaurant	in	the	above	mentioned	North	American	regions,	he	would	certainly	not	be	admitted	and	he	would	be	refused	admission	even	more	certainly	if	he	should	be	more	modestly	dressed.”369		The	author	explained	that	foundational	difference	on	the	legacy	of	racial	mixing	in	Spain,	where	“for	approximately	eight	centuries	they	had	maintained	racial	contacts	with	the	Moors.”	In	reality,	the	Spaniards	who	colonized	Latin	America	“were	themselves	mestizos,”	he	wrote,	and	therefore	viewed	racial	origins	as	less																																																									368	Manuel	Gamio,	Editorial,	“Race	Prejudices	and	Inferiority	Complexes,”	Boletín	
Indigenista,	1945	Vol.	5,	No.	2,	pp.	98-101.	369	Editorial,	“The	Indian	and	Social	Prejudice,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1957	Vol.	17	No.	4,	pp.	278-281.	
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significant	that	social	adaptations.	In	some	ways	this	feature	made	indigenista	projects	easier	in	Latin	America,	but	in	other	more	ideological	ways	they	were	profoundly	complicated	and	contradictory.		At	times,	indigenista	arguments	over-simplified	the	differences	between	social	sectors.	Given	the	complexity	of	indigenous	social	realities,	it	was	tempting	to	reduce	a	diverse	population	into	categories	of	traditional	and	acculturated	–	those	who	were	succeeding	at	bridging	a	divide	and	those	being	left	behind.	Similarly,	it	was	often	expedient	to	classify	those	cultural	traits	that	were	“favorable	and	valuable”	into	the	aesthetic	realm	of	the	arts,	and	to	characterize	all	others	as	obstacles	to	progress.370	Over-reliance	upon	corn	as	a	staple	food,	inferior	tools	and	inefficient	methods	of	production,	and	especially	the	persistence	of	native	healing,	were	all	construed	as	obstacles	by	some	indigenistas.371	But	the	persistence	of	indigenous	people	hanging	on	to	those	traditions	suggested	that	the	Indians	themselves	valued	them	in	ways	that	indigenistas	either	ignored	or	could	not	understand.	Furthermore,	although	it	was	tempting	to	point	to	basic	demographic	observations	like	population	growth	as	signs	of	progress,	indigenistas	were	quick	to	point	out	that	a	larger	population	did	not	necessarily	mean	improvement	in	their	standards	of	living.	In	fact,	more	individuals	in	a	given	community	that	lacked	the	resources	to	supply	health	care,	education	and	economic	opportunity	could	often	
																																																								370	Editorial,	“Changes	in	the	Way	of	Life	of	Indian	Groups,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1958	Vol.	18,	No.	1,	pp.	2-5.	371	Editorial,	“Present-Day	Pre-Colombian	Survivals	in	America,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1959	Vol.	19,	No.	1,	pp.	2-3.	
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overtax	traditional	cultural	patterns,	leading	to	a	greater	breakdown	of	the	social	system.372		As	the	1950s	progressed	and	relatively	little	was	done	by	national	governments	to	address	these	problems,	the	tone	of	the	indigenista	discourse	became	increasingly	frustrated	and	pessimistic.	Observers	could	see	social	programs	created	to	benefit	other	ethnic	minorities,	while	indigenous	sectors	of	society	were	increasingly	left	behind.	“These	monolingual	Indians,	who	have	no	idea	of	what	nationality	is,	are	more	foreign	to	their	own	country	than	the	foreigners	themselves.	They	can	do	nothing	for	themselves	in	raising	their	standard	of	living,	and,	since	no	one	helps	them,	they	continue	to	exist	as	they	did	many	centuries	ago.	In	the	meantime,	the	social	minorities	of	their	countries	and,	above	all,	of	the	Indo-Hispanic	ones,	are	making	progress	in	every	field.	Is	this	just,	at	a	time	when	so	much	is	said	about	democracy,	equality	of	rights,	humanity,	etc.?”373		By	the	end	of	the	decade,	it	seemed	as	if	the	indigenista	argument	that	national	progress	depended	upon	progress	for	Indians	in	Latin	America	had	gone	unheeded.	Although	they	continued	to	advocate	for	improvements	in	education,	infrastructure,	public	health	and	agricultural	production,	few	resources	generated	by	the	increasingly	prosperous	post-war	economy	were	being	allocated	for	the	benefit	of	indigenous	sectors	of	society.374	Nevertheless,	indigenistas	continued	to	advocate	for	projects	like	the	Pan-American	Highway,	which	had	the	potential	to	link	
																																																								372	Editorial,	“Rapid	Population	Increase	and	Pre-Colombian	Cultural	Survivals,”	Boletín	
Indigenista,	1958	Vol.	18,	No.	2,	pp.	90-93.	373	Editorial,	“The	Indian	of	Yesterday	and	Today,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1958	Vol.	18,	No.	3,	pp.	178-181.	374	Manuel	Gamio,	Editorial,	“Commemoration	of	the	Day	of	the	Indian,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1959	Vol.	19,	No.	2,	pp.	62-63.	
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indigenous	sectors	to	the	national	electorate,	connect	Indians	across	national	boundaries	and	integrate	them	into	national	and	international	markets.375	When	the	fourth	Inter-American	Indigenista	Conference	was	held	in	Guatemala	City	in	1959,	the	only	Chilean	delegate	to	attend	was	the	ambassador	to	Guatemala,	Edmundo	Fuenzalida	Espinosa.376	The	United	States,	for	its	part,	included	a	special	disclaimer	written	into	the	end	of	the	proceedings	stating	that	even	though	the	delegation	agreed	to	sign	the	final	act,	the	U.S.	would	not	comply	with	all	the	recommendations	because	some	of	them	were	not	applicable	due	to	assumptions	about	organizational	framework	and	capacity.	Furthermore,	“any	of	these	resolutions	having	financial	implications	for	the	Government	is	subject	to	review	and	approval	by	the	authorized	agencies	of	the	Executive	Department,	as	well	as	by	the	President	and	Congress.”377		By	1960,	the	indigenista	movement	was	losing	steam.	Committed	anthropologists	and	social	reformers	would	continue	to	labor	on	behalf	of	the	cause,	but	governments	were	less	motivated	to	allocate	resources	to	produce	meaningful	change	for	their	indigenous	populations.	Coinciding	with	the	waning	of	indigenismo	was	the	rise	of	social	movements	led	by	Indians	themselves,	which	sometimes	took	a	more	antagonistic	stance	toward	national	governments.	In	the	United	States,	the	gradual	application	of	termination	policies	during	the	1950s	led	to	the	rise	of	the	American	Indian	Movement	in	the	late	1960s.	In	Chile,	all	the	Mapuche	deputies	lost																																																									375	Editorial,	The	Indian	Population	and	the	Pan-American	Highway,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1959	Vol.	19,	No.	4,	pp.	182-183.	376	“Proceedings	of	the	Fourth	Inter-American	Indian	Congress,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1959	Vol.	19,	No.	3,	p.	131.	377	Resolutions,	(clause	added	by	American	delegates	to	final	resolutions),	Boletín	
Indigenista,	1959	Vol.	19,	No.	3,	p.	178.	
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their	re-election	bids	to	the	Camara	de	Diputados	in	1958,	and	DASIN	was	increasingly	marginalized	within	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	until	Venancio	Coñuepán	was	replaced	as	the	agency’s	Director	during	the	Alessandri	administration.	For	its	part,	the	III	would	continue	to	function,	but	its	efficacy	was	clearly	waning.		In	July	of	1960,	Manuel	Gamio	died	following	several	months	of	poor	health.	His	passing	marked	the	end	of	an	era	and	the	dawn	of	another.	The	leadership	of	the	III	passed	to	the	renowned	Mexican	anthropologist	and	historian	Miguel	León-Portilla,	and	the	Institute	would	continue	to	carry	out	research	and	projects	for	social	improvement.378	Under	Leon-Portilla’s	leadership,	the	III	continued	the	basic	tenets	and	trajectory	of	indigenismo,	supporting	efforts	to	improve	the	lives	of	Indians	by	blending	elements	of	indigenous	culture	with	modern	technical	and	economic	improvement.	But	the	era	in	which	it	seemed	possible	for	governments	to	provide	support	for	indigenista	projects	was	rapidly	vanishing.		
Indigenismo	in	Chile	By	tracing	Chile’s	participation	in	the	III	from	1940-1993,	Chilean	historians	Jorge	Vergara	and	Hans	Gundermann	have	shown	that	state	actors	hesitated	to	sign	on	to	the	Patzcuaro	Convention,	and	although	they	sent	delegations	to	the	periodic	conferences,	the	work	of	the	III	did	not	have	a	significant	impact	on	Chilean	indigenous	policy	through	much	of	this	period.	Vergara	and	Gundermann	raise	(but	leave	unanswered)	the	question	of	whether	the	unenthusiastic	engagement	with	the																																																									378	Editorial,	“The	Initiator	of	Inter-American	Indianism	has	Died,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1960	Vol.	20,	No.	3,	pp.	166-169.	
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III	was	a	reflection	of	the	ambivalence	of	internal	Chilean	indigenous	politics,	or	had	more	to	do	with	Chile’s	foreign	policy	priorities	during	the	period.	They	do	suggest,	however,	that	the	passage	of	a	new	indigenous	law	in	1961	served	as	a	primary	impetus	for	Chile	to	become	more	formally	involved	with	the	III.379	But	in	order	to	understand	when,	how	and	why	the	Chilean	state	finally	did	embrace	the	III	as	an	institution,	we	must	first	examine	what	forms	of	interaction	non-state	actors	had	with	the	III	and	how	those	changed	during	the	1940-1961	period.	During	the	1940s	and	1950s,	Chilean	participation	in	the	transnational	indigenista	movement	was	continuous,	but	the	official	involvement	of	the	Chilean	state	was	minimal.	Chile	fell	into	the	class	of	countries	with	minority	indigenous	populations	that	promulgated	laws	specific	to	their	concerns,	even	though	they	had	technically	been	considered	citizens	of	the	Republic	of	Chile	since	independence	in	the	early	nineteenth	century.	Changes	and	proposed	changes	to	the	indigenous	laws	that	regulated	landholding	were	a	perennial	concern	for	both	indigenous	activists	and	indigenistas	in	Chile,	and	news	of	those	events	was	regularly	sent	to	the	III	for	publication	in	the	Noticias	section	of	the	Boletín	Indigenista.	When	the	first	International	Indigenista	Conference	was	held	in	Patzcuaro,	Mexico	in	1940,	Venancio	Coñuepán	and	César	Colima,	Mapuche	leaders	of	the	Corporación	Araucana,	attended	as	official	members	of	the	Chilean	delegation.	At	the	conference,	Coñuepán	and	Colima	gave	a	paper	on	the	indigenous	problem	in	Chile.380	Their	essay	argued	for	the	state’s	support	in	solving	indigenous	problems,																																																									379	Vergara	and	Gundermann,	p.	11.		380	Catholic	educator	Father	Juan	de	Forcheim	claims	that	he	was	the	author	of	a	paper	that	Coñuepán	read	at	the	Patzcuaro	Conference.	It	is	unclear	if	this	is	an	authentic	claim,	if	he’s	
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and	suggested	that	support	should	focus	on	three	areas:	education,	landholding,	and	economic	development.	Although	they	demanded	the	state’s	support	for	those	projects,	they	wanted	to	retain	the	participation	of	indigenous	leaders	in	the	process.	Finally,	Coñuepán	and	Colima	recommended	the	state	create	an	“Under-secretary	of	Indigenous	Affairs,”	–	a	sub-cabinet	level	position	working	across	four	separate	ministries	(Land	and	Colonization,	Treasury,	Education,	and	Agriculture)	–	that	would	work	with	indigenous	leaders	appointed	to	a	Council	of	Indigenous	Affairs.381	At	Patzcuaro,	Manuel	Hidalgo,	the	Chilean	ambassador	to	Mexico,	accompanied	Coñuepán	and	Colima.	At	the	conclusion	of	the	conference,	the	two	Mapuche	leaders	were	unable	to	immediately	return	to	Chile	because	they	were	not	provided	with	funds	to	purchase	return	tickets.	Hidalgo	sent	an	urgent	telegram	to	the	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	requesting	those	funds,	which	had	been	promised	by	the	Ministry	of	Education.382	That	the	state	would	include	the	two	Corporación	leaders	as	members	of	the	official	delegation	but	not	fully	support	their	travel	needs	can	perhaps	be	viewed	as	symbolic	of	the	state’s	indifference	or	ambivalence	toward	including	indigenous	leaders	in	official	state	projects	and	affairs.	Nevertheless,	engagement	with	the	broader	indigenista	movement	clearly	had	an	effect	on	Coñuepán.	It	provided	him	a	comparative	lens	from	which	to	draw	ideas	for	the	Mapuche	movement	and	legitimize	demands	for	state	support	for	indigenous	advancement	within	Chile.	For	example,	in	a	1947	address	to	the	Chilean	Congress,																																																																																																																																																																						claiming	to	have	written	the	paper	that	Coñuepán	delivered,	or	if	there	was	a	second	paper.	See	notes	458-460.	381	Vergara	and	Gundermann,	p.	4.		382	Ibid,	pp.	3-4.	
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Coñuepán	made	reference	to	the	successes	in	Mexico	and	the	US,	while	criticizing	“our	enemies”	in	Chile,	who	failed	to	elevate	indigenous	issues	to	the	level	of	concern	held	in	other	American	countries.383	Even	though,	as	Vergara	and	Gundermann	illustrate,	Chile’s	acceptance	of	the	Patzcuaro	Convention	and	more	formal	participation	in	the	III	did	not	commence	until	the	early	1960s,	for	two	decades	the	III	facilitated	an	exchange	of	ideas	between	indigenistas	working	in	Chile	and	their	counterparts	in	other	countries.	In	early	1942,	notice	of	a	new	publication	by	the	famed	Chilean	archaeologist	and	folklorist	Ricardo	E.	Latcham	appeared	on	the	pages	of	the	Boletín	Indigenista.	Latcham’s	article,	which	was	about	the	correlations	between	popular	and	indigenous	art	forms	in	Chile,	came	near	the	end	of	his	long	career	studying	Mapuche	language,	art	and	archeology.384	Those	interests	stemmed	from	his	early	excursions	to	southern	Chile	as	an	engineer	working	to	develop	railroad	lines	through	the	region,	and	mirrored	those	of	other	early	Mapuche	ethnologists	like	Tomás	Guevara	and	Carlos	Sadleir,	who	both	assisted	with	the	founding	of	the	first	Mapuche	political	organization,	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán,	as	described	in	the	opening	chapter.	As	chapter	one	also	makes	clear,	the	founding	of	the	first	Mapuche	organizations	in	the	1910s	and	1920s	came	as	direct	responses	to	the	ongoing	loss	of	land	experienced	by	Mapuche	communities.	Similarly,	Chilean	contributions	to	the	Boletín	Indigenista	in	the	early	1940s	illustrated	the	ongoing	centrality	of	the	issue	of	land	loss.	In	June	of	1942,	the	Boletín	reported	that	Minister	of	Land	and																																																									383	Ibid,	pp.	4-5.		384	Noticias:	Chile,	“Indian	Handicrafts,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1942	Vol.	2,	No.	1,	pp.	22-23.	
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Colonization	Rolando	Merino	Reyes	had	proposed	a	bill	to	exempt	Mapuche	communities	from	paying	tax	on	their	land.	According	to	Merino	Reyes,	although	no	formal	exemption	existed,	Mapuche	landholders	had	by	custom	not	paid	such	taxes,	and	that	unless	the	law	was	amended	he	would	be	required	to	begin	proceedings	to	seize	land	and	auction	it	off	to	pay	back	taxes.385	In	the	following	issue,	another	proposed	legislative	project	was	mentioned,	one	that	would	enable	absentee	members	of	the	community,	presumably	those	who	migrated	to	cities	in	search	of	work,	to	establish	legal	recognition	of	their	land	rights	and	provide	other	restraints	to	the	further	subdivision	and	sale	of	communal	landholdings.386		In	other	less	formal	ways,	Chilean	state	actors	did	sometimes	contribute	to	the	indigenista	discourse	even	though	the	state	had	not	formally	accepted	the	Patzcuaro	Convention.	In	1943,	the	Ministry	of	Education	submitted	a	report	for	publication	in	the	Boletín	Indigenista.	That	report,	written	by	Inspector	of	Indian	Education	Andrés	Aguayo	Paillalef,	made	recommendations	on	land	tenure,	economic	development	and	the	approval	of	the	Patzcuaro	Convention	and	founding	of	a	national	indigenista	institute.387	In	light	of	contributions	like	that	one,	we	should	remember	that	the	state	did	not	act	as	a	monolithic	entity,	and	that	some	state	actors,	working	on	behalf	of	indigenous	interests,	did	attempt	to	engage	the	broader	indigenista	project	when	they	perceived	it	could	advance	their	efforts.		
																																																								385	Noticias:	Chile,	“Indian	Exemption	from	Property	Taxes,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1942	Vol.	2,	No.	2,	p.	12.	386	Noticias:	Chile,	“Property	Law	Proposed,”Boletín	Indigenista,	1942	Vol.	2,	No.	3,	p.	13.	387	Noticias:	Chile,	“Proposed	Benefits	for	the	Indians,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1943	Vol.	3,	No.	1,	pp.	22-27.	
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At	other	times,	the	III	became	a	foil	for	non-state	actors	attempting	to	influence	the	state.	In	1944,	someone	sent	a	newspaper	story	to	the	III	that	reported	on	a	telegram	that	the	Corporación	Araucana	had	sent	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	Osvaldo	Vial,	in	which	they	simultaneously	thanked	him	for	his	work	on	behalf	of	the	Mapuche	people	and	requested	that	the	Minister	grant	an	audience	to	the	Corporación’s	representative,	Venancio	Coñuepán.	They	claimed	that	Indian	Courts	had	allowed	the	illegal	usurpation	of	Mapuche	lands	for	years,	and	that	was	the	cause	of	indigenous	poverty.	For	his	part,	Vial	refused	Coñuepán	an	audience,	replying	that	“the	Government	was	engaged	in	making	a	complete	study	of	the	Indian	problem;	that	it	was	considering	the	good	of	the	whole,	and	hence	would	not	receive	suggestions	from	interested	groups,	since	such	suggestions	could	only	be	detrimental	to	the	carrying	out	of	the	Government’s	plan.”388	In	that	way	the	Mapuche	struggle	for	land	and	rights	played	out	not	only	in	the	pages	of	the	Chilean	press,	but	also	through	the	transnational	medium	of	the	III	and	therefore	became	identifiable	within	the	indigenista	movement.	Rather	than	undertake	difficult	projects	to	uplift	indigenous	populations,	leaders	seeking	pure	economic	development	often	preferred	to	encourage	immigration	to	indigenous	zones.	That	was	certainly	the	case	in	Chile,	where	European	immigration	was	encouraged	and	the	state	actively	resettled	German	and	Italian	immigrants	throughout	the	southern	region	and	interspersed	them	between	Mapuche	reducciones.	That	practice	had	a	long	history	throughout	the	Americas,	which	Manuel	Gamio	drew	attention	to	in	his	1956	Day	of	the	Indian	address.	He																																																									388	Noticias:	Chile,	“Improvement	of	the	Indian,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1944	Vol.	4,	No.	2,	pp.	114-117.	
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pointed	out	that	the	most	prosperous	countries	in	the	Americas	were	the	ones	that	had	drawn	the	most	extensive	flow	of	migrants	from	Europe,	and	which	also	contained	the	smallest	percentages	of	indigenous	peoples,	notably	the	United	States	and	Argentina.	On	the	other	hand,	nations	in	the	tropical	region	with	larger	indigenous	populations,	i.e.	Mexico,	Guatemala,	Ecuador,	Peru	and	Bolivia,	had	stagnated	economically.	For	those	countries,	he	argued,	“there	is	no	need	then	to	resort	today	to	extended	immigration	in	order	to	stimulate	the	progress	of	the	republics	under	discussion;	the	most	necessary	and	urgent	step	to	achieve	such	an	end	is	to	raise	by	all	possible	means	the	inferior	standards	against	which	great	masses	of	Indomestizos	struggle.”389	Chilean	indigenistas	could	surely	relate	to	that	line	of	reasoning,	as	state	policies	had	encouraged	Euro-Chilean	migration	to	the	southern	region	since	the	mid-nineteenth	century.	For	his	part,	Alejandro	Lipschütz	saw	the	events	of	World	War	II	as	heralding	a	new	epoch	in	the	socio-political	experience	of	humankind,	which	he	termed	“the	great	social	world	reform.”	He	viewed	that	as	a	positive	development	and	his	optimism	drew	broadly	from	his	experience	working	out	problems	associated	with	race	relations	in	the	Americas	as	he	wrote	his	first	indigenista	treatise,	
Indoamericanismo	y	Raza	India,	and	also	his	experience	as	a	child	in	Eastern	Europe.	In	a	1944	speech	delivered	in	Santiago	and	reprinted	in	the	Boletín	Indigenista,	Lipschütz	argued	that	“upon	the	basis	of	the	sociological	experience	among	un-cultured	or	primitive	peoples	and	the	experiments	realized	on	other	groups…the	American	Indian	will	proceed	upwards,	incorporating	the	values	of	European																																																									389	Manuel	Gamio,	Editorial,	“Immigration	in	America,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1956	Vol.	16,	Nos.	2	and	3,	pp.	106-109.	
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culture,	however,	preserving	his	own	traditional	values	(emphasis	in	original).”	The	experiences	and	experiments	he	referenced	included	those	in	the	Baltic	region,	where	in	previous	centuries	German	feudal	lords	subjugated	Estonians	and	Lithuanians,	but	who	later	re-emerged	as	culturally	distinct	groups	within	the	Soviet	Union.	Additionally,	Lipschütz	referred	to	the	work	accomplished	by	John	Collier	in	the	United	States,	where	the	Indian	New	Deal	had	reformed	education	and	stemmed	the	tide	of	land	loss	through	legal	reform.	Lipschütz’s	optimistic	analysis	represents	a	truly	global	network	of	ideas	and	contributed	to	the	transnational	flow	of	ideas	about	indigenous	development.390	In	1946,	following	Lipschütz’s	anthropological	fieldwork	in	Tierra	del	Fuego	(which	is	examined	more	fully	in	chapter	four),	reports	of	his	mission	were	included	in	the	Boletín	Indigenista.	They	included	a	brief	summary	of	their	findings,	and	mentioned	the	members	of	the	international	team	of	scientists	who	participated	in	the	effort.	That	work	established	Lipschütz	as	a	bona	fide	anthropologist,	and	cemented	what	was	perhaps	the	strongest	individual	connection	between	Chile	and	the	III	in	the	period.391	Other,	more	general,	reports	ensued,	for	example	an	update	on	the	work	of	staff	at	the	Chilean	National	History	Museum,	who	offered	courses	on	indigenous	history	and	culture	to	elementary	school	students	in	Chile,	which	worked	to	“break	down	prejudices	and	to	implant	ideas	favorable	to	the	Indian	and	his	culture.”	Capuchin	missionaries	also	received	favorable	mention,	in	part	for	
																																																								390	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Noticias:	Chile,	“Aboriginal	Races	of	America	and	Social	Reform,”	
Boletín	Indigenista,	1944	Vol.	4,	No.	4,	pp.	274-285.	391	Noticias:	Chile,	“Investigation	in	Tierra	del	Fuego,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1946	Vol.	6,	No.	2,	pp.	112-117.	
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supporting	indigenous	youth	as	they	pursued	university	studies	that	“enable	them	to	help	their	Indian	brothers	and	contribute	to	the	advancement	of	their	country.”392		In	September	of	1949,	indigenistas	in	Chile	finally	formed	a	national	institute,	although	they	did	so	without	official	support	from	the	Chilean	government.	The	group	included	both	whites	and	Mapuche	among	its	leadership,	with	important	indigenistas	like	Alejandro	Lipschütz	and	Bishop	Guido	Beck	de	Ramberga	as	honorary	members.	In	the	notice	printed	in	the	Boletín	Indigenista,	the	editors	wrote	that	although	the	IIC	“does	not	have	an	official	character,	it	is	expected…that	the	Chilean	government…will	not	delay	in	recognizing	and	aiding	the	institution.”	They	went	on	to	speculate	that	pending	legislation	intended	to	reform	the	Ley	Indígena	might	include	the	recognition	and	support	of	the	state.393	However,	it	would	be	another	twelve	years	before	Chile	officially	signed	onto	the	Patzcuaro	Convention,	coinciding	with	yet	another	round	of	legislative	reforms	to	the	Ley	Indígena	in	1961.		The	year	after	it	was	formed,	in	1950,	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Chileno	organized	a	series	of	lectures	and	a	photographic	exhibition	to	celebrate	the	Day	of	the	Indian.	Lt.	Col.	Gregorio	Rodríguez,	vice-president	of	the	institute	gave	an	overview	of	the	indigenous	presence	in	Chile,	while	Lipschütz	and	Grete	Mostny	presented	on	groups	inhabiting	the	extreme	latitudes	of	the	country,	Tierra	del	Fuego	and	the	Atacama	Desert,	respectively.	Although	much	indigenista	work,	and	certainly	indigenous	politics,	in	Chile	centered	on	the	Mapuche,	the	IIC	attempted	to																																																									392	Noticias:	Chile,	“Labors	in	Benefit	of	th	Indian,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1947	Vol.	7,	No.	2,	p.	142.	393	Noticias:	Chile,	“Formation	of	an	Indian	Institute,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1949	Vol.	9,	No.	4,	pp.	336-341.	
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broaden	the	scope	of	their	work.394	It	is	also	interesting	to	note	the	participation	and	support	of	the	armed	forces	within	Chilean	indigenismo.	Air	Force	General	Ramón	Cañas	Montalva	had	previously	provided	support	for	Lipschütz’s	mission	to	Tierra	del	Fuego,	and	Lt.	Col.	Gregorio	Rodríguez	served	as	the	founding	Vice-President	of	the	IIC.	In	1951,	the	Boletín	Indigenista	recognized	the	Air	Force	for	its	efforts	to	protect	and	provide	for	Alcalufe	Indians	near	its	southernmost	bases.	Since	1937,	commanders	stationed	there	provided	protection	from	unscrupulous	merchants	who	sought	to	defraud	the	Indians,	and	basic	education	for	their	children	by	founding	a	small	school.395	By	1952,	Augusto	Iglesias	and	Grete	Mostny	had	resigned	as	the	founding	President	and	Secretary	of	the	IIC	and	the	group	elected	new	leadership.	At	the	same	time	Gregorio	Rodríguez	took	over	as	President,	the	IIC’s	voice	in	Chilean	indigenous	affairs	was	increasing.	They	again	led	the	Day	of	the	Indian	celebrations	in	1952,	and	expanded	the	scope	of	their	work	to	include	public	statements	on	proposed	legislation,	such	as	a	plan	put	forth	by	the	Department	of	Urbanization	to	redistribute	Mapuche	land	around	Temuco	to	German	and	Italian	immigrants.396	The	IIC	also	made	plans	to	compile	a	report	on	the	history	of	indigenous	legislation	
																																																								394	Noticias:	Chile,	“Indianist	Activities,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1950	Vol.	10,	No.	2,	p.	146.	395	Noticias:	Chile,	“Pro-Indian	Labor	of	the	Chilean	Air	Force,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1951	Vol.	11,	No.	2,	pp.	128-131.	396	Accompanying	this	proposal	was	a	sustained	campaign	in	the	regional	press	that	characterized	the	Mapuche	population	surrounding	Temuco	as	a	“suicide	belt”	that	strangled	the	town	and	its	ability	to	develop	economically.	See	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	129-132.	
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in	Chile,	to	contribute	to	the	III’s	effort	to	gather	that	information	from	countries	across	the	Americas.397	That	same	year,	Carlos	Ibañez	del	Campo	was	elected	President	of	Chile	for	a	second	time.	After	his	first	presidency	had	ended	with	his	exile	in	1931,	Ibañez	returned	as	a	more	centrist	and	populist	presidential	candidate,	and	had	courted	the	Mapuche	vote	as	he	assembled	an	electoral	victory.	With	a	new	president	in	office,	the	IIC	again	pressed	the	government	to	accept	the	Patzcuaro	Convention	and	grant	it	official	recognition	as	a	state	agency,	“independent	and	advisory	in	nature,	which	should	be	consulted	with	reference	to	Indian	policy	and	legislation	in	Chile.”	Ibañez	met	with	members	of	the	IIC’s	governing	board,	including	Lipschütz,	Rodríguez	and	historian	Álvaro	Jara,	even	posing	with	them	for	a	photograph	that	was	reprinted	in	the	Boletín	Indigenista.	Although	Ibañez	expressed	“his	desire	that	his	government	take	up	these	problems	seriously	and	in	due	time”	and	promised	to	study	their	requests	thoughtfully,	he	would	not	grant	official	status	nor	sign	the	Patzcuaro	agreement	during	his	presidency.398	However,	when	he	assembled	his	new	cabinet	in	1952,	Ibañez	named	Venancio	Coñuepán	as	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization.	In	early	1953,	the	editors	of	the	Boletín	Indigenista	printed	a	short	biography	of	Coñuepán	along	with	news	of	his	appointment	as	Minister,	in	which	they	expressed	their	“hopes	that	in	this	position	he	will	be	able	to	give	greater	support	to	the	Chilean	Indian	Institute,	as	the	
																																																								397	Noticias:	Chile,	“Indian	Activities,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1952	Vol.	12,	No.	3,	pp.	228-245.	398	Noticias:	Chile,	“The	Indian	Institute	Should	be	a	Government	Agency,”	Boletín	
Indigenista,	1952	Vol.	12,	No.	4,	pp.	296-299.	
	167	
	
President	of	Chile	himself	has	promised	to	do.”399	However,	Coñuepán	would	step	aside	as	Minister	after	only	six	months	to	become	the	Director	of	the	newly	established	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs.	While	Coñuepán’s	tenure	as	DASIN’s	Director	is	examined	in	greater	detail	in	chapter	five,	it	is	important	to	mention	here	that	in	this	context	Ibañez’s	move	could	be	viewed	as	an	alternative	to	granting	the	IIC	an	official	status	as	a	state	agency.	By	placing	Coñuepán	atop	the	agency	he	was	able	to	reward	the	most	accomplished	and	politically	connected	Mapuche	leader	of	the	era	for	his	support	in	the	recent	presidential	election,	and	provide	a	nod	to	members	of	that	constituency	for	their	loyalty.	For	Coñuepán’s	part,	he	may	have	believed	he	would	have	more	direct	control	and	influence	on	governmental	indigenous	policy	from	that	post.	The	agency	also	mirrored	the	model	created	in	Mexico	under	Lázaro	Cárdenas,	although	the	Office	of	Indian	Affairs	in	that	coutry	was	later	integrated	into	the	Ministry	of	Education	and	was	never	led	by	indigenous	leaders,	rather	by	indigenistas	with	training	in	social	science.	Also	in	1953,	Gregorio	Rodríguez	stepped	down	as	President	of	the	IIC	and	was	replaced	by	General	Ramón	Cañas	Montalva,	who	was	at	the	time	a	retired	Air	Force	General.	In	addition	to	his	military	career,	Cañas	Montalva	was	an	active	scientist	who	published	works	on	geography	and	would	later	go	on	to	lead	the	Pan	American	Institute	of	Geography	and	History.	At	the	same	time	the	Boletín	
Indigenista	reported	on	that	leadership	transition,	it	also	provided	notice	of	the	creation	of	DASIN,	an	issue	“of	utmost	importance”	that	they	anticipated	reporting	
																																																								399	Noticias:	Chile,	“A	Representative	of	the	Araucanian	Indians	is	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1953	Vol.	13,	No.	2,	pp.	116-117.	
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on	soon.400	However,	no	further	news	of	DASIN	appeared	on	the	pages	of	the	Boletín	
Indigenista	for	some	time.		In	1954,	eight	representatives	from	Chile	attended	the	third	International	Indigenista	Conference	in	La	Paz,	Bolivia.	Álvaro	Jara	served	as	president	of	the	delegation,	and	it	seems	that	they	again	participated	as	private	citizens,	with	no	official	representatives	of	the	government	in	attendance.401	For	the	remainder	of	the	1950s,	the	IIC	continued	to	function	independently	of	the	Chilean	government	and	DASIN.	Although	individual	members	contributed	news	and	scholarly	articles	to	III	publications,	the	Mapuche	political	project	advanced	separately	from	indigenista	contributions.	As	can	be	seen	in	the	analysis	of	DASIN’s	history	in	chapter	five,	Coñuepán	spent	much	of	his	time	as	Director	of	DASIN	advocating	for	Indians	and	supervising	the	Indian	Courts,	which	were	under	his	jurisdiction.	But	private	Chilean	contributions	to	the	indigenista	movement	continued.		In	1955	Lipschütz	forwarded	to	the	III	news	of	a	unique	legal	decision	in	which	a	Mapuche	woman	was	acquitted	of	murdering	her	grandmother,	whom	she	alleged	had	practiced	witchcraft	against	her.	The	judge	found	Juana	Catrilaf	Calfiñanco	not	guilty	on	the	grounds	that	she	acted	in	self-defense,	believing	as	she	did	that	her	grandmother	had	cast	a	spell	upon	her.	In	the	decision,	Judge	Maria	Mardones	cited	a	report	provided	by	the	IIC,	authored	by	Rodríguez,	Lipschütz	and	
																																																								400	Noticias:	Chile,	“New	Director	of	the	Chilean	Institute”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1953	Vol.	13,	No.	3,	pp.	238-241.	401	General	Information	on	the	III	Inter-American	Indian	Congress,	“Organization	and	Functioning	of	the	Congress,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1954	Vol.	14,	No.	3,	p.	201.	
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Rigoberto	Iglesias.402	The	case	was	later	written	up	in	a	law	review	journal	in	Chile,	which	gave	the	case	an	important	distinction	as	legal	precedent.	The	law	review’s	analysis	of	Catrilaf’s	acquittal	established	that	an	indigenous	worldview	could	be	used	as	a	legitimate	line	of	defense	in	criminal	court.	This	was	of	course	very	interesting	and	important	to	the	III,	which	had	resolved	at	the	La	Paz	Conference	to	construct	“an	adequate	understanding	of	the	legal	and	administrative	problems	of	American	Indians”	within	the	frameworks	of	various	national	legal	systems.403	The	issue	brought	together	questions	of	legal	interpretation,	economic	development	and	Mapuche	cosmology.	When	printed	in	the	III	journal	Boletín	Indigenista,	it	became	a	part	of	the	transnational	discourse	about	the	relationship	between	indigenous	people	and	modern	nation-states.	In	the	process,	what	it	meant	to	be	an	Indian	became	an	inherently	political	subject,	effectively	placing	limits	on	the	state’s	ability	to	establish	the	terms	of	justice	in	accordance	with	the	values	of	the	dominant	culture.	In	this	way,	indigenismo	offered	the	Mapuche	a	powerful	set	of	analytical	tools	to	push	back	against	the	efforts	of	state	actors	to	simply	assimilate	the	Mapuche	or	reduce	their	landholdings.	That	decision	notwithstanding,	the	courts	remained	an	important	battleground	in	the	effort	to	protect	and	advance	indigenous	causes.	In	1955	the	District	Attorney	of	the	Court	of	Temuco	issued	a	report	condemning	the	slow	and	inefficient	progress	of	Mapuche	land	division	through	the	Indian	Courts	supervised	
																																																								402	Noticias:	Chile,	“Acquittal	of	an	Araucanian	Woman	for	the	Murder	of	a	Witch,”	Boletín	
Indigenista,	1955	Vol.	15,	No.	2,	pp.	160-167.	403	Noticias:	Chile,	“Acquittal	of	the	Araucanian	Indian	Woman,	Witchcraft	as	Homicide	Motive	Formulated	as	a	Legal	Doctrine,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1956	Vol.	16,	No.	4,	pp.	318-321.	
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by	DASIN.	When	viewed	through	an	indigenista	lens,	District	Attorney	Leon	Erbetta	Vaccaro’s	report	could	be	seen	as	verification	that	the	protections	afforded	Indians	by	DASIN	were	actually	working,	for	as	the	Boletín	editors	point	out,	without	thorough	“preparation	and	self-defense,	the	Indian	would	sell	out	for	a	paltry	sum,”	leading	to	further	concentration	of	land	in	the	hands	of	latifundistas	(large	landholders)	who	would	leave	much	of	it	unproductive.	“Such	a	thing	took	place	in	Mexico,	where	President	Benito	Juárez,	guided	by	the	best	intentions,	abolished	communal	properties,	the	allotments	being	rapidly	secured	by	landholders.	This	led	to	a	state	of	misery	of	millions	of	natives,	which	in	turn	brought	about	the	1910	Revolution…”404	A	notice	printed	in	the	next	issue	suggests	that	Erbetta’s	report	prompted	“indigenistas	of	the	continent”	to	write	to	the	Institute.	“Their	opinion	is	that	the	aforesaid	report	should	be	openly	condemned	for	comprising	acts	contrary	to	the	rights	of	the	Indian	population	of	Chile.”405	Although	it	remained	outside	of	the	state	bureaucracy,	members	of	the	IIC	labored	on	in	defense	of	indigenous	causes.	In	1956,	they	expanded	the	Indian	Day	celebrations	to	comprise	an	entire	week	of	events.	On	April	20th,	Alejandro	Lipschütz	highlighted	the	week’s	events	with	a	lecture	on	“The	Indian	Community	in	Chile	and	Latin	America,”	which	coincided	with	the	publication	of	his	new	book	of	the	same	title.	While	Lipschütz	and	Coñuepán	occupied	opposite	ends	of	the	political	spectrum,	and	therefore	had	little	direct	interaction	that	can	be	verified	in	the	archives,	they	were	both	present	at	the	Indian	Day	celebration	of	1956.	The	week																																																									404	Noticias:	Chile,	“Report	Directed	to	Transform	the	Legal	Situation	of	the	Indians	of	Chile,”	
Boletín	Indigenista,	1955	Vol.	15,	No.	4,	pp.	340-343.	405	Noticias:	Chile,	“Remarks	on	the	Report	of	the	District	Attorney	of	Temuco,”	Boletín	
Indigenista,	1956	Vol.	16,	No.	1,	p.	39.	
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culminated	with	the	opening	of	a	new	exhibition	of	Indian	crafts	at	the	Cerro	Santa	Lucia	museum,	which	arose	from	collaboration	between	the	IIC	and	the	Museum	of	Popular	Art.406	As	the	IIC	worked	to	expand	awareness	of	the	rich	legacy	that	indigenous	sectors	contributed	to	Chilean	popular	culture,	legislators	continued	their	push	to	repeal	legal	protections	for	Indian	lands.	Chilean	indigenistas	kept	the	III	informed	of	developments,	as	Álvaro	Jara	did	in	1958	when	a	bill	was	introduced	to	the	Chilean	Congress	that	stood	to	abolish	the	Indian	Courts	and	place	“the	Indians	and	their	property	within	the	jurisdiction	of	common	law,	as	well	as	(suppress)	the	Department	of	Indian	Affairs.”	The	editors	of	the	Boletín	Indigenista	voiced	their	opposition	to	that	project	on	grounds	that	the	minority	status	of	Indians	in	Chile	justified	special	protections	under	the	law.	In	doing	so,	they	referenced	Jara’s	
Legislación	Indigenista	de	Chile,	where	he	traced	the	origins	of	and	challenges	to	the	various	indigenous	laws	in	Chile,	and	thus	contributed	to	the	III’s	project	to	collect	and	disseminate	information	about	legislation	that	impacted	indigenous	peoples	across	the	Americas.407	In	1959,	Jara	reported	to	the	III	that	Antonio	Mulato	Ñunque	and	Martín	Alonqueo,	the	President	and	Secretary	of	the	Mapuche	organization	Sociedad	
Lautaro,	had	presented	a	written	assessment	of	the	problems	facing	Mapuche	communities	in	the	south	to	a	group	of	Diputados	in	Santiago.	Among	those	
																																																								406	Noticias:	Chile,	“Celebration	of	the	Day	of	the	Indian,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1956	Vol.	16,	Nos.	2-3,	pp.	142-144.	407	Noticias:	Chile,	“Project	for	Placing	the	Indians	of	Chile	under	the	Jurisdiction	of	the	Common	Law,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1958	Vol.	18,	No.	1,	pp.	34-37.	See	also	Álvaro	Jara,	
Legislación	Indigenista	de	Chile,	Mexico	City:	Ediciones	Especiales	del	III,	1956.	
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problems,	the	loss	of	land	was	presented	as	the	main	source	poverty	and	ill	health.	Population	growth,	combined	with	individual	sales	of	divided	community	land,	had	led	to	a	landholding	pattern	they	termed	minifundios	(small	landholdings).	“Each	family	is	left	with	two	or	three	hectares,	impoverished	by	intensive	cultivation.	This	situation	has	obliged	thousands	of	Araucanos	to	emigrate	to	Argentina	in	search	of	new	lands.”	As	a	remedy,	they	requested	the	“prohibition	of	transfer	of	Mapuche	land	to	private	persons	(Chilean	and	foreigners),	during	a	period	of	fifteen	years.”	They	went	on	to	address	health	concerns	related	to	poor	living	conditions	and	a	lack	of	access	to	education	for	Mapuche	youth.	But	loss	of	land	continued	to	be	viewed	as	the	source	of	other	deprivations,	and	also	the	primary	aim	of	anti-indigenista	forces	within	Chile.408	Chilean	indigenistas	served	as	allies	to	Mapuche	organizations	and	activists	as	they	sought	to	protect	indigenous	lands	and	support	the	general	advancement	of	Mapuche	society.	In	June	of	1959,	the	IIC	organized	the	First	Indigenista	Forum	in	Santiago.	Those	gathered	passed	a	resolution	to	formally	request	legislation	from	the	Chilean	state	that	served	four	functions.	The	first	identified	“preservation	of	the	Indian	communities	and	their	way	of	life,	based	on	possession	of	the	land,	with	a	view	toward	modernizing	economic	exploitation…”	(emphasis	added).	The	second	requested	that	Indian	lands	be	protected	from	sale	or	transfer	by	classifying	them	as	“inalienable	in	perpetuity.”	Those	demands	illustrate	the	view	in	Chile,	shared	by	both	Mapuche	and	indigenistas,	that	land	ownership	was	central	to	both	the	preservation	of	indigenous	culture	and	economic	development.	The	latter	would																																																									408	Noticias:	Chile,	“The	Mapuches	Request	Culture,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1959	Vol.	19,	No.	2,	pp.	96-99.	
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also	require	the	“organization	of	technical	and	economic	help	on	a	grand	scale”	in	order	to	increase	productivity.	Here	we	can	see	the	persistence	and	scope	of	those	two	indigenista	themes	in	the	Chilean	landscape.	The	Forum	also	requested	the	“perfection”	of	DASIN,	“so	that	it	may	be	used	to	undertake	and	carry	out	this	vast	plan	of	protection	and	help,”	and	the	ratification	of	the	Patzcuaro	Convention	“in	order	to	be	able	to	benefit…from	the	valuable	experiences	in	Indianist	work	on	the	continent,	especially	in	countries	such	as	the	United	States,	Mexico,”	and	others.	The	Forum	recognized	the	value	of	formal	organizations	in	assisting	with	the	advancement	of	indigenous	society,	but	also	acknowledged	that	it	was	not	working	well	because	of	flaws	within	DASIN	and	the	state’s	refusal	to	participate	more	fully	in	the	broader	indigenista	movement.409	In	1961,	the	III	published	a	special	edition	of	the	Boletín	Indigenista,	which	was	presented	as	a	panoramic	view	of	the	status	of	indigenous	populations	in	each	American	nation-state.	In	consultation	with	specialists	–	in	Chile,	those	included	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Grete	Mostny	and	Álvaro	Jara	–	demographic	data	was	compiled	from	the	most	recent	censuses	and	presented	alongside	other	cultural	information.	The	guide	included	geographic	distribution	of	populations,	linguistic	characteristics,	primary	economic	activities,	overview	of	indigenous	laws	and	a	summary	list	of	indigenista	organizations	operating	in	each	country.	For	Chile,	the	guide	drew	statistics	from	the	General	Census	of	1952	and	established	the	total	Mapuche	population	at	127,151,	acknowledging	that	the	figure	included	only	those	living	in	southern	communities,	as	“no	reliable	information	on	the	Indians	in	the																																																									409	Noticias:	Chile,	“First	Indianist	Forum,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1959	Vol.	19,	No.	4,	p.	217.	
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northern	part	of	the	country”	existed.410	That	acknowledgment	provides	an	important	insight	into	the	importance	of	the	existence	of	Mapuche	communities	and	communal	land.	According	to	the	Chilean	state,	at	least	for	the	purpose	of	establishing	statistics,	when	an	Indian	left	the	reservation,	they	ceased	to	be	an	Indian.	Understanding	that,	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	maintenance	of	communal	land	and	ties	to	that	land	were	so	important	to	the	Mapuche	political	struggle.		
Summary	Although	efforts	to	provide	aid	and	social	improvement	to	indigenous	populations	began	early	in	the	twentieth	century	across	the	Americas,	the	founding	of	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano	in	1940	provided	a	formal	network	for	indigenista	researchers	and	indigenous	leaders	to	collaborate	and	share	ideas.	While	the	period	opened	with	broad	and	ambitious	goals	to	generate	solutions	to	complex	social	problems	that	spanned	a	broad	range	of	issues	like	health,	sanitation,	education,	racial	prejudices	and	political	participation,	global	and	hemispheric	geopolitical	priorities	narrowed	the	scope	of	interventions	to	focus	on	economic	development.	In	that	transition,	nuanced	connections	between	economics	and	other	aspects	of	indigenous	culture	and	society	were	glossed	over.		In	Chile,	as	in	other	national	contexts,	the	efforts	and	accomplishments	of	indigenistas	were	minimized	by	the	state’s	lack	of	support	for	the	IIC	as	an	institution,	as	well	as	fairly	tepid	support	for	their	cause	more	broadly.	The	relatively	small	group	of	indigenistas	never	attracted	the	attention	and	support	of																																																									410	Guide	to	the	Indians	Of	America:	Chile,	Boletín	Indigenista,	1961	Vol.	21,	No.	Especial,	pp.	202-205.	
	175	
	
the	state,	while	the	relatively	large	Mapuche	organizations	garnered	much	more	serious	consideration	from	elected	officials.	In	some	ways,	we	can	see	the	strength	of	the	Mapuche	movement	as	another	factor	that	limited	indigenista	effectiveness.	Finally,	in	much	the	same	way	that	economic	development	eclipsed	more	integrated	development	goals	and	projects	in	the	indigenista	movement	more	broadly,	the	ongoing	emphasis	on	Mapuche	land	tenure	and	legislative	reforms	that	either	supported	or	threatened	Mapuche	community	lands	overshadowed	efforts	to	improve	education,	health,	infrastructure	and	other	objectives.	
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Chapter	4:	Alejandro	Lipschütz	and	Chilean	Indigenismo	
	In	many	ways,	the	story	of	Alejandro	Lipschütz	embodies	the	story	of	indigenistas	across	the	hemisphere.	His	interest	in	the	plight	of	indigenous	peoples	began	through	personal	contacts	and	the	general	belief	that	Indians	required	special	consideration	as	national	states	adopted	a	rational	scientific	approach	to	development	and	governance.	Lipschütz	is	also	important	to	the	story	of	indigenismo	in	Chile,	as	he	was	the	foremost	Chilean	contributor	to	the	transnational	discouse	in	the	mid-twentieth	century.	But	Lipschütz	came	to	indigenismo	as	a	second	(or	parallel)	career,	and	the	existence	of	his	voluminous	body	of	work	and	its	influence	is	remarkable	considering	that	for	him	it	was	an	avocation	coexisting	alongside	his	career	as	a	research	biologist	and	Director	of	the	Institute	for	Experimental	Medicine,	which	he	founded	within	the	National	Health	Service	and	led	for	more	than	twenty	years.	Furthermore,	the	indigenismo	of	Alejandro	Lipschütz	was	never	supported	by	the	Chilean	state,	and	through	most	of	the	period	ran	counter	to	the	goals	of	state	officials	and	the	larger	Chilean	public.	This	chapter	will	first	locate	Lipschütz	within	the	broad	trends	of	Chilean	anthropology	and	indigenismo	in	the	Americas,	and	then	tease	out	his	contributions	to	the	pan-American	discourse	and	impact	on	the	Mapuche	movement.	That	analysis	demonstrates	that	his	work	was	prolific,	sophisticated	and	important.	His	personal	connections	with	Mapuche	individuals	and	organizations	left	a	lasting	impact	within	Chile	and	across	the	Americas.	
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Alejandro	Lipschütz’s	indigenista	career	contributes	several	important	insights	into	the	relationship	between	indigenismo	and	Mapuche	activism	throughout	the	entire	period.	First,	it	shows	that	formal	transnational	indigenismo	developed	significantly	later	than	the	indigenous-indigenista	collaboration	that	took	place	through	the	Mapuche	political	organizations.	Related	to	that	observation,	the	formal	category	of	indigenismo	held	less	significance	in	Chile	than	in	other	countries,	at	least	in	its	ability	to	influence	state	policies.	Finally,	recognizing	how	important	partisan	political	alliances	were	for	Mapuche	leaders	as	shown	in	earlier	chapters,	I	contend	that	Lipschütz	was	fairly	ineffective	in	the	1940s	and	1950s	because	the	main	body	of	the	Mapuche	movement	was	aligned	with	the	political	right	in	that	period,	while	Lipschütz	was	decidedly	more	leftist	in	his	views.	By	the	end	of	the	era	that	would	begin	to	change,	as	the	last	section	of	this	chapter	shows	by	following	Lipschütz’s	work	into	the	1960s	as	the	left	became	more	influential	in	Chilean	national	politics.	The	picture	that	emerges	shows	that	indigenismo,	as	a	body	of	ideas,	was	filtered	through	national	political	circumstances	as	it	was	applied	to	the	case	of	the	Mapuche	in	Chile.	In	addition,	those	ideas	were	adopted	selectively	and	sometimes	excluded	or	transformed	significantly	by	indigenous	actors	and	organizations.		
Biography	Alejandro	Lipschütz	was	born	in	the	capital	of	Riga,	in	what	is	now	Latvia,	in	1883.	He	was	born	into	a	family	of	cultured,	relatively	secular,	German-speaking	Jews	in	the	Livonian	province	of	the	Russian	Empire.	From	a	very	early	age,	
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Lipschütz	was	effectively	trilingual,	as	German	was	the	native	tongue	of	his	parents,	Latvian	was	the	popular	language	in	the	province,	but	primary	schooling	was	carried	out	in	Russian.	His	father,	owner	of	a	successful	publishing	house,	supported	his	scientific	education	by	sending	him	to	study	medicine	at	the	University	of	Göttingen	at	the	age	of	twenty,	but	even	in	his	teens	Alejandro	had	begun	to	take	an	interest	in	social	questions	by	observing	the	emerging	workers’	movement	in	his	hometown,	which	later	contributed	to	the	Russian	Revolution.411	After	graduating	with	a	medical	degree	from	the	University	of	Göttingen,	Lipschütz	went	on	to	hold	professorships	at	three	European	universities,	first	in	Germany,	then	Switzerland	where	he	met	his	wife	Marguerite	Vogel,	and	finally	returning	to	Livonia	to	teach	at	the	University	of	Tartu	in	1919.	During	that	time,	he	studied	and	collaborated	with	important	experimental	scientists	throughout	Europe	and	published	prolifically,	establishing	himself	as	a	world-renowned	endocrinologist	in	his	thirties.	But	in	the	wake	of	the	First	World	War	and	the	Russian	Revolution,	life	was	difficult	in	the	Baltic	republics	and	shortages	hampered	his	work.	So	in	1926	he	accepted	a	chaired	faculty	position	in	the	School	of	Medicine	at	the	University	of	Concepción.	Attracted	in	part	by	the	temperate	climate	of	central	Chile,	he	immigrated	with	his	wife,	two	daughters	and	his	long-time	secretary	Dagmar	Staden.	In	Concepción	he	was	first	introduced	to	Mapuche	culture	in	villages	located	not	far	from	the	city.	His	research	formed	a	bridge	between	his	interests	in	laboratory	and	social	science.	412	
																																																								411	Berdichewsky,	pp.	25-32.	412	Ibid.	pp.	32-35.	
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Lipschütz’s	work	in	endocrinology	led	him	to	investigate	ways	in	which	human	sex	glands	produced	sexual	difference	during	the	course	of	physical	development.	While	still	in	Europe	he	had	studied	the	Skoptsi,	a	religious	sect	in	Eastern	Europe	that	practiced	castration	for	spiritual	reasons.	Skoptsi	eunuchs	provided	an	opportunity	to	learn	how	the	absence	of	sex	glands	altered	the	development	of	masculine	and	feminine	physiognomic	traits.	In	southern	Chile	in	the	1930s,	Lipschütz	found	himself	amid	broader	efforts	to	reimagine	Chile	as	a	homogeneous	mestizo	nation.	In	that	climate,	researchers	sought	to	understand	apparent	physical	differences	observable	in	indigenous	populations.	Endocrinology	provided	a	useful	framework	for	those	inquiries,	and	Lipschütz	consulted	on	several	investigations.413	Lipschütz	used	hard	science	to	dispute	widely	held	notions	of	indigenous	racial	inferiority,	and	his	first	indigenista	book,	although	it	was	not	published	until	1937	after	he	had	moved	to	Santiago,	drew	on	research	he	conducted	and	supervised	while	in	Concepción.414		
Origins	of	Chilean	Anthropology	Intrigued	by	both	biological	questions	about	indigenous	peoples	and	his	personal	connections	to	Mapuche	through	visits	to	nearby	villages,	Lipschütz	began	to	read	works	by	the	founders	of	Chilean	anthropology	to	learn	more	about	the																																																									413	Kurt	Thomas	MacMillan,	Hormonal	Bodies:	Sex,	Race	and	Constitutional	Medicine	in	the	
Iberian-American	World,	1900-1950,	Dissertation:	University	of	California,	Irvine,	2013.	MacMillan	gives	three	examples:	an	article	co-authored	by	Jaime	Pi-Suñer	Bayo	and	Guillermo	Reyes	on	the	distribution	of	body	hair	among	Mapuche	men	and	women	(1933),	a	second	article	by	Pi-Suñer	Bayo	on	Mapuche	metabolism,	and	a	1935	dissertation	by	Ernesto	Oliver	that	Lipschütz	supervised	on	the	development	of	body	hair	as	a	factor	of	age	and	race.	414	Lipschütz,	1937.	
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Mapuche	language	and	their	life	ways	in	modern	and	colonial	times.	The	roots	of	Chilean	anthropology	can	be	traced	back	to	the	chroniclers	of	Spanish	conquest	and	colonization,	but	the	true	scientific	orientation	of	the	observation	of	indigenous	populations	began	earnestly	in	Chile	during	the	late	nineteenth	century	with	the	work	of	historians	José	Toribio	Medina	and	Diego	Barros	Arana.	Moving	into	the	early	twentieth	century,	anthropological	investigations	were	supported	more	by	new	national	museums	than	by	the	country’s	universities,	whose	missions	were	oriented	toward	professional	training	and	licensure	rather	than	pure	scientific	investigation.	The	two	most	influential	museums,	“the	Museo	Nacional	de	Historia	
Natural	(National	Museum	of	Natural	History)	led	by	Ricardo	E.	Latcham,	and	the	
Museo	Etnográfico	y	Antropológico	(Museum	of	Ethnography	and	Anthropology)	directed	by	Aureliano	Oyarzún,”	were	both	based	in	Santiago	but	their	influence	extended	across	the	entire	country	and	even	to	foreign	scholars	conducting	research	in	Chile.	In	that	context,	the	transnational	theoretical	debate	between	evolution	and	diffusion	as	competing	producers	of	social	and	cultural	change	played	out	within	Chile,	with	Latcham	and	the	Museo	de	Historia	Natural	aligning	with	classical	evolution	of	Engels	and	Morgan	and	Oyarzún’s	Museo	Etnográfico	influenced	more	heavily	by	the	diffusionist	views	of	German	scholars	like	Martín	Gusinde	and	Max	Uhle.415	Following	the	Second	World	War,	Chilean	universities	reoriented	their	mission	toward	research	and	became	the	intellectual	centers	of	Chilean	anthropology.	That	transition	in	the	1940s	and	1950s	coincided	with	a	generational																																																									415	Berdichewsky,	pp.	81-86.	
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shift	in	which	a	new	cadre	of	researchers	associated	with	universities	became	the	vanguard	of	anthropological	and	ethnographic	research.	Although	his	life	and	career	spanned	both	eras,	Alejandro	Lipschütz’s	anthropological,	ethnographic	and	indigenista	work	aligns	with	the	latter	group.	The	new	generation	also	collaborated	with	and	drew	intellectual	inspiration	from	foreign	scholars	who	conducted	research	in	Chile,	originating	in	both	North	American	and	European	academic	circles.416	After	1920	the	Chilean	political	scene	underwent	dramatic	transformation,	as	discussed	more	fully	in	chapter	one.	Beginning	with	the	economic	trauma	wrought	by	World	War	I	and	the	Great	Depression,	Chile	embarked	on	a	developmental	program	of	import	substitution.	More	factories	meant	more	workers	concentrated	in	urban	areas,	and	consequently	more	populist	sentiments	in	Chilean	politics.	Labor	organizations	became	influential	and	the	influence	of	Socialist	and	Communist	political	parties	grew.	Later	in	the	century	anthropologists	studying	campesinos	and	indigenous	populations	were	inclined	to	support	political	movements	and	apply	their	research	to	those	ends.	In	such	a	contested	political	climate,	Lipschütz	was	not	only	important	for	the	work	he	personally	contributed,	but	also	the	many	younger	scholars	whom	he	influenced.417		In	order	to	fully	understand	Alejandro	Lipschütz’s	contributions	to	indigenismo,	it	is	important	to	recognize	the	confluence	of	four	broad	trends.	First,	his	background	as	a	medical	doctor	and	research	biologist	made	him	an	informed	critic	of	prevailing	views	of	race	in	his	era.	Second,	the	reorientation	of	the	Chilean																																																									416	Ibid.	pp.	87-88.	417	Ibid.	pp.	90-93.	
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academy	toward	evidenced-based	research	and	within	it	the	transformation	of	anthropology	brought	his	racial	and	evolutionary	ideas	into	contact	with	questions	pertaining	to	indigenous	populations,	both	related	to	their	origins	and	their	current	social	conditions.	Third,	Lipschütz’s	own	politics	and	experiences	as	an	observer	of	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	Russia’s	communist	transition	made	him	sympathetic	to	the	idea	of	popular	organizing	and	social	reform,	and	also	made	him	a	politically	engaged	scholar.	Finally,	the	emergence	of	indigenismo	as	a	transnational	ideology	and	movement	provided	a	platform	and	community	in	which	to	apply	those	various	elements	of	his	background.			
The	Indigenismo	of	Alejandro	Lipschütz	Considering	his	training	as	a	biologist,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	most	of	Lipschütz’s	indigenista	work	engaged	with	questions	of	cultural	anthropology	from	a	social	perspective.	Yet	it	was	Lipschütz’s	biological	understanding	of	the	fallacy	of	indigenous	racial	inferiority	that	led	him	into	anthropology	and	indigenismo	in	the	first	place.	His	1937	work	Indoamericanismo	y	Raza	India	was	the	bridge	by	which	he	crossed	the	divide	between	physical	and	social	science.	Work	that	followed	was	in	one	way	or	another	dedicated	to	combatting	or	correcting	the	wrongs	perpetrated	by	anti-indigenous	racism	and	to	create	and	support	conditions	conducive	to	political	self-determination	for	indigenous	populations	in	the	Americas.418																																																									418	See	also	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	El	Problema	Racial	en	la	Conquista	de	América	y	el	
Mestizaje,	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Andres	Bello,	1967,	and	Perfil	de	Indoamérica	de	Nuestro	
Tiempo,	Antología	1937-1962,	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Andres	Bello,	1968.	
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Beginning	with	Indoamericanismo	y	Raza	India,	Lipschütz	consistently	maintained	that	there	was	no	biological	justification	for	social	inequality	or	racial	inferiority	of	indigenous	peoples.	His	anthropological	work	endeavored	to	show	that	observed	differences	between	ethnically	distinct	populations	were	socially	and	politically	constructed.419		In	general,	Lipschütz	leaves	clearly	established	that	the	social	laws	and	those	that	govern	the	evolution	of	society,	are	the	same	for	all	human	societies,	but	they	manifest	themselves	according	to	the	specific	characteristics,	sometimes	natural,	sometimes	historical,	in	which	the	society’s	modes	of	production	are	developed,	and	where	the	greatest	types	of	social	formations	have	existed,	they	introduce	their	own	modalities.420		In	Indoamericanismo	y	Raza	India,	Lipschütz	showed	that	social	forces	impact	ethnic	groups	in	similar	ways.	For	example,	he	compared	indigenous	hierarchical	societies	of	the	Americas	(Inca,	Aztec	&	Maya)	with	those	of	Europe,	and	similarly	equated	pre-modern	European	tribes	with	indigenous	societies	like	the	Mapuche.	In	making	those	comparisons,	Lipschütz	discussed	the	tensions	between	tribal	and	national	identities,	and	showed	that	those	double	affiliations	occurred	in	a	variety	of	national	contexts,	including	Russia	and	the	United	States.	Chile	was	no	exception,	with	the	Mapuche	caught	in	the	bind	of	“double	patriotism.”	Their	troubles	were	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	the	Chilean	state	and	Chilean	society	had	oppressed	them,	stolen	their	land	and	discriminated	against	them	on	almost	every	level	of	social	interaction.	Out	of	this	recognition	arose	Lipschütz’s	commitment	to	social	and	political	activism	on	behalf	of	indígenas	in	Chile.421	
																																																								419	Berdichewsky,	pp.	73-81.	420	Ibid.	p.	81.	421	Ibid.	pp.	76-78;	Lipschütz,	1937.	
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One	of	the	most	salient	features	of	Lipschütz’s	work	in	anthropology	and	indigenismo,	is	that	his	thinking	did	not	devolve	into	biological	reductionism,	“as	could	have	been	expected	in	a	biologist	moving	into	the	social	sciences.”422	Furthermore,	he	viewed	indigenismo	as	more	than	a	form	of	benevolent	social	action,	rather	as	an	outgrowth	of	bona	fide	social	science	(applied	anthropology).	But	as	a	social	scientist	and	a	Marxist,	he	also	believed	that	the	scientist’s	role	included	political	intervention	on	behalf	of	the	subjects	of	analysis.423	Much	of	his	thinking	aligned	closely	with	the	movement’s	leaders	in	North	America,	especially	John	Collier	and	Manuel	Gamio.	However,	both	of	those	men	were	constrained	by	their	formal	roles	as	employees	of	the	state,	and	many	others	preferred	instead	to	pursue	policies	from	a	detached,	apolitical	and	scientific	orientation.424	Lipschütz	felt	it	was	the	duty	of	social	scientists	to	engage	with	politics	in	support	of	the	people	they	studied.	He	further	criticized	as	“timid”	social	scientists	that	adopted	a	more	neutral,	apolitical,	stance.425	Lipschütz	was	greatly	influenced	by	the	trajectory	of	Mexican	history	and	politics.	He	was	an	acquaintance	of	Manuel	Gamio	and	drew	inspiration	from	the	example	of	the	Mexican	Revolution	of	1910-1920,	and	also	the	revolutionary	government	of	Lázaro	Cárdenas	that	followed.	In	Mexico,	indigenismo	was	institutionalized	with	a	whole	range	of	policies	that	supported	the	advancement	of	indigenous	populations	and	their	incorporation	into	the	national	state	as	citizens.	Lipschütz’s	brand	of	indigenismo	was	also	influenced	by	his	socialist	political																																																									422	Berdichewsky,	p.	74.	423	Ibid.	pp.	74-75.	424	Giraudo	and	Lewis,	pp.	3-11.	425	Richard	P.	Schaedel,	introduction	to	Berdichewsky,	2004,	pp.	15-24.	
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inclinations	and	the	work	of	Peruvian	journalist	and	Marxist	political	theorist	José	Carlos	Mariátegui.426	Within	the	world	of	indigenista	thought,	two	of	the	strongest	voices	in	support	of	indigenous	self-determination	were	those	of	Mariátegui	and	Lipschütz.	But	even	for	them	the	concept	was	more	theoretical	than	practical	or	political.427	Mainstream	leftist	politics	preferred	to	conceive	of	Indians	in	class-based	terms,	combining	forces	with	workers	or	peasants	for	the	overthrow	of	capitalist	structures.	As	we	saw	in	chapters	one	and	two,	Mapuche-led	political	organizations	were	caught	up	within	these	trends	along	with	the	indigenistas.	By	the	late	1960s,	Lipschütz	came	to	realize	that	indigenismo	as	a	movement	was	failing	to	restore	rights,	ancestral	territories	and	cultural	artifacts	to	indigenous	peoples.428	His	biographer	Berdichewsky	described	Lipschütz’s	divergence	from	mainstream	indigenismo	as	follows:	Indigenismo	in	America,	during	more	than	half	a	century	of	life,	from	the	1920s	to	the	1970s,	was	a	progressive	movement	developed	by	socially	advanced,	non-indigenous	populations	that	tried	to	resolve	the	‘indigenous	question.’	Lipschütz	understood	the	basic	contradiction	of	the	indigenista	movement	by	the	1960s	and	1970s.	He	was	one	of	the	first	to	make	up	his	mind	about	it,	as	much	on	an	ideological	level	as	in	his	vision	of	indigenous	autonomy;	he	expressed	the	real	tendency	and	the	historical	and	social	practice	of	real	indígenas.429			
1937-1949	At	the	same	time	Alejandro	Lipschütz	was	working	to	break	into	the	field	of	indigenismo	and	applied	anthropology	by	publishing	books	and	articles	on																																																									426	Berdichewsky,	p.	87.	427	Ibid.	p.	113.	428	Ibid.	p.	17.	429	Ibid.	p.	97.	Berdichewsky	notes	that	Lipschütz’s	awareness	grew	at	about	the	same	time	the	American	Indian	Movement	arose	in	search	of	similar	autonomy.	
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indigenous	questions,	he	was	corresponding	and	collaborating	with	a	host	of	international	researchers.	Lipschütz’s	insertion	into	a	network	of	indigenistas	across	the	Americas	would	help	to	establish	him	as	a	leading	indigenista,	and	provide	a	Chilean	perspective	on	indigenismo	that	was	in	some	ways	distinct	from	the	discourse	in	other	national	contexts.	Lipschütz’s	voice	added	variety	to	indigenismo	in	Chile	and	provided	it	with	a	unique	blend	of	characteristics	that	drew	from	his	own	life	experiences	and	an	eclectic	set	of	influences.	What	started	as	a	quest	to	illustrate	the	biological	instability	of	race	as	an	analytic	category,	eventually	grew	to	a	broad	view	that	the	future	of	indigenous	peoples	would	always	be	dictated	to	them	in	postcolonial,	imperialistic	terms	unless	indigenous	peoples	organized	themselves	to	fight	for	independence	or	at	least	autonomy	within	the	context	of	national	states	contrived	along	a	trajectory	of	European	conquest	and	domination.		In	1944,	Lipschütz	followed	the	well-received	Indoamericanismo	y	Raza	
India,	which	was	more	like	an	essay	on	racial	myths	than	a	complete	treatment	of	the	racial	questions	pertaining	to	indigenous	Americans,	with	a	vastly	expanded	second	edition	entitled	El	Indoamericanismo	y	el	Problema	Racial	en	las	Américas.430	At	more	than	500	pages,	the	second	edition	added	a	broader	review	of	existing	literature	and	tackled	the	question	of	African	migration	and	racial	mixture	in	the	Americas	also.	Taken	together,	those	works	in	addition	to	his	“day	job,”	earned	Lipschütz	a	reputation	and	respect	among	indigenistas	across	the	Americas.	Throughout	the	1940s,	Lipschütz	corresponded	with	important	figures	in	the																																																									430	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	El	Indoamericanismo	y	el	Problema	Racial	en	las	Américas,	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Nascimiento,	1944.	
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indigenista	movement,	including	Manuel	Gamio	and	Juan	Comas	in	Mexico,	and	John	Collier	in	the	United	States.	For	the	much-expanded	second	edition	of	Indoamericanismo,	Lipschütz	collected	eighty-three	images,	including	charts,	tables,	microscopic	slides	and	many	photographs	of	indigenous	people	and	cultural	artifacts.	Some	images	were	his	own	productions,	but	many	were	gathered	by	writing	to	indigenistas	in	his	expanding	network.	For	that	purpose,	the	newly	formed	III	was	extremely	useful	to	him.	In	July	of	1943,	Lipschütz	wrote	to	Manuel	Gamio	to	request	copies	of	photographs	used	in	III	publications	and	for	permission	to	reproduce	them	in	his	book.	He	also	mentioned	that	he	was	including	a	chapter	on	Africans	in	the	Americas.431	Gamio	replied	by	sending	original	photographs	for	Lipschütz	to	reproduce	and	return,	and	mentioned	that	he	was	eager	to	read	the	new	chapter	on	Africans,	indicating	there	was	great	interest	for	that	subject	in	Mexico.432	Gamio	shared	Lipschütz’s	request	with	his	colleague	Juan	Comas,	who	in	turn	sent	it	to	another	colleague,	Professor	Pablo	Martínez	del	Rio.	Comas	then	wrote	to	Lipschütz	to	share	with	him	a	reference	to	a	French	work	on	racial	categories	and	two	bibliographic	summaries	that	might	be	useful.433	Lipschütz	concluded	the	exchange	by	sending	a	thank	you	note	to	Comas,	Gamio	and	their	colleagues	at	the	III	expressing	his	appreciation	for	their	assistance	and	mentioning	that	he	would	be	sure	to	cite	the	photographs	to	the	
																																																								431	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Manuel	Gamio,	Jul.	29,	1943.	CAL,	Caja	6370.		432	Manuel	Gamio	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Aug.	10,	1943.	CAL,	Caja	6370.		433	Juan	Comas	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jul.	17,	1943.	CAL,	Caja	6370.		
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fledgling	III	journal	América	Indígena,	in	which	they	had	originally	been	published.434		In	the	early	1940s,	Lipschütz’s	indigenista	network	also	extended	to	North	America,	where	he	was	in	contact	with	John	Collier,	the	Commissioner	of	the	U.	S.	Bureau	of	Indian	Affairs.	In	August	1943	Lipschütz	received	a	note	from	Collier’s	administrative	assistant	E.	M.	Izquierdo	approving	his	request	to	reproduce	photographs	from	BIA	publications	in	El	Indoamericanismo.	Izquierdo	went	on	to	make	suggestions	about	how	to	go	about	publishing	an	English	translation	of	the	text,	although	he	lamented	that	the	BIA	did	not	currently	have	funds	for	such	an	endeavor.	He	did	however	request	a	copy	of	the	Spanish	version	for	the	BIA	library	once	it	was	published.435	Later,	after	Collier	retired	as	the	Commissioner	of	Indian	Affairs	in	1945,	he	would	continue	trying	to	help	Lipschütz	get	English	translations	of	his	work	published	in	the	United	States	by	reaching	out	to	his	contacts	at	university	presses,	but	ultimately	those	efforts	were	unsuccessful.436	When	El	Indoamericanismo	was	published,	Lipschütz	sent	complimentary	copies	to	scholars	across	the	globe,	which	functioned	as	a	way	to	continue	building	his	professional	indigenista	network.	In	December	of	1944	John	Collier	wrote	to	Lipschütz	congratulating	him	on	the	publication	of	El	Indoamericanismo	and	thanking	him	for	sharing	a	copy	of	a	radio	address	that	Lipschütz	had	made	about	the	book.	He	went	on	to	affirm	the	interdependence	of	their	work	by	stating	his																																																									434	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	III,	Aug.	24,	1943.	CAL,	Caja	6370.		435	John	Collier	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Aug.	9,	1943.	CAL,	Caja	6370.		436	Correspondence	between	John	Collier	and	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	1956-1959.	CAL,	Caja	6373.	Most	notably,	in	1956	following	Lipschütz’s	publication	of	La	comunidad	indígena	en	
América	y	en	Chile,	Collier	wrote	letters	to	various	university	publishers	in	the	U.S.	in	the	attempt	to	get	that	work	translated	and	circulated	in	the	North	American	academy.	
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agreement	that	indigenous	peoples	have	something	important	to	offer	their	respective	national	communities	in	the	form	of	their	culture,	and	that	national	progress	in	many	countries	depended	on	the	progress	of	their	indigenous	populations.	The	two	indigenistas	shared	an	optimism	that	the	future	would	bring	such	progress,	and	held	the	mutual	view	that	“trying	to	help	the	Indians	to	help	themselves	and	to	exercise	their	rights	and	discharge	their	obligations	of	conscientious	citizenship”	was	the	way	to	pursue	that	progress.437		While	Lipschütz,	Collier,	Gamio	and	Comas	endeavored	to	build	a	transnational	network	of	scholarly	inquiry	around	subjects	pertaining	to	indigenous	peoples	in	the	Americas,	in	the	mid-1940s	that	network	was	relatively	small	and	fragile	and	suffered	from	the	isolation	produced	by	long	distances,	language	barriers	and	the	difficulty	of	procuring	information	published	in	other	national	contexts.	In	the	fall	of	1944	Lipschütz	sent	a	copy	of	El	Indoamericanismo	to	Melville	Herskovits,	the	influential	anthropologist	at	Northwestern	University	who	helped	establish	African	and	African-American	studies	in	the	North	American	academy.	In	his	reply,	Herskovits	lamented	that	“more	of	the	work	of	the	late	Professor	Franz	Boas	and	the	late	Professor	T.	Wingate	Todd	was	not	available	to	you.”	Herskovits	also	arranged	for	several	of	his	own	publications	to	be	sent	to	Lipschütz	for	his	future	reference	on	questions	pertaining	to	“the	problem	of	the	origins	of	New	World	Negroes.”438		In	November,	Lipschütz	wrote	back,	thanking	Herskovits	for	the	texts,	but	also	providing	insight	into	his	own	view	on	the	significance	of	the	work.		
																																																								437	John	Collier	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Dec.	1,	1944.	CAL,	Caja	6370.		438	Melville	Herskovits	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Sep.	19,	1944.	CAL,	Caja	6370.		
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I	was	also	very	interested	in	reading	your	brilliant	article	on	Native	Self-Government	published	in	Foreign	Affairs.	I	fully	agree	with	your	standpoint	but	I	have	not	the	necessary	optimism	as	resumed	[sic]	in	your	words	of	“sufficient	good	will.”	The	point	is	that	this	good	will	is	lacking	on	the	part	of	whites	in	Africa	and	elsewhere	where	colored	people	served	for	the	purpose	of	making	money	by	the	white.	The	only	way	to	come	out	from	the	difficulties	is	dropping	the	capitalistic	system	as	it	has	been	done	in	the	U.S.S.R	where	the	problems	of	mutual	relations	between	white	and	colored	have	been	settled	definitively.	And	it	is	surprising	that	this	was	done	happily	without	sacrificing	those	advantages	which	are	due	to	the	incorporation	of	formerly	independent	territories	into	the	economy	of	the	Empire.439		Already	in	1944	Lipschütz	was	developing	his	view	that	self-government	was	to	be	the	ultimate	goal	to	which	indigenismo	should	be	applied.	Furthermore,	he	expressed	his	lack	of	confidence	in	the	ability	to	achieve	that	through	reform	of	capitalistic	and	imperial	politico-economic	structures.	Instead,	the	liberation	of	the	Indian	in	the	Americas	was	tied	to	socialist	revolution	in	his	view,	just	as	it	had	been	for	blacks	in	Africa	and	the	Soviet	Union.	Although	Lipschütz	held	firm	convictions	about	the	future	of	indigenous	peoples	and	their	liberation	from	capitalist	and	imperialist	forces,	he	maintained	cordial	friendships	with	indigenistas	across	the	ideological	spectrum.	In	January	1946	he	received	a	long	letter	from	Doris	Stone,	the	daughter	of	Samuel	Zemurray,	who	was	popularly	known	as	“Sam	the	Banana	Man.”	In	1946	Stone	was	living	and	working	in	Costa	Rica	where	her	husband	Roger	Stone	had	business	interests	in	a	large	coffee	plantation.	She	wrote	Lipschütz	about	her	plans	to	build	reservations	for	Indians	“not	to	keep	these	people	like	monkies	[sic]	in	a	zoo,	but	to	educate	them	to	become	useful	citizens.”	She	was	petitioning	the	ruling	junta	for	money	to	create	schools	for	Indians	who	could	be	trained	as	teachers	and	return	to	their	people	to	educate	them	to	work	for	progress	and	protections	from	non-indigenous	colonists																																																									439	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Melville	Herskovitz,	Nov.	9,	1944.	CAL,	Caja	6370.		
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who	were	moving	into	their	territory	as	a	new	highway	was	being	completed.440	Stone’s	project	was	similar	in	orientation	to	indigenista	efforts	in	Mexico	to	create	indigenous	boarding	schools.	She	was	trained	as	an	ethnographer	and	later	became	the	Director	of	the	National	Museum	of	Costa	Rica.	Her	friendship	with	Lipschütz	and	his	wife	Marguerite	illustrates	the	flexibility	of	indigenismo	as	an	ideal.	Lipschütz,	an	ardent	communist	who	was	ultimately	working	for	the	liberation	of	indígenas	from	the	clutches	of	capitalistic	imperialism,	maintained	a	friendship	with	the	daughter	of	Samuel	Zemurray,	chairman	of	the	United	Fruit	Company	who	orchestrated	several	coups	in	Central	America	to	oust	or	establish	dictators	in	service	of	his	neo-colonial	corporation.	Zemurray	infamously	pushed	the	CIA	to	intervene	in	the	overthrow	of	Jacobo	Árbenz	in	Guatemala	in	1954,	thus	bringing	to	an	end	the	most	promising	socialist	experiment	in	Latin	America	at	the	time.	If	Indoamericanismo	y	Raza	India	represented	Lipschütz’s	theoretical	jump	into	indigenismo	in	the	late	1930s,	the	interdisciplinary	field	research	he	supervised	in	Tierra	del	Fuego	in	1946	constituted	a	more	praxis-oriented	transition	in	which	he	established	himself	as	an	applied	anthropologist.	In	the	process,	he	earned	credibility	as	a	field	researcher	with	indigenistas	abroad,	and	continued	to	expand	and	solidify	his	network.	Having	previously	consulted	on	biological	studies	of	Mapuche	in	south-central	Chile,	in	1945	Lipschütz	assembled	a	team	of	researchers	to	gather	a	broad	range	of	data	about	the	Ona,	Yamana	and	Alakaluf	cultures	of	the	extreme	southern	reaches	of	Chile	and	Argentina	–	peoples	collectively	referred	to	as	“Fuegians.”	The	mission’s	two	primary	goals	were	to	collect	information	on																																																									440	Doris	Stone	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jan.	3,	1946,	CAL,	Caja	6371.		
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physical	characteristics	that	would	be	useful	to	the	National	Health	Service	and	cultural	practices	that	would	benefit	the	Chilean	Museum	of	Natural	History.	Accordingly,	Lipschütz	asked	Grete	Mostny,	Director	of	the	National	Museum	of	Natural	History,	to	join	the	mission.	But	as	the	mission	also	sought	to	contribute	to	a	broader	transnational	debate	about	the	racial	origins	and	cultural	adaptations	of	indigenous	Fuegians,	Lipschütz	built	an	international	team	of	researchers	and	drew	support	from	a	host	of	Chilean	institutional	sponsors.	The	Misión	Científica	Chilena	
para	el	Estudio	del	Indio	Fueguino	(Chilean	Scientific	Mission	for	the	Study	of	Fuegian	Indians)	included	Chilean	Army	General	Ramón	Cañas	Montalva	and	foreign	scholars	like	Ecuadoran	anthropologist	Antonio	Santiana,	French	anthropologist	Louis	Robin,	and	German	photographer	and	ethnographic	filmmaker	Hans	Helfritz.441	For	Lipschütz,	the	expedition	resulted	in	two	inter-related	outcomes.	When	Antonio	Santiana	abruptly	left	the	mission	in	the	field	and	later	claimed	that	his	research	findings	had	been	stolen	by	the	team,	Lipschütz	found	himself	embroiled	in	the	second	rather	messy	and	public	controversy	of	his	career.442	At	the	same	time,	the	broad	publication	and	dissemination	of	the	mission’s	findings	through	journal	articles,	conference	presentations,	the	highly	collaborative	nature	of	the	mission	itself	and	publication	of	the	group’s	collected	works	in	a	volume	entitled	
Cuatro	Conferencias	sobre	los	Indios	Fueguinos	helped	Lipschütz	continue	to	grow	his	network	of	professional	indigenista	contacts.		
																																																								441	MacMillan,	pp.	130-131.	442	For	a	fuller	discussion	of	the	Lipschütz-Santiana	controversy,	see	MacMillan	chapter	3.	The	previous	controversy,	his	highly	publicized	lawsuit	and	subsequent	firing	from	the	University	of	Concepción	in	1936,	stemmed	from	a	contract	dispute.	
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While	still	in	the	field	on	the	Fuegian	expedition	in	March	of	1946,	Lipschütz	wrote	to	Manuel	Gamio	as	Director	of	the	III	from	Punta	Arenas.	He	sent	Gamio	information	about	the	expedition	for	publication	in	Boletín	Indigenista.443	Later	that	month	Gamio	replied	to	inform	Lipschütz	he	would	gladly	publish	the	information,	and	took	the	opportunity	to	express	an	appreciation	for	Lipschütz’s	varied	work	and	tireless	efforts.	“I	admire	the	intensity	and	variety	of	your	activities,	because	as	I	see,	after	your	trip	to	Tierra	del	Fuego,	you	will	give	lectures	in	England	about	hormones	in	relation	to	their	cancer-fighting	properties.	I	would	be	glad	to	know	the	secret	of	your	eternal	youth	that	keeps	you	first	in	line	among	the	hardest-working	researchers	on	the	continent.”444	While	in	England	lecturing	on	his	biological	research,	Lipschütz	also	gave	an	interview	to	the	BBC	about	his	recent	work	in	Tierra	del	Fuego,	which	included	a	hypothesis	that	he	and	his	team	constructed	to	explain	the	historical	decrease	in	the	population	of	indigenous	Fuegians.	They	had	heard	stories	about	professional	Indian	hunters	who	were	paid	by	the	head	for	the	number	of	Indians	they	killed.	Coincidentally,	Dr.	H.M.	Stanley	Turner,	a	medical	doctor,	President	of	the	British	Medical	Association	and	also	a	Wing	Commander	in	the	R.A.F,	heard	Lipschütz’s	radio	address	and	wrote	him	a	letter	about	a	story	he	heard	while	stationed	in	the	Falkland	Islands	between	1909-1915.	In	their	exchange	of	letters,	Turner	explained	that	those	hunters	were	sold	obsolete	Martini-Henry	rifles	from	the	British	Army	in	the	Falklands	with	the	understanding	they	would	be	used	to	kill	Indians,	and	the	two	men	tried	to	reconstruct	figures	about	how	many	Indians	the	hunters	may	have																																																									443	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Manuel	Gamio,	Mar.	2,	1946.	CAL,	Caja	6371.	444	Manuel	Gamio	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Mar.	15,	1946.	CAL,	Caja	6371.		
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killed.445	In	other	correspondence,	Turner	suggested	(from	his	own	expertise	in	medicine)	that	studying	the	Rh	factor	could	aid	in	mapping	blood	characteristics	among	indigenous	peoples.446	In	this	way	Lipschütz’s	travels	and	public	profile	as	a	researcher	in	experimental	medicine	contributed	to	his	work,	reputation	and	transnational	network	as	an	indigenista.447	Following	his	trip	to	England	in	1947,	Lipschütz	traveled	to	the	United	States	where	he	gave	medical	lectures	in	St.	Louis	and	also	visited	Washington	D.C.	In	the	capital,	Lipschütz	met	with	T.D.	Stewart,	then	editor	of	The	American	Journal	of	
Physical	Anthropology	who	later	went	on	to	become	the	Director	of	the	Smithsonian	Museum	of	Natural	History.	In	an	exchange	of	letters	with	Stewart	following	his	visit,	Lipschütz	recounted	the	remainder	of	his	trip,	in	which	he	toured	Mayan	remains	throughout	Central	America	and	met	with	indigenistas	in	several	countries.448	Stewart	was	also	in	contact	with	Grete	Mostny	and	Fidel	Jeldes,	with	whom	he	was	working	to	publish	some	of	their	work	from	the	Fuegian	expedition	in	the	Journal	of	Physical	Anthropology.449	Lipschütz’s	travel	and	connections	were	not	only	an	asset	to	his	own	publications,	but	also	those	with	whom	he	collaborated.	Upon	his	return	to	Chile,	Lipschütz	set	to	work	preparing	for	the	second	Congreso	Indigenista	Interamericano,	which	was	to	be	held	in	Cuzco,	Peru	in	October	of	1948.	While	Chile	had	sent	a	delegation	to	the	1940	Patzcuaro	Congress,	
																																																								445	Stanley	Turner	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jan.	10,	1947;	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Stanley	Turner,	Nov.	18,	1947.	CAL,	Caja	6371.		446	Stanley	Turner	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Sep.	8,	1947.	CAL,	Caja	6371.		447	Lipschütz	published	his	account	of	their	exchange	in	Perfil	de	Indoamérica	de	Nuestro	
Tiempo,	pp.	218-221.	448	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	T.D.	Stewart,	Nov.	11,	1947.	CAL,	Caja	6371.		449	T.D.	Stewart	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jan.	4,	1947.	CAL,	Caja	6371,		
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the	government	had	not	officially	complied	with	any	of	the	accords	that	came	out	of	that	conference.	Indeed,	much	of	the	work	of	the	III	was	put	on	hold	across	the	Americas	after	Patzcuaro,	as	World	War	II	stole	the	attention	of	most	of	the	world’s	governments,	especially	shifting	the	focus	of	the	United	States	away	from	domestic	Indian	affairs.	Lipschütz	had	not	attended	the	Patzcuaro	Congress,	but	as	his	thought	and	work	turned	increasingly	toward	indigenista	issues	in	the	1940s,	he	became	more	involved	with	the	III.	He	began	corresponding	more	with	indigenistas	through	the	III	network	and	gradually	began	championing	indigenista	causes	in	Chile.	As	the	preparations	for	the	Cuzco	summit	unfolded	in	1948,	Lipschütz	planned	to	attend	as	a	member	of	the	Chilean	delegation,	representing	the	University	of	Chile	and	the	Chilean	Museum	of	Natural	History.	He	was	to	be	named	the	technical	secretary,	official	spokesperson	for	Chile	and	the	president	of	the	anthropology	section	of	the	conference.450			In	May	of	1948,	Manuel	Gamio	wrote	Lipschütz	to	request	that	he	gather	information	about	what	measures	had	been	taken	in	Chile	to	comply	with	the	resolutions	passed	at	the	1940	Patzcuaro	Congres.451	So	in	the	summer	of	1948,	Lipschütz	began	writing	letters	to	functionaries	across	Chile	to	collect	and	disseminate	information	on	behalf	of	the	III.	Between	June	21st	and	August	5th	1948,	Lipschütz	wrote	at	least	twenty	letters	requesting	that	people	supply	information	so	he	could	report	to	the	III	what	had	been	done	in	Chile	since	the	1940	Patzcuaro	Congress.	He	acknowledged	that	there	was	not	yet	a	central	office	affiliated	with	the	III	in	Chile,	so	he	was	circulating	the	request	personally	to	interested	researchers.																																																									450	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	unnamed	Minister,	draft	communication.	CAL,	Caja	6349.		451	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Manuel	Gamio,	May	21,	1948.	CAL,	Caja	6371.		
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Following	a	standard	introduction	explaining	his	request,	Lipschütz	included	the	relevant	parts	of	the	resolutions	passed	at	Patzcuaro	pertaining	to	the	expertise	of	his	request’s	recipient.	Of	the	twenty	requests	recorded	in	Lipschütz’s	personal	papers,	five	are	accompanied	by	responses.	Taken	together	they	illustrate	the	indifference	of	many	sectors	of	Chilean	society	toward	indigenous	concerns	and	the	difficulty	of	organizing	efforts	on	behalf	of	Chilean	indígenas.452	From	the	School	of	Public	Health	at	the	University	of	Chile,	Lipschütz	received	a	reply	that	they	had	no	information	to	address	his	request.453	Although	the	Director	of	the	Institute	of	Criminology	replied	that	he	could	not	directly	answer	Lipschütz’s	questions,	he	referred	him	to	Fidel	Jeldes,	the	anthropologist	working	at	the	Institute	who	had	been	part	of	Lipschütz’s	recent	Fuegian	expedition.	Jeldes	had	also	written	a	short	work	entitled	“Some	Considerations	on	Criminality	among	the	Araucanians,”	which	he	enclosed	for	Lipschütz	to	read.454	Doctor	Ernesto	Herzog,	Director	of	the	Institute	of	Pathology	at	the	University	of	Concepción	and	a	former	colleague	of	Lipschütz,	wrote	that	he	had	previously	heard	nothing	about	the	1940	Congress	nor	the	resolutions	passed	in	Patzcuaro.	He	claimed	that	no	one	in	Concepción	outside	of	their	few	mutual	acquaintances	was	working	on	indigenous	issues.455	Professor	Eugenio	Pereira	Salas	of	the	Institute	for	Musical	Research	in	the	School	of	Fine	Arts	at	the	University	of	Chile	wrote	that	his	Institute	“had	complied,	from	a	certain	point	of	view,”	with	the	resolutions	passed	at	Patzcuaro	by	building	
																																																								452	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	various	researchers	and	officials	in	Chile,	on	behalf	of	the	IIC,	June	1948.	CAL,	Caja	6353.		453	Mario	Pizzi	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jul.	12,	1948.	CAL,	Caja	6353.		454	Israel	Drapkin	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jul.	23,	1948.	CAL,	Caja	6353.		455	Ernesto	Herzog	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jul.	5,	1958.	CAL,	Caja	6353		
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an	archive	of	Araucanian	music	and	sharing	that	music	publicly.456	However,	the	implication	in	all	four	of	those	responses	is	that	if	any	work	was	undertaken	that	complied	with	the	resolutions	passed	at	Patzcuaro	it	was	not	an	issue	of	compliance,	only	because	it	was	otherwise	a	relevant	part	of	their	work.	The	most	thorough	reply	that	Lipschütz	received	from	his	many	inquiries	was	from	Father	Juan	de	Forchheim,	the	Catholic	Church’s	Dean	of	Humanities	and	Director	General	of	Primary	Schools	in	Araucanía.	Forchheim	wrote	that	he	was	a	subscriber	to	the	III	publications	Boletín	Indigenista	and	América	Indígena,	and	had	recently	received	an	invitation	to	the	Second	International	Conference	in	Cuzco.	He	claimed	to	have	written	a	paper	that	he	sent	to	the	Patzcuaro	Conference,	which	was	read	there	by	Venancio	Coñuepán.	Regarding	the	effects	of	the	resolutions	passed	at	Patzcuaro	in	Chile,	Forchheim	had	seen	little	effect	on	public	opinion.	In	and	around	Temuco,	there	was	a	“suicide	belt”	of	neglect	and	economic	and	agricultural	stagnation.457	The	reinvigorated	activism	of	Mapuche	organizations	like	the	Unión	Araucana	and	the	propaganda	that	periodically	flared	up	to	support	the	development	of	new	schools	in	the	region,	particularly	the	stories	printed	and	circulated	by	teachers	who	had	come	to	the	region	to	teach	Mapuche	children,	represented	bright	spots	in	his	view.458		
																																																								456	Eugenio	Pereira	Salas	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jul.	6,	1948.	CAL,	Caja	6353.		457	The	term	“suicide	belt”	came	into	use	in	the	late	1940s	and	became	a	popular	refrain	in	the	regional	press	used	to	criticize	and	explain	the	region’s	lack	of	development.	The	basic	idea	was	that	the	lands	surrounding	Temuco,	in	the	hands	of	Indians	who	do	not	exploit	them	productively,	were	strangling	the	development	and	progress	of	the	city	and	the	region.	See	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	129-132,	159-164	and	276-281.	458	Juan	de	Forcheim	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jul.	14,	1948.	CAL,	Caja	6353.	
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Regarding	research	into	indigenous	languages,	Forchheim	wrote	that	no	new	work	on	Mapudungun	had	been	conducted	since	that	of	Rodolfo	Lenz,	Félix	de	Augusta	&	Ernesto	Moesbach	in	the	late	nineteenth	century.	Regarding	education	more	broadly,	in	his	view	the	state	still	had	not	adopted	a	meaningful	or	adequate	program	for	educating	Indians.	Those	working	in	various	missionary	efforts,	including	two	indigenous	priests	and	many	Mapuche	teachers,	had	filled	the	gap.	Forchheim	wrote	that	“the	majority	of	the	recommendations	(Article	36,	on	Indigenous	Education)	always	figure	into	our	educational	ideals,	as	made	clear	by	the	number	of	‘friends	of	the	school’	dating	back	to	before	the	first	Congreso	Indigenista.”	There	did	exist	many	vocational	schools,	which	offered	training	in	“home	economics”	and	agricultural	skills.	But	they	did	not	have	enough	opportunities	for	talented	students	to	enter	secondary	schools	to	get	training	in	humanistic	education	needed	to	become	leaders	who	might	then	help	their	fellow	Mapuche	regain	political	rights,	he	wrote.459	That	criticism	had	been	levied	against	Guido	Beck’s	mission	schools	since	the	early	1930s,	so	it	is	interesting	to	see	it	brought	up	in	twenty	years	later	by	an	educational	leader	within	the	same	system	of	schools.	Referring	to	more	technical	concerns,	Forchheim	mentioned	they	were	struggling	to	build	schools	with	sufficient	heat,	light	and	water	and	which	were	located	close	to	indigenous	communities.	However,	they	suffered	from	lack	of	material	support,	especially	as	it	pertained	to	the	health	and	well	being	of	students.	Many	schools	had	a	health	office	in	name,	but	few	had	a	doctor	that	regularly																																																									459	Ibid.		
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serviced	patients.	Some	material	support	was	being	provided	in	the	form	of	free	breakfast	distributed	to	students	in	168	schools,	but	little	to	no	remuneration	was	coming	from	municipalities	or	the	state.	In	short,	not	enough	support	was	coming	from	the	state	to	aid	schools	in	complying	with	the	III’s	recommendations.	In	Forcheim’s	view,	efforts	to	benefit	Indians	in	Chile	needed	the	legitimacy	of	an	official	organization	and	support	from	the	state	to	carry	out	the	suggestions	of	the	III.	As	to	whether	or	not	any	progress	had	been	made	in	the	Camara	de	Diputados,	he	suggested	asking	Coñuepán	directly.460		Many	of	the	problems	identified	by	Forchheim	could	conceivably	have	been	addressed	if	a	national	indigenista	institute	existed	within	Chile.	According	to	Berdichewsky,	“when	the	Organization	of	American	States	created	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano,	it	was	Lipschütz	who	was	prepared	to	implement	the	program	in	Chile.”461	However,	in	1940	Lipschütz	lacked	a	committed	group	of	indigenista	counterparts	in	Chile	to	collaborate	on	the	founding	of	a	national	indigenista	institute.	In	the	end,	the	Cuzco	congress	was	delayed	again	and	did	not	take	place	until	1949,	and	Guido	Beck	stood	in	for	Lipschütz	as	president	of	the	Chilean	delegation.462	But	later	that	year,	Lipschütz	and	others	came	together	to	establish	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Chileno,	which	was	“set	up	as	a	private	organization	on	September	1,	1949.”	And	while,	“it	is	hoped	that	in	due	course	it	will	
																																																								460	Ibid.		461	Berdichewsky,	p.	16.	462	“General	Information	on	the	II	Inter-American	Indian	Congres,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	Vol.	9,	No.	3,	Sept.	1949,	p.	259.	
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become	an	official	agency,”	the	organization	received	no	funding	from	the	state	and	had	no	formal	role	in	setting	indigenous	policy	in	Chile.463		However,	the	diverse	group	of	members	that	made	up	the	IIC	did	come	together	to	advocate	for	a	more	formal	role	in	setting	indigenous	policy	in	Chile.	After	1949,	the	IIC	made	an	official	declaration	to	oppose	plans	to	develop	areas	around	Temuco	and	settle	German	and	Italian	colonists	there,	in	response	to	those	critics	who	advanced	the	idea	as	a	way	to	solve	the	“suicide	belt”	problem.	They	used	Mapuche	status	as	citizens	with	the	same	rights	as	white	Chileans	to	oppose	the	government’s	plan,	and	wrote	that	if	the	goal	was	to	increase	agricultural	production	state	banks	should	invest	in	improving	Mapuche	cultivation	of	the	land	rather	than	push	them	out	and	replace	them	with	other	people.	To	make	this	argument	the	IIC	referenced	the	1813	Chilean	constitution,	the	1934	Indian	Reorganization	Act	in	the	United	States	and	a	July	1947	executive	order	signed	by	President	Gabriel	González	Videla	that	condemned	usury	and	other	abuses	carried	out	against	Mapuche	landowners.	The	latter,	they	argued,	specifically	contradicted	the	proposal	then	under	consideration	by	the	government.	Finally,	they	requested	a	more	formal	role	for	the	IIC	by	asking	for	official	recognition	by	the	state,	in	keeping	with	the	conventions	of	the	III.	Although	the	IIC	wanted	that	recognition,	they	simultaneously	wanted	autonomy	and	to	be	consulted	before	any	modifications	to	indigenous	laws	were	passed.	This	document	was	signed	by	a	host	of	functionaries	within	Chilean	society,	including	anthropologists	like	Lipschütz	and	Grete	Mostny,	
																																																								463	Noticias,	“National	Indian	Institutes,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	Vol.	15,	No.	1,	Mar.	1955,	p.	31.	
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but	also	judges,	public	health	officials,	former	army	generals,	a	supreme	court	judge,	a	UN	delegate	and	Mapuche	representatives.464		
1950-1961	In	March	of	1947,	Presidential	Decree	No.	987	had	established	a	commission	to	study	the	possibility	of	reforming	laws	pertaining	to	indigenous	peoples	in	Chile.465	The	study	they	produced	addressed	themes	like	the	organization	and	function	of	the	Juzgados	de	Indios,	protection	of	indigenous	rights	and	organization	of	property,	needs	for	indigenous	education	and	rural	development,	and	finally	the	creation	of	a	department	of	indigenous	affairs	located	within	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization.	In	order	to	carry	out	those	reforms,	the	commission	recommended	revising	the	Ley	Indígena	4.111	of	1931	and	following	the	international	accords	of	the	III	established	at	the	Patzcuaro	and	Cuzco	conferences.	Those	included	creating	a	national	indigenous	institute	to	be	funded	by	the	state	and	granted	official	powers.466	While	the	IIC	remained	a	private	organization,	the	Dirección	de	Asuntos	Indígenas	that	would	be	created	in	1953	by	presidential	decree	could	be	viewed	as	partially	the	result	of	this	project.467	Ley	4.111	would	not	be	revised	until	1961,	but	DASIN	was	given	broad	powers	to	interpret	and	implement	the	law	by	controlling	the	courts	and	their	employees	as	dependent	branches	of	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization.	
																																																								464	Declaration	of	the	IIC,	undated.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		465	Francisco	Javier	Fermandois	to	Alberto	Foessel,	Jul.	14,	1947.	CAL,	Caja	6358.		466	Report	of	the	Commission	to	study	proposed	reforms	to	Ley	Indígena.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		467	Copy	of	Decree	56,	creating	DASIN.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		
	202	
	
Although	Lipschütz	was	not	officially	named	to	the	commission,	he	consulted	on	the	project.	In	March	1950,	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	Ingnacio	Palma	reached	out	to	Lipschütz	to	ask	for	his	advice.	“Having	considered	the	problem	in	the	south,	I	think	that	some	form	of	restoration	of	traditional	indigenous	institutions	will	be	necessary	to	consider	in	the	new	law,”	Palma	wrote.468	Lipschütz	replied	that	he	would	be	glad	to	meet	with	the	Minister	for	such	a	conversation,	and	also	that	he	had	been	following	the	project	through	the	IIC,	which	had	been	brought	into	the	conversation	by	Javier	Fermandois,	as	Director	General	of	the	Ministry	and	the	vice	president	of	the	commission.469	Palma	personally	invited	Lipschütz	to	attend	a	meeting	with	employees	of	the	Ministry	in	Temuco	in	August	1950.470	He	later	wrote	to	thank	Lipschütz	for	sending	him	a	copy	of	his	recent	book	on	the	Fuegians	and	mentioned	that	he	had	studied	with	anthropologist	Martín	Gusinde	for	three	years	as	a	secondary	student,	and	was	grateful	for	the	wealth	of	scientific	data	that	Lipschütz’s	work	had	brought	to	the	subject.471		Lipschütz	also	advocated	on	behalf	of	the	IIC	with	other	government	officials	in	this	period,	for	example	addressing	the	Minister	of	Education	to	request	that	the	position	of	Inspector	of	Indigenous	Education	in	Temuco	be	filled	through	the	appointment	of	an	indigenous	teacher.472		Also	in	1950,	Lipschütz	and	Mostny	collected	several	of	the	most	significant	lectures	and	papers	they	and	others	had	given	on	the	Tierra	del	Fuego	mission	and	published	them	in	a	volume	entitled	Cuatro	Conferencias	sobre	los	Indios																																																									468	Ignacio	Palma,	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Mar.	28,	1950.	CAL,	Caja	6372.		469	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Ignacio	Palma,	Jul.	26,	1950.	CAL,	Caja	6372.		470	Ignacio	Palma	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Aug.	29,	1970.	CAL,	Caja	6372.		471	Ignacio	Palma	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	May.	30,	1951.	CAL,	Caja	6372.		472	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Minister	of	Public	Education,	Sep.	15,	1950.	CAL,	Caja	6372.		
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Fueguinos.473	They	noted	in	a	foreword	that	Santiana	had	published	findings	separately,	but	those	were	not	included	in	the	text.474	While	they	both	attempted	to	support	the	publication	of	other	manuscripts,	the	most	significant	achievement	of	the	Fuegian	research	mission	was	that	it	established	Lipschütz	as	a	bona	fide	indigenista	on	a	transnational	scale.475	By	the	early	1950s	North	American	anthropologists	began	to	take	interest	in	studying	the	Mapuche,	and	naturally	they	looked	to	Lipschütz	for	guidance	and	assistance	in	coordinating	and	conducting	field	research.	One	such	researcher	was	Louis	C.	Faron,	an	anthropologist	trained	by	Julian	Steward	at	Columbia	University.		Lipschütz	helped	Faron	make	contact	with	Mapuche	scholars	and	subjects,	and	they	continued	to	exchange	letters	while	Faron	was	conducting	field	research.	In	January	1953,	he	wrote	to	Lipschütz	updating	him	on	progress,	and	thanking	him	for	putting	him	in	touch	with	Domingo	Curaqueo,	a	Mapuche	professor	at	the	University	of	Chile,	who	then	wrote	“to	his	friend	Victor	Painemal,	who	in	turn	put	me	in	touch	with	Martín	Alonqueo.”476	Faron	and	his	wife	lived	with	members	of	the	Alonqueo	family	while	studying	Mapuche	kinship	and	agricultural	production	in	1953.	Faron	reached	out	a	second	time	to	ask	Lipschütz	to	speak	to	Curaqueo	and																																																									473	Alejandro	Lipschütz	and	Grete	Mostny,	Cuatro	conferencias	sobre	los	indios	Fueginos,	Santiago,	Chile:	Revista	Geographica	de	Chile,	1950.	474	Lipschütz	and	Mostny,	p.	XV.	475	Grete	Mostny	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jan.	4,	1947;	Correspondence	between	Alejandro	Lipschütz	and	T.D.	Stewart,	Jan.-Feb.	1947.	CAL,	Caja	6371.	Both	Lipschütz	and	Mostny	had	corresponded	with	T.D.	Stewart	to	recommend	Fidel	Jeldes’s	manuscript	for	publication	in	the	American	Journal	of	Physical	Anthropology.	Ultimately,	he	rejected	it	because	the	number	of	skulls	examined	was	too	small,	Jeldes	did	not	consult	the	exhaustive	study	of	Martín	Gusinde	on	a	similar	population,	and	because	recent	work	by	an	American	anthropologist	conducting	similar	but	more	sophisticated	analysis	on	Australian	aborigines	put	Jeldes’s	work	“in	an	unfavorable	light.”	476	Louis	Faron	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jan.	20,	1953.	CAL,	Caja	6353.	380-384.	Interestingly,	Curaqueo,	Painemal	and	Alonqueo	were	all	connected	to	the	Unión	Araucana.	
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ask	him	to	put	Faron	in	contact	with	Mapuche	farmers	in	Lonquimay,	as	he	sought	to	expand	his	research	to	include	a	second	field	site.477	Finally,	Faron	wrote	also	to	ask	Lipschütz	to	write	him	a	letter	of	introduction	to	his	contacts	in	Tierra	del	Fuego,	as	he	hoped	to	follow	up	on	several	of	Grete	Mostny’s	lines	of	inquiry	among	the	indigenous	Fueginos.478	In	the	early	1950s,	Lipschütz	also	began	interacting	with	Mapuche	organizations	more	directly.	While	he	continued	to	exchange	ideas	and	friendly	correspondence	through	the	indigenista	network,	and	also	publish	books	on	indigenista	themes,	this	reorientation	of	his	activities	had	an	impact	on	his	work.	By	the	1950s,	Mapuche	organizations	had	achieved	greater	political	significance	through	the	rise	of	the	Corporación	Araucana,	the	election	of	several	more	Mapuche	deputies	to	the	lower	house	of	the	legislature,	and	Carlos	Ibañez	del	Campo’s	appointment	of	Coñuepán	to	establish	and	direct	DASIN	within	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization.	For	his	part,	Lipschütz	would	continue	to	write,	publish	and	interact	through	the	indigenista	network.	He	would	also	increasingly	engage	Mapuche	political	organizations	within	Chile,	but	his	leftist	political	views	would	limit	his	interaction	with	“official”	indigenous	policy	and	representatives	as	more	moderate	Mapuche	politicians	and	activists	were	aligned	with	the	Ibañez	government.		Lipschütz	had	always	used	his	many	personal	connections	with	Mapuche	individuals	to	support	their	own	self-advocacy	through	training	and	mentorship.	In	a	letter	from	Domingo	Tripailaf	in	July	of	1951,	Tripailaf	thanked	Lipschütz	for																																																									477	Louis	Faron	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Aug.	6,	1953.	CAL,	Caja	6353.		478	Louis	Faron	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jul.	9,	1953.	CAL,	Caja	6353.		
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sending	him	a	book,	but	also	for	his	long	and	tireless	work	on	behalf	of	his	people.	He	referred	to	Lipschütz	as	inspiring,	which	illustrates	Lipschütz’s	goal	of	empowering	Mapuche	to	better	their	own	social,	economic	and	political	situation.479	As	the	1950s	wore	on	and	Mapuche	organizations	began	to	formalize	their	activities,	Lipschütz	was	invited	to	attend	and	participate	in	a	number	of	meetings	convened	by	Mapuche	organizations.	Martín	Painemal	and	Juan	Llanquinao	requested	his	presence	at	the	first	National	Mapuche	Congress	in	December	of	1953,	to	be	held	in	Temuco.	Continuing	the	theme	of	combining	indigenista	work	with	his	career	as	a	doctor	and	biologist,	Lipschütz	was	scheduled	to	attend	a	medical	conference	on	the	same	day,	but	was	able	to	participate	in	both	events.	In	an	attempt	to	make	participation	in	the	congress	as	broad	as	possible,	it	was	called	to	order	without	distinction	to	the	political	or	religious	agendas	of	the	participants,	rallying	around	the	cause	of	studying	and	solving	problems	faced	by	Mapuche	broadly.	Those	included	the	loss	of	land,	rising	prices	and	falling	yields	of	agricultural	products,	inadequate	educational	facilities	for	Mapuche	youth	and	the	difficulty	of	passing	language,	culture	and	traditions	to	the	next	generation.	The	list	of	Mapuche	organizations	fighting	this	onslaught	included	the	Corporación	Araucana,	Unión	Araucana,	an	urban	organization	based	in	Santiago	called	the	“Unión	Araucano	Sociedad	Galvarino”	and	others.480	Through	his	work	with	Mapuche	organizations,	Lipschütz	realized	that	the	various	problems	they	were	trying	to	solve	all	in	some	way	or	another	threatened																																																									479	Domingo	Tripailaf	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jul.	8,	1951.	CAL,	Caja	6372.		480	Documents	and	correspondence	relating	to	First	Congreso	Nacional	Mapuche,	Nov.-Dec.	1953.	CAL,	Caja	6358.		
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the	stability	of	their	communities.	Those	organizations	began	thinking	and	talking	about	“community”	as	an	analytic	framework	within	which	to	grapple	with	those	challenges.	In	October	of	1955,	Galvarino	and	the	IIC	jointly	hosted	a	forum	on	community,	and	the	Galvarino	leadership	personally	invited	Lipschütz	to	attend.481	Lipschütz	replied	that	he	was	unfortunately	confined	to	bed	for	a	few	days	and	so	would	not	be	able	to	make	it.	However,	he	did	provide	a	letter	in	which	he	shared	his	thoughts	on	the	topic.	Lipschütz	asserted	the	importance	of	the	agricultural	community	as	a	defense	against	the	“proletarianization”	of	the	Mapuche.	He	disputed	the	notion	that	legal	protections	preventing	the	sale	of	property	deprived	Mapuche	of	their	rights,	and	equated	that	to	the	argument	that	holding	a	mortgage	deprives	one	of	the	right	to	sell	their	land	and	keep	the	profits.	Instead,	he	argued	that	Mapuche	should	borrow	funds	for	the	purchase	of	more	land	from	a	special	fund	created	by	the	state	if	one	wished	to	buy	a	parcel	and	move	away	from	the	community.	“You	have	to	develop	the	community,	you	have	to	improve	it,	but	not	
liquidate	it.”	482		The	forum	drew	a	crowd	of	more	than	200	people	and	passed	a	series	of	resolutions	that	expressed	their	positions	on	a	variety	of	topics	that	could	help	defend	Mapuche	communities	from	the	loss	of	land,	while	at	the	same	time	improve	living	conditions	for	comuneros.	They	began	with	a	statement	justifying	the	preservation	of	Mapuche	communities	in	accordance	with	the	títulos	de	merced	that	created	them.	Preserving	and	improving	laws	that	protected	communities,	while	speaking	out	against	legislative	efforts	intended	to	include	indígenas	under	common																																																									481	Unión	Araucana	Galvarino	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Oct.	17,	1955.	CAL,	Caja	6357.	482	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Sociedad	Unión	Araucango	“Galvarino.”	CAL,	Caja	6357.		
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Chilean	law,	would	further	that	project,	they	argued.	They	also	advocated	for	state	efforts	to	support	education	in	the	communities,	found	post	offices,	hospitals	and	pharmacies,	and	lend	money	for	land	improvements.	Finally,	the	accords	were	to	be	presented	to	public	officials	and	journalists	were	asked	to	print	and	distribute	them.483		Prompted	by	the	ideas	circulated	at	the	forum,	Lipschütz	published	La	
Comunidad	Indígena	en	América	y	en	Chile	in	1956.	The	book	brought	together	many	themes	that	Lipschütz	had	treated	before,	but	put	them	to	work	in	service	of	preserving	indigenous	communities.	In	the	preface,	he	described	the	project	as	follows:	The	present	volume	owes	its	origin	to	circumstantial	causes.	The	“Unión	Araucana	[Sociedad]	Galvarino”	and	the	“Corporación	Araucana”	extended	me	an	invitation	to	summarize,	in	a	lecture,	my	ideas	about	indigenous	community	in	Chile.		This	was	a	very	gracious	invitation,	because	with	it	the	directors	of	the	societies,	who	look	after	the	interests	of	the	indigenous	people	of	Chile,	have	asked	me	to	use	my	scientific	objectivity	to	make	them	aware	of	concepts	that	on	several	occasions	before	I	had	applied	to	the	vast	problems	of	indigenous	peoples	across	the	Americas.484			The	collaboration	Lipschütz	described	indicates	that	the	agency	of	the	indígena	and	the	indigenista	were	working	together	to	understand	a	complex	set	of	problems	and	try	to	solve	them.	The	instance	provides	an	example	that	connects	significant	Mapuche	leaders	and	organizations	directly	to	the	IIC	and	Lipschütz	personally.	His	subsequent	correspondence	with	Mapuche	leaders	and	indigenistas	outside	of	Chile	connected	the	Mapuche	movement	to	the	broader	transnational	indigenista	movement.																																																										483	Manuel	Huenulao,	President,	Unión	Araucano	Galvarino	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Nov.	1,	1955.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		484	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	La	comunidad	indígena	en	América	y	en	Chile:	Su	pasado	histórico	y	sus	perspectivas,	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Universitaria,	1956,	p.	19.	
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As	he	was	compiling	La	Comunidad,	Lipschütz	wrote	to	Coñuepán	at	DASIN	to	request	verification	of	statistics	on	indigenous	land	ownership	in	Chile.485	He	was	trying	to	track	down	discrepancies	between	figures	he	had	received	from	Louis	Faron	and	some	recently	presented	in	the	Cámara	de	Diputados.	Treating	that	subject	in	the	book,	Lipschütz	claimed	that	within	a	two-year	period	in	the	early	1950s,	the	subdivision	of	Mapuche	land	prompted	29	percent	of	divided	land	to	be	sold	or	otherwise	lost	by	Mapuche	communities.486	Refuting	the	claims	of	those	advocating	subdivision	of	indigenous	land	that	individual	property	rights	would	encourage	investment	and	more	efficient	exploitation	of	agricultural	land	to	benefit	Mapuche	smallholders,	Lipschütz	asked,	“What	then	is	the	real	reason	of	the	steps	being	taken	to	‘liquidate’	the	indigenous	community	in	Chile?”487	In	writing	La	
Comunidad,	Lipschütz	also	had	the	opportunity	to	correspond	with	Mapuche	Diputado	José	Cayupi.	In	June	of	1956,	he	wrote	Cayupi	to	congratulate	him	on	a	recent	speech	in	the	Cámara	and	thank	him	for	loaning	Lipschütz	some	documents	that	he	used	in	writing	the	book.488	While	Lipschütz	collaborated	extensively	with	other	indigenista	scholars	in	the	Fuegian	project,	La	Comunidad	involved	more	collaboration	with	Mapuche	leaders	and	organizations.		The	publication	of	La	Comunidad	also	stimulated	further	dialogue	with	indigenistas	in	Mexico	and	North	America.	Manuel	Gamio	wrote	Lipschütz	twice	in	1956	to	ask	him	to	contribute	an	article	on	indigenous	community	for	publication	in	
																																																								485	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Feb.	13,	1956.	CAL,	Caja	6373.		486	Lipschütz	1956,	footnote	42,	p.	174.	487	Lipschütz	1956,	p.	176.	488	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	José	Cayupi,	Jun.	27,	1956.	CAL,	Caja	6373.		
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América	Indígena.489	Lipschütz	sent	a	copy	of	the	La	Comunidad	manuscript	to	Alfonso	Caso,	who	at	the	time	was	serving	as	Director	of	the	Instituto	Nacional	Indigenista	in	Mexico,	and	asked	him	to	write	a	prologue	for	the	book.490	The	publication	of	La	Comunidad	also	brought	renewed	correspondence	with	a	host	of	North	American	scholars,	including	Faron,	Herskovits	and	Robert	Redfield.491	That	dialogue	accomplished	several	things	for	Lipschütz	and	his	indigenista	work.	On	one	hand	his	cordial	relationship	with	John	Collier	led	the	latter	to	make	numerous	attempts	to	get	La	Comunidad	translated	and	published	by	various	North	American	university	presses.492	At	the	same	time	it	engendered	a	dialogue	that	compared	Indian	policy	in	the	United	States	with	legal	reforms	in	Chile.	The	writing,	publication	and	distribution	of	La	Comunidad	perhaps	represents	the	most	concrete	example	of	Mapuche	organizations	and	activism	directly	contributing	to	indigenismo	as	a	formal,	transnational	intellectual	debate.	After	1950,	winds	of	change	were	altering	the	political	landscape	across	the	globe.	Internationally,	the	expansion	of	the	Cold	War	caused	the	United	States	to	change	both	its	Indian	policy	within	the	country,	and	also	the	nature	of	its	engagement	with	Latin	American	states.	In	a	1956	letter	to	Lipschütz,	John	Collier	wrote,	“I	resigned	as	Indian	Commissioner	in	1945,	to	engage	in	international	work.	However,	it	is	a	fact	that	the	policies	I	had	worked	for	were	continued	until	1950,	when	the	whole	movement	of	national	policy	was	thrown	into	reverse.”	Collier	
																																																								489	Manuel	Gamio	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jan.	11,	24,	1956.	CAL,	Caja	6373.		490	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Alfonso	Caso,	Mar.	16,	1956.	CAL,	Caja	6373.		491	Correspondence	with	various	North	American	scholars,	Jun.-Sep.	1956.	CAL,	Caja	6373.		492	Correspondence	with	John	Collier	and	various	North	American	publishers,	Sep.	1957-Mar.	1959.	CAL,	Caja	6373.		
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continued,	“The	Democratic	Party’s	platform	this	year,	on	Indians,	has	adopted	completely	the	Indian’s	own	program	and	stated	it	with	lucidity	and	brevity.”493	Lipschütz	replied:	“I	was	especially	interested	to	hear	that	the	Indians	own	program	has	been	adopted	by	the	Democratic	Party.	Let	us	hope	that	this	program	will	become	a	reality.	Quite	recently	I	had	lunch	with	the	leaders	of	the	Araucanians.	The	Araucanian	members	of	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	informed	me	that	they	were	successful	in	the	Program	Committee:	the	Committee	refused	to	bring	before	the	Chamber	the	project	of	a	law	abolishing	protection	of	Indian	land	property.	Unfortunately	the	Indians	are	politically	very	divided.”494		The	following	year,	Lipschütz	updated	Collier	on	the	situation	in	Chile.	“You	may	be	interested	to	know	that	local	groups	are	again	working	hard	to	obtain	derogation	of	all	the	laws	of	protection	of	Indian	(land)	tenure	including	the	law	by	which	our	Indian	office	(DASIN)	has	been	created.	Let	us	hope	that	they	will	not	succeed.”495	Collier	replied:	“…the	Indian	situation	in	the	USA	is	paradoxical,	if	not	desperate,	i.e.,	the	expenditure	on	Indians	has	increased	fourfold	in	three	or	four	years	and	the	fundamental	benefits	to	Indians	have	not	increased	at	all;	while	the	onslaught	against	Indian	properties,	goes	on	unabated.	I	note	your	information	as	to	the	continuing	attack	against	the	Indian	community	in	Chile.”496		Later,	in	1959,	Collier	reported:	“Concerning	USA	Indians,	I	can	report	that	within	the	last	two	years,	approximately,	the	Interior	Department	has	moved	away	from	its	atomizing	policies	of	the	years	since	1950,	and	approximately	into	the	philosophy	of	the	Indian	Reorganization	Act.	For	how	long	this	good	report	may	continue	to	be	made,	I	can’t	guess;	you,	better	than	almost	anyone	else,	know	in	history	and	in	the	present	what	sort	of	struggle	the	Indian	community	has	to	wage,	usually	alone	and	unhelped.”497		
																																																								493	John	Collier	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Sep.	19,	1956.	CAL,	Caja	6373.		494	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	John	Collier,	Sep.	27,	1956.	CAL,	Caja	6373.		495	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	John	Collier,	Sep.	30,	1957.	CAL,	Caja	6373.		496	John	Collier	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Oct.	14,	1957.	CAL,	Caja	6373.		497	John	Collier	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Dec.	3,	1959.	CAL,	Caja	6373.		
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Lipschütz	and	Collier	thus	shared	the	frustrations	and	uncertainties	involved	in	navigating	the	ever-shifting	sands	of	national	indigenous	policies.	In	one	another	they	found	academic	support	and	also	intellectual	inspiration.	In	Chile,	although	efforts	to	bring	Mapuche	organizations	together	across	political	and	ideological	spectra	continued	throughout	the	1950s,	those	efforts	were	often	frustrated	by	the	ambitions	of	individuals	and	infighting	between	organizations.	The	IIC	sometimes	found	itself	dragged	into	those	disputes.	In	June	of	1959,	Juan	Huaiquimil	and	Armando	Huarapil,	president	and	secretary	of	Galvarino	respectively,	wrote	a	letter	to	the	president	of	the	IIC	to	oppose	a	forum	organized	by	the	Corporación	Araucana	because	it	was	not	opened	to	the	public.	Due	to	recent	unfavorable	results	in	the	Juzgado	de	Indios	in	Temuco,	they	claimed	it	would	only	serve	to	fracture	Mapuche	solidarity	due	to	frustration	with	the	Corporación’s	leaders.	They	further	claimed	that	someone	within	the	Corporación	had	been	claiming	to	represent	the	opinions	of	Galvarino,	an	act	they	considered	“subterfuge.”498	In	October	of	1960,	a	large	gathering	of	Mapuche	convened	to	discuss	education,	indigenous	laws,	the	Juzgados	de	Indios	and	relations	with	the	III.	Illustrating	divides	within	the	Mapuche	movement,	attendees	called	for	Coñuepán’s	dismissal	as	Director	of	DASIN,	under	the	rationale	that	he	was	not	adequately	doing	his	job	and	was	currently	running	for	office	again.	They	also	repeated	the	request	that	the	state	send	official	representation	to	the	III	in	Mexico	City.499	Again	in	1961,	the	leaders	of	Galvarino	invited	members	of	the	IIC	to	attend	a	public	meeting	to																																																									498	Juan	Huaiquimil	and	Armando	Huarapil	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Jun.	6,	1959.	CAL,	Caja	6358.		499	Statement	by	leaders	of	Galvarino,	Nov.	14,	1960.	CAL,	Caja	6358.		
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discuss	the	leadership	of	DASIN,	among	other	things.500	But	by	the	early	1960s,	the	attention	of	Mapuche	organizations	and	indigenistas	again	returned	to	stave	off	efforts	to	change	the	Ley	Indígena	that	would	make	it	easier	for	Mapuche	communal	land	to	be	subdivided	and	sold.	This	time,	the	push	came	from	President	Jorge	Alessandri,	who	had	been	elected	in	1958.	The	1961	reform	of	the	Ley	Indígena	would	also	serve	as	a	bridge	to	broader	agrarian	reform	efforts	later	championed	by	President	Eduardo	Frei	Montalva	after	his	election	in	1964.		
1961-1973	Following	the	1958	national	elections	in	which	Mapuche	politicians	were	swept	from	office,	grassroots	Mapuche	organizations	began	to	shift	leftward	along	the	political	spectrum.	As	the	1960s	unfolded,	the	weight	of	influence	held	by	Mapuche	organizations	shifted	toward	those	that	aligned	not	with	conservative	politicians	like	Ibañez	del	Campo	or	his	successor	Jorge	Alessandri	(1958-1964).	Rather,	left-leaning	Mapuche	organizations	ultimately	became	an	important	pillar	of	support	for	Salvador	Allende	in	his	unsuccessful	bid	for	the	presidency	in	1964,	and	later	the	1970	electoral	victory	of	his	leftist	Popular	Unity	coalition	government.501	Meanwhile,	Lipschütz	continued	to	engage	with	Mapuche	organizations	and	the	transnational	indigenista	network.	In	doing	so	he	stayed	abreast	of	the	themes	of	the	era,	grappling	with	questions	of	agrarian	reform	and	the	relationship	between	indigenismo	and	socialist	revolution.	He	stayed	true	to	his	principles,	including	broad	support	for	socialism	but	also	the	preservation	of	indigenous	communities.																																																									500	Leaders	of	Galvarino	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	May	8,	1961.	CAL,	Caja	6358.		501	Albó,	pp.	820-821.	
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He	resisted	the	temptation	to	incorporate	indigenous	peoples	into	broader	class	struggles	in	ways	that	would	threaten	their	cultural	preservation	or	ability	to	seek	political	autonomy.	But	the	most	significant	shift	for	Lipschütz	was	that	in	this	period	he	more	directly	engaged	the	state	to	advocate	for	indigenous	protections.	As	leftist	political	forces	ultimately	came	to	control	the	state	by	the	end	of	the	decade,	national	politics	in	Chile	finally	came	into	alignment	with	Lipschütz’s	own	views	and	values.	In	1960,	legislators	proposed	changes	to	the	Ley	Indígena	4.111,	which	accompanied	a	broader	effort	to	pass	a	package	of	agrarian	reform	measures	that	would	benefit	Mapuche	and	non-Mapuche	Chilean	peasants	alike.	The	original	purpose	of	the	project	was	to	reform	the	way	the	Juzgados	de	Indios	functioned	to	settle	indigenous	land	disputes	and	sell	or	divide	community	lands.	However,	in	the	course	of	their	work,	the	commission	decided	that	a	completely	new	and	revamped	Ley	Indígena	was	needed.502	The	legislation	that	resulted	mostly	dealt	with	land	issues,	although	discussions	that	arose	subsequently	raised	other	indigenous	concerns.	Most	significantly,	the	Ley	Indígena	14.511	of	1961	established	the	
Juzgados	de	Letras	de	Indios	(Indian	Civil	Courts)	to	deal	with	land	and	title	issues.	It	did	establish	some	protections	against	selling	and	dividing	community	land	by	creating	a	fifteen-year	moratorium	or	waiting	period	for	sales,	but	that	nevertheless	opened	the	door	to	the	dissolution	of	community	lands	more	than	had	been	previously	possible.	The	Ley	Indígena	14.511	also	established	more	detailed	procedures	for	settling	land	disputes,	recording	sales	or	transfers	of	title,	and																																																									502	Boletín	No.	19.186,	Commission	to	Reform	Ley	Indígena.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		
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procedures	for	the	state	to	expropriate	land	from	indígenas	or	assign	state	land	to	indigenous	communities	through	the	Juzgados	de	Letras.	Most	of	these	mechanisms	were	thought	necessary	and	relevant	in	the	early	1960s	as	the	Chilean	state	embarked	on	a	broader	program	of	agrarian	reform.	Finally,	the	Ley	14.511	also	created	regional	banks	as	dependencies	of	the	Banco	del	Estado	to	loan	money	to	indigenous	communities	and	individuals.503		Mapuche	organizations,	indigenistas	and	others	rallied	to	oppose	those	changes	and	identify	the	many	and	various	ways	they	would	impact	Mapuche	peasants.	In	August	of	1960	the	President	of	the	Corporación	Araucana	in	Santiago	Lorenzo	Lemunguier	penned	a	long	letter	to	President	Alessandri	to	oppose	the	new	Ley	Indígena	on	the	grounds	that	it	would	make	the	subdivision	of	Mapuche	community	land	easier.	He	argued	that	as	a	general	rule,	the	elimination	of	indigenous	communities	would	have	broader	negative	consequences	for	Chilean	society,	and	that	instead	the	government	should	provide	more	technical	and	material	support	to	help	Mapuche	increase	the	agricultural	productivity	of	their	land.	He	asked	the	government	to	postpone	action	on	the	new	law	so	that	Mapuche	organizations	would	have	more	time	to	propose	alternatives	that	would	prevent	the	inevitable	loss	of	land.504	By	December	of	1960,	six	major	Mapuche	organizations	(including	Galvarino,	Corporación	Araucana	and	Movimiento	de	Unificación	Araucana)	came	together	with	the	IIC	to	jointly	request	that	the	ratification	of	Ley	14.511	be	delayed	to	give	them	more	time	to	study	and	prepare	a	response.	They	complained	that	the	proposed	changes	were	causing	a	panic	among	the	indigenous																																																									503	Draft	revision	of	Ley	Indígena,	Nov.	15,	1960.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		504	Lorenzo	Lemunguier	to	President	Alessandri,	Aug.	30,	1960.		
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population	of	the	south	and	that	indígenas	across	the	country	were	universally	opposed	to	the	law	because	it	made	it	easier	to	divide	community	lands,	allowing	a	minority	of	the	community	to	decide	the	fate	of	the	whole	group.	In	crafting	their	opposition	to	the	law	the	authors	cited	Federal	Indian	Laws	in	the	United	States,	which	established	tribal	lands	as	inalienable	in	1934,	although	they	ignored	the	“termination”	policies	of	the	post-War	period.505	Despite	widespread	Mapuche	opposition,	the	Ley	Indígena	14.511	was	passed	on	January	3rd,	1961.	In	May	1961	Galvarino	organized	a	public	meeting	to	discuss	the	new	law	and	other	issues.	In	a	letter	addressed	to	the	“President	and	members	of	the	National	Indigenista	Institute,”	the	leaders	of	Galvarino	invited	the	IIC	to	attend	a	large	public	rally	where	themes	like	the	leadership	of	DASIN,	the	reform	of	the	Ley	Indígena	4.111	and	the	defense	of	Mapuche	language,	culture	and	folklore	would	be	discussed.506		Following	the	promulgation	of	Ley	14.511,	DASIN	was	increasingly	viewed	as	an	organ	of	the	state,	and	one	that	was	not	particularly	responsive	to	indigenous	concerns	in	the	early	1960s.	However,	the	office	did	carry	out	significant	work	in	coordinating	or	at	least	recording	the	efforts	of	various	government	agencies.	In	the	annual	report	recapping	the	work	of	1963,	DASIN	chronicled	efforts	that	spanned	the	study	and	rectification	of	a	variety	of	land	issues,	including	legal	disputes,	technical	challenges	and	efforts	to	increase	agricultural	production.	The	office,	although	situated	as	a	dependency	of	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization,	coordinated	efforts	with	the	Ministry	of	Education	to	improve	indigenous	education	and	worked	with	the	Ministry	of	the	Treasury	to	absolve	debt	and	extend	credit	to																																																									505	Leaders	of	Galvarino	to	President	Alessandri,	Dec.	7,	1960.		506	Leaders	of	Galvarino	to	IIC,	May	8,	1961.		
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indigenous	farmers.	DASIN	was	also	involved	in	coordinating	relief	efforts	following	major	earthquakes	in	1960	and	consulting	on	construction	projects,	including	hospitals.	Much	of	their	work	had	to	do	with	the	agrarian	reform	efforts,	even	though	the	impact	of	agrarian	reform	on	Mapuche	communities	was	limited	in	the	early	1960s.	DASIN	also	collaborated	with	agencies	outside	of	Chile	to	benefit	Chilean	indígenas,	for	example	a	program	funded	by	the	Mexican	government	to	revive	the	art	of	Mapuche	silverwork	and	Rockefeller	Foundation	initiatives	to	found	schools	in	the	south.	Looking	to	the	future,	the	1963	report	offered	six	proposals	for	improving	education	for	Mapuche,	which	included:	creating	new	primary	schools,	improving	vocational	training,	serving	breakfast	and	lunch	to	students,	providing	grants	for	students	to	continue	their	studies	after	primary	school,	offering	adult	education	courses,	and	producing	educational	films	for	the	benefit	of	Mapuche	and	all	Chileans.507	Although	intimately	involved	in	the	creation	of	DASIN,	neither	Lipschütz	nor	the	IIC	appear	to	have	been	consulted	in	the	same	way	they	were	in	the	late	1940s	and	early	1950s	when	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	was	getting	DASIN	off	the	ground.	But	when	asked,	Lipschütz	did	offer	his	advice	and	professional	opinions,	and	when	opposed	to	wrongheaded	initiatives	he	spoke	out	vocally,	especially	when	they	pertained	to	the	subdivision	of	indigenous	community	land.	In	March	of	1962,	he	wrote	to	José	Gonzáles,	Secretary	of	the	Socialist	Party,	to	oppose	the	proposition	that	indigenous	land	be	incorporated	into	broader	farming	cooperatives	composed	of	Mapuche	and	non-Mapuche	land	and	workers.	He																																																									507	Report	of	German	Silva	Echavarria,	Asesor,	DASIN.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		
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reiterated	that	indigenous	interests	could	only	be	protected	and	served	by	preserving	the	integrity	of	their	communities	through	communal	land	ownership.	Lipschütz	also	took	the	opportunity	to	advocate	for	the	creation	of	a	National	Mapuche	Council,	led	by	Mapuche	and	elected	by	Mapuche,	and	functioning	to	protect	Mapuche	material	and	cultural	interests.508	As	an	indication	of	his	influence	across	Latin	America	and	particularly	in	socialist	circles,	when	Lipschütz	celebrated	his	eightieth	birthday	in	1963,	he	was	awarded	an	honorary	doctorate	from	the	University	of	Havana.509	Despite	his	age,	Lipschütz	continued	to	write,	publish	and	participate	in	the	transnational	indigenista	discourse.	In	fact,	the	1960s	and	early	1970s	were	a	particularly	productive	time	for	his	indigenista	work.	Following	his	retirement	as	Director	of	the	Institute	for	Experimental	Medicine	in	1962	he	dedicated	more	time	to	writing,	publishing	four	books	on	indigenista	themes	between	1963	and	1974.510	Significantly,	he	also	continued	as	an	active	member	of	the	IIC	and	collaborated	with	Mapuche	leaders	and	organizations	as	they	grappled	with	the	questions	of	the	day.	In	1964	he	joined	the	Chilean	delegation	to	the	fifth	Congreso	Indigenista	Interamericano	in	Quito.	There	he	presented	on	the	themes	of	agrarian	reform	and	colonization	as	they	pertained	to	indigenous	populations,	which	coincided	with	the	start	of	a	major	push	for	agrarian	reform	under	President	Eduardo	Frei	Montalva.511		
																																																								508	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	José	González,	Mar.	5,	1962.	CAL,	Caja	6374.		509	Berdichewsky,	p.	95.	510	Those	works	include:	El	Problema	Racial	in	la	Conquista	de	América,	y	el	Mestizaje	(1963),	Perfíl	de	Indoamérica	de	Nuestro	Tiempo:	Antología	1937-1962	(1968),	Los	Muros	Pintados	de	Bonampak:	enseñanzos	sociológicos	(1971)	and	Marx	y	Lenin	en	la	América	Latina	y	los	Problemas	Indigenistas	(1974).	511	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Gonzalo	Rubio	Orbe,	Jul.	6,	1964.	CAL,	Caja	6373.	
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Lipschütz’s	status	as	a	scientist	gave	him	credibility	in	the	eyes	of	Chilean	society	and	Mapuche	actors,	and	that	cachet	extended	beyond	his	formal	scientific	training	in	biology.	In	June	of	1960,	members	of	the	Movimiento	de	Unificación	
Araucana	(Araucanian	Unification	Movement)	wrote	to	ask	for	his	help	in	a	court	case	that	was	underway.	In	keeping	with	millenarian	oral	traditions,	a	machi	in	Puerto	Saavedra	had	sacrificed	a	child	on	the	shore	of	the	ocean	and	threw	his	remains	into	the	sea	to	calm	its	rage	and	prevent	tsunamis.	The	authors	of	the	letter	acknowledged	that	the	act	was	profoundly	disturbing	and	it	offended	the	norms	of	contemporary	western	civilization.	However,	they	blamed	the	“cultural	backwardness”	of	the	Indians	who	carried	out	the	act,	and	in	keeping	with	indigenista	philosophy	argued	that	their	culture	needed	to	be	brought	gradually	and	thoughtfully	into	alignment	with	the	more	current	norms	of	the	country.	They	also	acknowledged	that	in	ancient	times	the	forebears	of	western	civilizations	(Greeks	and	Romans)	had	also	practiced	human	sacrifice.	They	objected	to	the	treatment	of	the	issue	in	the	newspapers,	which	had	sensationalized	the	events	for	profit	and	exploited	them	for	commercial	gain.	They	sought	a	judicial	interpretation	of	the	law	that	took	into	consideration	the	complicated	history,	social	reality	and	cultural	legacy	of	the	Mapuche	in	Chile.	They	wrote	to	Lipschütz	to	ask	him	to	serve	on	a	commission	that	could	interpret	this	act	for	the	courts,	in	light	of	its	ceremonial	significance	and	legitimacy	from	the	perspective	of	indigenous	medicine.512	The	request	aligned	quite	specifically	with	much	of	his	previous	work,	and	the	article	
																																																								512	Leaders	of	Movimiento	de	Unificación	de	Araucanía,	Jun.	24,	1960.	CAL,	Caja	6358.		
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that	Lipschütz	had	published	in	the	III’s	Boletín	Indigenista,	which	utilized	a	similar	defense	in	another	murder	trial.513	Lipschütz	maintained	active	correspondence	with	North	American	academics	with	whom	he	had	shared	interests	and	insights	in	the	past,	and	also	continued	to	reach	out	to	people	whose	work	he	respected	but	did	not	necessarily	know	personally.	In	February,	1964	he	wrote	to	Woodrow	Borah,	an	anthropologist	at	the	University	of	California,	Berkeley	who	studied	peasants	in	Latin	America.	“Although	we	have	not	been	in	correspondence,	I	have	long	read	and	made	use	of	your	work.	Your	insight	into	the	problems	of	rural	poverty	in	Latin	America,	and	the	directness	with	which	you	have	cut	through	the	entire	mythology	of	indigenismo	lighted	my	path	twelve	years	ago	for	an	understanding	of	much	of	the	problem.”514	Likewise,	his	engagement	with	socialism	and	Marxist	theory	often	set	the	tone	for	these	exchanges.	In	November	1965	he	wrote	to	Leslie	White,	an	important	anthropologist	at	the	University	of	Michigan:	“My	feeling	is	that	progress	of	social	or	cultural	anthropology	is	intimately	dependent	on	the	spread	of	Marxian	thought.	Malinowski	contributed	to	this	progress	because	his	thought	was	greatly	influenced	by	Marx,	though	personally	he	was	convinced	that	he	was	an	anti-Marxist.	It	is	the	same	with	Kroeber…”	515		Although	Lipschütz	had	held	communist	views	since	his	early	years	in	Europe,	it	was	not	until	the	1960s	that	socialism	became	a	viable	alternative	in	Chilean	national	politics.	Although	some	Mapuche	leaders	had	flirted	with	the	left	in	the	
																																																								513	Noticias:	Chile,	“Acquittal	of	an	Araucanian	Woman	for	the	Murder	of	a	Witch,”	Boletín	
Indigenista,	Vol.	15,	No.	2,	pp.	160-169.	Lipschütz	co-authored	a	report	on	a	case	in	which	a	Mapuche	woman	was	acquitted	of	murder	charges	after	she	killed	her	grandmother,	whom	she	accused	of	witchcraft.	This	case	is	described	more	fully	in	chapter	three.	514	Woodrow	Borah	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Feb.	3,	1964.	CAL,	Caja	6376.		515	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Leslie	White,	Nov.	17,	1965.	CAL,	Caja	6376.		
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1920s	and	early	1930s	(notably	Aburto	and	Huenchullán),	the	failure	of	the	Corporación’s	more	moderate	position	pushed	the	next	generation	of	Mapuche	activists	further	to	the	left.	By	the	end	of	the	decade,	the	tenor	of	public	events	had	become	more	radical	and	aggressive	in	their	advocacy	for	change,	and	simultaneously	more	legitimate	within	the	academy.	In	November	1970,	the	Department	of	University	Extension	of	the	University	of	Chile	hosted	a	public	forum	entitled,	“The	Mapuche:	Second	Class	Citizens?”	which	featured	participants	from	Mapuche	organizations,	government	agencies	and	university	professors.516	Interestingly,	those	developed	as	Mapuche	began	to	enjoy	increased	access	to	some	state	services	and	more	support	from	indigenistas	who	had	access	to	academic	circles.	This	can	be	seen	in	the	program	of	a	conference	hosted	jointly	by	the	IIC	and	Galvarino,	which	included	remarks	from	IIC	President	Tomás	Lago,	Galvarino	President	Remigio	Catrileo,	Mapuche	Professor	Domingo	Curaqueo	and	a	lecture	by	Lipschütz.	The	evening	concluded	with	a	musical	rendition	by	Lautaro	Manquilef	and	his	band.517	Cultural	appreciation	and	support	for	the	preservation	of	Mapuche	culture	developed	alongside	increasingly	radical	calls	for	change.	In	addition	to	his	work	supporting	Mapuche	political	organizations	and	initiatives,	Lipschütz	used	his	influence	and	contacts	to	support	Mapuche	cultural	and	artistic	preservation.	On	Christmas	Eve	1970,	he	and	Marguerite	addressed	a	letter	to	the	Director	of	DASIN	to	suggest	that	a	collection	of	art	by	the	Mapuche	painter	Celia	Leyton	was	a	cultural	treasure	and	should	be	preserved.	In	that																																																									516	Conference	announcement,	Nov.	1970.	CAL,	Caja	6358.		517	Program	of	IIC/Unión	Galvarino	joint	conference.	CAL,	Caja	6358.		
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request,	they	referenced	the	work	of	the	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs	in	Mexico,	making	a	point	that	indígenas	should	be	integrated	into	the	nation-state	in	ways	that	preserve	their	cultural	practices	and	legacy.	The	Lipschützes	requested	that	DASIN	provide	or	secure	a	place	for	the	collection	to	be	held,	independent	of	the	national	museums	where	the	collection	would	be	lost	among	so	many	other	works,	only	to	be	displayed	infrequently.	Ever	optimistic,	they	proposed	that	the	“future	home	of	the	IIC”	would	eventually	become	a	good	permanent	solution.518	While	Lipschütz	was	supporting,	training	and	collaborating	with	young	Mapuche	students	and	activists,	he	also	trained	Chilean	scholars,	who	carried	on	his	indigenista	work.	Bernardo	Berdichewsky,	who	later	wrote	a	biography	of	his	former	teacher,	and	Cristián	Vives,	a	sociologist	working	for	the	Corporación	de	la	
Reforma	Agraria	(Corporation	for	Agrarian	Reform),	wrote	a	paper	advising	Salvador	Allende’s	UP	government	to	adopt	an	indigenista	program	to	forestall	the	processes	of	change	in	the	Araucanía,	specifically	through	agrarian	reform.	By	addressing	the	cultural	distinctiveness	of	Mapuche	populations	and	the	long	history	of	racial	discrimination	as	justification	for	such	a	program,	they	affirmed	the	Mapuche	right	to	self-determination	and	integration	without	assimilation.	Within	the	process	of	agrarian	reform,	they	suggested	provisions	for	communal	land	tenure	and	proposed	a	series	of	other	legal	and	administrative	supports	for	Mapuche	communities,	including	improvements	to	the	constitution	and	function	of	the	Juzgados	de	Indios,	creation	of	a	national	indigenista	institute	supported	by	the	state	and	affiliated	with	the	III,	and	support	for	existing	Mapuche	organizations.																																																									518	Alejandro	and	Margarita	Lipschütz	to	Director,	DASIN,	Dec.	24,	1970.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		
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Other	suggestions	included	hygiene	and	public	health	initiatives,	promotion	of	Mapuche	folklore	and	folk	art,	bilingual	education	for	Mapuche	children	and	the	teaching	of	Mapudungun	to	Chilean	children	in	non-Mapuche	schools.	In	a	two-page	appendix,	Lipschütz	lent	his	support	to	the	proposals	of	Berdichewsky	and	Vives,	and	significantly	advocated	for	the	creation	of	a	Mapuche	Council,	to	be	elected	by	Mapuches	themselves	and	with	an	official	status	within	the	state.519	That	final	point,	although	Lipschütz	had	held	the	conviction	for	some	time,	parallels	broader	disillusionment	with	indigenista	efforts	across	the	Americas	by	the	early	1970s.	Berdichewsky	describes	the	decline	of	indigenismo	commencing	in	the	1970s,	which	corroborates	similar	assertions	by	Stephen	Lewis	and	Laura	Giraudo	in	Latin	
American	Perspectives.	By	that	decade,	indigenous	leaders	and	their	organizations	across	the	Americas	were	rising	to	eclipse	the	indigenista	organizations	that	helped	them	gain	a	footing	in	political	struggles.520		Lipschütz	had	an	ongoing	tense	relationship	with	the	more	conservative	institutions	within	Chile,	in	particular	with	the	editorial	board	of	El	Mercurio,	the	nation’s	paper	of	record,	but	a	conservative	one.	Writing	to	Eduardo	Castro	in	1971,	his	editor	at	Editorial	Universitaria,	Lipschütz	made	suggestions	as	to	how	Castro	could	most	effectively	promote	Lipschütz’s	recent	book	on	Bonampak	in	Chile.	He	suggested,	“The	most	important	(way)	would	be	an	article	in	El	Mercurio,	which	doesn’t	like	me	because	of	my	bad	conduct	in	the	treatment	of	social	problems,	and	especially	indigenista	ones.”	Lipschütz	went	on	to	make	suggestions	for	Mexico,																																																									519	Draft	Manuscript,	“Para	una	Política	de	Acción	Indigenista	en	Alejandro	Lipschütz	Area	Araucana.”	CAL,	Caja	6357.		520	Berdichewsky,	pp.	115-118.	
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Guatemala,	Cuba,	Colombia	and	Uruguay,	which	illustrate	not	only	his	tense	relationship	with	the	Chilean	establishment,	but	also	his	broad	range	of	contacts	across	Latin	America.	521	By	the	end	of	the	decade,	however,	the	whole	tenor	of	Chilean	national	politics	shifted	dramatically	to	the	left	with	the	election	of	Salvadore	Allende	and	his	
Unidad	Popular	(UP	–	Popular	Unity)	coalition	government.	In	response	to	growing	cries	for	dramatic	action	needed	to	address	Mapuche	social	inequalities,	and	also	as	a	result	of	broad	Mapuche	support	for	Allende	in	the	election,	the	UP	undertook	a	major	reform	of	the	Ley	Indígena	in	1972.	Although	he	was	in	his	late	eighties	and	officially	retired,	UP	officials	sought	Lipschütz’s	counsel	for	his	expertise	on	indigenous	rights	and	issues,	and	also	because	his	politics	were	compatible	with	their	agenda.	In	summarizing	the	new	law,	the	indigenous	problem	was	characterized	as	part	of	the	UP’s	over-arching	goals,	but	at	the	same	time	a	unique	situation	that	required	special	efforts	to	rectify.	The	basic	program	of	the	Unidad	Popular	attaches	great	importance	to	the	situation	of	the	most	disadvantaged	sectors	of	our	society.	Within	the	demands	of	the	working	class	and	peasants,	there	exists	a	sector	that,	above	all	the	rest,	has	been	forgotten	for	centuries,	and	is	undoubtedly	the	most	authentic	example	of	a	system	that	has	supported	the	blind	exploitation	of	man	by	man:	the	indigenous	sector.	The	indigenous	“problem”	is	a	central	concern	for	the	Popular	Government	and	should	be	also	for	all	Chileans.	We	defend	the	integrity	and	support	the	expansion	of	indigenous	communities	so	long	dispossessed,	in	order	to	give	them	adequate,	timely	and	sufficient	technical	and	financial	assistance	–	to	provide	the	same	possibilities	as	other	citizens.522		In	presenting	the	actual	text	of	the	proposed	law	to	the	Cámara	de	Diputados,	the	Commission	on	Agriculture	and	Colonization,	which	had	been	tasked	with	studying	the	issue	and	drafting	the	legislation,	added	that	it	was	their	hope	that	the	law																																																									521	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Eduardo	Castro,	Dec.	12,	1971.	CAL,	Caja	6382.		522	Message	to	Senado	and	Cámara,	p.	1.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		
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would	“end,	once	and	for	all,	the	false	image	that	the	rest	of	the	country	has	formed	of	the	indigenous	race.”523	On	August	10,	1972,	Acting	Director	of	DASIN	Hugo	Ormeño	Melet	wrote	to	Lipschütz	to	ask	for	his	suggestions	and	observations	on	the	proposed	law.524	Two	weeks	later,	Director	Daniel	Colompil	Quilaqueo	sent	a	second	request,	this	time	with	a	copy	of	the	text	that	had	been	vetted	by	the	judicial	team	and	which	was	currently	being	analyzed	by	Mapuche	organizations	before	an	anticipated	vote	in	early	September.525	Lipschütz	thanked	Colompil	for	asking	for	his	input,	but	wrote	that,	“My	knowledge	and	scientific	interests	allow	me	to	give	my	opinion	only	on…(the	subject	of)	indigenous	development.	Those	are	related	to	problems	of	‘tribal	autonomy’	in	the	advance	of	the	‘great	nation,’	problems	that	acquired	significant	importance	in	recent	years.”526	The	section	of	the	law	that	Lipschütz	referred	to	replaced	DASIN	with	the	Instituto	de	Desarollo	Indígena	(IDI	–	Institute	for	Indigenous	Development).	The	IDI	was	proposed	to	exist	for	a	period	of	twenty	years,	but	Lipschütz	recommended	decreasing	that	duration	to	five,	after	which	Mapuches	would	take	over	and	operate	autonomously.	He	also	suggested	that	instead	of	including	seven	Mapuche	representatives	on	the	governing	council,	the	number	should	be	increased	to	fifteen.	Finally,	he	advised	referring	to	those	representatives	as	simply	“Mapuche”	instead	of		“Mapuche	campesinos”	because	as	he	pointed	out,	“’the	principal	objectives	of	the	Institute’	are	not	only	(to	find)	
																																																								523	Boletín	No.	674-71-2.	Report	of	the	Commission	to	study	revising	Ley	Indígena,	p.	U.	CAL,	Caja	6358.			524	Hugo	Ormeño	Melet	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Aug.	10,	1971.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		525	Daniel	Colompil	Quilaqueo	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Aug.	22,	1971.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		526	Alejandro	Lipschütz	to	Daniel	Colompil	Quilaqueo,	Aug.	23,	21,	1972.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		
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solutions	to	problems	related	to	lands	but	also	educational,	cultural	and	public	
health	problems”	(emphasis	in	original).	527	In	the	resulting	Ley	Indígena	17.729,	none	of	Lipschütz’s	three	suggestions	were	accepted.528	But	Minister	of	Agriculture	Jacques	Chonchol	did	invite	him	to	the	official	promulgation	of	the	law	at	the	Palacio	Moneda	on	September	15,	1972.529			
Summary		For	more	than	four	decades,	Alejandro	Lipschütz	was	an	active	participant	in	national	and	transnational	debates	about	the	place	of	indígenas	in	contemporary	western	society.	In	that	time	he	worked	tirelessly,	mostly	outside	the	traditional	boundaries	of	his	professional	obligations,	to	study	and	propose	solutions	to	problems	faced	by	indígenas	in	Chile	and	across	the	Americas.	In	doing	that,	Lipschütz	provides	us	with	an	example	of	how	integrated	and	complex	the	indigenista	discourse	was.	During	the	1940s	he	established	himself	as	a	legitimate	researcher	in	the	field	of	applied	anthropology	despite	the	fact	that	his	formal	training	was	in	biology.	He	built	a	transnational	network	of	professional	contacts	who	read	and	disseminated	his	work.	In	the	1950s,	Lipschütz	forged	critical	ties	with	Mapuche	leaders	and	political	organizations	despite	the	fact	that	he	did	not	share	their	ethnic	identity,	lived	far	removed	from	the	majority	of	the	population	and	was	in	fact	himself	an	immigrant	to	Chile.	Finally,	although	more	conservative	politics	held	sway	during	the	1950s,	in	the	1960s	and	early	1970s,	the	national																																																									527	Lipschütz	to	Daniel	Colompil	Quilaqueo,	Aug,	21,	1972.	CAL,	Caja	6357.		528	Text	of	Ley	Indígena	17.729,	Biblioteca	Nacional	de	Chile	website,	http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=29250		529	Jacques	Chonchol	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz.	CAL,	Caja	6381.		
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political	climate	turned	in	the	direction	of	his	long-held	personal	beliefs.	Although	he	was	officially	retired,	his	public	profile	did	not	diminish	and	the	frequency	and	volume	of	his	publication	actually	increased.	Across	the	entire	period,	from	1937	to	1973,	Lipschütz	wove	together	scholarship,	politics	and	broad	collaboration	with	indigenous	leaders	to	construct	an	indigenismo	that	served	to	connect	otherwise	disparate	actors	and	ideas.	In	doing	so,	he	also	maintained	a	commitment	to	political	autonomy	for	indigenous	peoples	that	would	later	become	foundational	for	many	indigenous	activists	in	Chile	and	across	the	Americas	after	identity-based	social	movements	emerged	in	the	1980s.	
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Chapter	5:	Venancio	Coñuepán	and	the	Dirección	de	Asuntos	Indígenas	
	 Thus	far,	we	have	seen	that	Manuel	Aburto	represented	an	archetypal	indigenous	leader	by	combining	traditional	notions	of	Mapuche	authority	and	political	strategy	with	a	sophisticated	understanding	of	the	social	and	political	environment	in	which	he	was	fighting	for	his	people.	Meanwhile,	Alejandro	Lipschütz	characterized	the	traditional	description	of	an	indigenista	as	a	white	man,	based	in	the	nation’s	capital.	He	was	integrated	into	the	formal	academic	networks	and	government	bureaucracy	of	his	time	and	attempted	to	use	those	positions	of	privilege	to	advocate	for	solutions	on	behalf	of	indigenous	people.	We	now	turn	our	attention	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	whose	life	and	career	show	him	to	be	both	an	indigenista	and	an	indigenous	activist,	blurring	distinctions	between	the	two	categories	and	demonstrating	that	they	were	highly	permeable.	Coñuepán’s	creation	and	leadership	of	the	national	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs	in	the	1950s	was	an	episode	in	which	he	clearly	functioned	as	both	Indian	and	indigenista	simultaneously.		If	there	was	a	singular	point,	or	goal,	to	Coñuepán’s	thirty-year	career	in	politics,	it	was	to	reach	a	high	enough	height	within	the	formal	structure	of	the	Chilean	government	to	protect	the	rights	of	Mapuche	and	lead	them	toward	formal	political	participation	as	equal	citizens	of	Chile.	He	viewed	the	creation	of	a	government	agency	tasked	with	that	specific	purpose	as	the	best	vehicle	by	which	to	accomplish	his	goal.	In	1953,	Coñuepán’s	efforts	and	accumulated	political	influence	
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led	to	the	creation	of	the	Dirección	de	Asuntos	Indígenas	and	his	appointment	as	the	Director	of	that	agency.	Because	DASIN	was	tasked	with	overseeing	the	Juzgados	de	
Indios	(Indian	Courts),	Coñuepán	was	positioned	to	manage	the	courts	to	provide	protection	to	Mapuche	as	they	defended	their	interests.	In	the	course	of	his	tenure	he	also	engaged	other	branches	of	government	toward	similar	ends.	In	addition,	he	leveraged	his	personal	influence	with	white	Chilean	leaders	and	his	indigenous	identity	to	function	as	a	go-between,	bridging	what	often	seemed	like	two	very	different	worlds	sharing	the	Chilean	landscape	in	the	twentieth	century.	And	although	he	sought	to	make	Mapuche	into	citizens	with	equal	rights,	he	employed	indigenous	identity	and	the	legacy	of	conquest	and	colonization	to	argue	that	the	Mapuche	formed	a	special	class	of	citizens,	one	that	needed	and	deserved	unique	consideration	and	protection.	Twice	elected	to	the	Cámara	de	Diputados	and	long-time	leader	of	the	Corporación	Araucana,	Coñuepán’s	support	had	helped	return	Carlos	Ibañez	del	Campo	to	the	presidency	in	1952	after	a	twenty-year	hiatus.	Upon	his	election,	Ibañez	first	rewarded	Coñuepán	with	a	cabinet-level	appointment	as	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	but	Coñuepán	and	the	Corporación	had	lobbied	for	the	creation	of	an	office	dedicated	to	the	protection	of	indígenas,	in	one	form	or	another,	since	even	before	his	speech	at	the	Patzcuaro	Conference	in	1940.	So	in	1953,	as	part	of	a	broad	administrative	reorganization	of	the	federal	government,	Ibañez	created	the	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs	within	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization.	Ibañez	chose	Coñuepán	to	lead	the	new	agency.	As	the	Director	of	DASIN,	Coñuepán	achieved	some	success	using	his	post	to	protect	the	rights	of	
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Mapuche	during	the	time	Ibañez	was	in	office.	But	ultimately,	his	accomplishments	did	not	outlast	his	tenure.	As	political	winds	shifted,	Mapuche	deputies	were	swept	from	office	in	the	1958	congressional	elections	at	the	same	time	Jorge	Alessandri	succeeded	Ibañez	as	President,	and	afterward	a	new	generation	of	Mapuche	leaders	would	seek	political	advantage	by	allying	with	the	left	to	attempt	more	radical	reforms	and	bring	about	a	new	political	order.	This	chapter	examines	the	work	of	Venancio	Coñuepán	as	the	Director	of	DASIN.	As	a	historical	episode,	the	mid-1950s	represents	a	unique	moment	in	the	twentieth	century	history	of	Mapuche-state	relations	and	a	distinct	form	of	indigenismo,	led	not	by	white	urban	intellectuals	but	rather	by	indigenous	leaders.530	Despite	relatively	weak	ties	to	transnational	indigenista	projects,	DASIN’s	work	was	consistent	with	ideas	circulating	through	that	network,	and	therefore	its	successes	and	failures	ought	to	be	considered	in	the	light	of	that	broader	transnational	context.	In	addition,	this	chapter	shows	that	DASIN	represents	a	material	form	of	indigenismo,	consistent	with	economic	themes	of	development	and	dependency	circulating	throughout	the	Americas,	but	largely	distinct	from	other	aspects	of	the	indigenista	discourse	that	emphasized	culture	and	integrated	development.		In	order	to	evaluate	DASIN	as	an	indigenista	project	and	understand	Coñuepán’s	leadership	of	the	agency,	I	first	introduce	his	life,	background	and	career.	Following	that,	I	explain	the	political	environment	that	led	to	Ibañez’s	election	in	1952,	and	discuss	Coñuepán’s	leadership	of	the	Ministry	of	Land	and																																																									530	This	characterization	follows	the	one	established	by	Giraudo,	2016.	
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Colonization.	Then	I	explore	the	reorganization	of	the	federal	government	that	coincided	with	the	creation	of	DASIN	in	order	to	build	context	around	the	political	environment	in	which	it	operated.	I	next	turn	to	study	the	actual	work	that	DASIN	carried	out	during	Coñuepán’s	tenure	as	the	ageny’s	Director,	specifically	as	it	related	to	Coñuepán’s	role	as	an	interlocutor	in	land	claims	and	disputes,	and	his	interactions	with	various	government	officials.	I	examine	the	forestry	industry	in	greater	detail,	using	the	case	of	the	Comunidad	Bernardo	Ñanco	as	an	example,	because	it	received	significant	coverage	in	the	regional	and	national	press	and	led	to	changes	in	the	way	DASIN	approved	contracts	between	Chilean	companies	and	Mapuche	communities.	I	show	that	the	government’s	goals	for	developing	the	forestry	industry	continued	a	pattern	of	colonial	incursions	onto	indigenous	lands	and	provide	an	example	that	explains	the	materialist	orientation	of	DASIN.	Finally,	the	complicated	and	frustrating	work	of	DASIN	is	evaluated	as	an	indigenista	project,	with	special	emphasis	given	to	ways	in	which	transnational	connections	can	be	seen	in	the	work	of	DASIN	and	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	during	the	1950s.	The	chapter	concludes	by	examining	Coñeupán’s	role	supervising	the	Indian	Courts,	a	significant	part	of	his	role	as	Director,	but	one	that	led	to	persistent	frustration	and	conflict	with	the	judges	and	courts	he	was	tasked	with	overseeing.	
	
Biography	and	Political	Context	Born	in	Cautín	Province	in	1905,	Venancio	Coñuepán	received	his	formal	education	at	the	same	schools	that	Manuel	Aburto	and	Manuel	Manquilef	had	attended	during	their	early	years	–	first	the	Anglican	mission	school	and	then	Liceo	
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Temuco.	Coñuepán	had	attained	some	wealth	and	success	by	the	age	of	twenty-five	working	for	the	Ford	automobile	company	in	Temuco.	In	the	late	1920s	he	rose	to	prominence	within	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán,	becoming	its	secretary	in	1929	and	president	in	1931.531	“Relying	on	his	personal	experience	and	that	of	other	merchant	leaders,	he	proposed	that	the	Mapuche	win	equality	within	Chilean	society	through	economic	success.”532	Coñuepán’s	rise	to	prominence	derived	from	at	least	three	major	factors.	First,	and	principal	among	them,	was	his	family	history	and	personal	qualities	that	established	him	as	a	ñizol	longko,	or	“prominent	chief.”	Within	traditional	Mapuche	society,	the	political	power	of	longkos	was	not	equal,	and	derived	from	many	factors,	including	the	size	and	significance	of	their	kinship	network,	ability	to	mobilize	forces	in	times	of	war,	and	wealth.	Venancio	descended	from	a	prominent	family	of	Mapuche	longkos	and	his	lineage	could	be	traced	back	to	famous	chiefs	who	allied	with	Chilean	patriot	creole	forces	during	the	war	for	independence	and	also	the	Chilean	army	during	the	Pacification.	In	addition,	the	wealth	displayed	by	his	family’s	large	reduccion	near	Temuco	and	the	income	from	his	career	enabled	him	to	dress	well,	drive	an	automobile	in	an	era	when	few	Mapuche	could	afford	one,	and	publicly	display	generosity	to	friends	and	acquaintances.	His	education	and	personal	abilities	also	made	him	an	excellent	public	speaker,	and	one	who	could	
																																																								531	Foerster	and	Montecino,	pp.	30-32.	532	Albó,	p.	818.	
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deliver	his	message	to	both	Chilean	and	Mapuche	audiences,	as	he	often	did	in	bilingual	speeches.533	Leveraging	those	personal	characteristics,	Coñuepán’s	success	also	resulted	from	his	ability	to	mobilize	a	substantial	ethnic	Mapuche	political	base	through	the	consolidated	capacity	of	the	movement’s	major	organizations	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Corporación	Araucana.534	Building	on	the	success	of	Mapuche	mobilization	that	caused	President	Ibañez	del	Campo	to	soften	his	program	of	indigenous	land	division	during	his	first	presidency	(1927-1931)	Coñuepán	sought	increased	collaboration	between	Mapuche	organizations	in	the	1930s.	Ultimately,	those	efforts	led	to	the	creation	of	the	Corporación	Araucana	in	1938.	As	discussed	in	chapters	one	and	two,	Coñuepán	assumed	leadership	of	the	Corporación	after	its	formation	in	1938,	having	worked	for	nearly	ten	years	to	grow	an	alliance	between	the	major	Mapuche	organizations.	Although	the	Corporación	originally	functioned	as	an	umbrella	group	that	allowed	its	constituent	organizations	autonomy	to	pursue	their	own	agendas	and	political	stances,	by	the	1950s	its	influence	had	increased	and	the	Corporación	began	to	function	more	like	a	political	party,	although	he	was	formally	a	member	of	several	other	conservative	political	parties		in	that	era.535		During	the	1940s,	Coñuepán	strategically	crafted	political	alliances	with	the	conservative	sectors	of	Chilean	politics,	which	held	the	most	sway	in	the	rural	south,	resulting	in	electoral	success.	The	Corporación	supported	Mapuche	leaders	in	their																																																									533	José	Ancan	Jara,	“Venancio	Coñuepán:	Ñizol	Longko,	Líder	Regional,	Hombre	de	Estado:	Resplandor	y	eclipse	de	la	Corporación	Araucana	en	medio	siglo	de	organización	indígena	en	el	sur	de	Chile,	1938-1968,	in	Intelectuales	Indígenas	Piensan	América	Latina,	Claudia	Zapata	Silva,	ed.	Quito:	Ediciones	Abya-Yala,	2007,	pp.	207-210.	534	Ancan,	p.	211.	535	Albó,	p.	818.	
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bids	for	elected	office	and	generated	broad	Mapuche	support	for	conservative	political	factions.	Coñuepán	was	elected	to	the	Cámara	de	Diputados	representing	the	Partido	Alianza	Popular	Libertadora	(Popular	Freedom	Alliance	Party)	in	1945,	the	Conservative	Party	in	1949,	and	then	again	in	1965	following	political	appointments	during	the	Ibañez	and	Alessandri	administrations.	His	electoral	success	simply	would	not	have	been	possible	at	that	time	if	Mapuche	leaders	had	positioned	themselves	elsewhere	on	the	political	spectrum,	according	to	former	Corporación	Secretary	and	Inspector	of	Indigenous	Affairs,	Carlos	Huentequeo.		The	Conservative	Party	was	the	most	powerful	in	our	(region)…so	if	we	wanted	to	make	an	allegiance,	how	could	we	go	to	the	Socialist	Party	in	that	era,	or	to	the	Communist	Party?	They	had	no	power	here…so	we	aligned	ourselves	with	those	who	had	the	most	power,	to	achieve	something	with	that	power…and	that	is	what	our	people	never	understood.536		Although	Carlos	Ibañez	was	not	officially	a	member	of	the	Conservative	Party,	his	success	in	the	1952	presidential	election	stemmed	from	his	vague	representation	of	conservative	interests,	combined	with	electoral	frustration	with	partisan	political	coalitions	and	twelve	years	of	Radical	Party	control	since	Pedro	Aguirre	Cerda’s	Popular	Front	victory	in	1938.	During	the	administrations	of	Aguirre	Cerda	(1938-1941),	Juan	Antonio	Rios	(1942-1946)	and	Gabriel	Gonzalez	Videla	(1946-1952),	the	Chilean	economy	struggled	to	effectively	carry	out	import	substitution	development	schemes,	and	the	people	suffered	under	high	rates	of	inflation	that	accompanied	deficit	spending	by	the	government.	In	the	1952	election,	Ibañez	was	able	to	leverage	the	people’s	frustration	with	economic	stagnation	and	their	disenchantment	with	partisan	
																																																								536	Ancan,	p.	213.	
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political	bickering	by	establishing	himself	as	a	candidate	who	was	“above	petty	politics.”	In	addition,	he	promised	to	rein	in	government	spending	and	address	the	country’s	development	goals	by	reforming	state-owned	industrial	enterprises	and	government	lending	practices.	Although	his	platform	was	generally	conservative,	he	resisted	strict	ideological	classification,	and	received	electoral	support	from	across	the	political	spectrum.	Nevertheless,	Ibañez’s	broad	and	nondescript	populist	appeal	was	built	upon	his	political	legacy	that	spanned	a	generation.537	As	a	result	of	the	election	of	1952,	Carlos	Ibañez	del	Campo	was	returned	to	the	presidency	after	a	long	and	storied	thirty-year	career	in	Chilean	politics.	During	his	first	presidency	he	had	been	a	driving	force	behind	the	Ley	Indígena	1.469	of	1927	that	made	the	subdivision	of	indigenous	communal	landholdings	much	easier,	and	also	persecuted	Manuel	Aburto	and	his	Federación	Araucana.	But	following	the	ascent	of	the	Corporación	Araucana	under	Coñuepán’s	leadership,	Ibañez	rewarded	Venancio	for	his	support.	Following	an	overwhelming	victory	at	the	polls,	Ibañez	named	Coñuepán	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	an	important	position	for	a	Mapuche	politician	to	occupy	given	the	long	legacy	of	land	fraud	and	usurpation	associated	with	the	colonization	of	southern	Chile.	On	the	fifteenth	of	November,	1952,	Coñuepán	wrote	to	the	President	of	the	Cámara	de	Diputados	to	inform	him	
																																																								537	General	summaries	of	the	election	of	1952,	and	the	political	trends	that	coalesced	from	the	preceding	era	can	be	found	in	Brian	Loveman,	Chile:	The	Legacy	of	Hispanic	Capitalism,	
2nd	ed.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1988,	pp.	260-262,	Paul	Drake,	“Chile:	1930-1958,”	in	Leslie	Bethell,	ed.	Chile	Since	Independence,	Cambridge	UK:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1993,	pp.	122-124,	and	Collier	and	Sater,	pp.	251-254.	
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that	he	had	accepted	the	appointment,	and	thank	him	for	his	support	during	his	time	as	a	Deputy.538		Coñuepán	attempted	to	use	his	position	as	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	bring	together	many	branches	of	government	for	the	benefit	of	the	Mapuche	people	and	the	problems	they	faced.	Sometimes	those	efforts	were	relatively	small	and	came	about	as	reactions	to	specific	problems	or	grievances.	But	as	Minister	he	was	also	responsible	for	representing	many	other	interests,	including	those	of	non-Mapuche	indigenous	peoples,	Euro-Chilean	citizens	and	state-owned	property.	Although	Coñuepán	held	the	post	for	less	than	six	months,	his	time	as	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	helped	him	learn	how	to	navigate	overlapping	state	bureaucracies	and	allowed	him	to	expand	his	professional	network	within	the	government,	and	even	in	some	cases	outside	of	Chile.	While	serving	as	Minister	in	1953,	Coñuepán	proposed	projects	to	construct	houses,	study	soil	erosion,	the	effects	of	forestry	on	indígenas	and	expropriate	land	from	large	fondos	for	redistribution	to	smallholders.	He	boldly	requested	the	assistance	of	his	fellow	ministers	for	those	efforts.	“These	are	not	expenses,	but	create	wealth	for	the	state	and	help	solve	a	variety	of	social	problems,”	he	wrote	in	one	such	request.539	In	1952,	the	Ministry	of	National	Defense	requested	information	from	Land	and	Colonization	about	the	possibility	of	establishing	an	experimental	agricultural	station	to	carry	out	reforestation	on	Isla	de	Pascua.	That	proposal	included	the	sum	of	500,000	pesos	to	be	allocated	for	material	assistance																																																									538	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	President	of	Cámara,	Nov.	15,	1952.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3739.		539	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Finance,	Nov.	24,	1952.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3740.		
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to	indigenous	islanders.540	Later,	in	January	1953,	Coñuepán	allocated	300,000	pesos	to	provide	food	and	supplies	to	fifty	soldiers	who	were	working	on	a	forestation	project	in	the	Dunes	of	Chanco	in	the	Maule	region	(just	north	of	the	Araucanía)	over	a	ten-month	period.541	In	another	collaborative	effort,	Coñuepán	appointed	Jacques	Chonchol,	an	agronomist	who	later	became	Minister	of	Agriculture	during	the	presidency	of	Salvador	Allende,	to	lead	a	commission	studying	ways	that	the	armed	forces	could	contribute	to	public	works	projects.542	In	other	instances	Coñuepán’s	schemes	constituted	grander	projects,	like	the	request	he	made	of	the	Minister	of	Housing	for	the	large	sum	of	57	million	pesos.	While	many	of	these	efforts	were	intended	to	benefit	non-Mapuche	Chileans,	even	as	Minister,	Coñuepán	attempted	to	use	his	influence	to	aid	the	advancement	of	his	people.	In	many	instances	he	found	support	for	those	efforts	from	officials	in	other	branches	of	government.	Early	in	his	tenure	as	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Coñuepán	reached	out	to	the	Director	General	of	Internal	Taxation	to	request	the	suspension	of	land	seizures	from	indigenous	peasants	due	to	outstanding	tax	debts.	He	proposed	that	in	order	to	solve	a	“grave	social	problem,”	those	smallholders	should	have	their	back	taxes	and	outstanding	debts	cancelled.	He	blamed	their	inability	to	pay	on	their	extreme	poverty,	lack	of	farming	tools,	exhausted	soil	and	
																																																								540	Carlos	del	Rio	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Nov.	25,	1952.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3740.	It	is	worth	noting	that	those	indigenous	islanders	were	not	ethnically	Mapuche.	541	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Defense,	Jan.	10,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3883.		542	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Defense,	Dec.	5,	1952.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3741.		
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even	“ignorance	and	lack	of	culture.”543	In	some	cases,	settlement	and	division	of	indigenous	landholdings	resulted	from	the	need	to	pay	back	taxes,	but	in	other	instances	it	led	to	tax	and	debt	relief,	as	in	the	case	of	Alberto	and	Carlos	Chihuailaf	Railef	in	November	of	1952.544	Again	in	January	of	1953,	Coñuepán	requested	tax	and	debt	relief	for	other	“small	indigenous	farmers.”	He	argued	that	it	was	the	President’s	wish	that	agricultural	production	be	stimulated	and	seizing	their	land	would	have	the	opposite	effect.545		Under	Coñuepán’s	leadership,	local	and	regional	officials	delivered	grievances	to	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization.	That	was	the	case	of	a	correspondence	in	February	of	1953,	following	a	large	public	meeting	presided	over	by	local	officials	the	southern	town	of	La	Unión,	in	Ranco	Province.	Interestingly,	the	letter	was	addressed	to	the	President	of	the	Republic,	and	laid	out	demands	to	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	as	well	as	six	other	ministries.	But	Land	and	Colonization	was	listed	first,	and	Venancio	Coñuepán	was	the	only	minister	addressed	by	name	and	of	whom	the	complainants	demanded	a	personal	visit.	Their	request	illustrates	the	importance	of	Land	and	Colonization	in	the	rural	and	agricultural	south,	and	also	the	significance	of	Coñuepán’s	ethnic	identity	in	his	post	as	Minister.546		
																																																								543	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Director	General	of	Internal	Taxation,	Nov.	14,	1952.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3739.		544	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Carlos	del	Rio,	Nov.	17,	1952;	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	President	of	Cámara,	Nov.	26,	1952.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3739;	3740.		545	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Internal	Taxation,	Jan.	28,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3884.		546	Alejandro	Pozo	and	Norberto	Wehrt	to	President	of	Chile,	Feb.	17,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3840		
	238	
	
Coñuepán	also	fielded	complaints	from	indígenas	about	various	types	of	prejudicial	or	discriminatory	treatment,	such	as	insults	and	personal	attacks.	In	November	of	1952,	while	serving	as	Minister,	the	president	and	secretary	of	the	regional	headquarters	of	the	Corporación	Araucana	in	Malleco	registered	such	a	complaint.	547	Their	correspondence	indicated	that	Coñuepán’s	position	within	the	government	engendered	more	direct	access	to	state	authority	for	Mapuche	organizations,	especially	those	with	which	Coñuepán	had	been	personally	affiliated.	In	many	cases,	Coñuepán	or	his	subsecretaries	would	forward	those	complaints	to	the	Carabineros.548	As	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Coñuepán	also	had	opportunities	to	extend	his	reach	outside	of	the	Chilean	government	by	contributing	to	international	aid	and	development	efforts.	Throughout	the	1950s,	various	branches	of	the	Chilean	national	government	participated	in	efforts	to	improve	conditions	for	rural	peasants	by	cooperating	with	international	organizations	and	foreign	governments.	Those	interactions	made	clear	that	Chileans	were	participating	in	transnational	discourses	on	a	variety	of	subjects,	and	several	that	pertained	directly	to	indígenas.	But	it	is	striking	is	how	rarely	those	peasants	are	referred	to,	or	given	special	consideration,	as	indígenas.		In	September	of	1951,	José	Ramón	Astorga,	an	Inspector	working	for	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization,	participated	in	a	conference	on	land	tenure	in	the	Americas	at	the	University	of	Wisconsin,	Madison.	Nowhere	in	his	paper	does	he																																																									547	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Justice,	Nov.	15,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3739.	548	Raúl	Rodríguez	to	Dir.	Gen.	Carabineros,	Nov.	17,	1952;	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Carabineros,	May	14,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3739;	4176.		
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reference	indigenous	issues	as	relevant	to	land	tenure	questions	in	Chile.549	In	June	of	1953,	the	Minister	of	Education	wrote	to	the	Ministry	of	Exterior	Relations	requesting	passports	and	visas	for	five	primary	school	teachers	to	travel	to	Patzcuaro,	Mexico	to	attend	training	provided	by	CREFAL,	an	institution	organized	under	the	auspices	of	UNESCO	to	provide	training	to	teachers	in	rural	settings.	In	that	communication,	no	mention	of	where	the	teachers	were	to	work	or	what	ethnic	identity	they	claimed	was	identified.550		It	was	apparent,	however	that	in	the	context	of	the	Cold	War,	the	United	States	was	calling	for	agrarian	reform	in	countries	where	communist	elements	threatened	the	peace	and	stability	of	the	region.	Pasted	into	the	records	of	the	Ministry	of	National	Property	is	an	article	from	El	Mercurio	dated	December	1,	1951,	in	which	U.S.	Secretary	of	State	Dean	Acheson	made	the	argument	that	such	action	by	developing	countries	could	forestall	communist	uprisings.551	In	addition,	General	Ramón	Cañas	Montalva	of	the	Panamerican	Institute	of	Geography	and	History,	the	indigenista	who	had	assisted	Lipschütz’s	team	during	his	Tierra	del	Fuego	mission	and	later	became	president	of	the	Chilean	Indigenista	Institute,	communicated	with	Coñuepán	in	January	of	1953,	asking	for	his	cooperation	with	studies	they	were	conducting.	Montalva	was	bringing	a	team	to	Chile	later	that	month	to	assess	the	country’s	natural	resources	and	asked	for	the	Ministry’s	support,	suggestions	and	cooperation	in	their	work.	In	his	letter	introducing	the	team,	he	referenced	the																																																									549	Documents	related	to	José	Ramón	Astorga’s	attendance	at	land	tenure	conference,	Sep.	1951.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3830.		550	Minister	of	Education	to	Minister	of	Foreign	Relations,	Jun.	16,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Educación,	Libro	12261.		551	News	clipping,	El	Mercurio,	Dec.	1,	1951.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3830.		
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importance	of	their	work	to	improving	the	health	and	livelihood	of	working	classes,	but	not	peasant	farmers	or	Indians.552	That	characterization	is	consistent	with	the	priority	of	stimulating	economic	development	on	an	industrial	scale,	and	the	shift	from	integrated	development	projects	to	targeted	economic	development	that	was	a	dominant	trend	in	the	post-War	era.	Yet	as	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Coñuepán’s	participation	in	some	inter-American	dialogues	related	to	agriculture	and	rural	development	began	to	specifically	mention	indigenous	land	tenure.		In	April	of	1953,	the	Director	General	of	the	Ministry	wrote	to	the	judges	presiding	over	Indian	Courts	in	Pitrufquén	and	Temuco	to	request	data	about	indigenous	land	holdings	and	agricultural	challenges	in	preparation	for	a	“Seminar	on	Latin	American	Indians.”	The	judges	wrote	back	with	fairly	detailed	statistics	on	population	and	hectares	under	cultivation,	indicating	that	the	main	problems	faced	by	Indians	stemmed	from	excessive	division	and	exploitation	of	land	and	the	degradation	of	soils	that	resulted	from	it.	However,	this	interaction	took	place	between	the	Ministry	and	two	judges	under	its	charge,	rather	than	scientists	or	technicians	who	seemed	to	dominate	conversations	about	rational	management	of	national	resources	to	the	exclusion	of	indigenous	peoples.553	Thus	we	can	see	that	indigenous	identity	tended	not	to	be	broadly	referenced	in	inter-ministry	or	international	correspondence,	but	was	more	frequently	referenced	in	dialogues	within	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization.	That																																																									552	Ramóne	Cañas	Montalva	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Jan.	23,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3884.		553	Dir.	Gen.	Land	and	Colonization	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Pitrufquén,	Apr.	28,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3840		
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recognition	leads	us	to	conclude	that	debates	about	the	welfare	of	peasants	in	the	countryside,	as	well	as	those	pertaining	to	urban	migration	and	economic	development,	often	neglected	to	address	problems	as	“indigenous.”	Instead,	they	glossed	over	racial	and	ethnic	divisions	within	Chilean	society.	Coñuepán	recognized	that	tendency,	and	for	that	reason	fought	hard	for	the	creation	of	an	official	government	agency	dedicated	to	helping	indigenous	Chileans,	and	specifically	the	large	population	of	Mapuche	in	the	rural	south.	Within	six	months	of	his	appointment	as	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Coñuepán	would	get	the	chance	to	lead	the	newly	created	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs.	In	that	role	he	would	be	able	to	expand	his	efforts	to	problems	faced	by	his	people,	and	in	doing	so	he	would	contine	to	collaborate	with	other	ministries	on	a	variety	of	projects,	although	his	efforts	to	connect	to	the	broader	transnational	indigenista	network	were	stymied.			
Government	Reorganization	of	1953	In	the	first	year	of	his	presidency	Ibañez	undertook	a	substantial	reorganization	of	the	government.	In	order	to	carry	out	his	campaign	promises	of	fiscal	responsibility	and	the	reform	of	bloated	and	inefficient	government	agencies,	Ley	11.151	gave	the	president	the	power	to	reorganize	all	branches	of	the	public	administration	for	a	period	of	six	months,	and	set	the	number	of	employees	in	each	agency.554	In	addition,	the	law	gave	the	president	the	power	to	set	certain	rents	and	prices,	as	well	as	regulate	interest	rates	and	foreign	investment	for	a	period	of	one	
																																																								554	Ley	11.151,	Art.	1,	Feb.	3,	1953.	Biblioteca	del	Congreso	Nacional,	http://bcn.cl/1vsc8,	accessed	Nov.	19,	2017.	
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year.555	As	Ibañez	carried	out	the	reform	of	public	administration,	a	fair	amount	of	chaos	and	uncertainty	ensued	on	the	part	of	public	employees	of	the	agencies	being	restructured.	Over	the	next	several	months,	numerous	personnel	had	their	positions	eliminated,	consolidated	or	altered.	According	to	many	documents	from	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization,	the	restructuring	of	government	made	it	impossible	for	the	Ministry	to	continue	carrying	out	the	normal	functions	required	of	them.	Capable	administrators	like	Carlos	del	Rio,	Director	General	of	Land	and	Colonization,	were	replaced	and	others	simply	quit	because	they	found	it	impossible	to	do	their	jobs	with	the	time	and	resources	allotted	to	them.	556			As	they	were	appointed	and	began	their	duties,	the	new	officers	within	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	began	to	point	out	errors	in	the	original	plan.	Only	one	week	after	assuming	his	charge,	the	new	Director	General	of	Land	and	Colonization	Victor	Chaves	Dailhe	wrote	to	the	Minister	to	point	out	that	the	employees	in	his	service	were	struggling	with	low	morale	and	less	productivity.	Among	other	things,	they	did	not	have	access	to	background	information	in	the	cases	they	were	trying	to	resolve,	and	in	some	instances	the	superiors	in	the	provincial	offices	were	of	lesser	rank	than	those	they	supervised.557	Two	months	later,	Chaves	Dailhe	wrote	to	the	Minister	again,	suggesting	that	the	President	should	promulgate	a	new	decree	law	to	rectify	the	mistakes	made	in	the	original	
																																																								555	Ley	11.151,	Art.	6.	556	Documents	related	Carlos	del	Rio’s	resignation,	Mar.	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3886.		557	Documents	related	to	personnel	and	reorganization	of	1953,	Mar.	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3886.		
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reorganization	scheme.558	He	followed	that	with	a	letter	detailing	complaints	against	an	incompetent	boss	in	the	Temuco	office,	who	continued	in	his	post	despite	his	lack	of	experience	and	expertise,	and	numerous	infractions	of	protocol.559	A	year	later,	those	problems	persisted.	In	his	letter	of	resignation	in	July	of	1954,	sub-secretary	of	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	Francisco	Javier	Fermandois	complained	that	the	goals	of	the	1953	reorganization	of	the	ministry	had	not	been	realized	because	it	operated	with	insufficient	funds	and	personnel.	He	added	that	he	himself	often	worked	outside	of	the	regular	business	day	to	fulfill	the	duties	of	his	position.560	Soon	after	taking	over	as	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	in	January	of	1953,	Venancio	Coñuepán	requested	a	report	from	the	general	office	of	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization.	That	report	provided	a	number	of	suggestions	for	reorganizing	the	offices,	personnel	and	their	duties	within	the	Ministry.	At	that	time,	there	were	no	specific	provisions	for	staff	or	functions	dedicated	to	indigenous	affairs.561	But	on	April	25,	1953,	Ibañez	promulgated	Decree	Law	56,	which	created	the	Dirección	de	Asuntos	Indígenas	as	a	dependency	within	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization.	The	law	charged	DASIN	with	carrying	out	the	settlement	and	subdivision	of	indigenous	communities,	and	liquidation	of	credit	according	to	the	provisions	of	Ley	Indígena	4.111	of	1931.	Because	Ley	4.111	created	the	Indian																																																									558	Victor	Chaves	Dailhe	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Jun.	5,	1956.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3887.		559	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Victor	Chaves	Dailhe,	Jun.	6,	1956.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3887.		560	Francisco	Javier	Fermandois	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Jul.	28,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3954.		561	Carlos	del	Rio	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Jan.	24,	27,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3884.		
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Courts	as	a	mechanism	for	carrying	out	those	tasks,	Decree	56	effectively	placed	DASIN	in	charge	of	those	courts.	The	agency	would	be	staffed	with	a	total	of	five	employees,	including	one	director	and	one	attorney.	In	addition,	Decree	56	gave	DASIN	the	power	to	“supervise	the	rational	economic	exploitation	of	agricultural	lands”	and	“establish	cooperatives,	organizations	or	associations	of	an	economic	character”	to	carry	out	that	supervision.562	Although	simply	stated	in	a	one-page	decree,	those	powers	were	for	the	first	time	placed	solely	in	the	hands	of	an	indigenous	representative,	and	for	Coñuepán	it	must	have	seemed	like	the	most	significant	accomplishment	for	his	people	in	a	generation,	at	least	since	the	Ley	Indígena	1.469	was	reformed	in	1931.	Coñuepán	began	his	tenure	as	Director	of	DASIN	with	great	optimism	and	vibrant	energy.	Although	headquartered	in	Santiago,	he	began	making	weekly	trips	to	the	south	and	for	a	time	spent	Friday	through	Monday	in	Temuco,	only	returning	to	the	offices	in	Santiago	midweek.563	That	schedule	enabled	him	to	visit	the	courts,	judges	and	advocates	who	worked	under	him	in	the	new	bureaucracy.	In	the	field,	he	endeavored	to	meet	personally	with	indígenas	who	sought	his	help	and	advice	and	to	remain	available	for	consultation.	However,	once	in	the	role	of	Director,	Coñuepán	struggled	to	lead	an	office	with	a	poorly	defined	mission,	shortages	of	staff	and	resources,	all	the	while	meeting	resistance	from	entrenched	interests	in	the	south.	
																																																								562	Decreto	con	Fuerza	de	Ley	56,	Arts.	1,	4	and	3,		Apr.	25,	1953,	Biblioteca	del	Congreso	Nacional,	http://bcn.cl/22psp,	accessed	Nov.	19,	2017.	563	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Oct.	30,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3895.		
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More	than	a	year	after	its	creation,	the	functions	of	DASIN	were	still	being	worked	out,	and	Coñuepán	found	it	necessary	to	delineate	the	exact	role	of	the	office	and	himself	as	its	Director.	In	a	three-page	letter	to	the	new	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	he	sorted	through	apparent	contradictions	in	indigenous	law	and	overlapping	roles	for	DASIN	and	the	Juzgados	de	Indios	under	its	authority.	He	went	on	to	characterize	the	role	of	DASIN	as	having	a	“protectionist	orientation,”	and	argued	that	such	was	the	intent	of	President	Ibañez	when	he	created	it,	“because	on	many	occasions	(Ibañez)	publicly	demonstrated	his	favor	for	the	rights	of	indígenas,	in	his	first	administration	and	the	current	one,	in	a	way	that	indígenas	have	always	had	faith	in	his	integrity,	patriotism	and	spirit	of	justice.”564	In	that	way	Coñuepán	constructed	Ibañez	as	a	defender	of	Indians,	the	way	he	had	done	when	he	campaigned	for	him	in	1952,	“comparing	him	to	Franklin	Roosevelt	and	Mexico’s	Lázaro	Cárdenas.”565	Implicit	in	his	statement	is	the	argument	that	in	order	for	Mapuche	to	integrate	into	the	political	system	on	a	footing	equal	to	white	Chileans	they	required	special	protections	to	compensate	for	a	legacy	of	injustice	and	ongoing	discrimination.	At	the	national	level,	Coñuepán’s	political	clout	stemmed	from	his	ability	to	deliver	Mapuche	votes	to	Ibañez	in	presidential	campaigns.	Indeed,	his	ability	to	do	so	led	directly	to	his	ministerial	appointment	and	also	the	creation	of	DASIN.	But	once	in	the	role	of	Director,	he	had	little	political	capital	to	exchange	with	other	branches	of	government	to	get	things	done.	On	the	occasion	of	the	second																																																									564	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Aug.	29,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4027.		565	Albó,	p.	820.	
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anniversary	of	Carlos	Ibañez	del	Campo’s	election	to	the	presidency,	Coñuepán	wrote	a	flattering	tribute	to	the	organizer	of	a	committee	to	celebrate	the	anniversary,	“by	his	help	and	valiant	defense…he	has	always	protected	our	natives,	like	no	other	president	of	Chile	has	done.”566	Although	he	regretted	that	DASIN	could	not	play	a	more	central	role	in	the	celebration	given	the	shortage	of	time	and	funds,	he	did	promise	to	attend	along	with	the	Mapuche	Diputados	Esteban	Romero	and	José	Cayupi,	and	a	delegation	from	the	Corporación	Araucana.			
The	Role	of	DASIN	within	the	State	A	large	part	of	Coñuepán’s	work	in	government,	first	as	a	Deputy,	then	as	a	Minister	and	ultimately	as	Director	of	DASIN,	included	serving	as	an	interlocutor	between	individual	Mapuche	complainants	and	various	branches	of	the	government.567	The	creation	of	the	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs	institutionalized	that	role,	which	testified	to	the	trust	and	credibility	he	maintained	with	those	he	served,	and	also	the	fact	that	indígenas	had	experienced	difficulty	having	their	grievances	addressed	by	the	courts	and	other	officials	that	were	supposed	to	resolve	their	disputes.568	That	work	required	his	presence	in	the	south,	so	by	October	1953	
																																																								566	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	German	Sanhueza	Correa,	Oct.	25,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4029.		567	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Temuco,	Jan.	4,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4020.		568	Venancio	Coñuepán	weekly	report,	Oct.	17,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3894.		
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Coñuepán	requested	to	close	the	office	in	Santiago	on	Mondays	and	Fridays,	so	he	could	work	in	Temuco	over	the	long	weekend.569	Coñuepán	filed	weekly	reports	that	detailed	the	work	completed	in	the	DASIN	office,	which	provide	insight	into	the	goals	and	challenges	of	the	agency	and	his	work.570	At	the	end	of	the	year,	Coñuepán	submitted	an	annual	report,	detailing	the	agency’s	accomplishments	and	outlining	goals	for	the	future.	The	first	of	those,	submitted	in	March	of	1955,	summarized	the	number	and	types	of	communications	sent	and	general	schedule	of	meetings	held.	It	also	indicated	the	type	of	work	undertaken:	awarding	grants	to	indigenous	students,	working	to	protect	indigenous	property	(especially	forests),	facilitating	the	construction	of	schools,	houses	and	roads,	and	awarding	55	million	pesos	in	loans	for	indigenous	agricultural	efforts.	He	summarized	the	work	of	the	various	Juzgados	de	Indios	under	his	jurisdiction.	The	future	plans	that	Coñuepán	identified	were	ambitious	and	seemed	to	require	more	funds	than	were	imminently	available.	Coñuepán	noted	in	closing	that	the	important	work	of	the	office	was	hampered	by	a	shortage	of	personnel	and	a	lack	of	funds.571	Although	his	judicial	appointments	had	to	be	approved	by	the	Minister	and	President,	Coñuepán	appointed	some	personnel	directly,	for	example	the	Inspectors	of	Indigenous	Affairs.572	That	was	a	new	position	within	the	Ministry,	and	the	primary	role	of	the	Inspectors	was	to	address	land	problems	and	intervene	on																																																									569	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Oct.	30,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3895.		570		Venancio	Coñuepán,	letters	sent	Oct.-Nov.	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libros	3894-3897.		571	Venancio	Coñuepán,	annual	report,	Mar.	17,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4173.		572	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Controller,	Oct.	9,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3894		
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Indians’	behalf	in	credit	issues	with	the	Agricultural	Credit	Fund.573	As	the	Office	undertook	its	work,	requests	for	the	appointment	of	more	inspectors	were	regularly	made.	In	many	cases	those	came	attached	to	other	requests,	such	as	in	the	letter	sent	to	Coñuepán	by	L.	Amaza	and	J.	Cheuquihue	in	October	of	1953.	Their	letter	indicates	they	had	also	communicated	their	request	to	Esteban	Romero	as	a	Diputado	representing	them	and	also	the	President	of	the	Corporación	Araucana.574	Those	communications	show	how	institutionalized	this	cadre	of	Mapuche	leaders	had	become,	and	how	their	official	roles	overlapped	with	their	personal	connections	and	Mapuche	identity.		Much	of	Coñuepán’s	correspondence	in	the	first	years	of	DASIN	involved	receiving	and	forwarding	complaints	and	requests	that	indígenas	in	the	south	sent	him.	In	June	of	1954	he	reached	out	to	the	Juez	de	Indios	(Indian	Court	Judge)	in	Pitrufquén	to	bring	a	halt	to	some	logging	activity	that	was	unsanctioned.575	He	wrote	to	an	official	at	the	National	Archives	to	request	a	copy	of	a	1934	Decree	Law	on	behalf	of	a	community	who	needed	it	to	protect	their	land.576	Coñuepán	also	sent	two	letters	to	the	Director	General	of	Primary	Education	in	the	Ministry	of	Education,	first	to	ask	for	clarification	as	to	why	a	request	to	found	a	new	school	had	been	denied,	then	to	forward	a	complaint	against	a	teacher	who	was	accused	of	
																																																								573	Venancio	Coñuepán,	weekly	report,	Oct.	13,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3894.		574	L.	Amaza	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Oct.	14,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3895.		575	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Pitrufquén,	Jun.	3,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4024.		576	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Nactional	Archives,	Jun.	4,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4024.		
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trying	to	usurp	land	from	the	comuneros.577	Coñuepán	also	used	his	office	to	keep	tabs	on	ongoing	legal	cases,	as	in	the	case	of	Andrés	Huaiquimil,	where	he	simply	requested	an	update.578	In	other	instances,	Coñuepán’s	interventions	seemed	to	take	on	more	of	a	tone	of	requesting	or	even	dictating	certain	actions.	In	the	case	of	Maria	Cayupi	Neculman,	he	suggested	in	a	pretty	direct	way	that	the	judge	should	evict	the	offending	party.579	While	he	had	the	authority	to	supervise	and	manage	the	courts,	telling	a	judge	how	to	rule	would	almost	certainly	have	been	perceived	as	overstepping	his	authority.	Coñuepán	regularly	received	complaints	about	unjust	legal	action	and	requests	for	legal	help.	In	some	cases	he	simply	forwarded	the	complaint	to	the	appropriate	person.	In	the	case	of	Alejandro	Hueichaqueo,	who	was	being	repeatedly	harassed	through	the	courts,	Coñuepán	forwarded	his	telegram	to	the	Juez	de	Indios	in	Temuco.580	In	other	instances	he	contacted	judges	and	other	officials	personally	and	tried	to	move	things	along.	When	he	learned	that	someone	was	trying	to	collect	taxes	unjustly	from	Indians	in	Ranquilhue,	he	wrote	the	Director	General	of	Internal	Taxation	to	ask	him	to	investigate.581	In	other	instances,	requests	were	formulated	by	groups	or	communities	and	sent	to	Coñuepán,	whom	they	viewed	as	a	representative.	He	would	then	forward	the	requests	to	the																																																									577	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Primary	Education,	Jun.	5,	9,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4024.		578	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Temuco,	Feb.	11,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4172.		579	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Pitrufquén,	Jun.	3,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4024.		580	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Temuco,	Jan.	14,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4170.		581	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Internal	Taxation,	Jan.	15,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4170.		
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appropriate	officials	in	government.	In	May	of	1954,	Coñuepán	wrote	to	the	Agricultural	Department	of	the	Bank	of	State	to	request	the	addition	of	a	staff	person	in	the	Traiguén	office	dedicated	to	servicing	credit	to	indigenous	peasants.	In	that	instance,	Coñuepán	was	forwarding	a	request	from	a	group	of	small	farmers	in	the	area	of	Paillahue,	who	were	seeking	to	increase	yields	and	improve	their	land.582	The	next	letter	he	sent	(on	the	same	day)	was	to	an	official	in	the	Ministry	of	Education,	requesting	assistance	with	a	school	matter	for	a	group	of	parents,	also	from	Paillahue.583	Although	the	original	requests	that	he	forwarded	are	not	included	in	the	record,	they	fit	a	pattern	of	indígenas	using	Coñuepán	and	DASIN	as	advocates	and	go-betweens	with	the	state.		Coñuepán	would	also	attempt	to	use	his	influence	within	the	government	to	encourage	officials	in	positions	of	specific	authority	to	take	particular	action.	On	many	occasions	Coñuepán	brought	abuses	by	court	officials	directly	to	the	Minister’s	attention.584	In	1955,	he	lobbied	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	curtail	the	practice	of	using	the	courts	to	harass	Indians	through	litigation,	which	caused	“recurring	distress	and	expense	for	members	of	the	community.”585	In	addition,	over	the	years	the	actual	jurisdictional	boundaries	of	Juzgados	de	Indios	were	changed.	Sometimes	those	changes	were	undertaken	to	make	their	function	more	efficient	in	keeping	with	natural	geographic	considerations,	which	was	the																																																									582	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Bank	of	Chile,	May	28,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4024.		583	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Temuco,	May	28,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4024.		584	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Sep.	4,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4027.		585	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	May	28,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4176.		
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explicit	reason	given	by	the	Director	General	in	1952.586	However,	that	practice	also	presented	opportunities	to	manipulate	outcomes	and	increase	or	decrease	the	authority	of	particular	agents.	Coñuepán’s	work	as	Director	was	also	hampered	by	interpersonal	conflicts	and	the	failure	of	some	within	the	courts	to	adequately	carry	out	their	charge	to	protect	indígenas	under	their	jurisdiction.	Coñuepán	and	the	Dirección	de	Asuntos	Indígenas	were	not	always	able	to	fix	the	broken	state	apparatuses	that	led	to	the	loss	of	indigenous	land	and	the	ongoing	frustration	of	indígenas	seeking	restitution	through	the	courts	and	the	government.	In	1958,	as	the	Ibañez	government	was	drawing	to	a	close,	the	account	of	Doña	Rosa	Licopan	Neculqueo	bore	witness	to	that	reality.	Doña	Rosa	had	travelled	all	the	way	to	Santiago	to	request	an	audience	with	Coñuepán	and	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	personally.	In	April,	Lorenzo	Lemunguier,	another	Mapuche	politician	and	representative	of	the	Corporación	who	was	at	the	time	serving	as	Acting	Director	of	DASIN,	wrote	to	the	Juez	de	Indios	of	Temuco	requesting	that	he	take	action	and	find	a	permanent	resolution	to	her	case.587	Coñuepán’s	intercessions	extended	to	very	personal	and	peculiar	needs	of	his	indigenous	constituents.	In	September	of	1954	he	responded	to	a	complaint	forwarded	to	him	by	the	mayor	of	the	small	town	of	Galvarino	by	requesting	that	the	director	of	a	psychiatric	hospital	admit	the	indígena	Manuel	Quintriqueo	Nahuelñir.	He	claimed	that	Quintriqueo’s	“freedom	in	this	state	constitutes	a	danger	to	the	people,”	and	that	“in	my	role	as	Director	of	Asuntos	Indígenas,	I	have	the	obligation																																																									586	Carlos	del	Rio	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Nov.	1952-Feb.	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libros	3739,	3844		587	Lorenzo	Lemunguier	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Temuco,	Apr.	24,	1958.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4520.		
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to	find	a	solution	to	this	problem.”588	That	type	of	personal	care	and	intervention	seems	to	be	what	Coñuepán	did	best	in	his	role	as	Director	of	DASIN.	He	was	clearly	very	invested	in	it,	often	working	all	weekend	long	to	reach	out	and	remain	personally	accessible	to	indígenas	in	the	south.	Coñuepán’s	style	of	political	patronage	was	indicative	of	the	era	in	which	he	operated,	and	also	Mapuche	traditions	of	political	leadership	inherent	to	the	role	of	the	longko.	Of	the	personal	requests	for	assistance	that	he	received,	land	claims	and	disputes	consumed	much	of	Coñuepán’s	time	at	DASIN.589	Oftentimes,	individuals	would	solicit	the	aid	of	the	office	in	prompting	action	from	the	Juzgado,	which	otherwise	was	slow	to	act.	Interventions	often	consisted	of	referring	complainants	to	other	branches	of	government	or	other	offices	within	the	Ministry	to	stimulate	a	response,	as	was	the	case	with	Pedro	Morales,	who	had	been	attempting	to	obtain	redress	for	ten	years	following	the	division	of	his	community	in	1940-41.590	After	the	reorganization	of	1953,	DASIN	took	over	much	of	that	work.	It	seems	that	Coñuepán	thought	his	role	as	Director	of	DASIN	would	elevate	and	streamline	those	efforts.	However,	in	some	ways	it	may	have	actually	served	to	cordon	them	off	and	marginalize	his	effectiveness.	Even	though	some	Mapuche	lands	had	been	illegally	absorbed	into	other	properties,	and	though	all	conditions	for	the	expropriation	of	those	plots	were	met,	the	actual	carrying	out	of	the	restitution	was	often	held	up	by	lack	of	funds	available	from	the	state	to	compensate	those	who	had	usurped	the																																																									588	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Psychiatric	Hospital,	Sep.	25,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4027.		589	Carlos	del	Rio	to	Juzgado	de	Indios,	Temuco,	Nov.	1952.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3739.		590	Documents	related	to	Pedro	Morales	case,	Dec.	1952-May	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3830.		
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land	in	the	first	place.591	For	example,	in	order	to	bring	about	the	expropriation	of	land,	Coñuepán	had	to	request	action	from	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization.592	Ministers	and	their	Directors	General	did	not	have	the	protection	of	indigenous	interests	as	their	top	priority,	rather	they	represented	a	broad	variety	of	interests,	as	evidenced	by	Coñuepán’s	own	work	when	he	was	Minister.		Another	significant	aspect	of	Coñuepán’s	career	was	his	effort	to	reform	the	way	in	which	Mapuche	farmers	borrowed	money.	As	far	back	as	the	1930s	he	had	created	and	promoted	an	indigenous	credit	fund	under	the	auspices	of	the	Sociedad	Caupolicán.	The	fund	facilitated	the	lending	of	money	between	Mapuche.593	Working	within	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	in	the	1950s,	he	interfaced	with	creditors	and	tax	collectors	to	ease	the	burden	and	diminish	consequences	of	debt	peonage.594	To	an	extent,	Coñuepán’s	efforts	to	reform	lending	practices	to	Mapuche	smallholders	were	also	supported	by	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization.	In	January	of	1955,	the	Minister	authorized	the	vice-president	of	the	State	Bank	to	release	30	million	pesos	in	loans	to	indígenas	to	support	the	“organization	of	indigenous	property.”595	Although	it	is	not	clear	toward	what	purposes	those	loans	were	intended,	or	whether	they	enabled	communities	to	keep	their	lands	together	or	facilitated	the	division	of	community	land,	Coñuepán	did	find	support	for	some	of	his	efforts	from	the	Ministers	under	whom	he	worked.																																																									591	Chief	Counsel,	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Mar.	9,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4173.		592	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	May	12,	1955.		593	Albó,	818.	594	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Internal	Taxation	and	Vice	Pres.	Agricultural	Fund,	Nov.	14,	1952.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3739.		595	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Temuco,	Jan.	14,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4170.		
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Coñuepán	also	communicated	regularly	with	the	legal	department	of	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization.	In	early	1954,	he	requested	a	legal	opinion	from	the	General	Counsel	on	the	question	of	whether	or	not	indígenas	could	form	and/or	join	agricultural	cooperatives,	in	light	of	the	special	protection	guaranteed	them	by	the	Ley	Indígena	of	1931.	In	May,	he	received	a	response,	stating	that	yes	they	could	indeed	form	and/or	join	cooperatives.	Importantly,	they	could	also	borrow	against	their	land,	counsel	advised,	so	long	as	they	were	constituted	as	limited	liability	partnerships.	Proscriptions	on	dividing	communally	owned	land	established	by	the	1931	law	made	unlimited	liability	partnerships	invalid,	because	land	could	not	be	sold	or	forfeited	to	pay	off	debts	incurred.	Using	this	line	of	argument,	Counsel	affirmed	the	constitutional	equality	of	indígenas	as	individual	citizens,	and	neither	afforded	them	special	consideration	nor	special	restrictions	stemming	from	their	ethnic	identity.596	In	order	to	proactively	cultivate	relationships	with	leaders	in	other	branches	of	government,	Coñuepán	utilized	personal	connections	and	relationships	developed	during	his	time	as	an	elected	official.	In	April	of	1954,	he	wrote	a	lengthy	and	flattering	note	to	Jorge	Ardiles	Galdames,	Director	General	of	the	Carabineros,	in	celebration	of	the	twenty-seventh	anniversary	of	that	institution,	in	which	he	referenced	their	long	friendship.597	The	following	month,	Coñuepán	wrote	Ardiles	again,	that	time	to	request	the	appointment	of	“four	men	of	my	race”	who	wished	to	
																																																								596	Venancio	Coñuepán	correspondence	with	Chief	Counsel,	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	May	10,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4023.		597	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Carabineros,	Apr.	27,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4023.		
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join	the	Carabineros,	making	explicit	reference	to	their	ethnic	identity.598	A	week	later	he	wrote	again,	apologizing	profusely	for	the	imposition,	acknowledging	that	“although	this	constantly	asking	you	to	fill	vacancies	in	the	Carabineros	with	men	of	my	race	is	bordering	on	nonsense,	I	have	no	choice	but	to	continue	in	order	to	meet	the	requests	of	those	who	ask,	and	meanwhile	the	General	Office	of	the	Carabineros	continues	to	keep	me	in	its	good	graces.”599	In	June,	he	sent	a	fourth	request,	once	again	referencing	their	friendship	and	the	magnanimous	gesture	that	Ardiles’s	assistance	demonstrated.600	At	least	some	of	those	requests	seem	to	have	been	granted,	because	later	in	the	year	he	reached	out	to	Ardiles	again	to	relay	a	transfer	request	for	the	Carabinero	Domingo	Ñanco	Huenuhueque	from	that	officer’s	father.601		Coñuepán	also	had	the	power	to	grant	favors	directly.	He	was	involved	in	securing	a	property	in	Loncoche	to	build	quarters	for	the	Carabineros,	and	then	reached	out	to	the	Mayor	of	Loncoche,	don	Arturo	Coñuepán	(relation	unknown),	letting	him	know	that	the	Minister	of	Public	Works	was	about	to	expropriate	a	parcel	there	for	that	purpose.602	He	lent	his	support	to	a	variety	of	development	efforts,	including	the	electrification	of	the	city	of	Loncoche.603	In	November	of	1953,																																																									598	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Carabineros,	May	5,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4023.		599	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Carabineros,	May	13,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4023.		600	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Carabineros,	Jun.	10,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4024.		601	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Carabineros,	Sep.	11,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4027.		602	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Arturo	Coñuepán,	Sep.	8,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4027.		603	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Governor	of	Loncoche,	Oct.	29,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro		
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Coñuepán	forwarded	a	request	for	a	subsidy	from	the	director	of	a	school	in	Puifú	directly	to	the	Minister	of	Education.	He	noted	in	his	letter	that	the	director	asked	Coñuepán	to	write	before	sending	his	own	request,	“so	that	(the	request)	would	be	executed	as	quickly	as	possible.”604	In	late	1959,	Coñuepán	sent	several	more	letters	to	the	Minister	of	Education,	requesting	that	property	be	leased	to	an	indigenous	community	for	a	school,	and	that	a	school	in	Temuco	be	subsidized	by	the	Ministry	of	Education.	Coñuepán	also	used	DASIN	to	check	the	power	of	other	branches	of	the	federal	government	where	indígenas	were	concerned.	In	September	of	1956,	he	wrote	to	the	Ministry	of	Public	Works	to	request	background	documents	concerning	the	seizure	of	land	from	a	Mapuche	community	for	the	construction	of	a	railroad.605	More	significantly,	he	regularly	received	complaints	about	abuse	of	power	on	the	part	of	Carabineros	in	the	south.	In	addition	to	making	many	requests	of	his	friend	Jorge	Ardiles	Galdames	for	the	appointment	of	indigenous	Carabineros,	Coñuepán	also	repeatedly	asked	him	to	intervene	in	an	ongoing	pattern	of	abuse.	Reporting	such	a	case	in	November	of	1954,	Coñuepán	added,		“I	have	been	made	aware	of	many	cases	such	as	these,	committed	against	indigenous	citizens,	by	functionaries	who	have	not	upheld	the	honorable	and	noble	mission	of	the	Carabineros	de	Chile,	that	correspond	to	the	carrying	out	of	life	in	our	country.	For	those	reasons	I	ask	one	more	time,	Mr.	Director,	take	appropriate	actions…instruct	your	people	in	the	southern	provinces	to	give	greater	consideration	to	the	modest	indigenous	peasants,	who	are	often	maligned	and	mistreated	without	any	cause.”606																																																										604	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Education,	Nov.	30,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3897.		605	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Ministry	of	Public	Works,	Sep.	6,	1956.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4303.		606	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Carabineros,	Nov.	12,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4029.		
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In	some	instances,	reports	of	such	mistreatment	came	to	Coñuepán	directly	and	personally.	At	other	times	he	acted	upon	more	general	and	public	information,	for	example	sending	Aldines	a	newspaper	clipping	detailing	alleged	abuses.607	In	addition	to	ongoing	social	tensions	between	indígenas	and	Euro-Chileans	in	the	south,	DASIN	struggled	with	the	perennial	problems	related	to	the	meager	funds	allocated	to	sustain	their	operations.	Although	the	Dirección	de	Asuntos	Indígenas	cooperated	with	many	other	officials	in	the	execution	of	its	duties,	the	overlapping	authority	and	expenses	seemed	to	regularly	impede	efficient	operations.	Following	the	creation	of	DASIN,	employees	of	the	office	loaned	their	services	to	other	branches	of	government,	which	had	to	be	reported	to	the	Treasury,	presumably	so	their	wages	and	expenses	could	be	billed	out.	For	example,	in	October	of	1953	four	Inspectors	were	loaned	to	the	Juzgados	of	Temuco	and	Pitrufquen.608	In	May	of	1954,	Coñuepán	wrote	the	Juezes	de	Indios	in	Temuco	and	Pitrufquén,	informing	them	of	several	layoffs	in	their	courts	because	DASIN	did	not	have	enough	funds	to	pay	their	salaries.609	Shortages	of	vehicles,	drivers	and	funds	for	maintenance	and	repairs	also	seem	to	be	recurrent	themes	in	Coñuepán’s	requests.610	
																																																								607	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Carabineros,	Nov.	17,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4029.		608	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Oct.	17,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3894.		609	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Jueces	de	Indios,	Temuco	and	Pitrufquén,	May	13,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4023.		610	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Mar.	23,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4173.		
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Regional	agents	also	attempted	to	protect	their	meager	budgets	by	billing	travel	costs	back	to	DASIN.611	When	duties	carried	an	Inspector	outside	the	jurisdiction	of	a	particular	court,	judges	would	sometimes	request	that	personnel	be	added	or	redistributed	between	courts.612	In	August	of	1953,	the	Director	of	the	Office	of	National	Land	and	Property	Victor	Chaves	Dailhe	formally	asked	the	new	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	order	the	return	of	a	vehicle	that	Coñuepán	had	loaned	to	the	Juzgado	de	Indios	in	Temuco.613	That	request	prompted	Coñuepán	to	submit	a	lengthy	letter	justifying	the	Inspector’s	need	for	a	vehicle	to	his	new	boss,	and	pitting	him	against	his	former	employee,	Chaves	Dailhe.614	Because	DASIN’s	jurisdiction	extended	into	more	aspects	of	indigenous	life,	Coñuepán’s	role	gave	him	influence	into	a	broader	array	of	options,	for	example	advising	judges	on	particular	points	of	logging	contracts.615	The	development	of	the	forestry	industry	in	southern	Chile	provides	a	window	into	the	relationship	between	Mapuche	communities	and	state	actors	in	the	1950s,	and	shows	that	DASIN	created	a	unique	opportunity	to	insert	indigenous	questions	into	broader	narratives	of	economic	development.	
	
Forestry	and	the	Bernardo	Ñanco	Community	
																																																								611	Venancio	Coñuepán	correspondence	with	Juez	de	Indios,	Temuco,	Oct.	16,	21,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3895.		612	Chief	Counsel	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	Oct.	24,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3895.		613	Victor	Chaves	Dailhe	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Aup.	24,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3895.		614	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Nov.	24,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3897.		615	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Pitrufquén,	May	13,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4176.		
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Historian	Thomas	Klubock	has	shown	that	“the	spread	of	the	North	American	conifer	throughout	southern	Chile	was	largely	the	result	of	state-directed	development	programs	and	forestry	policy	before	1973.”	As	pine	plantations	penetrated	the	southern	landscape,	they	also	reshaped	a	complex	system	of	social	relations	in	the	rural	south,	and	although	indigenous	Mapuche	were	impacted	directly,	they	were	caught	up	in	the	transformation	along	with	other	sectors	of	society,	including	non-indigenous	migrant	laborers,	squatters	and	inquilinos	(resident	estate	laborers).	Collectively,	rural	peasants	viewed	the	incursions	of	the	state	and	private	landowners	as	part	of	a	broader	trend	of	injustice	that	had	displaced	and	dispossessed	them	since	the	nineteenth	century.616	Although	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	clearly	played	a	role	in	the	state’s	broader	development	strategy,	DASIN	was	positioned	to	check	injustice	against	indigenous	communities	as	the	forestry	industry	grew.	In	south-central	Chile,	forestry	was	a	particularly	important	industry	to	the	development	of	the	national	economy,	and	also	one	that	disproportionately	and	negatively	impacted	Mapuche	peasants.	From	the	perspective	of	the	state,	forestry	practices	were	conceived	as	questions	of	rational	scientific	exploitation,	industry	and	national	wealth.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	growth	of	privately	owned	tree	plantations	impacted	Mapuche	communities	by	detracting	from	their	native	cultural	and	material	uses	of	forests	as	natural	resources,	and	the	fact	that	the	land	on	which	timber	was	harvested	was	sometimes	owned	by	Mapuche	communities,	indigenous	concerns	and	questions	rarely	entered	the	discourse.	In	July	of	1953,	the	Chilean																																																									616	Klubock,	2014,	pp.	3-4.	
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Senate	and	Chamber	of	Deputies	undertook	a	legal	project	to	reform	forestry	laws.	In	the	ten-page	text	of	that	law,	indigenous	lands	and	cultural	impacts	are	not	mentioned	or	considered.617	Forestry	was	also	an	issue	that	prompted	collaboration	between	branches	of	the	Chilean	government	and	a	substantial	amount	of	international	cooperation	and	consultation.	The	Chilean	method	of	planting	fast-growing	trees	that	could	be	harvested	quickly	borrowed	heavily	from	a	North	American	model	of	industrial	agriculture.	Furthermore,	most	of	the	trees	that	were	planted	in	southern	Chile	were	Eucalyptus	or	Monterey	Pine,	species	that	consume	large	quantities	of	water	and	have	significant	impact	on	watersheds.	They	had	the	effect	of	drying	up	watersheds	used	by	Mapuche	farmers	and	other	native	species.	Those	effects	led	to	problems	with	erosion	and	forest	fires.	As	the	Chilean	state	promoted	that	model	of	industrial	development,	they	relied	heavily	on	consultants	from	the	north	and	cooperation	with	neighboring	countries.	For	example,	in	December	1952,	Argentine	officials	proposed	a	meeting	of	Chilean	and	Argentine	forestry	technicians	to	reach	an	“international	agreement	to	combat	forest	fires”	in	Patagonia.618	As	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Coñuepán’s	primary	role	was	to	determine	the	effectiveness	of	projects	in	developing	forests	as	national	wealth.	In	doing	so,	he	consulted	experts	like	agronomist	Jacques	Chonchol	to	determine	the	suitability	of	various	projects.	In	April	1953,	Chonchol	wrote	to	advise	that	establishing	a	farming	settlement	in	the	Malleco	Forest	Reserve	would	be	a	terrible																																																									617	Message	No.	2,	addressed	to	Senado	and	Cámara.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3900.		618	Carlos	del	Rio	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Dec.	12,	1952.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3741.		
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mistake.	First	of	all,	the	terrain	was	too	hilly	with	poor	soil,	suitable	only	for	trees,	he	explained.	Secondly,	neighboring	inquilinos	(some	of	whom	would	have	claimed	a	Mapuche	identity)	had	the	practice	of	using	the	reserve	for	collecting	piñones	and	firewood,	and	also	grazing	cattle	and	sheep	there.	The	reserve	was	also	part	of	the	Bío	Bío	watershed,	and	therefore	held	the	potential	to	disrupt	the	purity	of	water	downstream,	not	to	mention	that	it	was	isolated	from	markets	by	great	distance	and	poor	roads.619	In	instances	like	this,	even	though	the	impact	was	not	specifically	identified	as	one	that	affected	indígenas,	Coñuepán	was	in	a	position	to	protect	indigenous	interests	when	they	aligned	with	particular	projects.	As	Minister,	Coñuepán	found	his	authority	largely	sufficient	to	protect	the	interests	of	the	state.	In	January	of	1953	he	asked	the	Director	General	to	take	administrative	measures	to	stop	Don	Osvaldo	Jarpa	Bisquertt	from	unlawfully	harvesting	timber	from	state-owned	land	in	Hueñivales.	He	instructed	the	Director	General	to	contact	the	forestry	agent	in	the	region	to	intervene,	and	also	to	ask	the	Governor	of	Curacautín	to	use	public	force	if	necessary.	At	the	same	time	he	requested	an	appellate	court	in	Santiago	to	intervene	to	stop	the	illegal	logging.620	Two	weeks	later	the	Director	General	wrote	back	confirming	that	he	had	instructed	the	administrator	of	the	forestry	reserve	to	suspend	forestry	operations,	pending	the	outcome	of	the	legal	case.621	However,	as	Director	of	DASIN	he	no	longer	had	the	
																																																								619	Jacques	Chonchol	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Apr.	5,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro3886.		620	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Governor	of	Curacautín,	Jan.	6,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3883.		621	Carlos	del	Rio	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Jan.	23,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3884.		
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authority	of	a	member	of	the	president’s	cabinet,	which	made	protecting	the	interests	of	indígenas	more	difficult.	Even	though	his	overall	authority	had	diminished	in	the	transition	from	Minister	to	Director	of	DASIN,	Coñuepán	was	able	to	more	directly	advocate	for	indígenas	and	protect	their	interests	pertaining	to	a	broader	range	of	issues.	Companies	engaged	in	logging	on	indigenous	lands	often	sought	to	manipulate	the	terms	of	agreements	they	had	made	with	indigenous	communities,	sometimes	by	logging	more	land	than	they	had	contractually	agreed	to	or	by	felling	other	species	of	trees.	Coñuepán	used	DASIN	to	provide	a	check	on	that	tendency,	writing	to	remind	officials	“the	appointment	of	inspectors	and	regulations…is	the	exclusive	power	of	this	office.”622	The	case	of	the	Bernardo	Ñanco	community	provides	an	example	that	illustrates	the	power	and	limitations	of	Coñuepán’s	role	as	Director	of	DASIN,	and	some	of	the	strategies	he	employed	to	overcome	them.	In	1947,	the	Comunidad	Bernardo	Ñanco	signed	a	contract	with	the	Fresard	y	Viñuela	logging	company,	which	allowed	the	latter	to	harvest	old-growth	timber	on	the	community’s	land.623	However,	the	firm	soon	began	breaking	terms	in	the	contract	by	harvesting	species	that	they	were	not	supposed	to	and	exploiting	terrain	that	should	have	been	off-limits.	The	timber	firm’s	activities	created	ecological	problems	with	erosion	and	runoff,	and	the	firm	also	tried	to	get	away	with	paying	the	community	less	than	they	had	agreed	to	in	their	contract.	Although	the	troubles	began	while	Coñuepán	was	still	a	Deputy,	as	Minister	and	then	Director	of	DASIN	he																																																									622	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Pitrufquen,	Sep.	12,	1956.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4303.		623	Klubock,	2014,	p.	163.	
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was	able	to	insert	himself	into	the	conflict	more	directly.	In	addition,	Coñuepán	eventually	succeeded	in	implementing	new	protocols	for	the	awarding	of	forestry	contracts	on	indigenous	lands	by	instituting	a	public	bidding	process	and	requiring	the	approval	of	contracts	and	payment	of	monies	to	be	funneled	through	DASIN.		The	Ñanco	case	involved	a	broad	public	debate	about	the	exploitation	of	Mapuche	communities	and	preferential	awarding	of	contracts,	and	can	be	viewed	as	a	victory	for	Coñuepán	and	DASIN.	While	Coñuepán	was	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	his	Ministry	worked	through	the	courts	to	resolve	the	conflict.	In	November	of	1952,	Francisco	Javier	Fermandois,	working	as	an	attorney	for	the	Juzgado	de	Indios	of	Victoria,	wrote	a	brief	for	the	Director	General	of	the	Ministry,	outlining	the	intervention	of	the	Supreme	Court	and	a	committee	within	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	that	had	evaluated	the	case.	He	offered	assistance	and	collaboration	between	the	Juzgado	in	Victoria	and	the	Ministry	to	resolve	the	questions	pertaining	to	the	Fresard-Ñanco	forestry	contract.624		After	DASIN	was	created,	a	special	investigative	committee	was	formed	to	help	settle	the	Fresard-Ñanco	dispute.	That	commission	met	with	representatives	from	both	sides	in	September	of	1953,	but	the	session	ended	abruptly	when	the	community	claimed	Fresard	y	Viñuela	was	out	of	compliance	with	their	contract.625	In	addition,	the	courts	held	up	payments	to	the	community.	In	January	of	1954,	Coñuepán	sent	nine	telegrams	to	the	Juez	de	Indios	in	Temuco,	requesting	that	2	
																																																								624	Francisco	Javier	Fermandois	to	Dir.	Gen,	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Nov.	22,	1952.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3740		625	Special	Commission	for	Indigenous	Affairs	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Oct.	6,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3894.		
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million	pesos	deposited	by	the	logging	company	be	dispersed	to	the	community.626	Those	efforts	illustrate	a	series	of	systemic	problems	inherent	to	the	process	of	developing	indigenous	lands	for	forestry.	Primarily,	those	difficulties	centered	around	the	role	of	the	Indian	Courts,	which	were	responsible	for	approving	contracts	and	also	receiving	and	dispersing	funds.	As	Director	of	DASIN,	Coñuepán	was	in	a	position	to	reform	the	procedure	due	to	the	agency’s	role	in	overseeing	the	courts.	He	tried	to	establish	a	more	transparent,	public	process	for	awarding	logging	contracts	on	indigenous	lands,	but	his	efforts	attracted	the	attention	of	the	regional	press	and	the	involvement	of	his	former	colleagues	in	the	Cámara.	Stemming	from	the	difficulties	made	apparent	through	the	Ñanco	case,	on	August	20,	1954,	Coñuepán	published	a	call	for	bids	in	El	
Mercurio,	the	nation’s	paper	of	record,	for	logging	on	a	number	of	indigenous	reducciones	in	the	province	of	Malleco,	including	the	Ñanco	reducción.	Then	on	the	26th	of	August,	a	commission	within	the	Cámara	de	Diputados	instructed	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	send	it	all	the	antecedent	documentation	associated	with	Coñuepán’s	solicitation.	They	claimed	there	were	a	number	of	problems	with	it,	including	the	fact	that	the	Ministry	of	Defense	had	not	been	consulted,	that	the	lands	in	question	were	covered	in	snow	and	therefore	impossible	to	survey	in	that	season,	and	finally	that	the	firm	of	Fresard	y	Viñuela	had	already	been	contracted	to	log	the	Ñanco	community’s	land,	a	contract	that	Coñuepán	
																																																								626	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Temuco,	Jan.	4,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4020.		
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himself	had	approved.627	On	August	31st,	El	Diario	Ilustrado	(a	conservative	Santiago	newspaper)	ran	a	story	detailing	Coñuepán’s	public	call	for	bids	and	the	congressional	commission	investigating	the	procedures.	The	author	challenged	the	validity	of	the	process.628	On	September	3rd	Coñuepán	forwarded	the	requested	documentation	to	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	and	requested	clarification	on	the	appropriate	next	steps	to	take.629		On	September	7th	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	Mario	Montero	Schmidt	wrote	to	the	legal	department	of	the	Ministry,	asking	if	he	had	the	power	to	intervene	in	logging	contracts	and	negate	the	contract.	They	responded	that	the	Ministry	did	not	have	special	powers	to	intervene	on	behalf	of	indigenous	communities,	only	on	public	lands.	However,	intervention	could	be	made	by	the	Juzgados	de	Indios,	but	only	in	the	normal	course	of	the	application	process,	which	took	place	under	their	jurisdiction.630	Curiously,	later	that	month	Coñuepán	requested	the	sum	of	$4,128	pesos	from	the	Juez	de	Indios	in	Temuco	to	pay	for	the	advertisement	he	had	run	soliciting	bids.631	The	case	reached	a	favorable	conclusion	for	Coñuepán	and	the	Ñanco	community	in	November	of	1954,	when	the	Juez	de	Indios	in	Temuco	ruled	that	Fresard	and	Viñuela	should	pay	an	increased	rate	per	unit	of	timber	to	the	Ñanco																																																									627	Ernesto	Araneda	Rocha	and	Manuel	Bart	Herrera	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Aug.	26,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4027.		628	News	clipping,	Diario	Illustrado,	Aug.	32	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4029.		629	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Sep.	3,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4027.		630	Chief	Council,	Land	and	Colonization	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Sep.	16,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4027.		631	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Temuco,	Sep.	23,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4027.		
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community.	In	his	summary	of	the	judge’s	ruling,	Minister	Montero	Schmidt	congratulated	Coñuepán,	whose	intervention	“has	come	to	put	a	final	end	to	a	whole	class	of	abuses,	giving	indígenas	a	protection	that	they	lacked	and	securing	their	well-being	for	the	future.	The	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs	has	attained	for	the	Indians	of	Ñanco,	the	use	of	five	million	pesos,	which	no	one	could	have	imagined.”632		Following	the	court’s	ruling,	one	of	the	bidders,	Honorio	Cortez	Orrego,	published	a	lengthy	letter	to	the	editor	in	El	Diario	Austral	(a	conservative	newspaper	in	Temuco)	claiming	that	the	court	had	unjustly	thrown	out	his	bid	and	accepted	a	lower	bid.633	However,	in	response	to	an	inquiry	by	the	Investigative	Commission	of	Indigenous	Affairs	in	the	Cámara	de	Diputados,	the	judge	explained	that	Cortez	had	attempted	to	“game	the	system”	by	bidding	just	a	few	centavos	higher	than	the	next	highest	bidder	as	a	closing	“discounted”	bid.	The	judge	also	credited	Coñuepán’s	new	strategy	of	advertising	and	implementing	an	“open	bid”	system	for	protecting	the	indigenous	landholders’	rights.634		Coñuepán’s	intervention	in	the	Ñanco	community’s	dispute	with	the	Fresard	and	Viñuela	logging	company	illustrates	the	existence	of	counter-currents	within	the	mechanisms	of	state.	Although	the	primary	goal	of	state	policy	was	to	expand	the	production	of	agricultural	commodities	and	thereby	increase	the	nation’s	wealth,	Coñuepán	used	DASIN	to	check	the	irresponsible	and	unjust	exploitation	of	
																																																								632	Eduardo	Iturra	Pacheco	to	Special	Commission	for	Indigenous	Affairs,	Nov.	5,	1954.		633	Honorio	Cortez	Orrego	to	El	Diario	Austral,	Sep.	6,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4029.		634	Eduardo	Iturra	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Sep.	30,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4029.		
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indigenous	property.	Although	he	was	successful	in	bringing	minor	changes	to	the	state’s	process	for	evaluating	and	approving	contracts	for	logging	on	indigenous	lands,	the	overall	expansion	of	the	forestry	industry	had	much	greater	and	far-reaching	effects	of	the	ecology	of	southern	Chile,	and	continues	to	impact	Mapuche	communities	today.	Since	the	return	to	democracy	in	1992,	the	Mapuche	movement	has	grown	in	strength	and	numbers,	and	opposition	to	forestry	companies	is	a	key	point	of	contention	within	the	movement.	In	particular,	Mapuche	activists	frequently	vandalize	or	destroy	forestry	trucks	and	other	equipment.	In	seeking	to	curb	that	activity,	the	state	has	controversially	applied	harsh	anti-terrorist	legislation	to	prosecute	Mapuche	activists,	and	routine	clashes	between	activists	and	Carabineros	have	led	to	several	deaths,	which	then	became	rallying	cries	for	indigenous	leaders	and	activists.	
	
	
Evaluating	DASIN	as	an	Indigenista	Project	In	the	first	and	last	decades	of	the	twentieth	century,	indigenista	and	Indian-led	efforts	to	valorize	and	promote	indigenous	culture	and	identity	dominated	discussions	surrounding	indigenous	populations,	but	in	the	middle	decades	the	discourse	was	primarily	about	economic	development	and	formal	political	participation.	The	Chilean	case	roughly	fits	that	pattern.	Although	cultural	promotion	was	a	lesser	element	of	indigenous	affairs	in	Chile	in	the	1950s,	it	was	a	feature	of	the	discourse.	For	example,	in	1955,	Minister	of	Education	Oscar	Herrera	Palacios	helped	the	Rector	of	the	University	of	Chile	evaluate	a	collection	of	indigenous	art	offered	for	sale	by	a	private	individual.	The	Minister	acted	as	a	
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middleman,	facilitating	an	evaluation	of	the	collection	by	Tomás	Lago,	Director	of	the	Museum	of	Popular	Art,	and	suggesting	to	the	Rector	that	the	university	acquire	the	collection.635		The	creation	of	DASIN	represented	an	attempt	to	institutionalize	the	protection	of	indigenous	interests	within	the	state.	As	that	agency’s	Director,	Coñuepán	continued	to	try	and	expand	that	institutional	protection	in	a	variety	of	ways.	Although	he	used	his	office	to	promote	Mapuche	culture	and	art,	unlike	Manuel	Aburto	who	pursued	an	agenda	of	cultural	preservation	as	an	end	unto	itself,	Coñuepán	tended	to	promote	the	commercialization	of	culture.	In	November	of	1953,	Coñuepán	requested	150,000	pesos	from	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	for	costs	associated	with	filming	and	recording	folklore	at	a	“large	Mapuche	gathering”	the	following	month.636	In	October	of	1954	Coñuepán	sent	a	press	release	to	sixteen	radio	stations	announcing	“the	Trio	Nahuelpangui,	composed	of	indigenous	guitarists	and	singers	from	Villarrica.”637		Six	months	after	the	creation	of	the	Dirección	de	Asuntos	Indígenas,	Coñuepán	formally	requested	5	million	pesos	for	the	creation	of	an	Indigenous	Institute.	The	Minister’s	response	is	not	recorded	in	the	archive,	but	Coñuepán’s	letter	suggests	that	he	anticipated	the	request	would	be	approved.	He	mentioned	a	personal	conversation	they	had	and	said	that	he	wanted	to	announce	the	creation	of	
																																																								635	Oscar	Herrera	Palacios	to	Jan	Gobez	Millas,	Feb.	10,	1955.		636	Venancio	Coñuepán,	weekly	report,	Nov.	28,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3897.		637	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	various	radios	stations,	Oct.	7,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4019.		
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the	Chilean	Indigenous	Institute	at	a	big	meeting	and	celebration	five	days	later.638	It	is	not	entirely	clear	what	the	goal	of	that	institution	was	to	be.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	Coñuepán	calls	it	an	“indigenous”	institute,	rather	than	an	“indigenista”	institute.	The	distinction	would	not	have	been	lost	on	him,	and	although	he	does	not	reference	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano	in	his	request,	Coñuepán	certainly	knew	that	the	creation	of	a	national	indigenista	organ	was	a	criterion	for	participation	in	the	III	because	it	was	established	as	such	at	the	1940	Patzcuaro	conference,	which	he	attended.	Coñuepán	tried	to	continue	formal	participation	in	the	transnational	indigenista	discourse,	but	his	efforts	were	frustrated.	In	June	of	1954,	Coñuepán	wrote	the	new	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	let	him	know	his	plans	for	forming	a	delegation	to	attend	the	third	III	Congress	in	La	Paz,	Bolivia	in	August	of	1954.	Coñuepán	noted	that	the	previous	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	had	authorized	the	trip	and	empowered	the	Director	of	DASIN	to	form	the	delegation.	He	went	on	to	propose	that	he,	in	addition	to	Esteban	Romero	or	José	Cayupi	as	indigenous	Diputados,	should	attend.	Alfredo	Lea	Plaza,	a	lawyer	and	Diputado,	and	two	Mapuche	professors	would	round	out	the	delegation.	In	closing,	he	indicated	that	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	would	cover	the	expenses	incurred.639	Three	days	later	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	wrote	directly	to	the	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	to	say	that	the	Chilean	delegation	would	have	to	decline	the	invitation	because	“consistent	with	the	cost-saving	policies	introduced	by	the																																																									638	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Dec.	7,	1953.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	3897.		639	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Jun.	11,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4024.		
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government,	all	types	of	commissions	would	be	suspended	for	the	current	year.”640	In	that	note,	the	author	referenced	four	previous	communications	he	had	received	from	the	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs.	Combined	with	Coñuepán’s	note	on	the	subject,	it	seems	that	many	parties	were	in	favor	of	attending	the	conference,	but	that	it	was	blocked	at	the	last	minute.	It	is	unclear	whether	the	reason	given	(austerity	measures)	were	valid	or	simply	an	excuse.	In	the	end,	a	group	of	IIC	members	did	attend	the	1954	La	Paz	Congreso,	but	apparently	without	the	support	of	the	state.641	Despite	Coñuepán’s	efforts	to	support	Mapuche	interests	through	cultural	means	and	international	collaborative	efforts,	the	primary	mechanism	by	which	he	could	most	directly	benefit	his	people	remained	the	Juzgados	de	Indios.	Consequently,	Coñuepán	focused	much	of	his	effort	as	Director	of	DASIN	to	the	work	of	overseeing	the	courts.	However,	the	Juzgados	had	existed	for	decades	and	so	the	bureaucratic	structure	within	which	they	operated	was	well	established	and	staffed	with	officials	who	were	not	necessarily	inclined	to	embrace	new	leadership	or	a	revised	mission.	Additionally,	the	courts	had	not	been	very	effective	in	protecting	indigenous	interests	and	agents	of	the	courts	often	contributed	to	problems	through	corruption,	ineffectiveness	and	pressure	brought	to	bear	upon	them	by	wealthy	landowners	in	the	rural	south.	It	is	not	surprising,	therefore,	that	Coñuepán	struggled	to	overcome	those	legacies	once	supervision	of	the	courts	was	transferred	to	DASIN’s	authority.	
																																																								640	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Foreign	Relations,	Jun.	14,	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4024.		641	“III	Inter-American	Indigenista	Congress,”	Boletín	Indigenista,	1954,	Vol.	14,	No.	3,	p.	201.	Representatives	included	historian	Álvaro	Jaro,	Mapuche	professor	Domingo	Curaqueo,	and	others.	
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In	many	instances,	official	decrees	were	missing,	incomplete	or	not	officially	recorded.	In	the	case	of	Fundo	Lumaco,	an	official	decree	was	recognized	as	valid	despite	the	original	copy	being	lost	and	a	facsimile	being	used	in	its	place.642	In	other	cases,	officials	in	the	Juzgados	de	Indios	were	uncooperative,	inefficient	or	incompetent.	In	July	of	1955,	Coñuepán	wrote	to	the	Juez	de	Indios	of	Pitrufquen	requesting	that	he	send	a	file	on	a	pending	case	that	had	either	been	lost	or	that	the	judge	was	delayed	in	sending.	Coñuepán	listed	four	complaints,	including	that	he	had	been	sent	only	one-fourth	of	the	file,	because	the	evidence	had	been	folded	in	half	and	much	of	it	was	missing.	That	was	apparently	not	his	first	request	for	the	missing	evidence.643	Other	times	official	documents	contradicted	one	another.	In	July	of	1955,	Coñuepán	wrote	to	the	Juez	de	Indios	in	Temuco	to	ask	for	background	information	to	help	him	reconcile	two	“certificates	of	settlement”	that	contradicted	one	another.	In	that	instance,	the	indígena	José	Miguel	Rapimán	was	trying	to	confirm	the	community	in	which	his	parents	had	been	settled	by	examining	the	original	títulos	de	merced,	upon	which	the	entire	system	of	radicación	was	based.644	After	decades	of	corruption	and	fraud,	DASIN	had	dozens	if	not	hundreds	of	cases	to	examine	and	try	to	resolve.	In	1958,	the	Chief	Counsel	of	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	wrote	to	Coñuepán	to	inform	him	that	he	was	recommending	a	twenty-year-old	claim	should	be	paid	to	the	communities	of	Antonio	Rapimán	and	José	Gineo	for	mining	operations	that	had	been	carried	out	on	their	land	by	the	state																																																									642	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Controller	General	of	Chile,	Jul.	12,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4178.		643	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Pitrufquén,	Jul.	11,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4178.		644	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Temuco,	Jul.	22,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4178.		
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railroad	department	since	1938.645	Delays,	inaccuracies	and	other	problems	with	official	documentation	upon	which	the	courts	based	their	decisions	represented	a	tremendous	barrier	to	their	effectiveness.	The	courts	were	also	put	to	more	nefarious	purposes	and	were	sometimes	used	to	harass	indígenas	who	had	little	understanding,	resources	or	time	to	defend	themselves	in	court.	In	September	1956,	Coñuepán	wrote	directly	to	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	ask	him	to	instruct	the	Juez	de	Indios	in	Pitrufquén	to	dismiss	a	case	in	which	an	Indian	was	being	harassed.646	Often,	indígenas	claimed	to	have	received	verbal	instructions	that	later	turned	out	to	be	false	or	misleading.	In	July	of	1955,	Coñuepán	wrote	to	the	Director	of	Internal	Taxation	to	say	that	José	Santos	Colillanca	Raipan	had	been	told	he	did	not	owe	any	taxes,	but	later	his	land	was	seized	for	failure	to	pay	taxes.	In	requesting	a	solution	to	this	particular	problem,	Coñuepán	refers	to	the	problem	as	“maltreatment,”	implying	that	it	was	intentional,	and	also	claimed	that	many	such	cases	existed.647	Coñuepán	later	requested	that	all	such	procedures	be	cleared	through	DASIN	so	that	he	and	his	staff	could	verify	that	the	seizures	were	valid.648	Those	actions	fit	the	longstanding	pattern	of	fraud	and	usurpation	whereby	white	settlers	in	the	region	attempted	to	defraud	indígenas	by	using	the	courts	and	government	officials	who	were	generally	unsympathetic	or	outright	corrupt.																																																									645	Chief	Counsel,	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	Mar.	18,	1958.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4520.		646	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	Sep.	6,	1956.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4303.		647	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Internal	Taxation,	Jul.	14,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4178.		648	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Dir.	Gen.	Internal	Taxation,	Jul.	23,	1955.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4178.		
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By	1958,	it	appears	that	Coñuepán’s	ability	to	effectively	manage	DASIN	and	oversee	the	Juzgados	had	declined.	In	two	separate	communications,	Chief	Counsel	for	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	wrote	directly	to	the	Minister,	complaining	first	that	vacancies	in	the	Juzgados	de	Indios	were	allowed	to	remain	open	or	filled	with	unqualified	personnel	and	requesting	that	the	Minister	appoint	qualified	people	to	fill	the	vacancies,	a	function	that	would	have	previously	been	attended	to	by	Coñuepán	himself.	649	In	his	second	message,	the	Chief	Counsel	took	aim	at	Coñuepán	directly,	asking	the	Minister	to	order	the	Director	to	visit	and	supervise	the	function	of	the	Juzgados	de	Indios	under	his	charge.650		In	November	of	1959,	after	Jorge	Alessandri	succeeded	Ibañez	as	President,	Coñuepán	was	still	using	his	platform	as	Director	of	DASIN	to	press	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	for	redress	of	indigenous	grievances.	Addressing	a	case	of	unjust	eviction	by	a	former	prosecutor	in	the	Juzgado	de	Indios,	he	noted	that	José	Cayupi,	the	former	Diputado,	had	carried	the	complaint	directly	to	the	President.651	In	a	separate	instance,	indígena	Clorindo	Ancavil	Manqueo	delivered	a	broad	indictment	of	indigenous	education	directly	to	the	new	President	of	the	Republic,	which	Coñuepán	relayed	to	the	Minister.	In	it,	Ancavil	claimed	that	resources	for	the	adequate	education	of	Mapuche	were	not	available	and	that	a	number	of	primary	school	teachers	had	begun	to	agitate	students	and	comuneros	for	“political	
																																																								649	Chief	Counsel,	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Apr.	3,	1958.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4520.		650	Chief	Counsel,	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Apr.	22,	1958.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4520.		651	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Nov.	20,	1959.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4618.		
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interests…provoking	confusion	and	unrest	among	the	rural	indigenous	population.”652	By	the	late	1950s,	Coñuepán	was	pushing	back	quite	strongly	against	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization	and	the	Alessandri	government	more	broadly.	In	December	of	1959,	he	wrote	to	the	Minister,	complaining	that	Decree	number	1051	of	October	2,	1959	lacked	a	clause	that	would	return	background	files	to	the	Juzgados	from	which	they	originated.	Instead,	files	would	be	kept	by	the	Ministry	in	Santiago,	making	it	very	difficult	for	the	Juzgados	to	function	efficiently	and	with	full	background	knowledge	of	the	disputes	they	were	adjudicating.653	The	loss	or	lack	of	antecedent	information	had	hampered	DASIN’s	and	the	Juzgados’	ability	to	resolve	old	cases	for	Coñuepán’s	entire	tenure	as	Director.654	Coñuepán	was	also	fighting	an	uphill	battle	against	the	Juez	de	Indios	in	Temuco,	Hugo	Figueroa	Figueroa.	On	December	19,	he	penned	two	messages,	the	first	to	Figueroa	directly,	nullifying	a	logging	contract	with	the	Comunidad	Huaiquillán,	which	he	had	the	power	to	do	as	Director	of	DASIN.655	The	second	missive,	sent	to	the	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	levied	a	series	of	charges	against	Figueroa,	ranging	from	the	arbitrary	administration	of	justice,	to	
																																																								652	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Nov.	20,	1959.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4618.		653	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Dec.	18,	1959.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4618.		654	Chief	Counsel,	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	to	Venancio	Coñuepán,	May	3.	1954.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4023.	By	way	of	example,	that	was	the	complaint	of	the	defense	attorney	in	the	land	claim	referenced	here.	655	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Juez	de	Indios,	Temuco,	Dec.	19,	1959.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4618.		
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deliberately	stalling	the	resolution	of	cases	in	his	court.656	Ultimately,	Coñuepán	was	successful	in	bringing	about	the	reorganization	of	the	Juzgado	de	Temuco,	but	it	did	not	reverse	the	decline	of	his	effectiveness	as	Director	of	DASIN.	In	the	same	letter	that	called	for	the	reorganization	of	the	Court,	Diputado	Jorge	Lavandero	called	for	Coñuepán’s	dismissal,	citing	his	“repeated	public	appeals,	including	before	the	Minister	of	Agriculture,	for	the	dismissal	of	the	Juez	de	Indios	of	Temuco.”657		Without	the	support	of	Carlos	Ibañez	behind	him,	Coñuepán’s	leadership	of	DASIN	became	less	impactful	during	the	Jorge	Alessandri	administration	that	commenced	in	November	1958.	As	the	three	sitting	Mapuche	deputies	had	lost	their	re-election	bids	in	the	same	year,	this	signaled	a	monumental	shift	in	the	leadership	of	the	Mapuche	movement	and	also	its	connection	to	state-level	power.	Chilean	historians	Augusto	Samaniego	and	Carlos	Ruiz	attribute	the	transition	to	the	fragmentation	of	the	movement	on	the	ground,	as	well	as	the	failure	of	Corporación’s	long-time	political	strategy.	“The	crisis	had	reached	the	heart	of	the	Corporación	Araucana,	marking	the	end	of	Mapuche-led	indigenismo	according	to	
partisan	logic	and	wingka	power”	(emphasis	in	original).658	Cońuepán	would	continue	to	lead	DASIN	until	he	was	appointed	to	the	Board	of	Directors	of	Chile’s	Banco	del	Estado	in	1961.	But	his	leadership	of	the	Mapuche	movement	was	eclipsed	by	a	new	generation	of	activists	in	the	1960s.	
																																																								656	Venancio	Coñuepán	to	Minister	of	Land	and	Colonization,	Dec.	19,	1959.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4618.		657	Jorge	Lavandero	to	Controller	Gen.	of	Chile,	Nov.	25,	1959.	ARNAD,	Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales,	Libro	4618.		658	Augusto	Samaniego	Mesías	and	Carlos	Ruiz	Rodríguez,	Mentalidades	y	políticas	wingka:	
Pueblo	mapuche,	entre	golpe	y	golpe	(De	Ibañez	a	Pinochet),	Madrid:	Consejo	Superior	de	Investigaciones	Científicas,	2007,	p.	250.	
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Summary		Unlike	indigenista	projects	in	other	countries,	DASIN	was	created	in	response	to	a	call	directly	from	Indians	and	indigenous	leaders	like	Coñuepán,	who	were	chosen	for	leadership	roles	within	the	agency.	In	contrast,	in	Lázaro	Cárdenas’s	Mexico,	the	official	organ	of	state-led	indigenismo	was	created	and	supervised	by	indigenistas,	not	indigenous	leaders.	In	Mexico,	that	agency	was	also	called	the	Office	of	Indigenous	Affairs	until	1949,	when	it	was	transferred	to	the	Ministry	of	Education	and	renamed	the	Instituto	Nacional	Indigenista	(INI).	One	of	the	INI’s	goals	was	to	cultivate	indígenas	as	citizens	and	therefore	it	directly	served	the	interests	of	the	state	as	well	as	Indians.	Although	housed	within	and	funded	by	the	Mexican	government,	the	INI	was	deeply	connected	to	the	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano.	As	the	Chilean	equivalent,	DASIN	remained	largely	an	organ	of	the	Chilean	state	and	relatively	disconnected	from	the	broader	Pan-American	discourse	of	the	mid-twentieth	century,	as	evidenced	by	the	government’s	refusal	to	recognize	or	fund	a	national	indigenista	institute,	officially	ratify	the	Patzcuaro	Convention,	or	even	support	delegations	in	attending	indigenista	conferences.	In	addition,	the	goals	of	DASIN	often	seemed	at	odds	with	the	goals	of	the	state,	for	example	the	checks	that	Coñuepán	placed	upon	unbridled	expansion	of	the	forestry	industry.		However,	despite	the	lack	of	formal	ties,	intellectual	connections	did	exist.	Through	the	world	of	ideas,	Mapuche	leaders	sought	to	improve	conditions	for	their	people	by	working	within	and	between	state	bureaucracies,	and	as	they	did	so	they	drew	from	a	range	of	ideas,	as	Coñuepán’s	leadership	illustrates.	Some	were	
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uniquely	Chilean,	to	be	sure,	but	others	came	from	his	knowledge	of	the	emerging	relationships	between	indigenous	peoples	and	other	modern	nation-states	in	the	twentieth	century.	Once	Coñuepán	became	an	employee	of	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Colonization	rather	than	the	Minister	in	charge,	he	was	required	to	request	resources	and	petition	for	action	from	the	Minister.	Although	the	goal	of	creating	DASIN	was	to	establish	an	office	dedicated	to	the	protection	of	indigenous	interests,	in	some	ways	his	dependency	upon	the	Minister	hampered	his	ability	to	assist	Mapuche	in	their	struggles.	Coñuepán	himself	was	marginalized	within	the	Ministry	and	more	and	more	of	his	work	was	rendered	ineffective	as	the	1950s	wore	on.		Under	Coñuepán’s	leadership	between	1953	and	1961,	DASIN	represents	a	uniquely	Chilean	form	of	institutionalized	indigenismo.	As	Director	of	DASIN,	Venancio	Coñuepán	achieved	a	measure	of	institutional	protection	for	indígenas	that	had	not	been	possible	before.	His	work	crossed	several	branches	of	the	Chilean	government	and	enabled	him	address	issues	like	taxation	and	credit,	legal	protections	for	indigenous	lands	and	development	efforts,	all	of	which	were	in	keeping	with	his	personal	philosophy	that	the	path	toward	equal	citizenship	for	Mapuches	lay	in	developing	their	economic	sustainability	and	prosperity.	Those	aims	were	also	consistent	with	the	indigenista	discourse	across	the	Americas	in	the	1950s.	Even	though	Coñuepán	and	DASIN	were	rarely	involved	directly	in	that	network,	their	work	can	be	viewed	as	an	indigenista	project	in	Chile.		
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Conclusion		After	1959,	the	access	that	indigenous	leaders	had	to	Chilean	state	channels	of	power	decreased.	In	the	1960s,	Jorge	Alessandri	and	his	successor	Eduardo	Frei	Montalva	(1964-1970)	undertook	agrarian	reform	efforts,	but	Mapuche	peasants	did	not	benefit	significantly	considering	the	modest	scale	and	pace	of	land	redistribution.	Frustration	with	those	programs	and	the	failure	of	conservative	alliances	to	produce	meaningful	change	led	the	next	generation	of	Mapuche	activists	to	align	with	the	left	wing	of	the	Chilean	political	spectrum.	Salvador	Allende	famously	signed	the	“Cautín	Pact”	with	left-leaning	Mapuche	leaders	during	his	unsuccessful	campaign	for	the	presidency	in	1964,	in	which	he	promised	to	support	and	protect	historical	rights	of	the	Mapuche	people.	DASIN	continued	to	exist	until	1972,	although	it	was	less	effective	without	Coñuepán	at	the	helm.	Following	his	election	to	the	presidency	in	1970,	Allende’s	government	passed	a	new	indigenous	law	that	created	the	Instituto	de	Desarollo	Indígena	(IDI	–	Institute	for	Indigenous	Development),	which	replaced	DASIN.	But	ultimately	Augusto	Pinochet’s	1973	coup	d’etat	and	ensuing	military	dictatorship	ushered	in	a	renewed	assault	upon	indigenous	lands	and	identity	that	continued	through	the	1970s,	until	the	eventual	return	to	democracy	in	1990.659	
																																																								659	For	a	comparative	overview	of	state	institutions	dedicated	to	indigenous	affairs	in	Chile,	see	Jorge	Iván	Vergara,	Rolf	Foerster	and	Hans	Gundermann,	“Instituciones	Mediadores,	Legislación	y	Movimiento	Indígena	de	DASIN	a	CONADI	(1953-1994),	Sciencias	Sociales	
Online,	Universidad	de	Viña	del	Mar,	Chile,	Vol.	1,	No.	1,	September	2004,	pp.	86-97.	
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The	marginalization	of	Mapuche	organizations	and	activists	in	the	late	twentieth	century	make	the	period	examined	here	all	the	more	remarkable.	Between	1920	and	1960,	Mapuche	leaders	created	a	vibrant	political	movement	that	carved	out	space	within	a	state	apparatus	that	was	overwhelmingly	stacked	against	them.	Despite	their	small	numbers	in	proportion	to	the	overall	population	of	the	country,	between	1924	and	1958	the	grassroots	infrastructure	of	Mapuche	organizations	supported	the	election	of	six	of	their	leaders	to	the	lower	house	of	the	Chilean	National	Congress.	In	addition,	Venancio	Coñuepán	secured	an	appointment	to	President	Ibañez’s	cabinet	and	convinced	him	to	create	DASIN.	With	his	own	appointment	as	Director,	Coñuepán	had	the	institutional	mandate	to	guide	and	supervise	the	administration	of	justice	for	Mapuche	through	the	Juzgados	de	Indios.	This	history	shows	that	the	connections	between	indigenistas	(traditionally	defined	as	non-indigenous	allies	of	indigenous	peoples)	and	indigenous	leaders	extended	to	the	very	beginning	of	Mapuche	organizations	in	the	early	twentieth	century.	But	shortly	after	the	founding	of	those	organizations,	Mapuche	leaders,	not	their	white	allies,	steered	the	movement	according	to	their	own	determinations	about	the	best	interests	of	their	people.	Their	decisions	led	them	toward	inconsistent	and	sometimes	unlikely	political	alliances.	Although	the	main	body	of	the	movement	trended	toward	conservative	allies	and	strategies,	especially	under	the	leadership	of	Coñuepán	and	the	dominance	of	the	Corporación,	each	time	political	space	opened	factions	within	the	movement	took	advantage	of	opportunities	across	the	political	spectrum.	Manuel	Aburto	courted	the	Communist	Party	in	the	late-1920s	and	early	1930s,	urban	youth	organizations	challenged	the	
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hegemony	of	Coñuepán	and	the	Corporación	during	the	Popular	Front	era	and	allies	of	the	working	class	began	to	support	Allende’s	socialist	revolution	after	1960.		In	order	to	understand	how	those	patterns	unfolded,	I	have	argued	that	we	must	observe	at	least	three	inter-related	discursive	fields.	Beginning	on	the	ground,	the	persistence	of	traditional	aspects	of	Mapuche	political	culture	must	be	understood	as	significant	to	the	way	indigenous	peasants	in	southern	Chile	selected	and	followed	their	leaders.	José	Ancan	has	shown	that	Coñuepán	combined	important	personal	qualities	of	lineage,	wealth	and	charisma	as	he	built	a	following	among	Indians,	brought	the	major	Mapuche	organizations	together	and	maintained	their	alliance,	and	convinced	them	that	he	could	function	effectively	as	a	go-between	with	elite	Chilean	society.	André	Menard	and	Jorge	Pavez	explained	that	Manuel	Aburto	accessed	long	traditions	of	alliance	making	with	the	Chilean	state	to	cultivate	his	own	authority	and	also	to	choose	political	allies.	With	that	mindset,	the	strength	of	his	friends	as	well	as	his	adversaries	reflected	upon	Aburto’s	own	power,	explaining	in	part	why	he	would	have	supported	Ibañez	after	being	persecuted	by	him	during	his	first	presidency.		The	political	context	of	Chile,	both	at	the	regional	and	national	levels,	represents	a	second	field.	In	some	ways	it	was	obvious	that	Mapuche	leaders	would	ally	with	conservative	parties	because	those	factions	held	more	sway	in	the	rural	southern	part	of	the	country,	as	Corporación	leader	Carlos	Huentequeo	explained.	In	addition,	the	educational	and	material	support	provided	by	religious	leaders	in	the	region,	both	the	Anglican	Carlos	Sadleir	and	the	Catholic	Guido	Beck,	conditioned	some	Mapuche	leaders	and	their	followers	to	prefer	conservative	political	views	and	
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eschew	communist	and	socialist	principles	that	cast	religious	belief	and	distinct	cultural	identities	as	obstructions	to	the	unity	of	the	working	classes	and	the	process	of	proletarianization.	Within	the	Mapuche	movement,	tension	existed	between	the	preservation	of	cultural	traditions	and	the	very	real	and	immediate	material	needs	of	the	people.		Cultural	traditions	were	indeed	important	and	valuable	political	tools,	but	leaders	within	the	main	thrust	of	the	Mapuche	movement	concentrated	their	efforts	on	fulfilling	the	material	needs	of	their	constituents.	The	ever-present	specter	of	dispossession	from	rightful	land	and	territory	haunted	Mapuche	peasants	in	their	everyday	lives	and	pervaded	every	layer	of	the	political	discourse.	The	fact	that	land	loss	was	accompanied	by	violence	and	fraud	contributed	to	the	weight	and	significance	of	the	conjoined	themes	of	land,	dispossession	and	injustice	that	remained	central	to	the	movement.	The	combination	of	a	growing	population	and	shrinking	base	of	land	on	which	to	support	the	people	contributed	to	consistent	rural-urban	migration	throughout	the	period,	which	is	responsible	for	other	facets	of	the	history	we	observe.		At	times,	urban	Mapuche	populations	and	organizations	threatened	to	fracture	the	cohesiveness	of	the	movement.	We	saw	this	in	1936,	when	Aburto	broke	with	the	Communist	Party	over	their	support	of	urban	organizations	that	began	hosting	large	“congresos”	that	he	perceived	as	threatening	the	centrality	of	his	own	annual	gatherings.	Then	again	in	1938,	the	Frente	Único	de	la	Araucanía	formed	at	the	same	time	the	Corporación	consolidated	the	three	major	organizations	based	in	the	south.	The	rural-urban	divide	also	helps	to	explain	the	
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limited	influence	of	Lipschütz	and	the	other	indigenistas	working	in	Santiago	on	the	Mapuche	movement	that	was	based	in	the	south,	and	it	likely	contributed	to	the	generational	shift	that	took	place	around	1960,	as	more	and	more	indigenous	youth	were	forced	to	leave	their	communities	in	search	of	work	in	the	capital	and	other	cities.	 The	national	political	landscape	of	Chile	clearly	influenced	the	shape	and	direction	of	the	Mapuche	movement.	Throughout	the	period,	state	policies	prioritized	economic	development	over	more	integrated	efforts	that	were	observed	in	Mexico,	and	which	the	transnational	indigenista	movement	promoted.	While	national	priorities	were	formulated	from	a	set	of	options	articulated	through	transnational	discourses,	in	the	case	of	Chile	in	the	mid-twentieth	century,	the	United	States’	focus	on	anti-communism	and	the	promotion	of	free-market	capitalism	overshadowed	the	discourse	of	social	science	technocracy.	The	state’s	emphasis	on	forestry	as	a	vehicle	for	enhancing	the	nation’s	productive	capacity	grew	out	of	that	discourse,	while	the	broad-based	indigenismo	supported	by	the	state	in	Mexico	(in	the	1930s,	at	least)	never	took	hold	as	a	priority	for	the	Chilean	state.	So	while	ideas	circulating	through	that	third	transnational	discursive	field	were	important	to	the	Mapuche	movement	and	the	Chilean	state,	the	indigenista	discourse	was	overshadowed	by	the	free	market	discourse	in	southern	Chile.		That	is	not	to	say	that	transnational	indigenismo	had	no	effect	on	leaders	within	the	Mapuche	movement	or	state	support	of	their	efforts.	On	the	contrary,	this	history	shows	that	indigenismo	provided	a	powerful	lens	through	which	to	view	the	reality	of	indigenous	populations	in	Chile,	and	from	which	solutions	to	their	
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problems	could	be	formulated.	But	indigenismo	functioned	more	like	a	menu	of	options	from	which	Mapuche	leaders	and	state	actors	could	choose,	rather	than	a	formula	to	be	implemented	wholesale.	For	example,	DASIN	was	clearly	the	Chilean	equivalent	of	state	agencies	in	other	countries,	like	the	U.S.	Bureau	of	Indian	Affairs	or	the	Mexican	INI.	But	the	function	and	purpose	of	the	agency	was	conditioned	by	the	needs	of	indigenous	people	living	in	southern	Chile	and	the	priorities	of	the	state.	Although	it	would	be	over-simplified	to	say	that	Coñuepán	and	Ibañez	determined	its	structure	and	function	directly,	it	is	not	inaccurate	to	view	those	leaders	as	representatives	of	larger	coalitions,	who	negotiated	the	terms	by	which	Mapuche	could	and	would	interact	with	and	through	the	state.		Indigenismo	also	served	to	connect	individuals	grappling	with	similar	questions	in	very	different	contexts.	White	Chileans	and	indigenous	Chileans	were	brought	together	through	the	founding	of	Mapuche	organizations.	Indigenistas	connected	with	one	another	across	great	distances,	as	this	letter	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz	from	the	British	biochemist,	historian	and	sinologist	Joseph	Needham	shows.		“Although	you	were	so	kind	as	to	say	that	I	need	not	answer	your	letter	of	the	31st	of	March,	I	cannot	forbear	from	doing	so,	since	it	was	the	kind	of	letter	which	does	more	good	than	you	can	imagine	to	one	who	“plows	a	rather	lonely	furrow”	–	at	any	rate	in	his	immediate	environment.	I	know	that	very	many	throughout	the	world	appreciate	my	work,	but	I	suffer	a	good	deal	because	there	is	no	recognition	of	the	fact	that	I	have	metamorphosed	from	a	biochemist	into	an	orientalist	and	historian	of	science,	so	that	I	have	to	carry	a	particularly	heavy	burden	in	performing	all	the	duties	of	my	nominal	post.	Another	thing	which	touches	me	very	much	was	your	realization	that	it	is	possible	to	fall	in	love	with	a	civilization,	of	course	to	begin	with	through	personal	friendships	with	many	people	of	that	race	and	civilization.	We	cannot	deal	any	longer	with	them	except	on	a	basis	of	absolute	equality...”660																																																										660	Joseph	Needham,	to	Alejandro	Lipschütz,	Apr.	1955.	CAL,	Caja	6372.	
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For	individuals	working	within	each	of	those	fields,	their	labors	were	a	little	less	isolated	as	a	result	of	their	connections	to	the	indigenista	discourse.	But	perhaps	most	significantly,	Mapuche	leaders	were	able	to	access	circuits	of	power,	knowledge	and	authority	through	indigenismo,	as	when	Arturo	Huenchullán	left	Chile	to	study	in	the	United	States,	or	when	Coñuepán	attended	the	Patzcuaro	Conference.	Finally,	Venancio	Coñuepán’s	life	and	career	illustrate	significant	crossover	and	bleed-through	between	the	categories	of	indigenista	and	Indian,	as	well	as	the	fluidity	of	the	three	discursive	fields.	As	an	“indigenous	indigenista,”	Coñuepán	carved	out	space	within	the	bureaucracy	of	the	state	to	provide	a	check	on	the	unbridled	free-market	takeover	of	southern	property.	DASIN	functioned	to	push	back	against	the	broader	goals	of	the	ministry	in	which	it	was	located	in	defense	of	indigenous	Chileans.	In	that	way	it	functioned	very	similarly	to	the	overall	indigenista	discourse,	which	checked	the	unbridled	advance	of	western	social,	political	and	economic	systems.	While	Chilean	indigenismo	did	not	effectively	tackle	as	broad	a	range	of	issues	as	national	efforts	in	other	contexts	did,	it	took	on	the	ones	that	mattered	most	to	the	Mapuche:	land,	legal	rights	and	material	opportunities.	Thus	we	see	that	while	direct	ties	to	transnational	indigenismo	were	relatively	weak,	their	impact	was	considerable.	As	with	any	transnational	discourse,	the	implementation	of	ideas	was	filtered	through	concentric	rings	of	competing	interests	and	unequal	power.	
	
	
	285	
	
		
Bibliography	
	
Archival	Collections	
	
Archivo	Diócesis	de	Villarrica	–	(ADV)	
	
Archivo	Museo	Municipal	de	Loncoche	–	(AMML)		
	
Archivo	Regional	de	la	Araucanía	–	(ARA)		
	
Archivo	Nacional	de	la	Administración	–	(ARNAD)		 Ministerio	de	Educación	Ministerio	del	Interior		 Ministerio	de	Bienes	Nacionales	
	
Biblioteca	del	Congreso	Nacional	de	Chile	–	(BCN)	
	
Collección	Alejandro	Lipschütz	–	(CAL)		
	
Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano	–	(III)	
	
		
Secondary	Literature	
	Adams,	Abigail	E.	“Antonio	Goubaud	Carrera:	Between	the	Contradictions	of	the	Generación	de	1920	and	US	Anthropology.”	in	After	the	Coup:	An	
Ethnographic	Reframing	of	Guatemala	1954,	Tim	Smith	and	Abigail	Adams,	eds.	Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2011.	pp.	17-48.		Albó,	Xavier.	“Andean	People	in	the	Twentieth	Century.”	in	The	Cambridge	History	of	
the	Native	Peoples	of	the	Americas.	Edited	by	Frank	Salomon	and	Stuart	B.	Schwartz.	Cambridge,	England:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999.		Ancan	Jara,	José.	“Venancio	Coñuepán:	Ñizol	Longko,	Líder	Regional,	Hombre	de	Estado:	Resplandor	y	eclipse	de	la	Corporación	Araucana	en	medio	siglo	de	organización	indígena	en	el	sur	de	Chile,	1938-1968,”	in	Intelectuales	
Indígenas	Piensan	América	Latina,	Claudia	Zapata	Silva,	ed.	Quito:	Ediciones	Abya-Yala,	2007,	pp.	202-229.		Appelbaum,	Nancy	P.,	Anne	S.	Macpherson	and	Karin	Alejandra	Rosemblatt.	Race	
and	Nation	in	Modern	Latin	America.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2003.	
	286	
	
	Augusta,	Félix	José	de.	Gramática	Araucana,	Valdivia:	Imprenta	Central	J.	Lampert,	1903.		Bacigalupo,	Ana	Mariella.	Shamans	of	the	Foye	Tree:	Gender,	Power,	and	Healing	
among	Chilean	Mapuche.	Austin:	University	of	Texas	Press,	2007.		Barr-Melej,	Patrick.	Reforming	Chile:	Cultural	Politics,	Nationalism	and	the	Rise	of	the	
Middle	Classes.	Chapel	Hill,	NC:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2001.		Bengoa,	José.	Historia	de	un	Conflicto:	El	estado	y	los	mapuches	en	el	siglo	XX.	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Planeta,	1999.		_____.	Historia	del	Pueblo	Mapuche:	Siglo	XIX	y	XX.	Santiago,	Chile:	Ediciones	Sur,	1985.		Berdichewsky,	Bernardo.	Alejandro	Lipschütz:	Su	Visión	Indigenista	y	Antroplógica	Santiago:	Ediciones	UCSH,	2004.		Bethell,	Leslie,	ed.	Chile	Since	Independence,	Cambridge	UK:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1993.		Boas,	Franz.	Race,	Language	and	Culture.	New	York:	Macmillan,	1940.		Brading,	David.	“Manuel	Gamio	and	Official	Indigenismo	in	Mexico.”	Bulletin	of	Latin	
American	Research.	Vol.	7,	No.	1.	1998,	pp.	75-89.		Céspedes,	Mario	and	Lelia	Garreaud.	Gran	Diccionario	de	Chile	(Biográfico-Cultural),	2nd	ed.	Santiago,	Chile:	CMA,	1988.		Craib,	Raymond.	The	Cry	of	the	Renegade:	Politics	and	Poetry	in	Interwar	Chile.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2016.		Collier,	Simon	and	William	F.	Sater,	A	History	of	Chile,	1808-1994.	Cambridge,	UK:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996.		Constable,	Pamela	and	Arturo	Valenzuela.	A	Nation	of	Enemies:	Chile	Under	Pinochet.	New	York:	Norton,	1993.		Course,	Magnus.	Becoming	Mapuche:	Person	and	Ritual	in	Indigenous	Chile.	Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2011.		Crow,	Joanna.	“Debates	about	Ethnicity,	Class	and	Nation	in	Allende’s	Chile	(1970-1973).”	Bulletin	of	Latin	American	Research.	Vol.	26,	No.	3.	2007,	pp.	319-338.		
	287	
	
_____.	The	Mapuche	in	Modern	Chile:	A	Cultural	History,	Gainesville:	University	of	Florida	Press,	2013.		_____.	“Negotiating	Inclusion	in	the	Nation:	Mapuche	Intellectuals	and	the	Chilean	State.”	Latin	American	and	Caribbean	Ethnic	Studies.	Vol.	5,	No.	2,	July	2010,	131-152.		Danner,	Mark.	The	Massacre	at	El	Mozote:	A	Parable	of	the	Cold	War.	New	York:	Vintage	Books,	1994.		Dawson,	Alexander.	“Histories	and	Memories	of	the	Indian	Boarding	Schools	in	Mexico,	Canada,	and	the	United	States.”	Latin	American	Perspectives.	Issue	186,	Vol.	39,	No.	5.	September	2012,	pp.	80-99.		
_____.	Indian	and	Nation	in	Revolutionary	Mexico.	Tucson,	AZ:	University	of	Arizona	Press,	2004.		De	la	Cadena,	Marisol.	“From	Race	to	Class:	Insurgent	Intellectuals	de	provincia	in	Peru,	1910-1970.”	In	Shining	and	Other	Paths:	War	and	Society	in	Peru,	1980-
1995.	Steve	J.	Stern,	ed.	Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	1998,	pp.	22-59.		
_____.	Indigenous	Mestizos:	The	Politics	of	Race	and	Culture	in	Cuzco,	Peru,	1919-1991.	Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	2000.	
	Earle,	Rebecca.	The	Return	of	the	Native:	Indians	and	Myth-Making	in	Spanish	
America,	1810-1930.	Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	2007.		“El	Primer	Congreso	Indigenista	Interamericano.”	Boletín	Bibliográfico	de	
Antropología	Americana	(1937-1948).	Vol.	4,	No.	1.	Enero-Abril	1940,	pp.	1-36.	
		Foerster,	Rolf	and	Sonia	Montecino.	Organizaciones,	Lideres	y	Contiendas	Mapuches	
(1900-1970).	Santiago	de	Chile:	Ediciones	CEM,	1988.		Gamio,	Manuel.	“Static	and	Dynamic	Values	of	the	Indigenous	Past	of	America.”	The	
Spanish	American	Historical	Review.	Vol.	23,	No.	3.	Aug.	1943,	pp.	392-392.		Giraudo,	Laura.	“Neither	‘Scientific’	nor	‘Colonialist.’”	Latin	American	Perspectives,	Issue	186,	Vol.	39,	No.	5.	September	2012.	pp.	12-32.		Giraudo,	Laura	and	Stephen	E.	Lewis.	“Pan-American	Indigenismo	(1940-1970):	New	Approaches	to	an	Ongoing	Debate.”	Latin	American	Perspectives.	Issue	186,	Vol.	39,	No.	5.	September	2012.	pp.	3-11.		Giraudo,	Laura	and	Juan	Martín-Sánchez.	“’Soy	Indígena	e	indigenista’:	Repensando	el	indigenismo	desde	la	participación	de	algunos,	no	tan	pocos,	indígenas.”	In	
	288	
	
Protaganismo	Ameríndio	de	Ontem	e	Hoje.	Maria	Cristina	dos	Santos	and	Guilherme	Galhegos	Filippe,	eds.	Brazil:	Paco	Editorial,	2016.	pp.	257-294.		Gotkowitz,	Laura.	A	Revolution	for	our	Rights:	Indigenous	Struggles	for	Land	and	
Justice	in	Bolivia,	1880-1952.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2007.		Gootenberg,	Paul.	Imagining	Development:	Economic	Ideas	in	Peru’s	“Fictitious	
Prosperity”	of	Guano,	1840-1880.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1993.		Gould,	Jeffrey.	To	Die	in	this	Way:	Nicaraguan	Indians	and	the	Myth	of	Mestizaje,	
1880-1965.	Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	1998.		Grandin,	Greg.	The	Last	Colonial	Massacre:	Latin	America	in	the	Cold	War.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2004.		Guardino,	Peter.	Peasants,	Politics,	and	the	Formation	of	Mexico’s	National	State:	
Guerrero,	1800-1857.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1996.		Heilman,	Jaymie	Patricia.	Before	the	Shining	Path:	Politics	in	Rural	Ayacucho,	1895-
1980.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2010.		Hutchison,	Elizabeth	Quay.	Labors	Appropriate	to	Their	Sex:	Gender,	Labor,	and	
Politics	in	Urban	Chile,	1900-1930.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2001.		James,	Daniel.	Resistance	and	Integration:	Peronism	and	the	Argentine	Working	Class,	
1946-1976.	Cambridge,	UK:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1988.		Jara,	Álvaro.	Legislación	Indigenista	de	Chile.	Mexico	City:	Ediciones	Especiales	del	III,	1956.		Joseph,	G.M.	and	Daniel	Nugent,	eds.	Everyday	Forms	of	State	Formation:	Revolution	
and	the	Negotiation	of	Rule	in	Modern	Mexico.	Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	1994.		Joseph,	Gilbert	M.	and	Daniela	Spenser,	eds.	In	From	the	Cold:	Latin	America’s	New	
Encounter	with	the	Cold	War.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2008.		Klubock,	Thomas	Miller.	Contested	Communities:	Class,	Gender,	and	Politics	in	Chile’s	
El	Teniente	Copper	Mine,	1904-1951.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	1998.			_____.	La	Frontera:	Forests	and	Ecological	Conflict	in	Chile’s	Frontier	Territory,	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2014.		_____.	“Nationalism,	Race,	and	the	Politics	of	Imperialism:	Workers	and	North	American	Capital	in	the	Chilean	Copper	Industry.”	in	Gilbert	Joseph,	ed.	
	289	
	
Reclaiming	the	Political	in	Latin	American	History:	Essays	from	the	North.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2001.	pp	231-267.		_____.	“Ránquil:	Violence	and	Peasant	Politics	on	Chile’s	Southern	Frontier.”	in	Greg	Grandin	and	Gil	Joseph,	eds.	A	Century	of	Revolution:	Insurgent	and	Counter-
Insurgent	Violence	During	Latin	America’s	Long	Cold	War.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010.		Larsen,	Brooke.	Trials	of	Nation	Making:	Liberalism,	Race,	and	Ethnicity	in	the	Andes,	
1810-1910.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004.		Lévi-Strauss,	Claude.	The	Savage	Mind,	London:	Weidenfeld	and	Nicholson,	1966.		Lewis,	Stephen	E.	“Myth	and	the	History	of	Chile’s	Araucanians.”	Radical	History	
Review.	Vol.	58,	1994.	pp.	112-141.		Lipschütz,	Alejandro.	El	Indoamericanismo	y	el	Problema	Racial	en	las	Américas.	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Nascimiento,	1944.		_____.	El	Problema	Racial	en	la	Conquista	de	América	y	el	Mestizaje.	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Andres	Bello,	1967.	
	
_____.	Indoamericanismo	y	Raza	India.	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Nascimiento,	1937.		_____.	La	Comunidad	Indígena	en	América	y	en	Chile:	Su	pasado	histórico	y	sus	
perspectivas,	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Universitaria,	1956.		
_____.	Los	Muros	Pintados	de	Bonampak:	Enseñanzos	sociológicos.	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Universitaria,	1971.		_____.	Marx	y	Lenin	en	la	América	Latina	y	los	Problemas	Indigenistas.	Havana:	Casa	de	las	Américas,	1974.		_____.	Perfil	de	Indoamérica	de	Nuestro	Tiempo,	Antología	1937-1962.	Santiago,	Chile:	Editorial	Andres	Bello,	1968.		Lipschütz,	Alejandro	and	Grete	Mostny.	Cuatro	conferencias	sobre	los	indios	
Fueginos.	Santiago,	Chile:	Revista	Geographica	de	Chile,	1950.		Loveman,	Brian.	Chile:	The	Legacy	of	Hispanic	Capitalism,	2nd	ed.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1988.		MacMillan,	Kurt	Thomas.	Hormonal	Bodies:	Sex,	Race	and	Constitutional	Medicine	in	
the	Iberian-American	World,	1900-1950.	Dissertation:	University	of	California,	Irvine,	2013.		
	290	
	
Mallon,	Florencia.	Courage	Tastes	of	Blood:	The	Mapuche	Community	of	Nicolás	Ailío	
and	the	Chilean	State,	1906-2001.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2005.		_____.	“Decolonizing	the	History	of	Allende’s	Chile:		The	Mapuche	and	the	Agrarian	Reform.”	Freedeman	Memorial	Lecture,	Friday	Nov.	11,	2011	5:00	pm,	Casadesus	Hall,	SUNY	Binghamton.		_____.	“’La	piedra	en	el	zapato:’	el	pueblo	mapuche	y	el	estado	chileno,	los	pueblos	indígenas	y	los	estados	en	América	Latina.”	in	Aproximaciones	a	la	cuestión	
mapuche	en	Chile:	Una	mirada	desde	la	historia	y	las	sciencias	sociales.	Claudio	Barrientos,	ed.	Santiago	de	Chile:	RIL	Editores,	2014.		_____.	Peasant	and	Nation:	The	Making	of	Postcolonial	Mexico	and	Peru.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1995.		Manquilef,	Manuel.	Comentarios	del	Pueblo	Araucano	(la	faz	social),	Santiago	de	Chile:	Imprenta	Cervantes,	1911.		_____.	Las	Tierras	del	Arauco,	Temuco:	Imprenta	Modernista,	1915.		Marimán,	Pablo.	“Coñuepán	en	el	Parlemento	de	1947:	argumentos	y	propuestas	de	la	Corporación	Araucana.”	Liwen,	vol.	5,	pp.	157-175.		Marimán,	Pablo,	Sergio	Caniuqueo,	José	Millalén	and	Rodrigo	Levil.	¡...Escucha,	
winka...!:	Cuatro	ensayos	de	Historia	Nacional	Mapuche	y	un	epílogo	sobre	el	
futuro.	Santiago	de	Chile:	LOM	Ediciones,	2006.		McAllister,	Carlota.	“Rural	Markets,	Revolutionary	Souls,	and	Rebellious	Women	in	Cold	War	Guatemala.”	in	In	From	the	Cold:	Latin	America’s	New	Encounter	
with	the	Cold	War.	Gilbert	M.	Joseph	and	Daniela	Spenser,	eds.	Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	2008.		Menard,	André,	“Estudio	Preliminar:	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef	y	los	archivos	de	la	Federación	Araucana.”	In	Manuel	Aburto	Panguilef,	Libro	Diario	del	
Presidente	de	la	Federación	Araucana,	1940,	1942,	1948-1951.	André	Menard,	ed.	Santiago,	Chile:	CoLibris,	2013.		Menard,	André	and	Jorge	Pavez.	“Documentos	de	la	Federación	Araucana	y	del	Comité	Ejecutivo	de	la	Araucanía	de	Chile:	Los	archivos	del	’29:	derroteros	y	derrota	de	la	F.A.”	Annales	de	Desclasificacion.	Vol.	1,	No.	1.	2005(a),	pp.	51-109.		_____.	“El	Congreso	Araucano:	Ley,	raza	y	escritura	en	la	política	mapuche.”	Política.	Vol.	44,	Autumn.	2005(b),	pp.	211-232.			
	291	
	
_____.	Mapuche	y	Anglicanos:	Vestigios	fotográficos	de	la	Misión	Araucana	de	Kepe,	1896-1908.	Ocho	Libros	Editores:	Santiago	de	Chile,	2007.		Nunn,	Frederick	N.	Chilean	Politics,	1920-1931:	The	Honorable	Mission	of	the	Armed	
Forces.	Albuquerque:	University	of	New	Mexico	Press,	1970.		Railaf,	Rafael,	et	al.	A	Desalambrar:	Historias	de	Mapuches	y	Chilenos	en	la	lucha	por	
la	tierra.	Santiago	de	Chile:	Editorial	Ayun,	2006.		Reuque	Paillalef,	Rosa	Isolde	and	Florencia	Mallon.	When	a	Flower	is	Reborn:	The	
Life	and	Times	of	a	Mapuche	Feminist.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2002.		Rosemblatt,	Karin	Alejandra.	Gendered	Compromises:	Political	Cultures	and	the	State	
in	Chile,	1920-1950.	Chapel	Hill,	NC:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2000.		_____.	“Modernization,	Dependency	and	the	Global	in	Mexican	Critiques	of	Anthropology”	Journal	of	Global	History.	Vol.	9,	No.	1.	March	2014,	pp.	94-121.		_____.	“Other	Americas:	Transnationalism,	Scholarship,	and	the	Culture	of	Poverty	in	Mexico	and	the	United	States.”	Hispanic	American	Historical	Review.	Vol.	89	(2009).		_____.	The	Science	and	Politics	of	Race	in	Mexico	and	the	United	States,	1910-1950.	Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2018.		_____.	“Sexuality	and	Bio-Power	in	Chile	and	Latin	America.”	Political	Power	and	
Social	Theory.	Vol.	15,	2002.		Samaniego	Mesías,	Augusto	and	Carlos	Ruiz	Rodríguez.	Mentalidades	y	políticas	
wingka:	Pueblo	mapuche,	entre	golpe	y	golpe	(De	Ibañez	a	Pinochet).	Madrid:	Consejo	Superior	de	Investigaciones	Científicas,	2007.		Schlesinger,	Stephen	C.	and	Stephen	Kinzer.	Bitter	Fruit:	The	Story	of	the	American	
Coup	in	Guatemala.	Boston:	Harvard	University	Press,	1999.		Stern,	Steven	J.	Battling	for	Hearts	and	Minds:	Memory	Struggles	in	Pinochet’s	Chile,	
1973-1988.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2006		_____.	Reckoning	with	Pinochet:	The	Memory	Question	in	Democratic	Chile,	1989-2006.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010.		_____.	Remembering	Pinochet’s	Chile:	On	the	Eve	of	London,	1998.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2004.		
	292	
	
Tinsman,	Heidi.	Partners	in	Conflict:	The	Politics	of	Gender,	Sexuality,	and	Labor	in	the	
Chilean	Agrarian	Reform,	1950-1973.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2002.		Ulianova,	Olga.	“Levantimiento	campesino	de	Lonquimay	y	la	Internacional	Comunista.”	Estudios	Publicos.	Santiago,	Chile	No.	89.	Summer	2003.			Vergara,	Jorge	Iván	and	Hans	Gundermann.	“Chile	y	El	Instituto	Indigenista	Interamericano,	1940-1993:	Una	Visión	de	Conjunto.”	Chungara,	Revista	de	
Antropología	Chilena.	2016.		Vergara,	Jorge	Iván,	Rolf	Foerster	and	Hans	Gundermann.	“Instituciones	Mediadores,	Legislación	y	Movimiento	Indígena	de	DASIN	a	CONADI	(1953-1994).	Sciencias	Sociales	Online,	Universidad	de	Viña	del	Mar,	Chile.	Vol.	1,	No.	1,	September	2004,	pp.	86-97.		Viotta	da	Costa,	Emilia.	“Experience	versus	Structure:	New	Tendencies	in	the	History	of	Labor	and	the	Working	Classes:	What	Do	We	Gain?	What	Do	We	Lose?”	
International	Labor	and	Working	Class	History.	No.	36,	Fall	1989.	pp.	3-24.		Winn,	Peter.	Weavers	of	Revolution:	The	Yarur	Workers	and	Chile’s	Road	to	Socialism.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1986.		Zarley,	Jesse.	“Settling	the	Mapuche	Question:	Concessionary	Colonization	in	Chile,	1900-1912.”	Undergraduate	Honors	Thesis.	University	of	Wisconsin,	Madison.		_____.	“Towards	a	Transandean	Mapuche	Politics:	Ritual	and	Power	in	Chile	and	Argentina,	1792-1834.”	PhD	Dissertation.	University	of	Maryland,	College	Park,	2017.			 	
	293	
	
	
	
Vita			 John	Stegeman	joined	the	PhD	program	in	the	History	Department	at	Syracuse	University	in	the	fall	of	2006.	Prior	to	that	he	completed	a	Master	of	Arts	in	World	History	at	the	State	University	of	New	York,	College	at	Brockport,	and	a	Bachelor	of	Arts	in	Anthropology	and	Economics	at	the	University	of	Colorado,	Boulder.	His	research	interests	center	around	the	history	of	indigenous	peoples	across	the	Americas,	and	particularly	ways	in	which	native	peoples	have	fought	for	their	place	in	conceptions	of	nation,	state	and	modernity.	In	addition	to	reading	and	writing	about	those	topics,	John	loves	teaching	and	is	currently	Head	of	Upper	School	at	Manlius	Pebble	Hill	School	in	Syracuse,	New	York.			
